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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the relationship between state-building and
ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq from 2003 to 2016 in the regional context
among Iraq’s core neighbours: Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The
purpose of this study is to examine how and why Iraq's neighbours engaged
in the process of state-building in Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime. Part
of this research’s significance lies in the fact that there is a lack of research
projects that examine Iraq’s state-building process in its regional dimension,
and of studies that address internal and external factors that shape security
policies in the Persian Gulf. The majority of previous studies so far have
addressed the state/nation-building process in Iraq as an internal issue
among Iraq’s different sectarian, ethnic, and political factions. However, this
study has found that the involvement of Iraq's neighbours in the ethno-
sectarian conflict has been an enduring part of the state-building process in
post-2003 Iraq. Furthermore, one of the central issues that this study has
demonstrated regarding the involvement of Iraq's neighbours is the constant
interaction of three main variables: security complex dynamics, ethno-
sectarian conflict, and the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq.
Based on the theoretical contribution of RSC, this research has found
that the engagement of Iraq’s neighbours in the state-building process and
ethno-sectarian conflict following the U.S. invasion of Iraq is rooted in the
RSC dynamics of Iraq with its neighbours in the region, on the one hand, and
among the neighbours themselves, on the other hand.
The engagement of Iraq's neighbours in the state-building process in
Iraq has been driven by both internal and external dimensions of the regional
security complex. Moreover, the thesis found that both Turkey and Iran have
built institutional bases for their leverage in post-2003 Iraq. Turkey through
the KRG and a part of the Arab Sunnis, and Iran through the Shi'a-centric
state and part of the Iraqi Kurds, have built institutional links with Iraq's
components. However, both Saudi Arabia and Syria lacked the capability to
build such institutional relations with post-2003 Iraq, and this has been a
main cause for their ineffective positions in the process of state-building in
Iraq after 2003.Thus, the ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq has been
a form of intervention by Iraq's neighbours in the state-building process.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1. Introduction
Following the U.S-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the role of Iraq’s
neighbours in Iraqi internal affairs has always been a problematic and
complicated issue, whether considered by the U.S or Iraqi officials. This subject
encompasses various issues, such as an apparent negligence on the U.S. side
prior to the invasion regarding the influence of Iraq’s neighbours, or a lack of
understanding of Iraq’s regional security interconnectedness and its dynamics
with its neighbours after the invasion. This is particularly in terms of the
ramifications of the occupation of Iraq within the context of the regional power
balance in the Persian Gulf on one hand, and ‘regional conflict complexes’ on
the other, in addition to the “persistent permeability” of the regional state
system, including Iraq and its neighbours (see Salloukh and Brynen, 2004, p.4).
Given its historical, economic, religious and demographical factors, Iraq is in a
very volatile position, whereby it has the potential to be a source of great
regional influence, with the possibility to either stabilise or destabilise the region
itself. Thus, having a number of regional middle powers in the region, such as
Iran, Turkey and Syria in a penetrated regional state system like the Persian
Gulf and the Levant, with a number of significantly less powerful states, such as
Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Syria (after 2011), can be extremely challenging
for a state-building process such as in post-2003 Iraq. As Buzan et al (1998,
p.11) point out, “most political and military threats travel more easily over short
distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity.” For
example, Iran and Syria's involvement in supporting Iraq's insurgent groups
directly after the U.S. invasion, such as Ba'athist and jihadist groups, has been
a hindrance to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)’s efforts and thereafter
the state-building process in Iraq.
It is vital to emphasise at this point that relations between Iraq and its
neighbours have long been a controversial matter since the creation of the Iraqi
state in 1921. The interaction between the Iraqi state and its neighbours was
often complicated and marked by mutual suspicion or even open hostility.
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During the rule of the Ba’ath regime, relations between Iraq and its neighbours
deteriorated even further, as Iraq began to pose a serious threat for its
neighbours. These threats then materialised in the form of bloody conflicts, such
as the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-1988 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The
volatile situation of the region and the threat posed by regional actors led to the
number of alliances formed in the region, such as the Iraq-Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) alliance which was mainly directed against Iran during the eight
years of the Iran-Iraq War, the Syria-Iran alliance against Iraq during the same
war, and the Gulf-Arab countries alliance against Iraq as a result of Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1991. However, after the U.S.-led invasion, the dynamics
of the relations between Iraq and its neighbours were reversed, whereby it was
now Iraq’s neighbours that represented a vital threat to the state-building
process of the new Iraqi state. Furthermore, the period after the U.S. invasion of
Iraq has witnessed various forms of intervention by Iraq’s neighbours in internal
Iraqi affairs. Consequently, these interventions have challenged the process of
rebuilding the Iraqi state in the aftermath of the invasion and shaped the ethnic
and sectarian conflict not only among Iraqi factions but also among Iraq's
neighbours in the region.
In this context, this study will focus on two essential stages of involvement
of regional powers in the process of state formation in post- 2003 Iraq. The first
stage is concerned with the regional dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflict prior
to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, whilst the
second stage includes the regional dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflicts after
the U.S. troops’ withdrawal from Iraq. Such a division into two stages also
reflects the fact that the involvement of regional powers and their mechanisms
in Iraq have differed from one country to another. Both Iran and Syria displayed
a strong tendency for interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs right after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, whereas other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
were less active in Iraq during the presence of the U.S. troops, yet became
more and more involved once the U.S. troops left Iraq. This latter period
witnessed the strong presence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the Iraqi political
scene. This is evident both through the Turkish relations with the Sunni Arab
anti-Maliki opposition, and a major shift in its relations with the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG).
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This study has employed the concept of the regional dimensions of ethno-
sectarian conflicts in Iraq with reference to the four major regional actors that
have been extensively linked with Iraq’s internal and external affairs: Iran, Syria,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The main reason for choosing these four countries is
because of their foreign policies, with all four of them being, to different extents,
middle powers in a penetrated regional system (see Ehteshami and
Hinnebusch, 1997). In addition to their strategic security links with Iraq within
the framework of the regional security complex, what will be addressed are
factors related to the existence of the common ethnic (such as the Kurds in
Turkey, Iran and Syria) and sectarian tensions among these four addressed
countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and even Turkey and Iran after the Arab
uprisings). The framework of regional security complex is based on a premise
that the security of each individual country in this region cannot be separated
from the security of other neighbouring countries (Buzan, 2003, p.190).
Meanwhile, due to the influence of the major regional powers, this region is
characterised by a number of cross-regional issues, including the presence of
transitional identities of Arabs, Turks and Kurds, the Sunni-Shi’a divide with its
far-reaching political consequences, and most importantly the complex system
of amity and enmity among countries in the region which is a source of various
political, ethno-religious and economic problems. Finally, this region’s salient
feature is the existence of ongoing conflicts, as well as diverse forms of
permeability of the regional state system, through local, regional, and
international interventions which have been paramount in putting the regional
and international relations of the region into a state of permanent tension.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relation between
the process of state-building in Iraq and the ethno-sectarian conflict, and the
role of Iraq's neighbours. This can be framed through the influence of regional
factors in the process of rebuilding the Iraqi state after 2003, by answering the
thesis’s main research question: how and why have Iraq’s neighbours (Iran,
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) engaged in the process of state-building in Iraq
after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime? This study will cover from 2003 and
until the end of 2016. All terms such as ‘after 2003’, ‘post-2003 Iraq’ and ‘post-
Saddam’ or ‘post-Ba'ath regime’ that have been used in this study refer to the
period from 2003 to 2016.
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The abovementioned question in the period of 2003-2016 can provide
cohesion to an investigation into understanding the relationship between three
important variables: the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq, Iraq's
neighbours, and regional dimensions of ethnic and sectarian conflict.
It can be argued that most of the political phenomena and case studies
regarding Middle East studies have not been examined in the regional context.
Regions have been ignored as analytical units in Middle East studies. As
Kaufman (1997, p. 201) observed, post-Cold War regional sub-systems have
become increasingly independent from global forces and have their own
ramifications on international relations. Researchers have paid much less
attention to the relation between the state-building process and ethno-sectarian
conflict in its regional context. Moreover, as Buzan and Wæver (2003, p.202)
point out, there has been a lack of actual research that looks for internal and
external factors which shape security policies in the Persian and Levant sub-
region. For the purpose of studying the regional dimensions of the ethno-
sectarian conflict in Iraq and its impact on the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq, the focus on a regional level as an analytical category is theoretically
appropriate and analytically interesting. Because of the clear interrelations
between the local state levels of analysis, on the one hand, and a regional level
of analysis on the other hand, Iraq has continuously been an active regional
agent in the Persian Gulf. As Marr (2004, p.185) reveals, Iraq has always been
part of several regions, such as the Arab world which at the same time includes
the Levant and the Persian Gulf, as well as having ethno-religious links with
countries outside the Arab world, such as Turkey and Iran. Having all these
regional faces with its neighbours has pushed Iraq into a persistent,
sophisticated position to differentiate itself from other regional powers. All this is
to say is that Iraq has long suffered from its geopolitical position alongside its
internal challenges, and its challenges for its neighbours have always been a
source of tension in the region.
1.1. Statement of hypothesis
Since the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921, the process of state-building
has been highly affected by three of Iraq’s main ethnic and religious identities:
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Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the three mentioned
dominating identities obtained a wider space and greater capacity for
maneuvering, whether inside, through their conflicts with each other, or outside
the frame of the state, through their cross-border ethnic and sectarian links with
Iraq’s neighbouring countries. It can be argued that the ethnic and religious
roles played by Iraq’s groups, inside and outside the state, have been a
challenge to the state-building process. As Ghassan Attiyah (cited in Haddad,
2011, p.12) argued, ethnic and sectarian relations have historically been a
persistent problem in Iraq, but after the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979,
become unmanageable. However, prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, particularly
until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the ethnic and sectarian issues were primarily
Iraq's internal concern, and had not been penetrated or instrumentalised by
Iraq's neighbours as a regional concern among regional powers. After the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq, both the state-building process and Iraq's ethnic and
sectarian conflict have become regional issues and at the same time shaped
regional security complex dynamics among Iraq's neighbours
There are two central arguments that this thesis points out for
understanding the relationship between regional dimensions of the ethnic and
religious conflict and the state-building process after the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq. In the first argument, I propose that the involvement of Iraq's neighbours
(Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) in the ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq has
been an enduring part of the state-building process in Iraq after regime change
in 2003. The second argument is linked to the first: the state-building process in
post-2003 Iraq has become part of the regional security complex dynamics of
Iraq's neighbours and is directly linked with cross-border ethno-sectarian
identities in the region.
Based on the abovementioned arguments, it can be argued that, at the
regional level, there are two fundamental factors that constitute major incentives
for Iraq’s neighbours’ involvement in Iraq’s internal affairs after regime change
in 2003. First, due to the existence of the regional security complex formation of
both the Persian Gulf and the Levant sub-complex regions, most of Iraq’s
neighbours are linked with Iraq through their internal, regional and international
security complex dynamics. The three security levels of the four of Iraq's
neighbours being addressed have interdepended substantially on one another
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within the region. In Buzan's words, these countries “cannot realistically be
considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991, p.190). Furthermore, the
relationship among Iraqi groups themselves on the one hand, and their links
with Iraq’s neighbours on the other hand, have created a powerful connection
between internal and external factors. These relations have historical, ethnic
and sectarian roots, whereby if one group considers its political and sectarian
rights as not being protected, they seek support from their external allies. This
has been a case for Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd after the U.S invasion of Iraq.
Second, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has unintentionally tilted the regional
balance of power in the region in favour of Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and even Syria. Due to the regional security interconnectedness of Iraq
with its neighbours, the main forces driving this shift were the ethnic and
sectarian factors. Consequently, the recent socio-political developments in Iraq
after 2003 have divided Iraq’s neighbours into opposing ethno-sectarian blocks
of rivals. This division subsequently has led to regular interference from Iran,
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Iraq’s domestic affairs. Moreover, the U.S.
presence in Iraq has posed a strategic threat for regional powers, particularly
those whose relationship with the U.S. is dictated by mutual distrust or even
enmity, such as Iran and Syria.
The regional balance of power has been relatively stable in the Persian
Gulf between Arab states and Iran. This situation continued in the region for
about eight decades, from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 until the
collapse of Iraq in 2003 (see Qablan, 2015, p. 5). The U.S. has played a major
role in protecting this balance; the international coalition against Saddam's
invasion to Kuwait in 1990 was part of ensuring the balance.
In addition, the permeability of the regional state structure in the region
has also been another factor which prompted Iraq's neighbours' engagement in
the process of state-building in Iraq. Iraq's neighbours viewed its social and
political links with Iraq's fractions as a source of security concerns. As Buzan
(1991, p. 100) pointed out, for the weak states most of the threats are internal
and will be portrayed in the context of national security threats. What makes this
circumstance viable in the region is the nature of Iraq's neighbours. As Ayoob
(1995, p.86) makes clear, those states “attempt to portray threats to their
regime as a threat to the state”. On the other hand, the historical failure of Iraqi
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state-building to create a unified Iraqi identity capable of gathering all Iraqi
factions as citizens has been another motivation regarding Iraq's neighbours'
interference. This situation has significantly weakened the Iraqi state and its
national institutions, whilst at the same time creating a platform for regional
powers’ meddling in Iraqi internal affairs after 2003.
Meanwhile, the abovementioned equation does not only stand in a narrow
scope of the ethnic and religious alignment among opposing parties. This is due
to the regional involvement in the ethno-sectarian strife in post-2003 Iraq having
complicated dimensions which go beyond local factors and cannot be examined
only through sectarian and ethnic narratives. To illustrate this point, take for
example Iran’s and Syria’s support of jihadist and Ba'athist groups in the period
right after the invasion of Iraq, or Turkey's economic and political cooperation
with the KRG. Yet, at the same time, the political calculus based on ethno-
sectarian motives has frequently been a part of Iraq’s neighbours' regional
policies, with Iraq often being their main target .
Both domestic and regional factors have existed intensely in the ethno-
sectarian conflicts in Iraq after 2003. However, this study will focus on the
regional dimension of the ethno-sectarian conflict as an essential factor highly
engaged in the process of state-building in Iraq, and becoming the crucial factor
for directing Iraqi internal and regional polices and reshaping the regional
balance of power. Meanwhile there are the local dynamics of the attitudes of the
ethnic and religious factions towards the state-building process in Iraq, which
have contributed to the vulnerability of this process. The state-building process
in Iraq after 2003 has primarily been linked with three internal dynamics among
Iraq’s divided factions, which could be framed as the following:
First, rebuilding the state essentially means the re-establishment of
political and constitutional institutions, yet this process is more complex and
sensitive in the case of Iraq. The rebuilding of any political, economic, judicial,
or social institutions in Iraq after 2003 means disrupting the existing equilibrium
between the ethnic and sectarian groups. To a degree, state-building may be
perceived as an existential threat to the other minority groups or the excluded
ethnic and religious groups. This view is not something new, and was
embedded in the Iraqi social fabric, since the Ba'ath regime had controlled by
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force. This had been the case in relation to both Shi'a and Kurd since the
creation of the Iraqi state.
Second, rebuilding state structures entailed the redistribution of political,
economic and social values, which, according to David Easton’s logic,
represents the “authoritative allocation of value” (Easton, 1965 p.50). Most
importantly, in the case of Iraq, these values are often framed in the ethno-
sectarian context. From the view of Iraq's identities, state-building redraws the
lines of hegemony amongst Iraq's local identities. Unfortunately this was the
case in 1921 when the British fashioned the Iraqi state (Osman, 2012). In Iraq,
the state was always more a source of hegemony for one sect/ethnicity over the
other excluded components than a source of security. For example, the British
model of the Sunni-centric state in 1921 led to the Sunni-Ba’ath domination. To
a degree, both Shi’a and Kurd were largely shut out of the state for more than
eight decades.
Third, the historical concern of possible imbalance created between
various identities in Iraqi society by the redistribution of political values, was the
key challenge which faced the U.S. in the process of state-building in Iraq.
Therefore, the factions have fought to strengthen their political (ethnic and
sectarian) roles, as illustrated during the process of writing of the new Iraqi
constitution and the constitutional referendum in October 2005.
The presented hypothesis (see figure 1) may be considered as
demonstrating the key factors contributing to the Iraq's neighbours' engagement
in the state-building process following the U.S invasion of Iraq.
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1.2. The application of the term state-building in this thesis
It can be argued that there is a kind of confusion in academic literature
over the terms “state-building” and “nation-building”. There are authors who
have used both terms interchangeably, while others use both terms with
different meanings (Scott, 2007, p.6). For example, the Rand Report on the
“nation-building” efforts of the U.S., United Nations, and European Union has
used the term nation-building; however, throughout the report the focus is on
the state rather than the nation (see Dobbins et al, 2003; 2005; 2007; 2008).
The same is true of Fukuyama; he uses the term “nation-building”. However,
acknowledging that the terms have different meanings, he claims that in the
language of politics the term ‘nation-building’ is used most commonly in a way
which in fact has the same meaning as state-building in academic literature
(see Fukuyama, 2004).
However, there are a number of authors that distinguish between these
two terms, such as Chesterman et al. 2004; Goldsmith 2007; and Ottaway
Figure (1) The regional dimensions of the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq
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1999. For instance, Goldsmith (2007, p.26) argued that nation-building is “the
establishment of a common national identity within a given geographical area,
based on shared language and culture”. This means that nation-building is more
about inventing a cultural identity which is mainly related to the specific territory
or state. However, most of what are called nation-building endeavours have
failed to build a national identity and mostly have ended up as failures. Ottaway
(1999, p.85) takes the argument a step further by arguing that the terms are not
synonyms and are even in conflict with each other; state-building aims to
develop democratic political systems, while nation-building attempts to engage
ethnic and nationalist groups within a state framework in order to prevent them
feeling excluded.
According to Ottaway, nation-building can be a challenging process for
multi-ethnic or multi-religious states, such as Iraq, in a way that might
undermine the state-building process. She has argued that “nation-building is
not necessarily a quagmire” and is the real task is not actually building a nation,
or imposing common identities on deeply divided societies, but to organise and
find a common ground for divided people to live under the state's umbrella
(Ottaway, 2002, p.2). Arguably, the concept of state-building has been used
more broadly, whether under the term of nation-building or as state-building,
than the concept of nation-building, especially in political science literature. The
term nation-building generally means promoting a nationalist sense within a
group of people, which is closer to the socialisation process rather than building
a state capacity, whereas state-building remains as an important requirement
for every nation-building process.
In American literature the term ‘state-building’ has been widely used under
the name ‘nation-building’ (Dobbins, 2003; Fukuyama, 2006; Rand Corporation,
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007; Carnegie Endowment, 2003). The concept refers to
the use of military force by the U.S. as a part of a broader attempt to accomplish
the political and economic reforms necessary for facilitating the transformation
of a society, together with the region it is positioned in, in the post-conflict
context (Dobbins et al, 2007, p. xvii). It can be said that the term ‘nation-
building’ used in American literature is highly misleading (see Tripp, 2004, p.
547), due to its consanguinity with the terms state-building and reconstruction,
sometimes used in the same context. Between 1920 and 1932 the British
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carried out both nation-building and state-building in Iraq. This process, besides
establishing a new political framework for the three remnants of Iraq inherited
from the Ottoman Empire (Basra, Baghdad and Mosul), also supported the
creation of a new Iraqi state by building constitutional and political institutions.
The employment of the term state-building in this thesis can be traced
back to Iraq’s de facto status as a post-war conflict state, going through the
state-building process since 2003. Based on this argument, almost all of the
political, economic, military and social activities which have occurred can be
counted as parts of an ongoing process of the rebuilding of the Iraqi state. The
CPA’s endeavours, and the conflict between Iraq’s parties after the invasion
whether ethnic, religious or political, can all be seen as part of the state-building
process in post-2003 Iraq. Meanwhile, the engagement of Iraq’s neighbours in
post-2003 Iraq has played a significant role in this process and cannot be
decoupled from their calculations of directing the form of the new Iraqi state, the
redistribution of power among Iraq’s parties, and the rebuilding of Iraq’s regional
role.
It can be argued that not every military operation aims to conduct steps
related to state-building. Pei and Kasper (2003, p. 1) have reported that there
should be a number of criteria clearly formulated as constituting the core of the
state-building process, such as the aim of changing the regime, the deployment
of troops on the ground, and the assistance of both civilian and military
resources in the formation of a new political administration of a given country. In
this regard, the Rand Report (Dobbins et al, 2003, p. xiii) adopted a different
definition of state-building, insofar as according to this report’s definition, each
nation-building process must indicate "the use of military force in the aftermath
of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation". It is
worth highlighting that according to both reports and their presented criteria, the
steps performed by the U.S. administration following the invasion of Iraq in 2003
can be considered as being a part of the state-building process.
This thesis understands the term state-building as a process whereby a
state that has been subjected to an intervention by an external force is then
being rebuilt by foreign powers, most often the U.S. and/or UN, through the
process of re-establishing political, economic, and social structures. In this
regard, it seems that Dobbins (2003, p. xiii) offers the most appropriate
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definition of these types of ‘state-building’ processes, since he defined state-
building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an
enduring transition to democracy”. This kind of state-building can be illustrated
with the example of post-war reconstructions of states such as Germany,
Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, as they all passed
through the stage of occupation followed by re-building processes. The
attention of this thesis lies with the overview of the political process following
2003 as period of state-building process, which has been penetrated by
regional actors, rather than with the events of democratisation or institution
building. It is worth explaining that, what is meant by the adoption of the term
“state building” in this thesis is to describe post-2003 Iraq as a new phase of the
state-building process in Iraq, in which Iraq's neighbours engagement in Iraq
have been mainly focused in that direction. Therefore the terms of state-building
and ethno-sectarian conflict in post 2003-Iraq can be used interchangeably in
this thesis. Thus, this study does not engage in analysing the concept of state-
building in depth, as it is with the case of development studies. The main focus
is to analyse regional dimensions of ethnic and sectarian conflict as a
dominating factor encompassing the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq.
1.3. Theoretical framework
The majority of scholars studying the international relations of the Middle
East have acknowledged the complexity of the theoretical framework that
defines intraregional relations. Therefore, it may be considered hardly plausible
to construct a model or formulate a theoretical approach encompassing the
whole variety and the nature of international relations in the Middle East. This
region, as Halliday (2005, p.14) has duly described, has been profoundly
affected by internal, regional and external armed conflicts, interventions of
western powers, the impact of oil, and ethno-religious tensions; hence, no
single theory can offer a complete analysis of the Middle East in this regard.
Notwithstanding this, there are several theoretical models of particular
relevance which have attempted to define the international relations of the
Middle East.
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One of the key problems with formulating any theoretical conceptualisation
of the relations between Iraq and its neighbours, and their development since
2003, revolves around the fact that a considerable portion of these relations
were shaped outside the traditionally delimited realm of foreign policy and
formal state institutions. Also, as Kamrava (2011, p.186) correctly argued, since
the 1980s the Persian Gulf region has been highly securitized, to a degree that
foreign and security policies are hardly separable. Therefore any analysis of
Iraq's neighbours’ involvement in state-building and thereafter ethnic and
sectarian conflict must take security factors into consideration. Meanwhile, an
active involvement of a significant number of non-state actors, including terrorist
and extremist groups, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, or League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hizbuallah
(KH, or the Hezbullah Brigades), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS or ISIS,
ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām) has been a salient feature of
these relations. It can, therefore, be argued that the factors mentioned have
increased the level of complexity of the socio-political developments in Iraq
since 2003, particularly regarding Iraq’s foreign policy and international relations
with other regional powers.
However, there are a number of scholars that have emphasised the
usefulness of applying certain theories in the context of the Middle East,
especially the theories of realism and constructivism. For example, Joseph Nye
(as cited in Fawcett, 2009, p. 6) describes realism as a very potent tool for an
investigation of the patterns of conflicts in the Middle East. However, most
theories related to international relations have failed to distinguish between the
nature of state relations in the Middle East and in Western states. The limited
suitability of these theories is according to Fawcett (2009) primarily due to their
inability to fully account for developments in the matrix of intraregional relations
of the Middle Eastern countries.
It is worth highlighting at this point that most of the literature discussing
ethno-sectarian conflicts in post-2003 Iraq has overlooked the examination of
these conflicts from the perspectives of international security theories. In this
regard, most studies have applied theories of nationalism, identity, communal
violence, and social identity. Nevertheless, whilst these theories may be able to
examine the historical and social dynamics of ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq,
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they fail however to provide comprehensive conclusions when used to analyse
the regional engagement of Iraq’s neighbours in post-2003 Iraq. This is mainly
due to the high level of complexity which characterises the regional dimension
of the ethno-sectarian strife in the new Iraq, which, in fact, often exceeds the
traditional framework of sectarian and ethnic dynamics.
In my view, to frame the engagement of Iraq’s neighbours in the process
of state-building in post-2003 Iraq, we should first understand the political
position of the Persian Gulf as a sub-regional security complex, in addition to
understanding the interplay between internal, regional and global factors that
have shaped regional security among Iraq's neighbours after the U.S. invasion
of Iraq. In this regard RSCT can offer a considerable ability to explain the
intensity of Iraq’s regional neighbours' (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Syria)
engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq.
1.3.1 The Persian Gulf as a sub-regional security complex
“Most states fear their neighbour more than distant powers; consequently, security
interdependence across international system as a whole is far from uniform.” (Buzan, 2008,
p.11).
The idea of the Regional Security Complex theory was initially developed
by Buzan, but has been further elaborated by Wæver, and now is a part of the
“Copenhagen School’s collective theoretical approach to security”. This theory
mainly is an attempt to bridge neo-realism and constructivism. The RSCT uses
the theory of international security as its platform, in which it has been
influenced by neo-classical realism and globalism. Thus, the RSCT is based on
three international security structures in the post-Cold War world: super power,
great power and regional power. Buzan divides the international security
complex into a group of complex, sub-complex and mini-complex regions.
Regarding the Middle East, the theory has divided regional security into
three sub-complex regions, the Gulf, Levant and Maghreb regions. In addition to
“insulator” countries, such as Turkey, which can be a part of a number of
regions, Buzan and Wæver (2033, p. 52) mention that Iraq belongs to both the
group Gulf sub-complex and the larger Middle East, or Iraq could be a member
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of both the Gulf and the Levant if these two sub-complex regions are seen as
separate RSCs. According to Buzan the concept of security level is not
applicable in regard to larger distances. Another point that is worth considering
in this thesis is that this theory devotes particular importance to the social
aspects of security which can be crucial regarding the regional dimension of
ethnic and sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 44,
484, 485).
Prior to the Cold War, regions as a key subject of international and
regional security studies had not been given much attention, especially in
regional and international studies. It was only after the Cold War and particularly
in the aftermath of 9/11 that the number of studies that consider the regional
dimensions as a major factor influencing security increased. However, the focus
and style of these studies have varied from one to another. On the other hand,
regional studies have helped to shift the primary focus of security studies from
the state and international organisations to regions and non-state actors,
including ethnic groups (Wolff, 2011, p.96).
It seems almost implausible to attempt to comprehend the complexity of
the process of rebuilding the Iraqi state after 2003 without understanding the
patterns of regional interference and foreign policies of countries that are linked
with sectarian and ethnic conflicts in Iraq. Simultaneously, the process of state-
building has caused new political repercussions in the region. An example of
such repercussions is the redistribution of power in the Persian Gulf, which
entails the deconstruction of the old geopolitical equilibrium and the forging of a
new power structure in the region; this process might give a fresh impetus to the
process of destabilisation of the regional security complex. The notion of the
regional implications of the Iraqi political turmoil is particularly relevant given the
bloody history of ethno-religions conflicts in the sub-complex region of the
Persian Gulf. Thus, it is possible to claim that the process of rebuilding the Iraqi
state after 2003 has represented not only an internal transformation of the Iraqi
socio-political structures, but, most importantly, it has symbolised a watershed
in the development of the regional security system. It is worth highlighting at this
point that Iraq was one of the major regional powers beside Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey in the regional milieu before the invasion of Kuwait. In order
to investigate how an internal conflict becomes an issue of regional security
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dynamics, it is important to adopt materials from the Regional Security Complex
Theory (RSCT). This is because the U.S. invasion of Iraq has affected the
regional security dynamics by creating real security issues in the Persian Gulf.
Thus, the invasion has been a significant security concern for Iran, Syria,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Buzan (2003, p.190) defined the “security complex as a group of states
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”,
whilst the relation between these units is represented by “durable patterns of
amity and enmity”. In this case the RSCT can explain the new structure of
regional security that has emerged in the region after the U.S.-led invasion in
2003, through addressing standard forms of a RSC among Iraq and its
neighbours including patterns of rivalry and alliance, and balance of power (see
Buzan and Wæver p.47).
In the context of Iraq's neighbours’ involvement with state-formation
(ethno-sectarian conflict) in post-2003 Iraq, the RSCT might play an important
role in analysing a type of relationship between regional actors within one
region on one side, and two sub complex regions on the other. According to
Buzan (2003, p.487), the Persian Gulf or “Gulf sub complex region”, comprises
Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. In this regard, Turkey has a
special status, and it is described by Buzan as an “insulator” state. The author
further highlights the existence of political, social and economic relationships
between the “Levant sub complex region” (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Israel) and the Gulf sub complex region. Due to the complexity of the issues
pertaining to regional security, each unit within the sub complex region is
intertwined with the others, but also in certain cases these units have strong
links across the sub complex region, as is the case for the relationship between
Syria and Iraq. Considering the position of Turkey and Syria in the RSCT, it is
important to explain the standing of these states in Buzan’s theory and the
reasons for including both countries in the theoretical framework of this study1.
1 The RSCT may have some limitations: for example, Turkey is not a member of the Gulf sub-
complex region, but rather it is marked as an “insulator country” which according to Buzan and
Waever can play a passive role (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.484-485). However, since 2002
Turkey has become very active in the Middle East and the RSCs that surround it. Thus, it will be
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hard to remove Turkey from both the Levant and Persian Gulf sub-complex regions. This is
especially relevant after Turkey’s foreign policy shift towards the Middle East, particularly
towards Arab Gulf countries, adhering to the notion of a zero-problem policy. The legacy of the
Ottoman Empire in the Persian region should also not be disregarded. The RSCT puts Syria in
the group of the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, there are a number of incentives for
Syria to play an active role in the ethno-sectarian turf war in Iraq: firstly, there was a strong
ideological link between the Syrian and the Iraqi Ba’ath regimes before 2003; secondly, the
alignment of Iran and Syria; thirdly, the collapse of the Ba'ath’s regime in Iraq after 2003, which
forced Syria to seek a new position in Shi’a-dominated Iraq; fourthly, Syria’s antagonism
towards the U.S., another factor governing Syria’s policies in the Persian region, particularly
given its long border with Iraq. Therefore, in this research, four of Iraq’s neighbours, namely
Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, are used in an analysis of the regional dimension of Iraq’s
political process focusing on the contribution of the ethnic and sectarian divide and its impact on
the failure of the U.S.-led process of rebuilding the Iraqi state after 2003. Another limitation
which might also confront this study is the position of the U.S. which is not a member of any
RSC in the region according to the RSCT. However, as Gause (2010, pp. 5, 6) pointed out, it
would be ''foolish'' to study the regional security in the Persian Gulf without including the U.S. as
a core member. Therefore, this study has paid a significant attention to the role played by the
U.S. whether prior to its withdrawal from Iraq, or after its withdrawal, as an active member
despite its changing involvement over time.
Map (1) The Middle Eastern Regeional Security Complex
(Buzan and waever, 2003, p. 189)
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The ‘Gulf sub-complex region’ began to be more pronounced on the
geopolitical map of the world after Britain’s withdrawal from the region in 1971.
The region is formed by the complex of a triangular enmity between Iran, Iraq
and Arab Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Despite
the considerable socio-political transformation of the region, its political map
preserved the same form until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This
invasion has overturned the political view in the region towards the ethnic and
sectarian cleavages as political realities, which has had a formidable impact on
the regional security policies. To an extent, this impact reconfigured the regional
powers’ political calculus in terms of their considering the ethno-sectarian divide
in the region as a major factor of the regional security. RSC can provide this
research with an explanation of the factors that are shaping security threats for
Iraq's neighbours on the one hand, and their involvement in the state-building
process and ethno-sectarian conflict after the breakdown of Iraq's Ba'ath regime
on the other hand.
One of the salient elements of the Gulf sub-complex region is therefore the
element of security, which is characterised by various transnational identities,
depending to a large degree on the regional ethnic and religious divisions, for
instance Arabs versus Jews versus Iranians, or the historically-rooted tension
between Arab and Turks which dates back to the era of World War 1, and last
but not least the Kurdish issue which affects several countries in the region (see
Gause, 2011, p.7). Furthermore, there is a religious rivalry between Shi’as and
Sunnis, Muslims and Jews, and in some countries, namely Egypt and Lebanon,
an animosity between Muslims and Christians. In this regard, different conflicts
relate to different countries within the region (Buzan and Waever, 2003). The
ethno-sectarian map after 2003 has become even more complex in terms of the
number of actors and the level of animosity between them. Thus, after the
withdrawal of U.S. forces, several regional powers, namely Turkey, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia, have exerted influence over Iraq’s domestic affairs, which was
seen by some as a demonstration of neo-Ottoman and neo-Persian regional
aspirations.
The question that remains open is, why did the state-building process
become an issue for Iraq's neighbours? The answer to this question lies in the
interconnected security of Iraq's regional neighbours with one another on the
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one hand and with Iraq on the other. For example, the issue of Kurdish identity
has been part of the security issue between Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, as
has been seen in the case of the movement of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) between Syria and Turkey from the 1980s, and even during the Syrian
crisis in the case of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) (see Cagaptay, 2011).
The RSC theory has drawn attention to four basic levels of analysis and
how these levels are interrelated. First, the patterns of security are deeply
connected internally through the extent by which one state is influenced by
other states or to which the state is perceived as weak or strong in its domestic
order, which means that this kind of security theorisation fears the particular
weakness of a state. The domestic level shows the vulnerabilities of Iraq's
neighbours, and their domestic motivations to interfere in Iraq, because ''the
specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has'' (Buzan
and Weaver, p. 52). This level applies to all of Iraq's neighbours addressed by
this study which have internal security dynamics with Iraq. Second are state-to-
state relations or relations between two or more states, for instance the pattern
of persistent amity and enmity between Iraq and its neighbours and among
Iraq’s neighbours at the same time Third, is the regional level, how the region is
connected with neighbouring regions; in the case of Iraq, which belongs to the
Gulf sub-complex region and Syria which belongs Levant sub-complex region.
The same is true of Iraq and Turkey or Turkey and Syria. Finally, the fourth level
acknowledges that the global powers role in the region, which is represented by
the interaction between the global and regional security structures. This can be
clearly noticed in the U.S.’s notable role in the region, or to a lesser extent the
roles of Russia and the European Union. Yet ultimately, regional factors do not
have to be always dominant, but they will always be operative (Buzan and
Weaver, p. 52).
The security complex does not only contain states but also nations or non-
state actors (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians) (Buzan, et.al, p.17). These four levels
together compose the security profile of a particular state (Buzan and Waever,
2003). This systematic matrix of RSCT can provide this study with a better
understanding of the degree to which the new Iraqi state has been affected by
regional powers. Simultaneously, the theory considers and addresses the
position of global powers and superpowers in the international order; thus for
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instance, it helps to explain the role of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf on one side,
and other regional actors’ response to the U.S. presence in the region on the
other side. Part of both Iranian and Syrian engagement in post-war Iraq can be
assessed in this context.
The fundamental structure in a security complex is constituted by the
pattern of cooperation and conflict which is formed by a diverse set of issues,
which are applicable in the case of regional involvement in Iraq after 2003, in
four levels, outlined below.
1.3.1.1. Long-standing Historical Links
The structures of Iraq's neighbours' security complexes are characterised
by a strong historical relationship between the region’s subjects, whether in
terms of common Arab national identity (Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia), shared
Islamic religious heritage between all countries, or the historical legacy of the
Ottoman Empire in the region. All these common features constitute a pattern of
amity. However, there are patterns of an opposite nature that stem from
traditional forms of rivalry and disputes, such as ethno-sectarian conflicts
between Shi’as and Sunnis, represented on a state level by the enmity between
Iran and Saudi Arabia (see Gause, 2011, p.7). For example, the majority of
Shi’as in Iraq view Saudi Arabia as the main culprit of the failure of the political
process in Iraq after 2003. They also believe that the majority of the foreign
fighters in Iraq have come from Saudi Arabia and have been indoctrinated by
Wahhabism. For example, Iraqi officials have accused Saudi Arabia many times
of supporting Sunni and jihadi insurgent groups in Iraq. Conversely, the Saudi
government perceives Iranian power as a threat for the regional power
equilibrium (see Kane, 2011), particularly if Iran reaches a position of hegemony
in Iraq’s domestic affairs. In addition, the vast majority of Saudis consider
Americans to be an occupier in the Arab world, and thus regard resistance as a
legitimate means of fighting against what is perceived as an effort of the Shi’as
to dominate the political sphere in Iraq (see Gause, 2007). The Saudis’ and
other GCC countries’ private donations for jihadist groups in post-2003 Iraq is a
good example in this regard.
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1.3.1.2 Border and Territorial Disputes
The region has experienced a large number of unresolved border disputes
that have made some commentators dub the region ‘a ticking bomb’ that is
prone to explode at any moment. For example, the conflicts include Bahrain-
Qatar (Hawar Islands), Qatar- Abu Dhabi (Khwar Al ‘Udayb), Iran-UAE (Abu
Musa and the Tunbs Islands), Saudi-Kuwait (Natural Zone), UAE-Oman,
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Abu Sa’fah Offshore Oil Field), Iran-Qatar ( North
field Gas), the Iraq-Kuwait border, Saudi Arabia-Iran (Al ‘Arabiyah and Farsi
Island) (Peterson, 2011, pp. 22-46). Furthermore, most neighbours of Saudi
Arabia have not yet reached an agreement that would present the line of
demarcation in a way that no objection is raised. Syria, Turkey and Iran have all
been involved in border disputes with Iraq, in the case of the latter country
during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88; Iran has also been involved in a border
dispute with the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar had a
border dispute in 1992, which resulted in a war. On the one hand this has led to
the complex type of relations among these countries in a form of a durable
pattern of enmity and amity, enmity against each other internally, and unity
against a stranger when it poses a threat from outside. That division can be
noticed in the Arab policy toward Israel and Iran, or the Arab view towards the
Syrian crisis after 2011. On the other hand, the volatile position of the countries
bordering Iraq has a significant impact on the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq, especially in the form of the flow of insurgent groups and foreign
fighters. This can be clearly seen between the Syria-Iraq borders from the onset
of the Iraq invasion in 2003 to the advert of Islamic State. This can be ascribed
to the close security links of Iraq's neighbours (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Syria) with Iraq, whether in term of ethnic and sectarian dynamics or in the form
of regional security order.
1.3.1.3 Interests in Ethnically Related Populations
The whole region represents a diverse ethno-sectarian body, with this
diversity being further underlined by the presence of Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria
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and Turkey as a security matter used as a political card in their regional
conflicts. This has been the case during the eight year Iran-Iraq War, as well as
between Turkey and Syria in case of the PKK, and even between Turkey and
Iraq after 2003, with Turkey’s engagement with the KRG, especially in the case
of selling the KRG oil through Turkey without Baghdad's permission (see
Lundgren, 2007, pp. 78-88). In the case of Iraq, after 2003, Iraqi Kurds have
managed to form a strong regional government that often works as a quasi-
state. Such a state is naturally perceived as a source of serious threat for other
regional powers that fear that the example of Iraqi Kurdistan will become an
inspiration in the quest of self-determination for their own Kurdish ethnic
minorities. The same is true of the de facto Kurdish autonomous region in
Northern Syria (Rojava) after the Syrian crisis in 2011. Turkey’s special
relations with PDK and Iran's relations with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) can be assessed in this context2. The Kurdish factor has been regionally
a matter of state-building process following the U.S. invasion of 2003. Similarly,
the growth of political influence and power of various Shi’a groups with the
presence of Arab ethnic groups in Iran constitutes a considerable security issue
for the ‘affected’ countries in the region. Such a complex ethno-sectarian matrix
has spurred the formation of a web of mutual amity and enmity among the
regional actors, whereby the former is due to a strong link between an ethnic
state and its diasporic communities in the region, whilst the latter is based on
the attitude of a state towards its ethnic or religious minorities, particularly if
these minorities are majorities in this state’s regional rival.
1.3.1.4 Ideological alignments and polarisation among the units
One of the peculiarities of the Gulf sub-complex region is the ideological
alignments between the countries within the region in the form of amity and
enmity. The map of regional alignments includes different forms of ideological
alliances, which might be illustrated by the example of the semi-alliance of the
whole region against Israel based on ethno-religious concerns, or the example
of the Gulf States’ alignment against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Another form
of alignment may take the form of a regional security pact, such as the GCC
2 I will analyse this point in detail in chapters four and seven.
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alliance against Iraq during the second Gulf War, or during the same time, the
anti-American axis comprising Syria and Iran (see Buzan and Weaver, 2003, p.
192). Furthermore, there are other forms of polarisations that have an ethno-
sectarian character, such as the Iran, Iraq and Syria alignment after 2011 which
connects and promulgates sectarian objectives of political Shi’itism. In addition,
there has been an implicit alignment between Turkey, Iran and Syria aimed at
mitigating Kurdish national aspirations.
The theoretical points presented above are of significant relevance in the
case of the regional dimension of the process of rebuilding the Iraqi state after
2003. These points constitute a theoretical framework that will assist the
understanding of the regional dimension of the process of state-building in Iraq
in several aspects: 1) the political configuration of the region after 2003; 2) the
types of amity and enmity between the units in the region; 3) the regional
influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Iraq on the one hand and Iran and Syria
on the other hand; and 4) the linkage between the ethno-sectarian composition
and the regional security of the Persian Gulf.
So, it can be assumed that the RSCT may help to draw a future image of
the ethno-sectarian strife in the Persian Gulf. This strife will be to a certain
extent based on the fact that Iraq remains a place for proxies of the regional
powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to fight for political dominance in
the new Iraqi state. Furthermore, the strong presence of Shi’as in the Gulf
countries, particularly in Bahrain with 70% of the population, Kuwait with 25%,
Saudi Arabia 11%, and Qatar 10%, may add another element to the already
complex geopolitical profile of the region (see Nasr, 2006; Pelham, 2008, p 225-
226). This regional rivalry will encourage other regional actors and the U.S. to
maintain a strong presence in the region. It is worth underlining the fact that all
the aforementioned have been part of the process of state-building in Iraq after
2003.
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1.4. Understanding the regional dimension of ethno-sectarian
conflict and the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq
Given the focus of this chapter, it is worth mentioning the plethora of
written material either explicitly or implicitly discussing the process of state-
building in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in April 2003. In particular, the pertinent
literature has focused on the nature of Iraqi society and its inter-communal
enmity. Regardless of the substantial portion of literature discussing issues
surrounding the state-building process in Iraq under the U.S. invasion, it is not
possible to review all of these studies here. Among studies that have dealt with
the subject of state-building in Iraq comprehensively, one can mention the
works of Fukyama, 2004; Williams, 2005; Hippler, 2005; Zartman, 2005; Doyle
and Sambanis, 2006; Lederach, 2006; Patrick and Brown, 2007; Coyne, 2008;
Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Ismael, and Ismael, 2010. However,
to analyse these studies would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore,
the present study will attempt to review the literature that has directly addressed
the regional dynamics of the ethno-sectarian conflicts in post-2003 Iraq and the
links with both state-building and security dimensions. This review is guided by
three major questions: firstly, how and why have the regional powers (Iran,
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) been engaged in the process of state-building
in Iraq after the regime change in 2003; secondly, how have the regional
dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflicts become an enduring factor of the
process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq; and thirdly, in what way has each of
Iraq’s neighbours been involved in this process? These three questions then
provide a framework for understanding the regional ethno-sectarian involvement
after regime change in 2003.
Due to the nature of the present study, the literature that addresses state-
building and ethnic and sectarianism has been divided into two parts.
1.4.1 State-building as a security issue
Understanding the relationship between the state-building process and
ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq may require a brief analysis of the
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state-building process in Europe, which in fact witnessed a significant
connection between state-building and violence (Rear, 2008, p.37). It can be
said that a number of studies and theories on the subject of early Western
European state-building are built upon Charles Tilly’s theory of the relationship
between state-building and war, summarised as: “War made the state and the
state made war” (Tilly, 1975, p. 42). For instance, Rear (2008, p.24) argues that
in the post-colonial states, ethnic violence has been part of the empirical state-
building process, as in the initial stages of state formation in Western Europe.
Porter (1994, p. 12) even goes a step further and states that civil wars played a
significant role in shaping states in medieval Europe. According to Porter’s view,
these civil wars were part of state-building rather than state collapse, because
they led to the fragmentation of the feudal societies in Europe and actually
provided a chance to the state to centralise its political power. Rear (2008, p.
35) reaches the conclusion that, if ethnic violence and civil wars became part of
the state-building process in Europe, “then does external intervention in the
form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement in contemporary ethnic civil wars
interfere with the creation of viable states?” (Rear, 2008, p. 35).
However, it is important to know that the process of state-building in
Western Europe has been a product of indigenous factors, while in Iraq and
perhaps most of the Middle East cases, the state has come to exist through
external powers, such as colonial interventions. Regarding Iraq, the cross-
border ethnic and religious identities have also been part of the state-building
process. However, the ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq has not fragmented
the primordial identities in favour of a centralising political power under the
control of the state, as has been the case in Europe, especially after the end of
the Cold War.
In order to make our argument relevant to the regional dimensions of
ethnic and sectarian conflict in the Persian Gulf after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it
is important to engage with that literature which has directly addressed the
factors that are shaping security either in the Arab state system or in the Middle
East state.
In his book The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional
Conflict, and the International System, Mohammed Ayoob (1995) build his
argument on a relationship between insecurity and state-building in the 'Third
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World' state to uncover the sources of insecurity in the Third World state.
According to Ayoob (1995, pp.73-75) the source of insecurity in the Middle
Eastern states is related to the fragility and incompletion of the 'state making'
process. Although most of these security issues have an interstate dimension
which making them “genuinely regional”, the insecurity has originated from
internal dimensions, such as state-building, state-breaking, regime legitimacy
and the involvement of various factions in conflicts (Ayoob, p. 49). Ayoob’s
argument, like that of many other western scholars, has sought the insecurity in
the Middle East state in the process of state-making, which to a great extent is
assumed to be similar to the early stages of the state building process in
Western Europe in the last decades of the 20th century.
Following Ayoob's argument, Iraq's neighbours’ engagement in ethno-
sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq has been highly driven their states’ fragility
which related to their internal security dynamics with Iraq. However, Ayoob's
argument overlooks regional factors, especially the regional rivalries among
actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which sometimes may have been less
relevant than the domestic factors; however, Ayoob's argument can be helpful
to understand how ethnic and religious conflict in Iraq become a source of
regional insecurity for Iraq's neighbours. However, this insecurity situation is not
necessarily always driven by domestic factors. For instance, as Lu and Thies,
(2012, p. 241-242) argued, international wars and regional issues, such as Pan-
Arabism and Arab-Israeli conflict, have highly shaped the security dynamics of
the Middle East.
Most of the literature dealing with state-building/making, especially post-
September 11, links state-building with state fragility or war-torn states.
However, as Paris and Sisk (2009, p.11) argue, the trajectories of state-building
in both Iraq and Afghanistan are deeply different from most other operations.
The majority of other state-building processes have been carried out after civil
wars, not after external invasion as has been the case in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. However, this difference between cases is often unrecognized. In the case
of post-2003 Iraq, the exogenous process of state-building in itself reached civil
war in the form of sectarian conflict, especially in 2006-2007.
According to Paris and Sisk (2009, p.11), regional neighbourhoods are
often responsible for state fragility and create challenges for post-war states to
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build new institutions and end civil wars. However, in contrast to a number of
other scholars who blame weak and failed states for insecurity, Paris and Sisk
(2009, p.290) point out that “in many respects the relevant unit of analysis is a
failed region rather than failed state”.  Paris and Sisk's work supports Buzan
and Waever’s work Regions and Powers which reveals that the structure of the
region can shape the type of security interdependency among units. However,
despite the importance of the regional level for security analysis in the
international system, Buzan (1991, p. 106) asserts that both global and
domestic factors are at play in the framework of RSCT (see Buzan and Waever,
2003, p. 51). The anarchical character of the global system and large number of
fragile states, are threats to international security, especially when there is a
growing risk of intra-sate and inter-state conflicts.
In a study of Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan et al (1998,
p.21) try to reconceptualise the study of security. The authors assert that what
makes something a security subject are political actors, not analysts. According
to Buzan et al (1998, p.22) there are five sectors for existential threats: military,
political, economic, environmental, and social. What are most relevant to the
current study are the political and societal sectors, since most of the ethnic and
religious issues that arise in post-2003 Iraq can be located in these sectors:
In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in term of
the constitutional principle, sovereignty but sometimes also ideology of the state
[and] in the societal sector the referent object is large-scale collective identities
that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions (Buzan
et al, pp. 22-23).
What can be concluded from above discussion is that both ethnic and
sectarian issues can be politicized and securitised as a response to internal and
external threats. This has been the case regarding Iraq's neighbours' reaction to
the post-2003 invasion of Iraq.
In this context, it is important to incorporate the co-author’s work (Dobbins,
et al, 2003): The United States and State-Building in Iraq. This research was
conducted prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and published a few months after
the invasion. This volume was designed primarily to be a set of guidelines for
America after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. On the back cover of this book there
is a warm endorsement from Paul Bremer, the U.S. Governor General of Iraq
from May 2003 until June 2004. He described the book as “a marvellous
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manual for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. I have kept a copy
handy for ready consultation since my arrival in Baghdad” (Dobbins, et al, 2003,
p. cover).
The book analysed the U.S. and international activities in the political,
military, and economic sectors in post-conflict countries since World War II
(Dobbins, et al, 2003). Seven case studies have been addressed, Germany,
Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, with the lessons
learned then applied to the case of Iraq. The book has paid a great attention to
the security situation, such as chaos and expressive violence, force and regime
protection and law and disorder (Dobbins, et al, 2003, p.172). Furthermore, the
regional interventions from Iraq's neighbours Turkey, Iran and Syria have been
shown to be of concern for the U.S. in post-2003 Iraq, due to the fragility of the
Iraqi state after the fall of Ba'ath regime (Dobbins, et al, 2003, p.175).  However,
most of the security challenges addressed by the authors are rooted in local
violence against state institutions, especially from post-invasion disorder and
supporters of the former regime. It is true that the issue of ‘‘foreign intervention”
(especially from Turkey, Iran and Syria) was expected, but was considered far
from any concerns to make a regional security dilemma among Iraq's
neighbours or in the form of RSC framework shaped by ethnic and sectarian
conflict. The research project failed to address the change of security dynamics
in the sub-complex Persian Gulf, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or
how western powers can intervene in order to change regional security
dynamics. For instance, after the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the
EU played an important role in postconflict peace-building and changing the
relations among the newly established states, through providing assistance,
such as help with institutionalization and political reform which later changed the
patterns of cooperation and competition among these states (Kovačević, 2011,
p. 59). As Tripp (2004, p.15) correctly argued, “much that has happened since
the publication of this book goes against many of its principal
recommendations”.
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1.4.2 Understanding ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq
The notion that the factor of sectarian conflicts has been pivotal in
hindering the state-building process in Iraq since the creation of the modern
Iraqi state in 1921, especially after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, is
supported by various studies, such as Khadduri, 1969; Kedourie, 1987; al-Urzi,
1991; al-Samarai, 1993; Lukitz, 1995; Tripp, 2002; Anderson and Stansfield,
2005. On the other hand, others such as Sluglett, and Farouk-Sluglett, 1978;
Visser, 2007, 2008 underestimate the impact of sectarian factors in favour of
other factors, namely geopolitics, colonial legacy, the role of ruling elites and the
nature of Iraq’s political system.
In the discussion concerning the role of sectarian factors on the Iraqi
national identity and state-building, Osman (2012, p.2), after examining the
relationship between sectarianism, and the “making of state” and “nation” in
Iraq, concludes that:
[The] sectarianism has been an enduring feature of the state-making
trajectory in Iraq due to the failure to resolve the inherent tensions between
ubiquitous primordial non-state, including and above all sectarian, ethnic and/or
tribal identities, on the one hand, and concepts of unified nationhood and a
uniform citizenry inherent in building a nation-state, on the other.
Arguably, Osman’s study has well understood the relation between the
state-building process and sectarianism since the creation of the Iraqi state,
whilst, like many others, attributing the failure of the state-building process in
Iraq to the influence of pre-state identities, such as sectarianism, ethnicism and
tribalism. Regarding such a claim, one can ask a vital question: why have these
dynamics become abiding hindrances of the state-building process in Iraq,
whilst their presence in a number of other countries in the Middle East did not
have the same impact? No one can deny the role of the aforementioned factors,
while after the U.S. invasion of Iraq these local identities have exceeded their
internal dimensions and become part of the regional conflict among actors in
the region. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has altered both the regional balance of
power and regional security dynamics. On the other hand, the process of state-
building in post-2003 Iraq has led to the rise of two of Iraq's main local identities,
Kurd and Shi'a, which have become source of concern among regional actors,
especially those neighbours that have the same communities at home.
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Two important events highlighted the role of regional actors in state-
making in Iraq, but have been overlooked by almost all studies that have
examined the role of ethno-sectarian conflict and state-building in Iraq. One was
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003 and their withdrawal from Iraq in late
2011, which spurred some regional actors to fill the political vacuum that the
U.S. left in Iraq and that directly affected the regional security order among
Iraq's neighbours. The second has been the Arab uprisings, which redrew the
map of the nation-state in the Arab world, in particular in the context of the
Syrian crisis. Thus, it can be argued that there are other factors outside the
realm of domestic sectarian conflicts that might have contributed to the state-
building process in Iraq. Osman's study has totally ignored the role of the
regional dimensions of the ethno-sectarian conflict, as well as Iraq's neighbours'
involvement in the state-building operations following the 2003 U.S. invasion of
Iraq. These regional dimensions of the state-building process have been mainly
a product of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, whilst these dimensions in post-
2003 Iraq have been interrelated with the ethno-denominational conflict among
Iraq's neighbours.
Al-Qarawee (2012) has taken a step forward in his study, Imagining the
nation: nationalism, sectarianism and socio-political conflict in Iraq by arguing
that what shapes collective identities and their political representation is socio-
political conflict and not vice versa (Al-Qarawee, 2012, p. 2). He argues that the
sectarian identities of Shi'a and Sunni were not the only identities by which the
Iraqi people defined themselves. Al-Qarawee's work is a good step towards
understanding the roots of the Shi'a-Sunni conflict beyond the traditional
dynamics of sectarianism in post-2003 Iraq. However, this study also fails to
elucidate how ethnicity and sectarianism can shape the internal and external
dynamics of security policies between Iraq and its neighbours, in order to
answer a question of the current thesis, how and why Iraq's neighbours became
involved in the state-building process and thereafter ethnic and sectarian
conflict in post-2003 Iraq.
Having reviewed both Osman’s and Al-Qarawee's positions, it is apparent that
both authors have to a large degree neglected the possibility of the regional
powers (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) being a source of ethno-sectarian
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tensions, security concerns and hence part of the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq.
However, in a slightly different way from Osman and Al-Qarawee's
rationalisation of the failing state-building process, Fanar Haddad (2011) has
tried to understand the sectarian relations in post-2003 Iraq through
examination of the popular culture, in particular myth-symbols, folk poetry and
the sectarian argument within Iraqi society. The main aim of Haddad’s research
has been to understand “the role that sectarian identity plays in conceptions of
self, other and state” (Haddad, 2011, p. 3). In this regard, the author concludes
that “sectarian identity must be viewed as a form of group identity whose
dynamics are no different from those of ethnicity or race” (Haddad, 2011, p. 3).
Haddad’s notion of sectarian identity may be helpful in understanding the
domestic dynamics of the religious strife within Iraqi society, together with the
level of sectarian antipathy or inter-communal enmity in Iraq. Notwithstanding,
the applicability of Haddad’s approach may be limited, insofar as the interplay
between the sectarian identity and the state, or ruling elites cannot be explained
merely as just a reflection of the popular culture in the form of poetry and music
(Haddad, 2011, p.5). Meanwhile, this approach, by relying predominantly on the
sectarian discussion ‘from below’ from the street level, may not be able to
properly account for the regional dimension of the ethno-religious conflicts in
Iraq. The reason for this is twofold. First, the regional engagement in internal
Iraqi affairs is less relevant with the level of popular culture than its relations
with the elite and state. Second, the ‘symbolism of sects’ may form or become
the symbolism of state or even nation, yet its effect on the formulation of
political strategies of Iraq’s neighbours is a rather questionable assumption.
Unlike Haddad, Dodge (2012) has dealt with the issues surrounding the
ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq more generally. This is evident from
Dodge’s (2012, p. 15) identification of three main sources of the pertinent
conflict, insofar as the socio-cultural factors promulgated by Haddad are
accompanied by the factor of the inner-political fragility of the Iraqi state and its
institutions and by the factor of the new Iraqi constitution, which was formulated
by embracing the ethno-sectarian solutions through what Dodge called the
“exclusive elite bargaining”. Furthermore, Dodge (2012, p. 15) asserts that the
abovementioned factors are the major reason dragging the post-Saddam Iraq
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into an ethno-religious civil war. However, at the same time, Dodge’s work
overlooks the regional dynamics that have substantially nourished the inter-
communal enmity in Iraq after 2003. Dodge’s (2012) central focus in his study is
to examine the future of the Iraqi state regarding the possibility of avoiding a
civil war, the on-going form of democracy and the political system under the
new Iraqi ruling elites. Concerning the regional dimensions of the process of
rebuilding the Iraqi state, Dodge (2012, p. 15) highlights that Iraq has always
been a source of instability for both its region as well as international relations in
the Middle East. It can be argued that the main concern of a large portion of
relevant literature, including the Dodge’s work, is whether Iraq poses a threat to
its neighbours, whilst simultaneously neglecting or omitting from their analyses
the challenges that the neighbouring countries (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey) have come to constitute for the process of state-building in post-2003
Iraq.
It can be argued that a salient feature of the studies discussing regional
factors and their impact on post-2003 Iraq is an increased attention that they
pay to the regional spill-over emanating from political developments in Iraq. This
interplay, according to these studies, has two aspects: first, the shifting of the
balance of power in the region in favour of non-Arab states, such as Iran,
Turkey and Israel; and second, the threats that the new Iraqi state might pose
for its neighbours. For example, Wehery et al (2010) has drawn attention to
three main points with regard to ‘the Iraqi effect’ on the Middle East after the
U.S-led invasion in 2003. First, the invasion has facilitated the tilting of the
power balance in favour of non-Arab states, especially Iran. Second, the
invasion has exacerbated the sectarian strife between Shi’a and Sunni, and
also contributed to the largest refugee crises in the region since the Arab-Israeli
war in 1948 (Wehrey et al., 2010, pp.xiv-11). Third, the impact of the socio-
political developments on the regional issues, particularly surrounding activities
of the global terrorist networks, cannot be overlooked. It can be noted that
Wehrey, et al.’s (2010, p.152 ) focus on the regional dimensions of the state-
building process is in compliance with the overall approach of a number of other
think tank reports aiming to provide the U.S. government with a blueprint to
create a new strategic framework for the region that would encompass Iraq’s
neighbours. In addition, this framework would consider possible measures to
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mitigate a negative impact of various regional developments related to the
state-building process in Iraq.
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has created a new environment
conducive to the formation of alliances governed by the regional ethno-
sectarian dynamic. For example, there is a theoretical potential for cooperation
among Shi’as living in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon and Syria on one side, and
among Sunni communities in Iraq, Syria, Jordan and the Gulf countries on the
other. The same might be true of the socio-political relations among Kurds in
Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. In this regard, Faleh A. Jabar's (2003) work (The
Shi'ite Movement in Iraq) can be very helpful to understand social, cultural and
ideological roots of Shi'a Islamism in Iraq and how it connects to the
transnational Shi'a movements in the region. He argued that Shi'a Islamist
groups in Iraq are on one hand part of a combination of the general rise of
Islamist movements in the Middle East, and on the other hand a domestic
response to political oppression at home (A. Jabar, 2003, p. 35). Jabar's work
would have been more important if it had covered the role of Shi'a Islamist
movements after 2003 and the transnational dimensions of Iraq's immediate
neighbours. The interregional connections among communities with similar
religious or ethnic affiliations have become part of the regional security concern.
This inter-state ethnic and sectarian solidarity has been more obvious following
the Syrian crisis and the Islamic State’s arrival in Iraq in June 2014.
Gause (2010) tries to understand the international politics of the Persian
Gulf region since the British withdrawal from the region in 1971. He argued that
“regional states acted more against perceived threats to their own domestic
stability emanating from abroad than to counter unfavorable change in the
distribution of power or to take advantage of favorable power imbalances.”
(2010, p. 9). This may be true of some states, but not for all states in the
Persian Gulf. The countries that are less fragile at home might have fewer
concerns about domestic threats than regional or global threats. For example,
after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, despite the importance of domestic threats
for both Tehran and Riyadh, the power imbalance or the U.S. presence in the
region for Tehran and Damascus was more serious than the Shi'a domestic
threat in Saudi Arabia or the Kurdish threat in Iran and Syria. Gause (2010, p. 4)
excluded both Turkey and Syria from the Persian Gulf sub-region, for which he
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cannot be criticised, due to the nature of his study (see p. 4). However, it will be
hard to understand the regional security dynamics in the region without Syria
and Turkey, in particular after the changing dynamics of Turkey’s foreign policy
towards the Middle East, and more precisely towards Iraq and Syria. After the
Syrian crisis and the advent of the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) to the region,
Turkish and Syrian security have been significantly interconnected with the
regional security complex dynamics and the transnational identities in the
Persian Gulf and Levant.
In a slightly different approach to that of Gause (2010) and Wehrey et al.
(2010), Bingo (2004, p. 50) tries to address the regional and international
ramifications of ‘new’ Iraq. The study found that the shifting of power from
Sunnis to Shi’as and Kurds may have affected the regional powers, especially
Iran, Syria and Turkey, mainly owing to what the author calls ‘the Kurdish
factor’. The study further argues that Iran had welcomed the end of Saddam’s
regime, yet was alarmed by the continuous presence of U.S. troops in the
region. However, some Iranian officials responsible for foreign policy considered
the new developments in Iraq as a good opportunity for establishing a link with
Shi’a factions or Kurds, such as the PUK, thus enhancing their regional status.
Through a closer examination, it is evident that Bingo's (2004) study does
not adequately cover the nature of each country’s engagement with the ethno-
religious conflicts in Iraq, and how this is interrelated with the state-building
process in post-2003 Iraq. Furthermore, the study has failed to see the whole
picture of the changes in the international relationships within the region, in
particular with regard to the regional engagement in the post-2003 state-
building trajectory in Iraq. This was pivotal for the formation of ethno-sectarian
alliances among Iraq’s neighbours, especially since the Syrian upheaval from
2011 onwards. In addition, the roles of Syria and Saudi Arabia in post-2003 Iraq
were overlooked. The abovementioned shortcomings could be to some extent
explained by time constraints, given that the study was published only few
months after the U.S. invasion Iraq in 2003; hence, the study was unable to
address the second phase of interference by Iraq’s neighbours in its internal
affairs, commencing after the U.S. withdrawal. This involvement of regional
powers in Iraq has been aimed, as will be argued throughout the present study,
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at boosting their standing in the region in general and in Iraq in particular by
using Iraqi proxies to pursue their own political interests.
Similarly to a number of other studies, Ostergard’s work Regional spillover
effects from Iraq's upheaval (2010) shows the regional dimensions of post-2003
Iraq’s socio-political developments. His book focuses predominantly on the
regional instability that may be caused by the volatile political situation in Iraq.
The range of possible spill-over effects stemming from this volatility, according
to Ostergard (2010, p. 16), could cover all Iraq’s neighbours, including even
Israel. It is evident that the author highlights the probability of Iraq being the
threat for its neighbours, whilst neglecting in his analysis the possibility that
these neighbours would become a source of destabilisation for Iraq after the fall
of Saddam’s regime, and also neglecting their security complex
interconnections with Iraq. Hence, further elaboration on the impact of Iraq’s
neighbours on the process of state-building in Iraq was also absent.
A more comprehensive study in this regard was conducted by a collective
of authors: Iraq, its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and
the Reordering of Power (2011). This study focuses on the impact of post-
Saddam Iraq on its neighbours and the region as a whole. The authors (Henri,
Scott, and Marr, 2011, p. 2) included in their analysis all of Iraq’s neighbours in
terms of their influences on Iraq and vice versa, highlighting particularly
economic, social and political aspects of this interaction, which has been both of
a negative and a positive character. It can be noticed that the monograph
comprises number of studies that have been apparently written under the
influence of the Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq in 2006. This report called for
U.S. engagement with Iraq’s neighbours including Iran and Syria on one hand,
and with the Arab Gulf countries and Turkey in order to mitigate Iran’s influence
in Iraq on the other. This group of countries was particularly alienated by Iran’s
increasing leverage on the socio-political developments in Iraq. Furthermore, a
part of the book outlines the areas of common interests between Iraq’s
neighbours and the U.S. (see Henri, Scott, and Marr, 2011, p.8).
Despite the above work (Henri, Scott, and Marr, 2011) touching upon a
number of old problems that Iraq still has with its neighbours, it limits its aim to
identifying ways of and reasons for the regional powers’ involvement in the
process of state-building in Iraq. In addition, the study seems to overlook the
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''securitization'' of ethno-sectarian conflicts inside Iraq and their connection with
the regional ethno-sectarian dynamics that have become a crucial element in
the regional security strategies among Iraq’s neighbours. Yet regardless of
these shortcomings, the study in question has contributed significantly to the
debate surrounding the interaction of Iraq with its neighbours and vice versa.
Moreover, the study attempts to formulate a blueprint for the U.S. policy
regarding Iraq’s neighbours, especially how to face the challenge of Iranian
supremacy in Iraq, which constitutes a considerable concern for Iraq’s
neighbours.
The analysis of relevant literature discussing the pertinent matters
regarding the post-2003 situation in Iraq has revealed that despite a significant
literary output, none of the reviewed studies focus primarily on investigating the
ways in which regional powers have contributed to the state-building process in
Iraq and what motives have governed this involvement. Moreover, these studies
fail to highlight the relation between regional dimensions of ethno-sectarian
conflict and the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq. Most of the studies
thus neglected to address extremely important questions regarding the
relationship between ethno-sectarian conflicts in Iraq and their broader regional
security complex dynamics, or the possibility of ethnic conflict and sectarianism
becoming forms of regional security complex among Iraq and its neighbours.
For instance, why are the four neighbours of Iraq under discussion (Iran, Syria
Saudi Arabia and Turkey) involved in and affected more by the state-building
process in Iraq than other Iraq's neighbours in the region, for instance Jordan or
Kuwait?
Highlighting these shortcomings has enabled the author of this thesis to
identify a gap in the literature dealing with ethno-sectarian conflicts post-2003
and its relationship with the state-building process. This gap is particularly
evident when regional dimensions of these conflicts are considered, such as
those related to Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia. These countries have
engaged in the process of state-building through different ways, the regional
security complex dynamics of the region being the salient reasons for this
engagement, and not transnational identities as has been argued by Gause
(2010, p. 9). This aforementioned discussion makes it possible to distinguish
this work from what has come before. The key difference lies in the fact that
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current study is less concerned with the causes of the state-building process
than with Iraq's neighbours’ involvement in the ethno-sectarian conflict,
especially the interdependent security complex among the units in post-2003
Iraq.
Furthermore, none of the aforementioned studies have shifted the focus
from ethno-sectarian conflict to the security complex dynamics that have
shaped regional security policies in the Persian region after the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. Most of them have been limited to addressing in a more comprehensive
manner the conduct of the regional security polices of the four countries in
question, not in the context of two conflicting political blocs involved into the
process of state-building in Iraq. To fully understand the relationship between
the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq and ethno-sectarian conflict, it is
necessary to shift the focus from historical, religious and internal dynamics to
the regional dynamics of the ethno-sectarian conflict within the framework of
regional security complex levels on the one hand, and the security complex
interconnectedness of Iraq's neighbours with Iraq on the other. This
abovementioned aspect of the thesis has not been given much attention in the
both state-building and ethno-sectarian literature after 2003. By analysing the
ethno-sectarian conflicts in Iraq from regional context, this research will fill a gap
left by previous studies on the subject.
1.5. Methodology and sources of the research
''When trying to make sense of the Middle East, one of the most important rules to keep
in mind is this: What politicians here tell you in private is usually irrelevant. What matters most,
and what explains their behavior more times than not, is what they say in public in their own
language to their own people.'' (Thomas Friedman, 11 Nov 2014).
In order to answer the presented research question, this study utilises
mainly qualitative methods. To achieve this, the thesis has used a variety of
data collection techniques, such as reading documents, newspaper and journal
articles, official documents, analysing video clips, leaked documents, press
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releases, memoir and field research. It is vital to emphasise at this point that the
thesis has largely relied on document analysis; as Johnson and Reynolds
(2012, p. 257) point out “this type of data collection relies heavily on the record-
keeping activates of government agencies, private institutions, interest groups
[and] media magazines”. The extent to which the thesis is limited regarding
interview data is a reflection of the difficulties by which essential data, mostly in
the forms of intelligence reports or interviews with the official figures and
decision makers are quite difficult to obtain in Iraq and its neighbours. In
addition to the dangerous security situation, especially in Iraq and Syria, the
limitation of accessibility to this kind of information is partly embedded in the
nature of political systems in most Middle Eastern countries, and partly also
relates to the fact that the process of regional engagement in Iraqi internal
affairs has not always been a part of the official foreign policy of the Iraq's
neighbours, but rather part of the security policies and various forms of
interventions are conducted clandestinely by organisations sponsored by states
or by non-state actors.
According to my personal research experience in the region and taking
three field visits in 2012, 2013 and 2014 to Iraq, I realised that conducting
interviews with decision makers and leaders of militia groups would be
extremely difficult if not impossible. However, I have substituted for the lack of
such interviews by applying a variety of qualitative data collection techniques
and data analysis at the same time. The importance of the qualitative approach
to social science research emphasises the necessity of both collecting and
analysing data. As Creswell states:
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of
imperial materials – case studies, personal experience, introspective, life story,
interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts- that describe
routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives (Creswell,
1998, p.15).
From qualitative methods' point of view, there are two important aspects
that can be adopted in this study. First is the way of collecting data, through
several methods within the qualitative approach. The second is the technique of
analysing the collected data through an interpretive process within the
qualitative method. The reason behind adapting qualitative approaches is the
issue of validity or credibility, which cannot be overestimated in the research
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fields. As Brady and Collier (2010, p.133) point out, the research should
“maximize the validity of measurements”, meaning that, “it should use reliable
data-collection procedures that, if applied again, would yield the same data”.
Thus, a part of the process of data collection in this thesis depends on a
variety of official materials and non-official materials. Official documents contain
materials that have been issued by one of the official institutions of the
government. As examples are such documents as might serve the U.S. foreign
policy, documents from the time of the Bush administration, official documents
that have been published by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, or
official documents from the Iraqi state. Besides, there are some data and
statistics that have been published by official institutions of government that
were also analysed for the purpose of this study .
Furthermore, intelligence agencies, personal memoirs of official figures,
such as Paul Bremer’s memoir which is particularly interesting given his position
as the civil governor of Iraq following the 2003 invasion, have also been drawn
upon. Considering Wikileaks as a valid source of information may be
questionable in the academic field (Malkan, 2016; O’Loughlin, 2016)3, however,
the Wikileaks cables can provide significant data regarding Iraq's neighbours’
involvement in both the state-building process and ethnic and religious strife in
the region. However, the author has been aware of the possibly biased nature
of these documents. Therefore, these documents have been subjected to an
analytical and comparative process with other data in order to check their
reliability. In addition, some of these data have been confirmed by local
authorities, for instance what are called the Sinjar documents (see Fishman, ed.
2008).
Many may criticise my reliance on think tanks; however due to the lack of
some official and up-to-date data and statistics from other sources, such as
books and journal articles, in addition to think tanks' special links with decision
makers and their access to the up-to-date information, this thesis has relied on
3 Considering Wikileaks as a non-valid source of information does not mean that Wikileaks is
not a reliable source. For example, Wikileaks released a number of government files to the New
York Times regarding the conflict in Afghanistan. After the documents were brought to the White
House and verified, it was found that those particular files were authentic (see Ferrer, A., 1 Jan
2017).
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some think tank studies. This is especially apt considering the role that think
tanks play in shaping state policy agendas at the present time. Moreover, the
recent scope of the study, which covers 2003-2016, made it difficult for the
author to obtain enough data from books or journals. However this information
has not been adopted without analysis and comparison with other sources. The
thesis’s reliance on Wikileaks and think tank reports has been mainly for the
sake of obtaining data rather than furnishing analysis.
Another portion of collected data will consist of press conferences, official
statements and newspaper articles that were written during the period of
forming this thesis. Furthermore, academic conferences to which the researcher
has had access (in both Iraq and Europe) will be used.
Other material sources used in this study are in the form of published
literature, such as books and journal articles. The thesis also uses several
unpublished works of academic research discussing relevant topics, including
works in English, Arabic, Persian and Kurdish. Such a multilingual base of
source material is of particular importance given the regional dimensions of the
thesis’s focus, which includes Iraq’s neighbours which have populations
speaking Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Kurdish. Beside all the above mentioned
methods and materials, the personal knowledge of the researcher together with
his academic experience, journalistic work, collaboration with think tank
research foundations and civil society organisations in Iraq are a supporting
factor in the effort to accomplish the objectives of this thesis.
The case studies that are presented in this thesis are best defined “as an
intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize a cross a larger set of
units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 327). Thus, in order to address the thesis research
question appropriately, this thesis has focused on multiple case studies. Each of
the four of Iraq's neighbours represented, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
has been divided into single case studies with the purpose to generalise across
a larger set of cases, on the one hand, and to narrow down a very wide area of
research into the simply researchable topic on the other. In addition, the role of
the U.S. and its ramifications on Iraq's neighbours' involvement after 2003 in
Iraq have been considered. All this is aiming to address a complementary
aspect of the main research question of how and why Iraq's neighbours
engaged in the process of state-building.
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All the collected material and analytical techniques are to provide the
researcher with a deep understanding of the reasons for and manners in which
the regional dimensions of the ethno-sectarian divide have affected the process
of state-building in Iraq after 2003, together with the knowledge about the
regional security complex that spurred regional powers to interfere in Iraqi
domestic affairs. In addition, the collected material helps to reveal the motives
of Iraq’s neighbours for intervention in its internal political process, and how Iraq
is perceived from the geopolitical point of view by the ruling regimes in Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.
1.6. The structure of the thesis
This thesis has been divided into eight chapters:
Chapter one: the first chapter includes the introduction, hypothesis,
theoretical framework, the literature review and methodology. In the theoretical
framework I have discussed RSCT in order to understand the regional
dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflicts in the Persian Gulf. The chapter also
consists of a literature review that will critically present most of the studies
dealing with the state-building process and the regional dimensions of ethno-
sectarian conflicts in post-2003 Iraq. The aim of this chapter is to structure a
theoretical framework to the thesis’s argument of how and why the ethno-
sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq has become the defining dynamic for an
RSC amongst Iraq and its neighbours. .
Chapter two: this chapter explores the challenges faced by the Iraqi state
from its creation until 2003 through an analysis of two main stages of the Iraqi
state: the monarchic regime (1921-1958) and republican regime (1958-2003), in
addition to the regional factors and their influence on the state-building process
in these two periods. The main attention of this chapter is devoted to analysing
how Britain dealt with the process of state building during the monarchic era,
and how the Iraqi ruling classes were associated with state-building process in
this period. This is in order to constitute a link between the two models of state
building applied in Iraq: the British model from 1921-1933 and the U.S. model in
2003-2011.
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Chapter three: this chapter shows why it is necessary to understand the
state-building carried out by the U.S. after the invasion in order to analyse the
regional dimensions of the ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq after 2003. It is also
important to bear in mind that the interference in Iraqi internal policies by the
four countries mentioned could have been a reaction to the U.S. version of
state-building in Iraq. In order to understand the U.S. model of state-building in
Iraq, this study examines the three different factors leading the state-building
operations in the country after Saddam’s fall. The first deals with the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) during the U.S. process of state-building. The
second analyses the constitutional process and redistribution of power. The
third looks to the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which sketched the
U.S.’s commitment to Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal, which has not been without
its regional repercussions.
Chapter four: the main question of this chapter revolves around how and
why Iran contributed to the process of state-building in Iraq after 2003. Despite
the complexity and multi-level engagement of Iran in Iraq, this chapter will
analyse how and why Iran became involved in the state-building process and
ethnic and sectarian conflict following the 2003 US-led invasion in Iraq,
considering the following three points. Firstly, Iran’s support to the Shi'a-centric
state in Iraq; secondly, the Iranian engagement with the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) will be discussed; thirdly, shows how and why Iran
attempted to exhaust U.S. troops in Iraq. The second part of this chapter will
analyse the ramifications of the Iranian hegemony on the region with a
particular attention to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in order to understand the
reaction of the pro-Sunni countries in the region.
Chapter five: this chapter aims to show the Syrian involvement in the
process of state-building in Iraq and its ideological and sectarian dimensions.
The chapter shows how and why the Syrian regime contributed to the post-
conflict state building process in Iraq. The analysis will focus on three main
points: firstly, the Syrian support of Iraqi Ba'athist, insurgent groups and al-
Qaeda linked ideological terrorist groups; secondly, how Syria engaged with the
Iraqi Kurds and the consequences for the Kurds after the Syrian uprising. The
chapter will also examine the significant shifting of Iraqi-Syrian relations after
the Syrian uprising and how these relations have transferred the relationship
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from an ideological enmity (1971-2003) to sectarian amity after 2011. An
explanation of the transformation of the Syrian crisis and its ramifications on
Iraq after 2011 has been another aim of this chapter. The third section
examines Daesh (IS or ISIS) and its impact on the process of state-building and
ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq.
Chapter six will address Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the state-making
process after 2003. The chapter will analyse two main points: the first seeks to
understand Saudi Arabia’s interest in opposing the pro-Iranian Shi’a-dominated
government, a fact denied by Saudi authorities. Second traces Saudi Arabia’s
concern towards the new regional security order that arose after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, in favour of Iran. The chapter also investigates the impact of
Saudi Arabia on the process of state-building after 2003, and its ramifications
on the Iranian and Syrian strategies in both Iraq and the Persian Gulf.
Chapter seven: this chapter answers the question of how and why Turkey
became involved in the state-building process after the 2003 war of Iraq, taking
into account two distinct periods. The first shows the Turkish engagement in
Iraq before the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, and the second, the Turkish
engagement in Iraq after 2011. This last part will show how the regional security
complex shifted Turkish strategy towards the state-building process in Iraq. This
is especially regarding Turkish-KRG political and economic relations and
Turkish involvement in the Syrian crisis. The second section of this chapter will
deal with the regional reactions towards Turkish hegemony in Iraq, in particular
for Iran and Syria.
Chapter eight: this chapter will conclude and discuss the results of the
study, answering the main questions posed by the investigation, and at the
same time will show the original contribution and significance of the thesis. I will
also discuss the broader theoretical implications of the findings as well as the
theoretical connection between the state-building process, regional dimensions
of the ethno-sectarian conflict and regional security complex dynamics.
Furthermore, the chapter will also present the limitations of the study and
propose new paths and questions for future studies.
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Chapter Two:
2 Challenges to state-building in Iraq: The regional
dimension (1921-2003)
Introduction:
“If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, then we don’t
understand history, the nature of the country, the divisions, or the underneath suppressed
passions that could rise up. God help us if we think this transition will occur easily. The attempts
I’ve seen to install democracy in short periods of time where there is no history and no roots
have failed. Take it to Somalia" (Marine General Anthony Zinni (retired) Head of U.S. Central
Command from 1997 to 2000, 10 October 2002, (Cited in Dodge, 2003, p. 157).
The objective of this chapter is not to discuss the history of the creation of
the Iraqi state in detail, but rather to address two main questions. First, how did
ethno-sectarian conflict accompany the process of state-building from the
creation of the Iraqi state in 1921 until the U.S. invasion of Iraq? Second, what
were Iraq’s neighbours roles in the state-building process during that period?
The purpose behind asking these questions goes back to the importance of the
state-building process, ethnic and sectarian conflict and Iraq’s neighbours’
engagement in these processes as three main factors that have played to
varying degrees major roles in the structure of the Iraqi state. Meanwhile,
addressing the abovementioned areas could be one way to respond to the
major questions of why the Iraqi state-building process has remained highly
problematic since the British creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, and until
the U.S. invasion in April 2003.
The questions outlined above can be prefaced by asking, firstly, what was
the form of the state-building process during the Hashemite Monarchy?
Secondly, what was the logical result of state-building in the republican period?
And last but not least, what are the implications of the regional factors of the
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state-building process in Iraq from 1921 to 2003? This chapter seeks to say
that, although ethnic and religious tension has been the dominant factor to
varying degrees in the state-building process from the creation of the Iraqi state
in 1921 until its fall in 2003, Iraq’s neighbours’ engagement in the state-building
process has not been through contributing to the ethnic and sectarian conflict,
as has been the case since 2003. Or, more precisely, the ethnic and sectarian
issue had not shaped security policies for Iraq's neighbours' prior to the 2003
invasion of Iraq.
In addition, this chapter draws a connection between the beginnings of the
embryonic Iraqi state in 1921 onwards, which was primarily motivated by the
British, and the Iraqi state-building after 2003 (which this study deals with in the
next chapters), and was mostly driven by the U.S.. Furthermore, understanding
the initial stages of creating the modern Iraqi state by the British in 1921 can be
considered a key factor for understanding the Iraqi state-building process in the
present, which is a fact to which Americans did not pay enough attention. It may
be argued that most of these historical problematic issues that have faced Iraqi
state-building in the monarchical period and onwards, such as identity,
citizenship, authoritarianism, constitutionalism, along with the Kurdish issue,
have arisen again more intensely after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 (see Davis,
2005;).
2.1. Iraqi state-building in the Hashemite Monarchy (1921-1958)
As is well represented in the historical literature, the modern Iraqi state is a
political and constitutional entity built on the remnants of three provinces
(Wilayet- Vilayet), namely Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which were
administrated by the Ottoman Empire4. The process of the creation of the
4 There is a difference between researchers regarding the history of using the name ‘Iraq’. For
example, Kadhim (2012, p.7) has asserted that the name Iraq is “the historic territory that
carried this name for more than fourteen centuries and was never identified by another name
throughout that period”. Both Kadhim (2012) and Visser (2005) have argued that Iraq was not
invented by the British, that what was invented was a political entity, and that Iraq as a territory
has been clearly defined by their people, always known as “Ahl al- ‘Iraq” (the people of Iraq). He
reports that the Greek word “Mesopotamia” was used in the British sources, but had not been
used by the Arab people until the British occupation of Iraq. Kadhim’s argument might be
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modern state of Iraq was not achieved in 1921, as is commonly held among
researchers. The creation of the modern Iraqi state as a state-building process
by the British was between 1914 and 1932 in the aftermath of World War I, and
between 1920 and 1925 the Iraqi state acquired a legal framework5 (Dodge,
2003, p.1). After that, in 1921 King Faisal was appointed in the Cairo
Conference as the king of the recently created Kingdom of Iraq. He had never
visited Iraq before his selection as its king; further, there was an agreement that
the new state would be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary kingdom
(Allawi, 2014, p. 339). In July 1921, the British tried to provide some legitimacy
to Faisal’s rule through a superficial referendum, which was in reality more
similar to the bay’a (allegiance sessions)6 than the constitutional means of
democratic election. As expected, the results were 96 percent in favour of King
Faisal, and in March 1921 Britain imposed its tutelage over a newly created
territory now formally known as Iraq (Husni, 1989, p. 232).
geographically correct; however, these three provinces had never been a political integrated
reality. According to Tripp, the term al-Iraq in that period had only a geographical connotation,
and it referred to “the shore of a great river along its length, as well as the grazing land
surrounding it... [and] to the great alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers”. (See Tripp,
2002, p.8). Whatever the claims about the existence of Iraq’s historical and collective memories
among the people who lived there, Iraq as a modern political nation-state was created for the
first time in 1921.
5 The institutional building process started during the monarchical period and took about five
years and went through different phases, from the formation of the temporary government (25th
of October) to the coronation of King Faisal on 23 August 1921, the (re)formation of
Abdulrahman al-Naqeeb’s  cabinet and promulgation of the electoral law. Later, on the 25th of
February 1924, elections were held for the Constituent Assembly and on 11 of June the Council
ratified the Iraqi-British treaty. These first steps formed the basis of the modern Iraqi state (see
al-Husni, p. 233-252).
6 Despite the referendum result which was highly in favour of King Faisal, there was an
opposition which had been concerned about ‘borrowing’ a new king, in addition to a number of
claims. For example, the province of Kirkuk had voted against King Faisal, and Sulaimanya
province did not vote, while Erbil and Mosul demanded guarantees regarding minorities’ rights
(see al-Husni, 1989, p 232).With regard to Basra there were two main arguments, either to
separate from the new state or stay in a confederative formula with Iraq under the name of
‘’United Province of Iraq and Basra’’ (wilayata al- ‘iraq wa-al- basra al-muttahidan) (see Visser,
2005, p. 73-74).
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It is worth considering that the creation of the Iraqi state cannot be
separated from a number of subjective and objective factors related to the
international order after World War I on one hand, and the period of both the
Ottoman Empire and European imperialism on the other. That is to say, the
creation of the modern Iraqi state corresponded with the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire and both the financial and military fatigue of the British in this
period. As Dodge (2003, p.1) correctly argues, the creation of the Iraqi state
was different from the usual territorial imperialism, and took place at the
beginning of the end of the dominance of the British Empire internationally,
particularly in the policies of the British India Office. All these factors have had a
great influence on the whole trajectory of state-building in Iraq, in particular in
monarchic Iraq.
A number of factors need to be addressed to understand the trajectory of
the state-building process in the monarchist period. It is true that the ethnic and
religious tensions have had a longer history than the arrival of the British in Iraq;
however the major part of this issue has had a direct relation with the British
invasion of Iraq and formation of the beginning steps of the new state. As Tejel
(2012, p.90) argued, the British perception of the Iraqi society as a country
divided between three unified blocs (Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds) contributed to
the creation of sub-Iraqi identities. To an extent, until now, and after more than
nine decades, the Iraqi state is still suffering from the same problems. These
features that have impact the path of state-building in Iraq can be grouped into
the factors following below.
2.1.1. The impact of the internal and external factors on the
British polices in Iraq
It can be said that the modern Iraqi state had been influenced directly by
the British vision and their policies in the Middle East and the Persian region on
the one hand, and the internal and external conditions of the British Empire on
the other. All these factors have left their influences on the trajectory of state-
building in Iraq. Between 1920 and 1932, which was an important period in Iraqi
state formation, British foreign policy faced significant military and financial
problems Between 1919 and 1923, the defence budget of the British army was
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cut down by half each year, and this pushed the British to impose a higher tax
on the tribes, especially in southern Iraq, which drove some tribes to revolt
against the British policies (Dodge, 2003, pp.134-135). From May 1920
onwards, Secretary of State for War, and then for the Colonies, Churchill,
pushed both the administration and the cabinet in Iraq to take in consideration
the unsustainable nature of the prevailing situation. He employed a very radical
policy by recommending that, if the British forces pulled out from Basra, the cost
of the occupation could be reduced from £30 million to £8 million. The British
vision for making the Iraqi state was influenced to a great extent on the Indian
model, which was guided by the philosophy of the nineteenth century and of the
“white man’s burden”, which meant that the British had to rule the new Iraqi
state indirectly, since the Colonial Indian Office did not believe that the Iraqi
people could rule Iraq wisely and fairly (Simon and Tejirian, 2004, p. 22). The
above-mentioned factors most likely directed the British toward the specific form
of the state, whereby they took into consideration the position of the British
Empire more than the status of Iraqi society, at the expense of a possible model
which would have considered Iraq’s social, political and cultural peculiarities. In
this context it may be argued that the British tried to build a kind of state which
could help them to alleviate their own economic and political burdens. In this
context, the creation of a new Iraq was a product of this difficult stage in the
history of the British Empire7.
Furthermore, the mandate period coincided with two decisive global
events or trends: first, the political and military decline of British hegemony;
second, the significant progress of the U.S. economy and the expansion of free
markets all over the world (Dodge, 2003, p.5). These factors forced a radical
shift regarding the position of British Empire, as well as on the territories that
were under British tutelage, in particular the newly created Iraqi state. Blackwell
(2005, p.446) has pointed out that an essential problem of the mandate was
that the British had lacked the resources that were necessary to implement their
‘traditional methods’; in addition, they wanted to build Iraqi society according to
what they preferred it to be, rather than taking into account the wishes of the
7 Allawi indicated that when the British or Indian Expeditionary Force first landed in Basra in
November 1914, there was no plan to capture the whole of Mesopotamia (Iraq); the British main
objective was to secure Basra and the headlands of the Gulf (see Allawi, A., Faisal I of Iraq,
2004, p.341,).
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Iraqi people. Meanwhile, the mandate failed to resolve the relationship between
the individual and the state, which later created serious problems for the
structure of the Iraqi state. On this basis it may be inferred that, besides it being
the British vision that had designed the main pillars of the modern Iraqi state,
British efforts were highly influenced by the regional and international events in
the mandate era. This was especially the case during the period of the making
of the Iraqi state between 1914 and 1932, which has been considered as an
essential period for the growth of almost all the basic parameters of the Iraqi
state.
2.1.2. The dominance of the Army on political and economic life
A salient characteristic that can be observed in the monarchical era was
military control of political and economic life in the new Iraqi state. This process
did not occur by an accident, but it was achieved through systematic support of
the British and King Faisal. This could be noticed during the creation of the Iraqi
Army, which was instituted officially on the 6th of January 1921, even before the
formation of the Iraqi government. The British attempted to provide a new
military as a tool in the hand of the King to reinforce his new kingdom,
especially to counter the tribes’ broad power, due to the royal family not having
roots in Iraqi society8 (Hikmat, 2008, p. 93). It can be argued that Faisal’s
weakness could have been one of the reasons that pushed him to approach
and form links with the former Sharifian officers9. It can be argued that the
8 One of the significant problems that both the British and Faisal faced in the beginning years of
their rule was the power of the tribes, which was above the ability of the young state to handle,
to the degree that the government possessed about fifteen thousand guns, while the average
number of guns which were possessed by tribes is estimated to be one hundred thousand (see
Allawi, 2014, 537).
9 It has been noted that the modern Iraqi state mainly stood on two fundamental pillars: first
were the Sharifian officers who had studied in the military academic school in Istanbul and
participated with Faisal’s father (Sharif Hussain) in the Arab revolt in Hejaz against the
Ottomans, which resulted in their later taking positions of hegemony in almost all of the critical
offices of the state; second, the Shaikhs, or tribal leaders, who had control of the social and
economic position in Iraqi society. The cabinet was dominated by the Sharifian officers, and the
council (parliament) by the tribal Shaikhs (see Mufti, 1993, p. 18, 37).
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British, through different policies, supported the Sunni minority in Iraq against
the domination of the majority (al-Alawi, 1999, p148). Fomenting the internal
divisions resulted in a winning policy for Britain, which managed to keep Iraq
under its colonial control for a long period. This policy showed its successes
especially during the monarchy period, when King Faisal, the Iraqi ruling class,
and especially the sometime Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, showed their support
to the British.
Since the beginning of the Iraqi state, the ruling elite kept a strict control of
the army, which witnessed a significant expansion during the period of the
mandate, when it increased from 3,500 to 12,000 men (Eisenstadt and
Mathewson, 2003, p. 7). In addition, the number of Iraqi officers increased from
12,000 to 43,300 between 1932 and 1941 (Tripp, 2002, p. 78). These officers
later played a major role in shaping policies of the Iraqi state with the support of
both the British and King Faisal.
Furthermore, Marr (2012, p. 43) points out that the military institution grew
rapidly in both size and effect. From 1921 to 1958, the monarchical era
witnessed 58 ministerial cabinets which were chaired by 23 persons, 15 of them
belonging to the military. In addition the army which dominated the political
process was also under the control of the Arab Sunnis, who used it as an
instrument in domestic political conflicts or against other Iraqi components, such
as the Kurds and the Assyrians. This made the military institution appear as a
non-national and sometimes repressive, ethnic and sectarian organisation. The
same was true regarding the executive authority; the Shi’a received premiership
only five times out of 59 ministerial cabinets throughout the monarchy era,
which accounts for 8.78 percent even though they constituted the majority. In all
these cases they were called to rule the country in the event of serious political
crises. For example, Salih Jabir was selected as a first Shi’a prime minister
when, in 1947, the Iraqi state wanted to sign the Portsmouth Agreement against
the wishes of the majority of the Iraqi people (al-Alawi, 1990, 200). However,
the signing of the Portsmouth Agreement led to the end of both Salih’s cabinet
and the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948.
Thus it could be concluded that the British, instead of building social and
economic structures, tried to build the Iraqi state through building a military
institution that was loyal to them. Therefore, they saw the army as a backbone
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of the new state and national integration, which has been the case in many
countries in the Middle East, for instance Turkey. This model of state-building
produced a number of negative outcomes: first, the domination of army
characteristics on the social, legal, and political institutions, which led to the
destruction of Iraqi civil society. Second, the hegemony of the army paved the
ground for marginalising the constitution and meanwhile gave less attention to
the peaceful transition of power, which situated the Iraqi political process in the
trench of military coups. Third, the military hegemony led to the emergence of
ambitions of military expansion, especially toward the neighbouring countries.
Fourth and most importantly, the Sunni domination on the Army deepened
ethnic and sectarian division within the state.
2.1.3. The dominance of a single identity and the lack of a
citizenship framework
One of the most serious problems that both the British and King Faisal
faced during the formation of the modern Iraqi state was how to incorporate the
diversity of ethnic and religious identities, in particular the Shi’a Arabs, the
Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. However, these three groups have never
constituted a monolithic political entity, and usually have been divided politically,
socially and economically (see Nakash, 2003, p.277). Each of these
components forms the majority percentage in their territorial provinces, with the
vast majority of Shi’as living in Basra, Sunnis in Baghdad and Kurds in Mosul. In
some academic literature there has been a debate arguing that the British
preferred the Sunnis to the other Iraqi components, especially the Shi’a and
Kurds, who formed around 80 percent of the Iraqi population. This claim of
Sunni preference is made on the pretext that both the Shi’a and Kurds formed
the ignorant majority, or did not have the ability to run the state (see Elliot, 1996;
Eisenstadt and Mathewson, 2003; Mufti 1993), which is very questionable. In
fact, the hegemony of Sunnis in the monarchy period was not because of the
above claim but is instead attributable to two main factors. First, when the
British first invaded Basra and later Baghdad and Mosul, they came to the
territories that had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for three hundred years,
which meant that the British came on the legacy of the Ottomans. Visser (2009,
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p. 146) points out that in 1880, when the Ottomans were ruling these areas,
they were very concerned about the spreading of Shi’ism in the eastern part of
their empire. Furthermore, they commented in their reports about “the day- to-
day spread of Shi’ism in Iraq (Hitta-i Irak’de Siilik yevman fa yevman tavsi ettegi
olup)” (Visser, 2009, p. 146). Also in 1907, there was a cabinet decision to
“strengthen dogma and Sunnism in Iraq, (Hitta-i Irak’de ittikad ve sunniligin
takviyesi)”, and this increased the payment of Sunni preachers in Basra and
Baghdad (cited in Visser, 2009, p.146).
Despite the Ottoman authorities’ attempts to reduce Shi’i activities through
the implementation of different policies, these actually increased during the
second half of the nineteenth century (see Nakash, 2003, p. 42). Due to the
remoteness of Iraq from the centre of the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, it was
difficult to control Shi’ism. In addition, the Iranian pressures from 1508 to 1638
helped the spread of Shi’ism in the country. With the British occupation of Basra
in 1914, Ottoman rule became nominal (Nakash, 2003, p. 34). However, the
British model followed the legacy of the Ottoman Empire as it was, and kept it
as a de facto process for building the new Iraqi state. The British believed that
to hold these three diverse provinces, they mainly needed a central and strong
coherent government (Eisenstaedt and Matheson, 2003, p. 70). On the other
hand, a united Iraq also would facilitate the process of controlling tribes and tax
collection for the new state; as well as this, the unified Iraq would impose the
acceptance of the authority of the centre on the Shi’a and the Kurds.
The British also played the sectarian chord during the building of their
framework of the modern Iraqi state. For example, Gertrude Bell (who became
very influential with regard to British imperial policy-making) clearly
demonstrated this in one of her letters, when she suggested that “Sunni Mosul
must be retained as a part of the Mesopotamian state in order to adjust the
[sectarian] balance .... I don't for a moment doubt that the final authority must be
in the hands of the Sunnis, in spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you
will have a mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil’’ (Visser, 2008,
p. 87). This may be evidence for why Sunni Mosul, which was where the vast
majority of the Kurds were living, had been annexed to the new Iraqi state, in
order to keep a sectarian balance between the Shi'a and the Sunnis. This was
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the form that the British depended on for making the Iraqi nation state (See
Visser, 2008, p. 83-99).
There is evidence to support the contention that both the Shi’a and the
Kurds had taken a strong stand against the British occupation, especially at the
beginning of the mandate. For instance, during the British mandate, Iraq
witnessed a number of revolts against British occupation, in particular during the
1920 revolution. Most of these revolts were by the Kurds and the Shi’a, for
example the Kurdish revolts in 1919-1920, 1923-1924, 1931-1932, and the
Shi’a uprising from 1935-1936 (see Kadhim, 2012, pp. 50, 70; Eisenstaedt and
Matheson, 2003, p. 68). It is arguable that these revolts are evidence that both
the Shi’a and the Kurds did not accept the British form of the new Iraqi state.
Many Shi’a even preferred direct rule by the British, or even separation from the
new country, due to the fact that they knew well that modern Iraq would lead to
the dominance of the Sunnis (Mufti, 1993, p.34).
With regard to the Kurds, they were never pleased with the formation of
new Iraq. They regarded their annexation to the new state as having been
forced upon them, and at the same time as a kind of betrayal, since they had
been promised by the League of Nations an independent territory, as had been
specified in the Sèvres Treaty in August 1920 (Kirmanj, 2010, p.45). However,
the Assyrians also demanded that London give them autonomy, while Iraq’s
Jews sought a guarantee of British citizenship10 (see Mufti, 1993, p34). Indeed,
the citizenship issue remained a huge challenge for the modern Iraqi state. This
problem can be seen as far back as the time of Midhat Pasha, governor of
Baghdad between 1869-1871, who attempted to reform the country after the
10 Despite the kind of tolerance that existed in the early years of the monarchy period in Iraq, as
Bashkin (2009, p.193) addresses; however, the Jews in Iraq were not considered Iraqi citizens
and were singled out as a threat to the Iraqi state. For example, Nuri al-Said, who had a
prominent role in monarchic Iraq, threatened the Jewish population with expulsion if
Palestinians refugees were not return to their homes after the creation of the State of Israel in
1948. This threat later turned into an offer to exchange them with an equivalent number of
Palestinian refugees, and to have their confiscated properties assigned to the Palestinians to
compensate for what they lost in Palestine (see Tripp, 2002, p.125).
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ideas of western liberalism. He established new military schools in Baghdad
from which Shi’a were excluded (al-Alawi, 1990, p. 171).
The case was even harder for ethnic minorities under the monarchist regime;
and most of them were concerned about the creation of the modern Iraqi state.
This fear became quite clear when the Iraqi state got its independence from the
League of Nations in 1932. Kurds and other minorities, such as Assyrians,
Yazidis, Jews, and to lesser extent Turkomans, asked both the British and the
League of Nations for international protection. This pushed the Assyrians to
hold a general conference in Mosul, where they asked for a ‘special
consideration’, or to be allowed to migrate to Syria or outside the Middle East
(see Tripp, 2002, p. 75). As a reaction to the Assyrians’ demands, in 1933 the
Iraqi armed forces committed a massacre in Mosul, which led to the escape of a
large group of Assyrians to Syria (Davis, 2005, p.61). The case of Assyrians
and Jews can be an outstanding example when Nuri al-Said, Iraqi prime
minister issued an ordinance number 62 of August 1933 and ordered the
withdrawal of Iraqi citizenship from thousands of Assyrians; laws number 1 in
1950, number 5 in 1951 and number 12 in 1963 also deprived thousands of
Jews of Iraqi citizenship and confiscated their properties (Kreyenbroek, & Sperl,
1991, p. 102). These processes have also been systematically applied by both
republican and Ba’ath regimes against the Kurds and the Shi’a.
However, in general the integration process in the monarchical era as
noticed by Batatue (1978, pp.27-32) and Marr, (2012, p.122) was positive, in
particular in the last decade of the monarchy. However, this process had been
mostly characterised by inclusive and coercive policies (Jabar, 2003, p.56); for
instance, the political level was through national institutions, such as schools,
the army and the parliament. On the level of infrastructure was the construction
of roads, railway and steamboats. Moreover, tribes begun for the first time to
settle down, and tribal Sheikhs transformed into land-owning class. It is true that
the social and economic interests of the middle class were on growth (see
Jabar, 2003, p.58). However, at the level of representation, both Shi'a and Kurd
were not totally integrated in the process of decision making in the constitutional
monarchy.
To an extent, both the British and King Faisal were well aware of the
marginalisation of the Shi’a and Kurds, but in fact little or nothing was done by
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the monarchic governments to address this historical predicament (see Elliot,
1996, p. 19). This was emphasised by King Faisal himself; he acknowledged in
his memoirs that Iraq was a Sunni kingdom, ruled by a Sunni Arab government,
and that there was a gap between people because of the sectarian divisions
which were created by persecution that was inflicted upon the Shi’a by Ottoman
rule, and that the Shi’a were not able to participate in government institutions
(see Allawi, 2014, p. 536-537; al-Urzi, n.d. p. 2-4). Given this evidence, it can be
seen that the ethnic and religious issue was an obstacle to Iraq's state
formation during the monarchical era.
2.1.4. The mobilisation of tribes
One of the other pillars of the British model of state-building in the
monarchy period was the utilisation of the tribal powers within traditional Iraqi
society, a strategy the British inherited from the Ottomans. However, tribal
power became more systematic in the monarchic period, due to British success
in shifting tribal power from the traditional structure to a type of political deal
between tribal leaders, such as Shaikhs and Aghas, and state institutions. This
was through the stipulation that the new state (Iraq) would support the tribal
powers, provide them with privileges and involve them in government
institutions, provided that the tribes obeyed the new state (see Batatu, 1978, pp.
88, 319).
It can be said that the British built their relations with Iraqi society through
tribal Shaikhs, and they dealt with Iraq as a pre-modern and rural society. The
British had applied the policy of subsidising Shaikhs to the extent that “some
Shaikhs had received a monthly subsidy and occasionally the right to regulate
the movement of any Bedouin from his designated area to markets and urban
centres” (Dodge, 2003, p. 84). For example, Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, received
a monthly subsidy of Rs. 12000. The policy faced opposition from Iraqi cabinets
because it increased the Shaikhs’ power, jeopardising the government’s
authority. In order to control the Shaikhs’ power, the first Iraqi Assembly decided
to concede 20 percent of its seats to elected Shaikhs. The result was that out of
a total of 99 members, 34 were Shaikhs (Batatu 1978, p. 95).
56 | P a g e
Batatu (1978, p.101) comments that “the tribes between 1941-1958 were
largely in harmony with the government; and following the mid-1930s and the
events of 1941, the authority stopped trusting the army and relied on the tribal
leaders” . Indeed, not just the government but also the political parties tried to
link with tribal leaders. For example, the Prime Minister Nuri al-Said reserved 17
out of 46 of the parliamentary seats of his party (the Constitutional Union) to the
tribes.
Dodge (2003, p.5) has drawn attention to the fact that the British, through
their model of state-building in Iraq, had been preoccupied with two main
arguments; should the state have a direct linkage with individuals, or should it
be ruled by “tribal organisations” and their local leaders? However, it seems that
the British chose the second way, because the first required a powerful civil
society and the individual’s power, when in fact Iraqi society lacked both of
these factors in the monarchic period. In the meantime, it would be costly to the
British in both manpower and money. In addition, this way might take a long
time without any guarantees of its success.
Furthermore, the intermarriage between the Sherifian elite and tribal
Shaikhs, especially Shi'i tribal leaders of the mid-Euphrates alongside ex-
Sharifyan officers, constituted a backbone of the Faisal I regime, and it
continued practically until the fall of the monarchy in 1958, through an
“independent legal system” that the British established exclusively for the tribes
(Fattah, 2009, p.164). However, the military was sometimes been against tribal
elements, especially in order to contain any Shi’i interference. This happened in
particular during the governments of Yasin al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Said and Ja’far
al-Askari (see, Salame, 1997, p.151).
The British dependence on tribes in general and Shaikhs in particular can
be understood by two reasons. First, some of the British officials, especially
Gertrude Bell (1868–1926), the Eastern secretary to the high commissioner,
viewed tribes as a main pillar of political power in the Arab countries. This view
was originally part of the Europeans’ understanding of the Middle East between
the 1920s and 1930s (Fattah, 2009. p.168). Second, the British believed that
“[the shaikh] was the readiest medium at hand on which [the British] could carry
on the administration of the countryside” (Batatu, 1978, p. 88).
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From this point of view, it can be argued that modern Iraq from 1921 to
1958 had been ruled through the indirect marriage between the military elite,
which was the Sherifian officers, and tribal leaders. Also, if the sectarian
background was a notable characteristic of the Sharifyan officers, the
monarchy's reliance on tribal leaders had not depended on the ethnic and
sectarian background of the tribal Shaikhs. As has been mentioned above, most
of the tribal leaders were from mid-Euphrates Shi'i tribes. Meanwhile, the tribal
backgrounds of the Sherifian officers were most likely a supporting factor to the
political elite. As well as this, the hegemony of tribes impeded democratic
growth, especially within the Iraqi social structure.
2.1.5. Use of violence and ineffectiveness of the constitution
One of the other aspects of political life which had latterly been deeply
involved in the process of state-building in monarchic Iraq was the use of
violence in political conflicts. The initial steps of using the army against the Iraqi
people had been practiced even before the inventing of the Iraqi state by the
British, for example in the 1920 revolution in which mass bombing had been
used against Kurdish tribes, which later produced a model for the Anfal
campaigns that was systematically practiced by Saddam’s regime in the late
eighties (see Kadhim, 2012, pp. 21, 22).
It can be said, in the absence of a national army, and the existence of
political, ethnical and sectarian conflicts, and at the same time the domination of
an oligarchic military elite on the monarchist Iraqi state, that all of these factors
produced a model of the state which has used violence against its own citizens.
For example in 1920, the army had been used against Shi’i tribal rebellions and
later against the Kurds, and also in 1935 and 1936, the army was used for
quelling the Shi’a insurgencies, as well as against the Assyrians, which was
known as the Assyrian pogrom in 1933 (see Eisenstaedt and Matheson, 2003,
p.31). All of these mentioned events confirm the use of violence for ethnic,
sectarian and political aims in support of the Sunni elite. In addition to the
above, the military coups in 1936, 1941 and finally in 1958 led to the end of the
monarchist system, and violence intensified in the structure of all successive
political systems in the modern Iraqi state.
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One of the serious problems that monarchic Iraq had to face was the
application of the constitution as a contract between the ruling class and the
citizens. Despite Iraq being a constitutional monarchy, the King along with the
Sunni oligarchy constituted the real basis of political power. This was due to the
fact that the 1925 constitution was imposed by a committee of British advisors
operating in the Iraqi ministry of justice. The Iraqi constitution was based on a
number of constitutional experiences of other countries, including Persia,
Turkey, Belgium, New Zealand and Australia (Eisenstad, and Mathewson,
2003, p. 19). However, the monarchical constitution ratified by the King in 1925
gave him ample powers; for example, any parliamentary law could not be
passed without his consent, and at the same time the government had to refer
to the king and not to the parliament, leaving it and the other components of
Iraq’s government without any power.
In this context, the constitution and electoral law were often criticised by
the Shi’a. For example, the main request of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)
founded by Salih al-Jabr in 1951 was that the parliament members should be
elected directly by the people (see Nakash, p. 131). Both the Shi’a and the
Kurds criticised the electoral law as well as the official lists of candidates to the
parliament. This was because, despite the existence of election lists, the
government and the king usually had their own lists, transforming the parliament
into a powerless institution. This led to the nomination of the candidates
favoured by the government and the king weakening the legislative power and
strengthening the executive. This tendency would go on to have a very
detrimental effect on Iraq’s most recent history, paving the way to the cycle of
violence affecting the whole society and preventing the country from developing
a modern civil society.
2.1.6. The failure of reforms
As a result of many structural problems that became a part of modern
monarchist Iraq, as have been stated above, both the British and King Faisal
were aware and did not hide their concerns over the mismanagement of political
processes in this period. Consequently, in 1932, King Faisal called for quick
reforms in several areas (Khadduri, 1951, p36-37), such as, 1) increasing the
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size of the armed forces and their logistic capabilities, to an extent that they had
the ability to face danger on multiple fronts at the same time, which could
happen in two different parts of Iraq; 2) giving political guarantees for equalities
between the two main religious sects, Shi’a and Sunni, as well as other non-
Islamic religious minorities; 3) increasing the power of the provinces and
municipal councils; and 4) making a separation between the executive and
legislative power, aside from other reforms in the areas of education and the
health system.
Muhammad Husain Kashif al-Ghita’s project can be seen as one of these
attempts, when he called for the resignation from parliament of the Shi’i
members appointed by the government and asked for a direct, democratic
election (see al-Alawi, 1990, p. 346, 347, 348). A great number of Arab tribal
leaders, especially Shi’a leaders in Najaf, responded positively to this call. It can
be said that this general reform project was meant to tackle the traditional
oligarchic sectarian and institutional attitude towards the Shi’a. Another main
purpose of the project was to amend the election law and give a greater role
and representation to the Shi’as. This could give them the opportunity to have a
highly active role in governmental institutions11. However, the project was not
successful, and was opposed even by a group of Shi’a leaders involved in the
monarchic government.
The evidence seems to be strong that both the British and King Faisal
depended on Nuri al-Said and his parliament to achieve these reforms, as a
response to the opposition parties that called many times for reforms. But
indeed, neither Nuri nor the others in the government had the intention to carry
out these reforms, and this pushed the British ambassador Sir Michael Wright in
July 1957, to describe Nuri al-Said as “no reformer”, and that Nuri did not
belong to the same school as Ataturk insofar as introducing reforms that would
have a significant impact on government and society (Elliot, 1996, p.165). On
the other hand, the relationship between the state structure and the
permanence of colonialism in monarchic Iraq made any reform efforts very
dangerous, due to the alliance between the Iraqi unified oligarchic elite and their
links with the British.
11 The Kashif al-Ghita’ project included 12 articles and was presented to King Ghazi and Prime
Minister Yasin al-Hashimi in March 1935 (al-Alawi, 1990, p. 346, 347).
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Thus, it can be concluded that the British and the monarchist regime failed
for more than three decades to build up an appropriate framework for the
process of state-building and governance which could encompass all the
different factions of Iraqi people. It is worth considering that the monarchic
regime remained to a high extent estranged from its population, in particular
from its middle class. Thus, as Batatu states, the monarchic state from its
creation to its downfall was an oligarchic system: “there was often no close
correspondence between the local distribution of wealth and local distribution of
power” (cited in Ismael, 2008, p.16). Furthermore, the identity of the monarchist
state remained an ethno-sectarian identity. Aside from this, as Ghasan Salame
(1997, p. 86) points out, the process of material transformation and state-
building in Iraq did not produce a civil society or class to base the state upon,
and therefore the state remained weak and resorted to coercive means to
impose its hegemony on society. Meanwhile, as Dodge (2006, p.187) observes,
"the British colonial officials never had the resources to transform the despotic
power deployed by the state into sustainable infrastructural capacity”.
Given the aforementioned, it can be argued that monarchical Iraq was a
political deal amongst tribes and the Sharifian officers on the one hand, and the
King and the British on the other, on the base of the distribution of power and
interests among these parties. Having the political contract among these
powers instead of the social contract between the Iraqi people and the political
system produced a model of state which lost its political and social legitimacy
and ability to impose order and stability. Thus, it can be argued that the logical
conclusion in monarchist Iraq was the rule of a limited elite that can be called a
Sunni military oligarchy, which struggled with power and monopolised the state
institutions.
2.2. Iraqi state-building in the republican era (1958-2003)
The republican regime was the product of a military coup carried out on 14
July 1958 and headed by Abdulkarim Qasim and General Abd al-Salam Arif.
This had massive popular support and was influenced by the struggle against
British colonialism and the monarchic system. Furthermore, this event cannot
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be separated from regional events, such as the emergence of liberation and
nationalist movements in the Arab world, in particular the influences of the
Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the Syrian coup in 1954 (see Al-Qarawee,
2012, pp. 91, 95). This period has been divided into various segments by
historians and political scholars12, whilst this study prefers to divide this period
of the modern Iraqi state into three main stages, as each of these stages had its
own vision of the political, social and economic process which directly affected
the state-building process in Iraq for a long time after.
2.2.1 The first decade of the republican era (1958-1968)
The revolutionary era, or more precisely Qasim’s military republic in 1958,
was a political-military reaction to the monarchist system and imperialism, which
depended to a great extent on the mass mobilisation that manufactured a
specific form of political chaos. This simultaneously produced a radical
paradigm of organized violence (see Bayat, 2013, p.8). The 1958 coup
produced two salient realities in Iraqi political life which later drew the
parameters of the political process in Iraq. First, both military power and the
military elite emerged as vital sources of political power. Second, “mass
mobilisation” was used as a mechanism in political conflicts (Anderson and
Stansfield 2005, p.33). The use of the masses became an easy instrument for
creating political crises and confrontations, which finally led to the fall of
Qasim’s regime in 1963.
Qasim tried especially in the early years of his rule to find a way to create
a common Iraqi identity for all the components of Iraqi society. The creation of a
three-man sovereignty council, in which was represented the three main Iraqi
elements of Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab and Kurd, was a first step towards shrinking
12 For example, there are many studies that divide the Iraqi state regimes according to their
political systems, such as first republican in 1958, second republican after 8 February 1963,
third republican after 18 November 1963 and fourth republican after 17 July 1968. Others have
depended on the role of the leaders of the political system; for example Marr (2012) has divided
these periods according the role of the leaders, such as the Qasim era 1958-1963, the Arab
nationalists in power 1963-1968, the era of Ba'ath Party rule 1968-1979, the Saddam Husain
regime 1979-1989 and the second period of Saddam’s regime 1990-2003.
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the hegemony of a single identity in the political process (see Rubin, 2007,
p.357) . Initially the Kurds looked favourably on Qasim’s regime, because they
saw it as an opportunity to solve the Kurdish issue. Moreover, there was
enthusiastic support by the Kurds for Qasim, particularly when the new
temporary constitution recognised Kurds for the first time besides Arabs as
partners in the new Iraqi state (article 3) (Marr, 2012, p. 104-105)13. However,
this development between Qasim and the Kurds under the leadership of
Mustafa Barzani did not last long, and on 9 September 1961 Qasim’s regime
ordered the aerial bombardment of Kurdistan region which led to a Kurdish
uprising. In addition, on 23 September of the same year the KDP party was
banned in Baghdad and a number of its leaders were arrested (see Ismael,
2008, p. 103).
Although the representation of the middle class improved under Qasim's
regime, especially through achieving their social and economic interests, the
percentage of Shi'i ministers was no more than 17.7 percent of the ministerial
appointments in the first decade of monarchy, whereas it reached 34.7 percent
in the last decade of the monarchy (Batatu, 1987, p.209). However, the new
military regime destroyed the old ruling class and interrupted the process of
national integration that had emerged in the monarchy era, especially when the
new regime's officer corps was historically dominated by Sunnis (Jabar, 2003,
p.58). So, despite the expectations that the majority of Iraqi people had from
Qasim's regime, the regime failed to represent the ethnic and religious diversity
of Iraqi society. The aftermath of the 1958 revolution witnessed the emergence
of Shi'a Islamic movement. The revival of the Shi'a movement after 1958 was
mainly a reaction to the Qasim government's social and economic reforms on
the one hand, and the intensive secular and leftist policies of the new regime on
the other (Al-Qarawee, 2012, p.102). This had provoked conservative and
religious Shi'a elements to support the new Shi'a movement. Qasim's land
distribution law shocked the landlords, tribal leaders and wealthy Shi'a, and was
another reason for the rising Shi'a religious movement. A Shi'a cleric Muhsin al-
Hakim issued a fatwa (religious decree) against communism which later
13 The Kurds played a major role in suppressing the revolt of Abd al-Wahab al-Shawaf against
Qasim’s regime in Mosul in 1959, when thousands of Kurds volunteered to fight the insurgency
(see Shuman, 2013, p. 85).
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contributed actively to the formation of the Shi'a Islamic party (Marr, 2004,
p.103).
The revival of the Shi'a movement, then, was not reaction to the sectarian
discrimination against the Shi'a, but as Jabar (2003, p.75) observed was a
direct response to the shift that was occurred as a result of the shift of socio-
political power from the old landowning and clerical elite to the modern middle
class. In particular, three main reasons provoked Shi'a clerics to take an
oppositional stand against Qasim's regime: the demise of the Sheikhly landlord
class, the new Family Law and the spread of communism among Shi'as of
lower and middle class14. The Shi'a clerics viewed Marxism as a threat to Islam
and at the same time to the source of their social power (Jabar, 2003, p.75).
Nevertheless, communism attracted significant sympathy among Shi'as,
especially from of the lower and middle classes. The Shi'a adherence to
communism grew gradually from late 1940s and 1950s, as well as after the
revival of Shi'a Islamic movement in the 1960s and 1970s in Iraq, mainly
because of the deprivation of the new Shi'a generation and their exclusion from
the political process (Naqash, 2003, p.132). The Shi'a attraction to the
communism in 1950s was mainly because of the failure of Pan-Arabism to
become a political and national framework for Iraqi Shi'a, since the Pan-Arabists
were mostly Sunni urban politicians whose interests different from those of the
Shi'as (Naqash, 2003, p. 133). Communism was favoured by some Shi'a
because of its principles, such as equality among Iraq's different classes and
ethnic and religious groups. To an extent during the revolutionary years 1958-
59, Shi'as had a significant weight within the communist party, including the
office of First Secretary and positions such as secretaries of Baghdad, the Mid-
14 Apart from the agrarian sector, Qasim also touched an important aspect in Iraqi society
through organising family relations in a form of new Personal Status Law in December 1959,
which was traditionally controlled by Islamic law (Al-Shari'a Al-Islamiyya). The new law limited
the right of polygamy, which was widely spread in Iraqi society. According to the new law, men
were not allowed to take a second wife without the permission of a judge. Also articles 8 and 9
set a minimum age for marriage at eighteen. Furthermore article 74 of the new law provided
women with equal rights with men regarding inheritance issues, and the code applied to both
Shi'a and Sunni (see Marr, 2004, p.100). The new family law aroused significant opposition
among religious leaders, clerics, 'Ulamas, and conservative citizens, which later contributed to
the revival of the Shi'a Islamic movement against Qasim.
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Euphrates region, the Farmers' Bureau and the Military Organization of the
communist party. It is true that communist Shi'a acted primarily as communists;
but they kept their Shi'a identity clear and did not deny it (Batatu, 1987, p. 209).
However, it is important to know that the emergence of Da'wa party and the
dominance of Ba'athist after Arif's coup d'état in 1963 limited the Shi'as’ weight
within both the communist party and the Ba'ath party, which was later gradually
reflected in the weaking of Shi'a representation in the state institutions. This
began to raise the sectarian question across the whole of Iraq's political system.
Despite the short period of Qasim’s rule, there was an attempt by Qasim to
carry out essential reforms in a number of aspects of government, particularly in
the service sector and civil rights. With regard to service aspects, the number of
hospitals increased significantly by 25 percent between 1957 and 1963, and
also the education field experienced an outstanding development; for example,
the number of primary and secondary schools increased from 520,000 in 1958
to 930,000 in 1960 (Eppel, 2004, p.158). Furthermore, the issuance of the law
of associations and political parties in 1961 had an important effect on the
expansion of association and political parties. This created a public sphere in
which freedoms could be exercised, but unfortunately did not last long15.
Based on the abovementioned argument, it can be said that both King
Faisal’s and Qasim’s attempts can be located in the field of nation-building and
state-building processes at the same time. The creation of the Iraqi state in
1921 was an attempt to make a nation-state through integrating various
religious and ethnic identities. That is to say, in Iraq the processes of building a
nation-state and state-building accompanied each other. However, considering
Iraq’s multi-ethnic and religious character, these processes were not easy work.
It is true that most of the earliest modern state-building examples in Europe
have gone through a similar process (Ayoob, 1995, p.24). However, as Smith
(1983, p.11) points out, ''the Western model is essentially a 'state system' rather
than a nation system''. The model of the state that the British built in Iraq was
highly based on Arab nationality, and within the Arab nationality on a narrow
15 In January 1961 for the first time in the Arab world a woman (Dr. Naziha Dulaymi) was
appointed as a government minister when she was made head of the protection of women’s
rights ministry in Iraq (see, Eppel, 2004).
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Sunni identity, which was magnified in particular from 1963 onwards, and
reached a peak under the rule of the Ba'ath party.
From this point of view, the Pan-Arabist ideology had challenged Qasim’s
regime both internally and externally16; internally he had to deal with the
criticism of the Ba'athist and nationalist parties regarding his alleged
engagement with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). On the other hand, after the
Mosul revolt, the ICP pushed Qasim to provide them with a greater role in the
government (Ismael, 2008, p. 87). Externally, the regional challenges remained
a huge threat for him.  For example, in 1958 the United Arab Republic (UAR)
accused him of anti-Arab sentiments. In addition, he faced further isolation
when after 1961 he warned Kuwait that the 1899 agreement between Britain
and Kuwait was illegal (Ismael, 2008, p. 102). This attitude caused the enmity of
Arab countries and his internal enemies took advantage of it in order to weaken
his regime.
It can be said that Qasim had many opportunities to ensure the process of
Iraqi state building was moving in the right direction. There were a number of
reasons for this. First, Qasim gained great popular support, especially in the
earlier years of his rule (Marr, 2012, p. 104-105). Particularly popular among the
wide base of rural and landowning peasants, was his Agrarian Reform Law of
redistribution of land which Qassim declared on 30th of September 1958 (see
Batatu, p.837). Second, Qasim’s family background was mixed Sunni, Shi’a,
and Kurd (Batatu, p. 836). This gave him a kind of trust from these three main
components, which could have produced the political stability needed to build
national institutions. However, this period on the contrary paved the way for the
new model of governance which relied primarily on violence and military coups.
This can be traced back firstly to the conflict between the Communist Party and
the Ba'athists, second to the hegemony of the military on the political process
which eased the way to the military coups, and third to the fact that Qasim failed
to find a solution to the Kurdish issue, as well as displaying the inability to
integrate the Shi'a into the political process. All these factors paved the way for
a military coup which was led by Ba'athists and nationalists on 8 January 1963
and put an end to Qasim’s regime in a tragic and brutal way.
16 Qasim was not an ideological leader, especially in the beginning (Batatu 1978, pp. 808–809).
However, he soon became a believer in Iraqi nationalism.
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The coup immediately installed the National Council of the Revolution
Command (NCRC), which was headed by Abd al-Salam Arif. The Ba’athists
controlled the most important positions in both the council and cabinet, including
the Prime Minister Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (see, Marr, 2012, p.16; Anderson
and Stansfield, 2005, p. 39). As Marr (2012) points out, the Ba’athists made a
great shift in Iraqi state policy towards the Pan-Arabism model. This step was
attractive to the youth, who were very enthusiastic toward Arab integration;
however, this enthusiasm was used negatively, and even caused great damage
to the process of state-building in Iraq. Under Arif's rule the Shi'a's sense of
exclusion was exacerbated, in particular through the Sunnization of the political
elite. As has been discussed earlier, despite the tendency of the ethnic and
sectarian outlook under both monarchy and Qasim's regime, both Shi'a and
Kurd had their representation in the state institutions. However, from 1963
onwards the political map of Iraqi leadership started to shift toward Sunni
domination: for example among the new Ba'ath leadership of November 1963
there were only three Shi'a, whereas the Sunnis’ seats were 15. Prior to 1963
the percentage of Shias was 38.5 with 7.5 for the Kurds (al-Fukaiki, 1993, 352).
Despite the aforementioned issue, this period witnessed two state-building
attempts; the first step started in 1964 with the launching of a new law which led
to the process of nationalising all banks and insurance companies, and
industries such as cement and cigarette companies. Also, the government
controlled the distribution of commodities, like cars, tea, sugar and
pharmaceuticals (Marr, 2012, p.125). The second step was led by the al-Bazzaz
government in September 1965, by reducing the influence of military officers in
the government; he also tried to alter the direction of the Iraqi economy from the
public sector to the private sector, especially by encouraging the industrial
sector (Eppil, 2004, p. 227). Through this initiative al-Bazzaz may have hoped
that he could decrease the influence of the army elite in the government
institutions, in favour of the elite civilian bureaucrats of which he was one.
However, both Arif brothers’ efforts failed to address outstanding
problems, in particular the Kurdish problem, to which both brothers promised to
find an appropriate solution during the 12-point peace plan in June 1966, which
was indeed a good initiative for solving Kurdish question. However, the plan
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was immediately withdrawn, and both the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish people
paid a price for this step; in addition, the continuity of ethno-sectarian
discrimination reached a peak. Between 1958 to 1968, of the 38 political
leaders only six were Arab Shi’a and only two were Kurds (Anderson and
Stansfield, 2005, p.40). Also, the Ba'ath party had totally dominated the political
process and state institutions. The core of real power was concentrated in the
National Revolutionary Command. Out of the eighteen members who
constituted the council, sixteen were Pan-Arab Ba'athists (Batatu, p. 1003). It is
not an exaggeration to say that the era of Abdul Salam Arif’s was the most
ethno-sectarian ever seen in Iraq, especially for the Shi’as and the Kurds17. The
first and second republic deepened the rifts among the Iraqi people on the basis
of their ethnic and religious differences.
2.2.2 The era of Ba'ath Party rule (1968-2003)
The Ba'athist period is one of the most influential periods in the life of the
Iraqi state and society, particularly for the process of state-building, in terms of
both the length of Ba'athist rule and the establishing of roots of the totalitarian
regime, which later penetrated deeply into all facets of the Iraqi state. The coup
of 17 July 1968 reinforced the hegemony of two Ba'athist figures. The first was
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, who became prime minister and the president of the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) on 30 July 1968; and the second figure
was Saddam Hussein, who became the deputy to al-Bakr (Marr, 2012, p.138).
Both figures (Bakr from 1968 until 1979 and Saddam from 1979 to 2003)
shaped the parameters of the Iraqi state.
The first decade of the Ba'athist model produced three essential changes
in the new political system (Marr, 2012, p.139): first, the RCC (Revolutionary
17 Abd al-Salam’s regime did not keep its promise to resolve the Kurdish issue. On the contrary,
it encouraged the higher Shi’i religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Mohsin al-Hakim, to issue a
fatwa in order to support the fighting against Kurds. However, Ayatollah Mohsin al-Hakim
refused to issue it. In the same way, the amended law of 1930 number 130, called the law of
inheritance tax, excluded the Shi’a from the tax break conceded to other components when
funding their own schools, on the pretext that the Shi’a schools were informal institutions (see,
Shuman, 2013, p. 97).
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Command Council) was fully controlled by the army; second, the RCC was also
dominated by the Tikriti clan; and third, the government was completely
monopolised by the Ba'athists. It could be seen that the Ba'ath regime in the
earlier years focused mainly on two major planks to strengthen the structure of
their power. The first step was based on the concerted plan to liquidate the
Ba'ath’s opponents, such as Ba'athist members whose loyalties were
questionable in the Ba'athist leadership’s eyes; in addition, thousands of
communists were murdered or arrested (see Sassoon, 2012, pp. 222-223). The
second step was openness over the Kurdish issue. It is well known that a part of
the breakdown of both Qasim’s and Arif’s regimes has been attributed to the
instability in the north (Kurdistan). That is why the outcome of this plan was the
manifesto of 11 March 1970, which adopted for the first time the “autonomy” of
Kurdistan, and also was a good step towards dealing with the Kurdish issue.
This step provided Kurds with a chance to benefit from a number of social and
cultural rights, in particular in education. But the 11 March agreement, like other
agreements with the Kurds, was never implemented; on the contrary, Iraq
reached another agreement with Iran known as the Algiers Agreement in
197518. The agreement completely eliminated the peace process between the
Kurds and the Iraqi government. Further, Mustafa Barzani and the Kurds were
accused of being separatists, and Saddam claimed that “we were debating a
draft for autonomy and not for a new state in Iraq” (Farouk-Sluglett, 2001,
p.165).
The Ba'ath’s main project for state-building in this period was concentrated
on two major aspects: first, how to raise the military capability of the Iraqi state
to play a regional role, especially toward Arab and regional issues by relying on
Iraq’s huge oil revenue, which witnessed a significant increase in 1972 from
$575 million to $26 billion in 1980; secondly, the adoption of a long-term
economic project, particularly to improve the standard of living, alongside
18 The Algiers agreement was a severe blow to the Kurdish national movement in Iraq because
it isolated them from external assistance. The greater part of the agreement was related to the
end of Iran’s support to the Kurds, which had been a major support in that period. It can be
argued that the Iranian Shah gained a great benefit from the Algiers agreement. According to
the agreement the Shah should stop supporting the Kurds in exchange for the sovereignty over
half of the Shatt Al-Arab and three islands, while Iraq would cede the oil-rich region of
Khuzestan (see, Charountaki, 2010, p. 140; Farouk-Sluglett, 2001, p.164).
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building the military (see, Marr, 2012, p. 159). Consequently, the agricultural,
industrial and educational sectors witnessed significant progress.
With regard to the military, in 1974 the Ba'ath regime secretly planned to
establish a three-man strategic development committee in order to develop
nuclear, chemical, and later biological weapons; the committee was headed by
Saddam Hussein. The first outcome of this committee was an agreement with
France for purchasing a nuclear reactor for the purpose of research (Marr,
2012, p. 162). Furthermore, the nationalisation of Iraqi oil in 1972 played an
important role in building Iraqi military capabilities. The oil income provided the
Ba'athist regime with a great chance to impose their control on the Iraqi natural
resources and use this to extend their hegemony over both state and society to
the extent that in 1974 the total oil revenue19 reached 5.7 billion dollars (Eppel,
2004, p. 254). In 1979 oil production contributed about 63 percent of Iraq’s
GDP. According to some sources the military expenditure was 30 percent of
Iraqi GNP by 1980 (Marr, 2012, 159) - see table (1). All these steps paved the
way for the Ba'ath regime to build Iraq into a huge regional military power, which
later posed a serious threat to its neighbours.
Table (1) Oil as a percentage of Iraq's Gross Domestic Product 1960-1979 in current ID
million.
(Cited in Marr, 2012, p. 159)
19 In 1973 and 1974 the majority of Arab countries joined the oil boycott campaign against the
United States and Israel, while Iraq was the only Arab-majority country that did not join this
group. This attitude could explain the importance of this period, which was a golden period for
the Ba'athist regime to reshape Iraqi state according to their vision.
70 | P a g e
Saddam's role here cannot be ignored; he was excessively interested in
enhancing the military establishment, especially from the second period of the
Ba’ath regime onwards. The state witnessed significant growth; the
government’s size had increased 18-fold in less than a quarter of a century.
Also the number of employees and workers in the Iraqi state reached 885,000
in the early nineties (Abdul-Jabar, 1995, p. 70).
It can be said that Saddam’s project of Iraqi state-building greatly
depended on reinforcing military institutions and the Ba'ath party. This was
especially so after Saddam became an absolute leader from 1979 onward. In
the Ba'ath’s model it was difficult to distinguish between state, government and
party. As has been mentioned by Makiya (1989, pp. 40-41), both military forces
and the Ba'ath party were considerably extended. Also, alongside the military
forces, Saddam reshaped the party’s “paramilitary militia forces” in the name of
the Popular Army, al-Jaish al-Shaabi, to the extent that by 1980, the number of
this army reached 250,000, and during the Iran-Iraq War, roughly one million
members. Moreover the Ba’ath Party had deeply penetrated into all spheres of
Iraqi society. As Mufti (1996, p. 70) notes, the eyes and ears of the party were
everywhere.  In addition, the Ba'ath’s members jumped from only 5,000 in 1968
to 500,000 in 1978. .
It is, however, important to note that in addition to the military building
plan, Saddam also launched a modernisation plan in the education20,
agricultural and industrial sectors. The Ba'athist regime in 1975 paid significant
attention to the variety of modernisation, which was based on the socialist
principles of Ba'athist ideology. The plan also aimed to transform Iraq from a
developing country to a developed country (Sassoon, 2012, p.238). This plan
was based on two main aspects. First, it focused on the equitable redistribution
of wealth by constructing a kind of welfare state for its people, which might
provide some political legitimacy for the regime. The second was the
diversification of the Iraqi economy to ensure it was no longer dependent on the
single product of oil.
20 For more detail about Ba'athist political education, and the project of mass Ba'athification, see
Sassoon, 2012, p.61-71. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: inside authoritarian regime.
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It is important to underline that, Saddam's regime especially from the
1980s until 1990, did not practice economic policies based on ethnic and
religious discrimination. His view towards the economy had been through the
lense of enhancing Ba'ath party power. As Sassoon (2012, p.326) argued,
Saddam believed that the people would not reject a regime’s rule if they felt
happy and lived in a welfare state. Saddam's vision toward Iraq's economy was
neither a communist model nor a western. He explained in a simple way that
“what is the point of talking about socialism while people stay hungry?” He told
his biographer Fuad Matar, '' we believe the private sector and the socialist
sector will go hand in hand forever. They are partners in the service of society''
(Cited in Sassoon, 2012, p.3270).
By the end of 1975, the consequence of this plan was an outstanding
development, especially in building schools and hospitals, free access to health
services and providing electricity to rural places, to the extent that for the first
time in Iraqi history, 4000 villages received electricity (Anderson and Stansfield,
2005, p. 76; Marr, 2012, p. 161). These development steps had positive
outcomes. For example, in the education field the Comprehensive National
Campaign for Compulsory Education, which was announced in 1977, led to two
million Iraqis learning to read and write in 1982 (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005,
p. 77). Consequently, by the end of the 1970s the middle class had witnessed a
significant growth, especially in occupations such as doctors, engineers,
teachers, civil servants and academics, to the extent that, as Marr (2012, p.
164) has mentioned, the middle class constituted about 35 percent of the urban
population in Iraq in 1977.
However, these rapid developments of the Iraqi state under the Ba'athist
regime reflected negatively internally and externally; internally it produced an
authoritarian state, which seriously pulverised civil society; some observers
have pointed out that there was nothing called an Iraqi civil society during the
Ba'ath period (see Byman, 2003, p.59). Moreover the Ba'ath regime depended
on the most repressive means to oppress any opposing voices that could
become a source of threat to the Ba'ath regime. Saddam’s regime viewed both
Kurds and Arab Shi’a as points of weakness for the process of state-building
and growing of the Ba'athist regime, in particular during the Iran-Iraq War, which
dealt with both groups in the cruellest fashion. With regard to the Kurds, the
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Ba'ath’s regime resorted to the liquidation of Kurdish identity through forced
displacement and replacement of up to 500,000 Kurds, as well as the
destruction of 4000 Kurdish villages, and also through the infamous Anfal
Campaigns in 1987 and 1988 under the pretext of cutting the sources for the
Kurdish opposition movements (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005, p.72); in
addition, the Ba'athists used chemical weapons in Halabja city, claiming the
lives of 5000 people (including women and children) in a tragic way.
The same happened with the Shi’a in the south. The Ba'ath regime saw
the Arab Shi’a as a threat to their political system and sometimes also as
potential Iranian agents. For example, in 1980, 40,000 Shi’as “of Iranian origin”
were deported to Iran. This number increased to over 400,000 Shi’a refugees
fleeing to Iran and Syria during the Iran-Iraq War (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, p.
258). Shi’a identity was always viewed with suspicion under the Ba'ath Party,
and this sectarian discrimination reached its peak in 1991 when the Shi’a took
advantage of the Ba'athist weakness by rising up against the regime. The
Ba'ath regime used the most repressive means against the uprising, with the
number of people displaced reaching between 100,000 and 190,000, in addition
to those people who were executed and killed (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005,
p.131).
The rapid expansion of the Ba'ath hegemony in economic and military
spheres had created expansionist ambitions in the Ba'ath, and can also be
considered as a main reason that drove the Ba'ath regime to the long-term war
with its neighbour Iran in 1980 and later with Kuwait in 1990. It may be argued
that the long-term war with Iran led to the elimination of all the previous positive
efforts that were made by the Ba'ath in the 1970s. Furthermore the human and
economic costs to the Iraqi state were very substantial, and this reflected on all
aspects of the state. The number of deaths according to some western sources
is estimated at 100,000 for Iraq, and about 750,000 injured (Sluglett and
Sluglett, 2001, p. 258). The total cost of the war for Iraq was estimated at
$456.6 billion, beside the great inflation that faced the Iraqi economy after the
war, which was estimated at 45 percent by 1990 (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, p.
258).
It can be said that, after the first Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) the Ba'ath
regime became a serious threat to its neighbours. Moreover, Iraq came out of
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the Iran-Iraq War with the feeling that it had lost much of its power and prestige,
especially with respect to Iraq’s economic abilities, the destruction of the
agricultural and industrial sectors, financial trouble, and the cheapness of oil in
the global markets, in addition to the huge of debts which according to Marr
(2012, p. 207), were estimated at $90 billion. It was therefore very difficult for
such an exhausted state like Iraq to repay all these debts. All these factors
pressed Saddam’s regime to look for another crisis with which it might cover its
failures, but this time with its southern neighbour Kuwait, which was one of the
main supporters of the Ba'athist regime against Iran. The invasion of Kuwait in
1990 was another knockout blow that damaged both Iraqi state and society, to
the extent that according to some observers it cost Iraq over $170 billion in
damages (see Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, p. 288), which was again at the
expense of the Iraqi state-building process.
It can be argued, as Sassoon (2012, p.158) points out, that the period
from 1988 until 2003 was a bleeding stage of the Iraqi state. In this period the
Ba'ath regime came out on the losing side in two bloody Gulf wars. In addition,
in 1991 Iraq witnessed two extensive uprisings in the south and north, which
were led by Arab Shi’a and Kurds. The intifada (uprising) included 16 out of 18
Iraqi provinces; the Ba'ath for the first time since 1968 felt that it was losing
power. Meanwhile, due to some changes in the Coalition Forces strategy and
the lack of organisation of the southern revolt, the Ba'ath regime restored its
power in the south, while the north remained under the power of the Kurdish
forces.
After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Ba'ath regime faced two of
shifts. First, the legitimacy of the Ba'ath regime reached its lowest level since
1968, both domestically, in the eyes of Iraqi people in all spheres (Arab Shiite,
Arab Sunni, Kurds and other components), and externally, the regime losing its
loyalty and respect in the eyes of the Arab people. Saddam no longer remained
as the protector of the Arab world's eastern gate. The second transformation
can be summarised as the shift of Ba'ath power from regional command and
government to the office of the presidency and Saddam’s family. The second
shift concerned the power of Ba'ath (which might be a reaction to the first shift),
which related to the loss of Saddam’s legitimacy to protect the regime against
any possible threats.
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Furthermore, in August 1990 the Iraqi state faced another phase of crises
that was no less influential than the first and second Gulf Wars. This conflict
was between Saddam’s regime and the international community, and was
represented by the imposition of international sanctions, through the 687
Resolution by the United Nations to control the Iraqi regime’s imports and
exports. According to this resolution, the Iraq regime was only allowed to import
medical supplies and foodstuffs, in addition to the “materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs” (Resolution 687) (see Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001, p.
291). The Shi'a uprising in the South and the Kurdish uprising in the North for
the first time since the creation of the modern Iraqi state demonstrated clear
ethnic and sectarian lines in the Iraqi state. This was admitted in public
discourse for the first time, that Iraqi society had a deep ethnic and sectarian
crisis (see Alqarawee, 2012, pp. 129,130). The Ba'ath regime authorised the
publication of serious articles in the state's official newspaper al-Thawra which
publicly criticized some sections of the Iraqi Shi'a (ibid, p.130). However,
despite the rising of communalism after the 1990s, the ethnic and sectarian
identities were still not a source of shaping regional security complex among
Iraq's neighbours, as has been the case after 2003.
The imposition of sanctions damaged both state and society to a great
degree. The sanctions seriously weakened the Ba'ath regime, while the impact
of the sanctions was yet more powerful on Iraqi society and in particular on the
lower and middle class. Marr (2012, p. 240) makes clear that the international
sanctions damaged one of the most important sectors in Iraqi society, namely
Iraq’s youth, who lost their education and future. Moreover, the phase of
sanctions destroyed all previous efforts that had been made by the Ba'ath
regime to build the Iraqi economy and social welfare, such as developing the
Iraqi agricultural and industrial sectors, the modernisation programme, and the
development of education. For example, Iraqi per capita income in 1989 was
over $2000, while in 1992 it fell to $609 (Marr, 2012, p. 233). Also the period of
sanctions caused damage to the middle class, which had witnessed notable
progress between 1975 and 1985. The vast majority of the Iraqi people (60
percent) depended on government salaries; the value of government salaries
dropped to $5 a month in 1993 (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005, p. 93). The
sanction war continued until 1996, after which the United Nations realised that
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the main victim was the Iraqi people. Thus, the UN initiated the Oil for Food
programme (986 Resolution) to help Iraqi civilians.
After the Iraqi acceptance of the Oil for Food programme in 1996 and until
the US-led invasion in 2003, Saddam tried to take advantage of the
improvement in the standard of living of the Iraqi people in order to re-organise
his power, which had been damaged after the Kuwait war. This period was also
a problematic stage for the Ba'athist regime, because of the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) crisis and the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) inspections.
Overall, there were many appropriate opportunities for Ba'athist rule to
develop Iraq and initiate an effective state-building process, particularly in terms
of the length of time, economic potential, comparative political stability, and
international and regional support which had not been available for both the
monarchy and Qasim’s regime. However, the Ba'ath regime posed the same
problem that was faced by previous Iraqi regimes. The question of Sunni
dominance, or ethno-sectarian discrimination, became more prominent, with the
use of violence reaching its highest level. Furthermore, political instability
continued from 1988 until the regime ended in 2003. A closer look at the
Ba'athist rule in Iraq can reveal that the Ba'ath regime lost an ideal opportunity
to build the Iraqi state by legitimate means. Conversely, Saddam’s state-
building model was producing a hegemonic state internally and regionally;
Saddam really only invented a totalitarian model for surviving as long as
possible, and was able to stay in place for 35 years, while all internal efforts
failed to defeat this model until the US-led invasion in 2003.
2.3. The regional dimension of the state-building process (1921-
2003)
It seems clear that the creation of the modern Iraqi state, in an important
geostrategic location the Persian Gulf, could not occur without regional and
international repercussions. This is especially the case given that the young
state was surrounded by classical empires – the Ottoman Empire to the north
and the Persian Empire to the east – and that the British and French retained
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interests in the region. The country was also subject to the political and
historical tensions from its different ethnic groups, including Arabs, Turks,
Persians, and Kurds, and the religious, differences especially in terms of the
sectarian, ethnic and political conflict between the Shi’a and Sunnis. Added to
these tensions, other factors, such as the struggle between regional and
international figures, the ideological conflicts between communism and
capitalism, and various bids for nationalism and imperialism have had a
profound impact on the trajectory of the Iraqi state-building process and its later
relations with Iraq’s neighbouring states.
The main argument in this section centres on whether the regional powers
(Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey) were involved in the process of state-
building in Iraq when it was first formed in 1921 as a monarchy, and how they
may have been involved in the following decades up until 2003. It also inquires
about what have been the main regional factors that impacted the process of
state-building in Iraq from the monarchic period until the demise of Saddam in
2003. As Marr (2004, p.182) has pointed out, one of the main projects of all the
successive regimes of Iraq from its inception in 1921 until the Ba’ath’s collapse
in 2003 was the search for how Iraq could be built as a nation state, or at least
how it could become a unified state among a number of equally diverse
countries. It can be argued that the Mesopotamian region before the creation of
the Iraqi state was economically divided and dependent on several surrounding
regional governments. For example, Perston (2003, p. 292) has indicated that
the population of Mosul had better economic and cultural relations with the Arab
communities of Syria than with those in southern Iraq, and further, that Baghdad
was an important centre for the Mesopotamian region, whilst Basra, as a port
city, was historically more related to the governments and people of the Persian
Gulf and India21.
The creation of the modern Iraqi state constituted a significant challenge
for Iran’s regional position in the Persian Gulf and its economic interests. The
mandate period limited Iranian hegemony in Iraq. After the establishment of the
21 It can be noted that the states bounding Iraq made a huge headache for both the new Iraqi
state and other neighbours, economically, ethnically, socially and politically, especially
economically, which later led to the bloody wars. The boundaries with Kuwait became a real
challenge for the Iraqi economy.
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Iraqi monarchic regime, Iran expressed openly its attitude saying that there was
no legal basis for its existence (Nakash, 1994, p. 102). Meanwhile, the
establishment of the monarchic Iraq constituted a real challenge for Shi’a
mujtahids (religious leadership) in the country. The main challenge was
transferring the religious leadership (al-Marja’iyya) from the city of Najaf to Qum
after the death of Abu al-Hassan Isfahani in 1946 (See Nakash, 1994, p. 88).
These shifts damaged both Persian and Iraqi Shi’a positions to the extent that
the number of Persians in Najaf decreased from 75 percent of the total
population to 12 percent in 1957 (Nakash, 1994, p. 105). The historic link
between Iran and Iraq had social, religious, political and economic dimensions,
which are keys for understanding the enmity that started from the creation of the
Iraqi state and continued through the fall of Saddam’s regime until after 2003.
The first king, Faisal, felt the many regional challenges in the earlier years
of his reign; they included the Persian influence among the Shi'a, pressure from
Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahabism and their raids on the south under the
monarchy, and Turkish attacks on Kurdistan in the north (see Mufti, 1996, p.
34). These regional challenges have pressed Iraqi regimes into a lasting pattern
of enmity and amity, with most of their neighbours and other regional powers,
especially after the signing of the Bagdad pact in 195522. However, worth
mentioning is that these challenges were not based on ethnic and religious
tensions, and were mainly political.
King Faisal was very cautious and concerned about Iraq’s relations with its
neighbours on the one hand, and with international powers in the region on the
other. This concern may have been caused by the fact that Faisal’s new
position in the region, which, being established by the British under a League of
Nations mandate, was a weak position. In a journal interview with King Faisal by
Amin al-Rihani (1980, p. 327) the King emphasised that he did not have any
22 The Bagdad pact was a pro-western defence alliance between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan,
and the United Kingdom. The agreement was a product of the high level of hostility between the
eastern camp led by the Soviet Union, and the western camp led by the U.S. and its European
allies. The agreement was a challenge to the Nasserists’ Pan-Arab ideology, and Nasser and
his supporters accused Nuri al-Said, promoter of the agreement in Iraqi, of betrayal. Nuri
riposted that the Baghdad Pact was not different from the Anglo-Egyptian agreement signed in
1954, and that it was no more a threat to “Arab collective security” than the Anglo-Egyptian
agreement had been (see Tripp, 2002, pp. 140-141).
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friends in the region except for the British; he stated also that the Iraqi state was
surrounded by greedy neighbours. In the north, Turkey made demands on
Mosul; the Kurds in the east were rebelling against the new state; the Shah of
Iran incited the Shi’a against the new state, motivated by sectarian ambitions;
Wahabis continued to raid southern Iraq and worked to undermine the rule of
Faisal’s father in Hejaz; and in the west French troops held a mandate over the
throne of Syria. Faisal emphasised many times that he had no reliable friends in
the region except for the British.
The above-mentioned outlook of King Faisal was reflected in Iraq’s foreign
policy. Khadduri (1951, p. 224) points out that the basis of Faisal’s foreign policy
in Iraq was composed of three tenets. First, Faisal worked hard to develop and
maintain an Anglo-Arab friendship. Second, Faisal adopted a “good-neighbour”
policy with most of the Middle Eastern countries. In his relations with Ibn Sa’ud
and with Persia, Faisal continually showed his good intentions to settle regional
tensions, making visits to Turkey and Iran in 1931, which became the starting
point for the Saadabad Pact in 1937. Third, Faisal tried not to ignore other Arab
countries, especially Syria and Palestine, by building reliable relations with
them. Diplomatic unity with Syria especially was one of Faisal’s wishes.
Moreover, King Faisal avoided following the pan-Arab school, which adopted
interventionist behaviour in helping other Arab countries to gain their
independence. In sum, Iraq’s foreign policy during its monarchic era followed
British foreign policy, especially with regard to its relations with the super
powers. In 1955 this relation took a defensive framework with the signing of the
Bagdad Pact by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Great Britain. The agreement
was based on military and economic goals, in particular, and countered the
influence of communism in the Middle East.
However, the 14th of July 1958 coup that overthrew the monarchy was a
major turning point in Iraq’s foreign policy. Although Iraq’s foreign policy during
the monarchic period was to a high degree pro-Western, especially towards the
British and the Americans, the 1958 coup totally changed the direction of Iraq’s
relations towards a pro-communist and pan-Arab ideology. The new Republic
immediately gained recognition from most communist countries, reaching
twenty-one countries by 26 July 1958. By that time neither the UK nor the U.S.
had recognised the new country, nor were other Western countries among the
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states recognising the new government (Romero, 2008, p. 24). Brigadier
General Abd al-Karim Qasim’s new regime faced a slew of international and
regional reactions. Internationally, both the British and the Americans were very
concerned about the possibility of Iraq’s coup spreading to Iraq’s neighbours,
especially Kuwait. This pushed Britain to prepare militarily for any emergency
threats on Kuwait’s oil fields. Regionally, Iraq’s former partners in the Baghdad
Pact pressed for a military intervention through Turkey against Qasim’s regime
with the hope of restoring the monarchic regime within twenty-four hours of the
coup (Romero, 2008, p. 221, 227). However, the plan was not supported by the
U.S. and British at that time23.
There are a number of factors which affected political instability in Iraq.
First, the creation of Israel in 1948 negatively impacted on the political process
and the efforts of state-building in Iraq. The creation of Israel angered the Arab
and Muslim people in Iraq, which led to the emergence of many nationalist
movements within the country, including sympathisers of ultra-nationalist ideas
that were influenced by European fascism and Nazism. These groups included
Ba'athists, nationalists, and communists. The situation was exploited by these
political movements and the Iraqi regimes for popular consumption, and
consequently produced two negative outcomes: first, it led to the postponement
of state-building and the democratisation process, and second, it provided the
regime with a kind of pseudo-legitimacy, especially in regards to the
monopolisation of power. A second event, the British withdrawal from the
Persian Gulf from 1968-1971, also had repercussions on Iraq and its
neighbours, because Iraq then became more confident about its power and
assumed an independent regional personality, especially in relation to the small
Gulf countries. Iraq became a source of threat for Kuwait, claiming more than
23 With regard to Iraqi relations with the great powers, Iraq’s greatest power ally up until 1958
was Great Britain, but the Soviet Union took over that role after 1958. Iraq–U.S. relations have
often been unstable, and the U.S. has never been Iraq’s main ally, while the US was the main
Western ally of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the late 1940s, and has also had a prominent role in
Iran, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan (Rubin, 1982, p. 109-110). It can be said that Iraq tried to
move close to the U.S. during the Iraq–Iran war in order to increase support from the great
powers. Despite Iraq’s expanding relations with the west (see Marr, 2012, p. 166, 194), Iraq
remained, until the demise of Saddam’s regime, a close partner with the Russians, and the
former Soviet Union, particularly in military aspects.
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once that Kuwait was an integral part of the Iraqi state (see al-Marashi, 2009, p.
450).
Two other events can also be seen as influential factors contributing to the
rise of Iraq’s regional role (Niblock, 1982, p. 115). First, the signing of the Camp
David Agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1978 was a fatal blow
to Egypt’s reputation and leadership among the Arab people. Because of this,
Iraq was offered a golden opportunity to take on the role as a protector of Arab
nationalism. Second, the demise of the Iranian Shah’s regime in 1979 created a
power vacuum in the Persian Gulf, when the Western powers lost one of their
best friends in the region. This may have pushed Iraq to take advantage of this
opportunity to assume Western support. This became especially clear when the
Islamic Republic of Iran announced its ambition to spread the principles of
Islamic revolution through the region. However, these regional transformations
did not favour the state-building process in Iraq, instead encouraged the Ba'ath
regime to impose its power on a regional level by engaging in ideological
conflicts with Egypt and Syria and in its eight-year armed conflict against Iran.
Iraq’s relations with Iran have never been completely stable, and a great
part of this tension might be ascribed, as Khadduri (1951) states, to the legacy
of Ottoman Empire toward the Persian Empire over boundary disputes,
especially over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The resolution of these disputes
was finally drafted into the Treaty of Erzerum (31 May, 1847). Moreover, the
Islamic revolution in 1979 had a profound impact on the regional landscape, in
particular on the Middle Eastern Shi’a, who saw it as a religious and political
revival. Iraq was greatly concerned that the disturbance in 1979 would spill over
into Iraq; indeed, the Iranian revolution incited the Shi’a opposition to step
forward, especially Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Marr, 2012, p. 171). The Iraqi
Shi’as were sympathetic to the Iranian revolution, and Sadr clearly stated
support for the Islamic revolution in a congratulatory message to Ayatollah
Khomeini (Marr, 2012, pp. 171-172).
It can be said that Iraq has usually viewed Iran as a challenge for the
achievement of its regional aspirations, and the sectarian factor, which had
become involved in political and economic considerations, made the problem
more complicated. However, the Iran-Iraq War was more ethnicised than
sectarian; both countries, and especially Iraq, avoided using sectarian slogans,
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because the majority of the Iraqi soldiers were Shi’i Arabs’24. On the Iraqi side
the war was formally called Qadisiyyat Saddam, which refers to the Arab victory
over the Persians in A.D. 636, still vivid in the collective memory of Arabs. On
the Iranian side the war was called Jang-e Tahmīlī “imposed war”, and Defā'-e
Moqaddas “holy defence”, which had religious overtones. Although the enmity
between Iraq and Iran had not been without sectarian slogans from both parties,
sectarian propaganda was not an active instrument for Iran’s involvement in
Iraq during Iran-Iraq War, due to the insignificance of the sectarian identity
among the Iraqi Army until the Shi’a uprising in the south in 1991.
The Arab Gulf countries were typically cautious over Iraq’s strength in the
region. However, after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, they too shared the
concern over the threat of the expansion of Islamic revolution, with the main
reason for this action being the factor of the Shi’a populations in Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, and which is why they supported Iraq financially during its
war with Iran. For example, Saudi Arabia offered to pay France for the
expenditure of reconstructing the Iraqi nuclear reactor that had been destroyed
by an Israeli air attack in 1981 (Tahir-Kheli and Ayubi, 1983, p. 153). It can be
argued that Iraq had bet on Arab unity under Iraqi leadership through its war
with Iran, while in fact the war produced a new division between Arab countries;
for example, the Gulf countries, Jordan, and Morocco sided with Iraq, whereas
Syria, Libya, South Yemen and the Palestinians were on the Iranian side (Tahir-
Kheli and Ayubi, 1983, p. 153).
With the exception of the monarchical period, Iraq’s relationship with Syria
had seen much tension, especially after 1970 when both Hafiz al-Asad and the
Iraqi Ba'athists came to power. The differences between the right-wing Syrian
Ba'ath and the left-wing Iraqi Ba'ath transformed into a problem between the
two states (see Marr, 2012, p. 145; Eppil, 2004, p. 191). The longstanding
hostility between Syria and Iraq had a profound influence on Iraq’s internal and
24 Both countries played the ethno-minority card. For example, Iraq had supported the Iranian
opposition, the People's Mojahedin, (Mojahedin-e-Khalq) as well as subverted Iran’s Arab
minority in Khuzistan by encouraging their separatist ambitions. Iraqi former foreign minister
Tariq Aziz clearly mentioned this aspect by saying that “five small Irans would be better than
one big Iran” (see Tripp & Chubin, 1988, p107). In the same way, Iran had also supported Iraqi
Shi’a and Kurdish opposition.
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regional attitudes. Internally, Saddam viewed the Syrian Ba'ath regime as a
source of threat to the Ba'ath’s regime in Iraq, and he put in place severe
procedures to counter any possible threats from Syria. Regionally, the hostility
reached such a point that Syria, unlike most Arab countries, openly backed Iran
against Iraq, and this attitude came at a high cost to Iraq’s economy. In 1980
the relation between the countries reached its lowest point, and Iraq severed its
diplomatic relations with Syria and started supporting the Syrian opposition. In
turn Syria cut off the Iraqi oil pipeline in 1982, which cost Iraq $6 billion
(Hirschfeld, 2013, p. 116). In spite of the tensions between the countries,
however, neither country resorted to using the sectarian card against the other
(al-Kayssi, 1998, p.423). This attitude could be explained by the similarity of
both countries in terms of ethnic and religious formations,
I would argue that, besides the factors that have been mentioned above,
there are two crucial regional events that have had seismic effects on the
trajectory of state-building in Iraq. Firstly, the pan-Arabism movement in the
region, and nationalist movements, negatively affected the process of state-
building, especially after the fall of the monarchic regime and throughout the
Qasim and Ba'athist regimes. The emergence of and the coming to power of
these groups entered the country into a spiral of bloody conflicts and military
coups, which normalised the use of violence for the establishment of power.
These nationalistic waves have really been devoted to the dominance of the
military and their use of all kinds of violence; meanwhile, the ideology was the
main reason behind Iraq’s regional aspirations. Second, the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran was a major historical shift in the Middle East, but its
implications for Iraq were different from those for the rest of the region. The
Islamic revolution led to a Shi’i revival in Iraq, and was supported by Shi’i
clerics. This pushed the Ba'ath regime to take the Shi'a as a serious threat until
the regime change in 200325. The Kurdish problem was also exploited as a
25 In October 1965, Ayatollah Khomeini moved to the holy city of Najaf, Iraq, where he stayed
until 1978, when he was pushed to leave by then-Vice President Saddam Hussein. During his
exile life in Najaf he gave a number of serious lectures about Islamic government (Hokumat-e
Islami: Velayat-e faqih). Khomeini had number of disagreements with other Shi’a clerics in
Najaf, in particular with Sayyed Mohsen al-Hakim who was the sole Marja' (source of religious
reference) for Shi’as after the death of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Husayn Borujerdi in 1961.
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means to pressure Iraq throughout the Iraq–Iran war. All of these events shifted
Iraq’s attention from state-building to the building of a hegemony which drove
Iraq to become a source of threat for its neighbours.
The above discussion yields the conclusion that Iraq, from its creation and
until its demise in 2003, was frequently an active player in the Middle East on
the regional level. Iraq's state-building trajectory has been repeatedly influenced
by regional events, and at the same time had a major impact on regional
events. However, it is worth considering that the regional engagement of Iraq's
neighbours in the process of state-building until 2003 was not part of the ethno-
religious conflict in the region. The successive Iraqi regimes had worked to
construct a regional power in the Persian Gulf and to assume a role of
leadership among Arab countries. However, the Iraqi dream of leadership
negatively affected the country’s state-building process by making the Iraqi
regimes’ priorities shift from building political, economic and social institutions to
concentrating on building a regional hegemony. These temerarious desires of
the Iraqi state cost the country much, both financially and in human lives; the
three Gulf wars, fought in 1980, 1990, and 2003, are the primary examples of
these costs.
2.4. Conclusion: State-building versus regional hegemony
At the margins of our debate, it can be argued that the Iraqi state, from its
creation in 1921 until its overthrow in 2003, lacked the effort to construct the
modern state through the building of modern political, social, and constitutional
institutions. Both British and Iraqi ruling elites failed to offer an appropriate form
of both nation- and state-building that reflected the nature of Iraqi society. Both
the state and society were monopolised by an exclusive group, which was
unable or unwilling to integrate other factions under the umbrella of a modern
state. Instead, the Iraqi regimes’ great concern was how to construct a
hegemonic regime that could hold control over the state’s various populations
domestically through seeking legitimacy for its power, and regionally through
84 | P a g e
playing a leadership role by interfering with the affairs of other states in the
region. Thus, the successive Iraqi regimes, in particular after the downfall of the
monarchic system, have had an interventionist tendency in regional affairs.
However, part of Iraq’s regional network of influence may be attributed to Iraq’s
geostrategic position in the region.
The essential aspects that successive Iraqi regimes failed to deal with
were primarily ethno-sectarian issues; in particular the Kurdish national identity,
and the Shi’i religious identity, were the main reasons behind the failure of the
state-building process. All successive Iraqi regimes failed to build a suitable
framework of citizenship to integrate the Kurds and the Shi’a in a new state.
However, regional engagement in the process of state-building in Iraq
from 1921 until 2003 has not aimed to orientate state-formation in Iraq toward a
certain form of state, or to support a particular ethnic or religious group.
Secondly, although ethno-sectarian division has been a durable feature of the
state-building process from the creation of the Iraqi state to the collapse of
Ba'ath regime in 2003 (see Osman, 2012); throughout this period, Iraq’s
neighbours’ involvement in the process of state-building has not been part of
the ethno-religious calculations. For example, between 1950 and 1960, the
source of Iraq's neighbours’ involvement in Iraq were the Arab left movements
and socialist regimes, especially from revolutionary republics, led by pan-Arab
nationalist military forces. Even the longstanding Iranian conflict with successive
Iraqi regimes was not for the sake of building a Shi’i dominated government in
Iraq, but was mainly part of the wider political conflict with Iraq which has been
related to building regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, until the
Iranian revolution in 1979, the internal and external political disputes over the
definition and leadership of Arab nationalism were more often sources of
shaping security policies in Arab states than the ethnic and sectarian threats
from other regional states. That is to say that the state-building process has not
been part of the ethnic and sectarian concerns among Iraq’s neighbours in the
regional context, as has been the case after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
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Chapter three:
3. U.S. engagement in state-building in Iraq 2003-2011
“Despite past failures, our policy in Iraq will succeed "because it has to."
President George W. Bush (New York Times, January 10, 2007).
Introduction
In the last chapter, I examined how the British, Iraq’s political elite, and
Iraq’s neighbours, engaged in the process of state-building from the creation of
the state in 1921 until the fall of Ba'ath regime in 2003. The aim of this chapter
is to explore the form of state-building that the U.S. left behind after 2003. I
argue that part of Iraq's neighbours’ interference and the ethno-confessional
conflict which occurred after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 have been
consequences of the state-building model applied by the U.S. in post-2003 Iraq,
a method that in the meantime had become the central foundation of the new
Iraqi state. The process of the rebuilding of the Iraqi state had been done
without having sufficient support from Iraq's main regional neighbours,
especially the countries linked directly through ethnic, religious, political and
economic ties to Iraq, mainly Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
In order to explore the basis of the U.S. state-building model in post-2003
Iraq, this chapter examines three stages of the state-building process in Iraq
after 2003. The first one was dominated by the role of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). The CPA was the higher authority after the U.S.-led invasion in
charge of starting the state-building project envisaged by the White House, and
drew up the most important landmarks of power which later became a
foundation of the distribution of power in post-2003 Iraq. The second stage was
characterised by the process of drafting a new constitution, which was expected
to be a factor of stability for the new political process following 2003 invasion,
but did not lead to the building of a satisfactory political formula agreed by all of
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Iraq's disputing parties. On the contrary, the constitutional process was also
partly responsible for the country’s political instability. The third stage was the
U.S. withdrawal strategy from Iraq at the end of 2011, which interrupted the
state-building project undertaken after the invasion. A detailed analysis of these
three levels will reveal the design of the state-building that the U.S. left behind
in post-2003 Iraq, one the one hand, and influenced by the involvement of Iraq’s
neighbours’ on the other hand.
3.1 The Coalition Provisional Authority: Dismantling the state and
establishing the sectarian quota system
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which had followed the Office
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)26, was the higher
provisional authority in the country after the U.S.-led invasion. The UN Security
Council Resolution 1483, of 22 May 2003, provided a legal base to the U.S,'s
and United Kingdom's status as ''occupying powers'' (see United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003)27. The CPA was in power
between 21 April 2003 and its dissolution on 28 June 2004; throughout these 14
months, the U.S. had set up the most important parameters of the state's
26 The ORHA was established by the Pentagon mainly to deal with a possible humanitarian
crisis in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion in 2003. The re-building of the state institutions and
set-up of a new political system were never the task of the ORHA. That is why, a few months
after the invasion, the ORHA faced a serious problem regarding the political situation on the
ground. In particular, this was evident in its inability to stop the looting of all Iraqi ministries
(except the ministry of oil), to provide public services, and stop chaos and disorder. Also, Jay
Garner (head of the ORHA) has been blamed for being wrong person for the reconstruction
process, especially after the visit of Tony Blair's special envoy to Iraq John Sawers, who
described the situation as an ''unbelievable mess''. See Bridoux, J. (2013), p 92; Allawi, A. A.
(2008), pp.104-105; Ricks, T. (2006), p. 109.
27 The CPA and its head ambassador Paul Bremer were treated by the U.S. institutions as the
president’s envoy to Iraq, in charge of the reconstruction and the rebuilding of the structure of
the Iraqi state following the 2003 invasion. There was a kind of obscurity over whether the CPA
was a federal agency of the U.S. or an agency belonging the UN Security Council. However, in
fact the CPA had been looked upon as a part of the U.S. federal government (see Allawi, 2008,
p.106).
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political structure and at the same time the political process for the new Iraqi
state.
The CPA’s engagement in the process of re-building the Iraqi state has
been criticised by several researchers, even inside the Bush administration. The
CPA can be responsible for institutionalising the basis for ethnic and sectarian
division in post-2003 Iraq. However, these blocks were already there even
before the invasion of 2003. Other broader reasons have to be explored. The
first is the U.S.'s misreading of Iraq's history, in particular its inability to
understand the complicated relationship between Iraq and the neighbouring
countries and their interests, as well as the regional security system after the
invasion. According to the U.S. Central Command documents, the U.S. had
assumed that ''regional states will not challenge U.S. military operations with
conventional forces'' (The National Security Archive, 2005, p. 4).
After the Gulf War of 1991, no-fly zone paved the way for shaping the Iraqi
state and society across ethnic and sectarian lines, which aimed to protect the
Kurds in Northern and Shi'as in Southern Iraq from the Ba'ath regime in the
centre. Thus, following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, the CPA could have followed
one of two options, either to accept the post-war de facto divided Iraq as it was,
or to insist on the reorganisation of the main divided groups under one unified
nation state. The CPA chose the easy option by constitutionalising the post-war
situation, which was highly influenced by the desires of the U.S.'s local allies the
Shi'as and Kurds, who had collaborated with the U.S. in defeating Saddam's
regime; they constituted the majority of nearly 80 percent of the Iraqi population.
This does not support the idea that the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq has
been related to a creative U.S. chaos policy in the region (Taras, 2006, p.34).
However, the U.S. view towards Iraq even prior to the 2003 invasion, was that
Iraq is a country which is ethnically and religiously divided among the three
main groups of Shi'i Arab, Sunni Arab and Kurd (Taras, 2006, p. 41), in addition
to the other smaller minorities, such as Christians, Yazidis and Turkmen.  After
the 1991 Gulf War, former U.S. president Bush Senior promoted the Shi'as in
southern Iraq against Saddam's regime. This continued to be the case when the
U.S. supported secular Shi'a exiles, such as Ahmed Chalabi the leader of the
INC, against the Ba'athist regime. Chalabi told some western journalists that the
U.S. had long intended to build a Shi'a dominated power in Iraq as a
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counterweight to the Sunni domination of the region (Hersh, 24 December
2001).
Second, the CPA was under pressure to demonstrate to U.S. public
opinion and the rest of the world that they would be successful in the process of
rebuilding a new Iraq. Third, the process of state-building in Iraq was part of the
U.S.'s war on terror, and was affected by this agenda more than by a sincere
desire to implement state-building policies. The CPA placed greater stress on
counterinsurgency, especially military capacities, than on rebuilding the
efficiency of Iraq’s state institutions. Furthermore, the process of state-building,
(particularly when led by the U.S.) has always been complicated, and is often
judged as a failure; especially in the Middle East, there has not been any single
successful case28.
It can be argued that the CPA efforts following the collapse of the Ba'ath
regime cannot be considered a serious contribution to the re-building of Iraqi
political and economic institutions. Most of the CPA activities focused on
security issues. There was not any sufficient attempt at building the institutional
structures of the new state (Chatham House, 2012, p 13). The U.S. had not
realised what post-war Iraq would look like. For example, Paul Bremer, the
head of the CPA, clearly mentioned in his book ''My year in Iraq'' that he asked
Ryan Crocker (U.S. ambassador to Iraq in the period of the U.S,-led invasion)
whether there was a ''practical plan'' for after the war; Crocker replied ‘‘not at
all…it was never intended as a post-war plan”. Furthermore, Bremer said “it is
not that we did not plan, the problem is that we planned for the wrong
contingency” (Bremer, 2006, p. 25). It may have been the case that the U.S.
invasion of Iraq was viewed by the Americans as a means to another end,
rather than an end in itself. As Stratfor (July 2003) noted, “the invasion of Iraq
was intended to bring U.S. power to bear against al Qaeda's enablers in the
28 According to the Carnegie report, from the sixteen cases of U.S.-led processes of state-
building (nation-building) from 1900 to the present, only four of them were successful cases:
Germany and Japan, both of which highly homogenous societies, and Panama and Granada,
both very small countries. There are another two cases, Sudan and Afghanistan, both of them
examples of failure. See Dobbins, J., et al. (2008). After the war: nation-building from FDR to
George W. Bush, Rand Corporation; Pei, M., & Kasper, S. (2003). Lessons from the past: the
American record on nation building (Vol. 24). Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
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region’’. The essential reason for that was that the U.S.'s main purpose in Iraq
was winning the war and changing the Ba'ath regime. This can be noticed
clearly in David Chasten’s interview with Thomas E. Ricks (2006, p.151): ‘‘No
one had talked about what would happen when we got there”, said Chasten.
‘‘There was no plan for that. They literally told us once we got there they would
pull us back out, take us home. Once we got there it was a clusterfuck, just
trying to figure out what to do”. The U.S.'s main priority during the rebuilding of
post-war Iraq was protecting Iraq's oil reserves, which was the only sector that
was protected from looting by the American forces. Iraq's huge reserves
prompted the former Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz to tell the
House Appropriation Committee on March 27 2003 ‘‘we are dealing with a
country that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon.”
(National Security Archive, document 8, 2005)
In addition to the challenges mentioned earlier, the U.S. did not expect
challenges to the state-building process from Iraq’s neighbours, in particular
from its allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey. However, countries such as Iran, Syria,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey are directly affected by change in the region, as a
result of the composition of the regional security complex among these states
(Iraq, Syria, Iran Saudi Arabia and Turkey), in accordance with the theory of
RSC. The regional balance of power among these countries has often been
deeply linked with Iraq and can be influenced by the balance of power among
Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups, particularly when the same ethnic
and (to lesser extent) religious identities are politically active in Iraq's
neighbouring countries. Despite this, the U.S. acted without consulting them.
Therefore, any successful state-building process, not only in Iraq but in the
whole Middle East, needs regional collaboration. With this in mind, it is useful to
remember the Bonn conference for Afghanistan on 5 December 2011, where
the U.S. and its allies consulted Afghanistan's neighbouring countries before
their intervention29.
29 Three years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, especially in 2006 when Iraq faced a bloody
ethno-sectarian war, the Iraqi study group set up a wide-ranging plan. In their report, James A.
Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, advised the U.S. to take a number of steps to undertake a
reasonable state-building project. The most important part of this report recommended the Bush
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Despite Iraq's neighbours' rejectionist stance towards the U.S. invasion,
the Bush administration called for a model for building a democratic Iraq which
became an example for the entire Middle East. The U.S. administration did not
take into account that this kind of strategy could alarm countries like Syria and
Iran, which felt threatened30. On the other hand, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq did
not enjoy international support, especially from other members in the Security
Council, like France, China and Russia (see, Dobbins, 2003, p. 167). In
addition, important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, opposed to the
invasion. The non-engagement of the U.N. brought into question the legitimacy
of the war. This does not mean that a multinational intervention guarantees a
successful state-building process; however, the examples of Bosnia and
Kosovo where missions were led by U.N. were shorter, cheaper, gained more
international legitimacy and were more successful than those had been
undertaken by countries unilaterally or bilaterally31 (see Dobbins, et al, 2001,
pp. xxxvii, 245).
Paul Bremer began his administration by issuing two key decisions that
jeopardised the entire U.S. process of state-building in Iraq. He first issued the
de-Ba'athification decree, excluding those were in 'the top four levels' of the
Ba'ath party and those who hold top three levels in each ministry from holding
office in the new Iraq (CPA order 1, 16 May 2003). With this decision he
eliminated 85,000 to 100,000 people belonging to the previous bureaucratic
elite from participating in the process of state-building (Pfiffner, 2010, p.79).
administration to involve Iraq's neighbours, especially Iran and Syria, in the process (See Baker
III and Hamilton, 2006).
30 According to some leaked documents made public by WikiLeaks, regarding crossing
international borders, the American military forces do not required permission before crossing
into Syrian or Iranian territory or airspace, when they are in pursuit of former regime or terrorist
groups (Wikileaks, 2008).
31 For example, both state-building processes in Bosnia and Kosovo were under U.S.-
leadership, but in were also multinational efforts, involving the likes of the UN, NATO, the World
Bank, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSED), in addition to other
international organisations which had a significant role in terms of building legitimacy and
lowering costs, this all achieved by sharing power and responsibilities (See Dobbins, et al.
2008, p. xviii).
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Cordesman (An interview with Anthony Cordesman, July 18, 2006)
pointed out that no one from the CPA realised how many people would be
affected by applying this decision. The CPA administration estimated that only
1% of the the Ba'ath party would be targeted, a total of 20,000 people from the
two million members of the Ba'ath party before the invasion (Pavel, 2012, p49).
In 2003, unemployment in Iraq was around 40 percent, and the de-
Ba'athification order was responsible for nearly 60 percent of unemployment in
post-2003 Iraq (Pavel, 2012, p. 39). This deeply affected the service sector in
the government following the U.S.-led invasion, especially the top technical
positions, such as in schools, electricity, transportation, communications,
universities and hospitals. For example, 18,046 people had been excluded in
the Ministry of Education, four times more than in any other ministries. The
second highest ministry was the Higher Education Ministry with 4,361, and the
Ministry of Health came in next with 2,367 excluded members32 (Sissons & Al-
Saiedi, 2013, p22).
A few days after the de-Ba'athification decree, The CPA issued another
order on 23 May 2003 which dissolved the Iraqi Army and called for a new
army. The former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in her recent
book (2017, p. 291) that she was not aware of the decision of disbanding the
Iraqi Army. She stated that Colin Powell had said ‘‘have you seen the order that
Jerry [Bremer] sent out in Baghdad? I said that I had not. He disbanded the
army”. This decision also affected about 385,000 members of the armed forces,
285,000 police in the Interior Ministry and 50,000 members in security
apparatus (Pfiffner, 2010, p. 20).
32 It can be argued that the de-Ba'athification decree was influenced by the de-Nazification in
Germany after World War II, which targeted 2.5 percent of the population from all kinds of
employment, while in Iraq the de-Ba'athification was less far-reaching and only the former
senior Ba'athists were banned from government jobs (see Dobbins, 2009, p. xxvii).
Frankly, the Iraqi case was much different from Germany's, since the Iraqi government,
particularly under Saddam’s rule, was practically the only provider of employment, since the
economy was entirely dependent on the oil revenues. It was very difficult to live in Iraq without
finding employment from the state. The chance of getting a job outside the government was
very low, and mainly limited to the business elite, who themselves were close to the Ba’ath
Party.
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Arguably, both CPA decisions contributed highly to the predicaments
faced by the U.S.-led effort of state-building. These decisions were also
exploited by the Shi'a, especially through the Higher National de-Ba'athification
Commission (HNDC), to the extent that some of Sunnis claimed that de-
Ba'athification transformed into a de-Sunnification (al-Hameed, 10 January
2010). Bremer himself admitted that the decision had exceeded its aims; he
stated: ''clearly I had been wrong to give a political body like the Governing
Council responsibility for overseeing the de-Ba'athification policy'' (Bremer,
2006, p. 297)33.
However, both decisions had been welcomed by the Kurds and the Shi'a.
Both communities would have withdrawn their support to the CPA if the
Ba'athists retained their higher positions, though arguably the CPA should not
have issued such a decree as a formal decision because it provided legal
support for Shi'i revenge against the Sunnis, while this should have been left for
bargaining among political parties. At the same time, after the fall of Saddam's
regime, countries like Syria and Jordan openly supported Iraqi Ba'athists. The
de-Ba'athification and dissolution of the army pushed many Ba'athists and
former members of the Iraqi Army to join the Iraqi insurgency in the
neighbouring countries, causing a real challenge for Iraqi security especially
between 2006 and 2009.
The CPA also failed to take into account the possibility of the
destabilisation of the country following the fall of the regime. The basic condition
for starting any state-building process is to establish law and order in the
territory, and this cannot be achieved without having enough troops on the
ground. This was particularly true in Iraq, a country historically deeply divided by
ethnic, political, religious, and even social hatred, where a civil war was likely to
33 Although the ideology of the Ba’ath party was more related to the Sunnis, there were also
millions of Shi’i members within the Ba’ath party. In 2009, in secret documents authored by the
former Iraqi president and released by the U.S. National Archives Saddam pointed out that the
Sunni leaders of the party between 1958 and 1963 were very few, and the Secretary-General of
the party (Abdul Khaliq al-Rikabi) was a Shi’a from the city of Nasiriyah. Saddam told the
investigator ‘’you might be surprised to know that in 1964 the Secretary-General of the Party
was a Kurd’’ (Asharq Al-Awsat, 5 July 2009). However, there has been very little information
released about these Shi’i Ba’athists after 2003, concerning whether they have been affected by
the de-Ba’athification process or not.
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happen. The lack of U.S. troops on the ground was a significant cause for
spreading chaos, disorder, ethno-sectarian revenge, crime and looting34.
In line with the historical record, the number of soldiers should be 20 for
every thousand people, in order to achieve stability on the ground in the
aftermath of conflicts (Bremer, 2006, p.10). The number of the Iraqi population
following the invasion, which was almost 25 million, required 500,000 troops to
reach to the above standard. However, the U.S. troops numbered only 150,000
soldiers, just a third of the number required (see Aljazeera/in depth,
20/06/2011). Larry Diamond (2004, pp. 35, 36) argued that about 300,000
troops would be enough to control Iraqi security following the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion. From this point of view, Iraq's post-war military plan required different
kind of troops, in particular military police and other troops in order to achieve
civil reconstruction and peace enforcement. For example, tens of thousands of
armed forces could have been posted along the borders with Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey, in order to stop the foreign fighters’ infiltration and prevent
the regional powers from supporting the militias and terrorist groups.
The abovementioned data might explain why the main reason behind the
failure of U.S. state-building efforts came from Iraq's neighbouring countries,
especially those which have been engaged in the ethno-confessional disputes
with Iraq following the fall of the Ba'athist regime. It was only in January 2007,
following strong pressure because of the civil war, that George Bush sent an
additional 20,000 soldiers to Iraq as part of a new strategy adopted by the
administration which focused more on security issues.  By December 2008 this
new strategy had reduced by 80 percent the level of violence and the number of
casualties among both Iraqi civilian and American soldiers (see figure 2 and
Figure 3).
34 The first days of the regime’s fall in April 2003 had witnessed widespread looting, which
included most of the Iraqi state institutions apart of the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Interior,
which the U.S. forces protected. It can be said that since then, most of the Iraqi people have
believed that Americans did not want to re-build the post-war Iraq.
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Figure (2) Reducing the level of ethno-sectarian death incidents, September 2006-November
2007
(DoD), 7 March 2008, p.18
Figure (3) Overall weekly attack trends from 25 September 2004 to 22 February 2008
(CSIS, 25 February 2008, p.22)
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Both the U.S. and Bremer believed that post-2003 Iraq should be a united
Iraq, and most of their efforts contributed towards this goal. On the ground,
however, it was much more difficult to keep the Iraqi state united based on the
modern principles of the nation state. The ethnic and religious heritage had
deeply cleft the structure of the new state. The main problem for the
reconstruction of Iraq was that the fall of Saddam's regime led to the fall of the
entire Iraqi state. Thus, after Saddam's demise there was no viable political
system to replace the previous regime.
In the abovementioned situation, the CPA had followed the reality of the
Iraqi society after the war, which was highly divided on an ethnic and religious
basis among three main groups, Shia, Sunni and Kurd. The first and main
foundation for this sectarian division reflected clearly on the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC) which was the temporary government of Iraq from 13 July 2003 to
1 June 200435. The IGC firmly established for the first time (officially) in Iraqi
history the ethno-sectarian roots of power in the post-2003 Iraq. The U.S.
believed that “Lebanonisation” of power might be the only way to keep Iraq
secure and stable (see Visser, 2007, p.93). However, they did not take into
consideration the possibility that the new ethno-confessional body would fail to
mitigate the sectarian tensions. On the contrary, this deepened them, not just
between the political elites but also between ordinary people. In the case of
Iraq, there were no powerful government institutions to control the ethno-
sectarian interests. Moreover, what made this process worse was that the Iraqi
political elites began mobilising the street, by exacerbating the ethnic and
religious divide in the country. In addition, the Iraqi political elite responded to
the political agendas of the neighbouring countries in different ways. Tensions
35 The Iraqi Governing Council was based on the ethnic and sectarian distribution of power
among Iraqi components. The Council included 13 Shi’is, five Kurds, five Sunnis, one Assyrian
and one Turkman. The council immediately gained the regional recognition from the Arab
League on 1st of June 2004. The council dissolved after Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar was chosen as a
first president of the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), as well as the sovereignty had been
transferred to the Interim Government on 28 June 2004; as soon as sovereignty transferred to
the Iraqis the CPA was dissolved. For more about the IGC see Coalition Provisional Authority,
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between Shi'a and Sunni reached their highest point during the civil war in
2006-2007.
The political situation following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the failure
of the CPA’s model of state-building after 2003 attracted the attention of Iraq's
neighbouring countries, especially those which have been influenced and
engaged by the new ethno-sectarian front in post-2003 Iraq. Taking into
consideration Iraq's neighbours as middle powers in a penetrated regional
system, their meddling policies in the region will very likely seek to take
advantage of any volatile situation in the Iraqi state (see Ehteshami and
Hinnebusch, 2002, p.5). In this way, the identity of the new Iraq has become a
source of shaping security policies and thereafter the balance of power in the
entire region (in accordance with this thesis’s theory). Some countries, such as
Turkey, Jordan and the Gulf countries, have been very concerned about the
Shi'a dominance in Iraq after 2003. Countries such as Iran, and to a lesser
extent Syria, exploited the new political map (Byman and Pollack, 2003, p.130).
The CPA's version of state-building in Iraq had a deep impact on the 15th
December 2005 parliamentary election results and produced a government
based on the ethno-sectarian division of political power, establishing new
parameters for the political process in post-2003 Iraq. Five political groups were
the winners of this election and have dominated the whole political process until
now. The ethno-sectarian geopolitics were very clear in the election: the vast
majority in the Kurdish provinces voted for Kurdish parties, and the same was
true of the Shi'i and Sunni majority provinces (as has been demonstrated in
table 2). The Unified Iraqi Coalition, which was composed of seventeen different
Shi'a parties, came out with 128 seats, the Kurdish coalition with 53 seats,
Tawafuq (the Iraqi Front), a Sunni coalition, with 44 seats, in addition to another
11 seats for the Hiwar National Front, which was also a Sunni party led by Salih
al- Mutlaq; the single list that called for liberal and non-sectarian politics, called
the National Iraqi List, got 25 seats (Independent High Electoral Commission -
IHEC, 2005).
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The new structure of the state-building process produced a pure ethnic
and sectarian body for the distribution of power inside the state. This process
led to the growth of a new political elite highly linked with the new ethnic and
religio-political structure of power, at the same time influenced by regional
dimensions of the sectarian conflict. This complicated structure of power
weakened the federal government, jeopardising the entire state-building project
envisaged by the Bush administration.
The CPA's approach to the state-building process in Iraq showed more
concern for keeping a new Iraqi state unified without laying any firm foundations
for this unification. It became clear that the idea of a unified Iraq could not
coexist with the reality on the ground. The Ba'ath regime, because of its
dictatorial nature, did not contribute to the unification of the different
components, which got the state-building process after 2003 off to a bad start.
This in addition to the miscalculations of the CPA analysed in this chapter. The
Table 2 the 2005 parliamentary election results
(CRS report for congress 2006, p.6)
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process of state-building in Iraq has faced both internal and regional challenges.
In this regard, there were no supporters of the U.S.'s state-building approach in
Iraq apart from the Americans themselves. In my view, the division of the Iraqi
state into three federal regions would have had more of a chance of success
than binding three broken parts of the state together without building
foundations for this unification. The CPA efforts in this stage ended up with
‘’dismantling the state’’ and establishing the sectarian quota system, which later
reflected on the entire political process in the post-2003 Iraq. The Sunni protest
movement against Maliki's government from 2012 to 2014, to the IS (ISIS or
ISIL) occupation of Mosul in June 2014 is the best example for this argument.
3.2 Constitution and redistribution of power: Building a basis of
ethno-sectarian citizenship
After the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on the 13th of July
2003 by the CPA, it was imperative to have an interim constitution to
administrate state affairs in the transitional period. The CPA already started this
process by issuing a law called the 'State Administration Law' (TAL) under Paul
Bremer’s leadership. This meant that the Governing Council had to approve the
TAL without making any change or modification. The result was that the vast
majority of the articles of the later permanent constitutionwere based on this
law. The Governing Council recognised the act and assumed this law as a
provisional Iraqi constitution for the transitional period. One of the main tasks of
the IGC was to put in place the necessary procedures for the establishment of a
permanent constitution36 (CPA/REG/6, 13July 2003). The TAL made provision
for federalism, decentralisation of power and de-Ba'athification, at the same
time as establishing the basis for ethno-sectarian rule in post-2003 Iraq.
It can be argued that the CPA's plan was to hand over sovereignty to
Iraqis and leave Iraq as soon as possible after drafting a temporary
36 According to the article 2/A of the TAL, ''The term transitional period shall refer to the period
beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government
pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in this Law, which in any case shall be no later
than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions of Article 61 are applied''. (See TAL, <www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/TAL.html> accessed 4/7/2014).
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constitutional framework, which had to pave the way to a permanent
constitution, general elections and a democratic government. All this had to be
achieved by 28 June 2004. However, the drafting of the constitution meant the
beginning of a new, challenging political era which lasted until after the U.S.
withdrawal from the country.
The Constitutional Preparatory Committee had been selected by the IGC
as an ethnic and religious division of power. The CPC included 25 members: 13
were Shi'a Arabs, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Assyrian-Christian and one
Turkmen. As has been mentioned earlier, the post-2003 situation in Iraq had a
strong impact on the constitutional process. The drafting process of the TAL
was very secretive. Zaid Al-Ali (2014 b, YouTube, 2014) points out that Iraqis
were not even told that an interim constitution was being drafted; also the
drafting committee consisted of some U.S. experts and academics, in addition
to some Iraqi-Americans who had been in exile during Saddam’s rule. The
constitutional drafting board had been dominated by the Shi’a majority, and the
powerful Kurdish block, with a limited contribution from the Sunnis, a reflection
of Iraq's reality following the invasion. The constitutional process reflected the
deep divisions between the different components with different agendas; the
Sunnis were worried about what they lost in the past, the Shi'as were concerned
about the future, and the Kurds were looking for guarantees of autonomy.
According to al-Istrabadi (2008, p. 1628), who was one of the main
principal legal drafters of Iraq’s interim constitution from 2003-2004, and a
Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations from 2004-
2007, there were two main factors that led to the failure of the constitutional
process in post-2003 Iraq.
First, both the UN and the U.S. put pressures on the constitutional drafters
and Iraq's political elites to finish the constitutional draft in a schedule which was
measured in weeks rather than months. For the U.S., the purpose for rushing
the constitutional process was to enable political and national reconstruction on
the one hand, and to influence the re-election of George Bush on the other
hand (see Brown, 2005, p.15). Second, the distrust among Iraq's political elites
created a negative atmosphere. In particular, Sunni Arabs felt that they had
been excluded from the new political process; this situation directly affected the
process of state-building, spreading a discontent which was seized upon by
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radical terrorist groups. To a degree, the Sunni community believed that the
actual purpose of the de-Ba'athification process was de-Sunnisation, by using
official institutions to implement this policy (Lafoucade, 2012, p.196-197).
There is another factor that can be added to the two above-mentioned.
Iraqis felt that the drafting of the constitution was not a sufficiently indigenous
process, but was more dictated by U.S. interests (see al-Istrabadi 2008,
p.1682). In particular, they felt that the process aimed to please American public
opinion and reflected the partisan calculation between Republican and
Democratic Parties. All this is in addition to the regional influences analysed
previously.
There were four main points of disagreement between those involved in
the drafting of the 2005 constitution.
1) Federalism had been rejected in the earlier stages of the
constitutional drafting by the Sunnis and some of the Shi'a parties, such as
Muqtada al-Sadr's group and members of the Da'wa Party. The latter fully
supported Sunni nationalist demands and considered federalism as a first
step toward Iraq's division. For example, Salih al-Mutlag, who was head of
the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, said: ''we are saying if federalism is
going to be approved now, it will be the destruction of Iraq'' (International
Crisis Group Report, 8 Jun 2005). On the other hand, Kurds and the ISCI
supported a federal Iraq with a weaker government in Baghdad (Hamoudi,
2013, pp. 64-65).
2) There was disagreement over the future role of the Ba'ath Party
(Saddamist Ba'ath). All Shi'a parties were strongly in favour of the de-
Ba'athification decree. The de-Ba'athification process wasused for political
calculations, especially after Ahmed Chalabi gained control on the Higher
National De-Ba'athification Commission (HNDC) in 2004. It can be argued
that the arbitrary implementation of the de-Ba'athification plan negatively
affected the Sunni view of post-Saddam Iraq. In the interim, the Shi'a view of
the Sunnis was almost akin to the view the U.S. had of the Nazis after World
War ll. New to power, they were fearful and insecure about the Ba'athists
and the power they might have in post-2003 Iraq.  For example, 10,000 Iraqi
teachers lost their jobs after 2003 because of their Ba'athist past. Chalabi
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said ''my proposal about the teachers was as if we had allowed the Nazis
back into government'' (Bremer, 2006, p. 344).
3) The role of Islam and Iraq's national identity were disputed. The
28 August constitutional draft stated that ''Iraq is a part of the Islamic
world…and its Arab people are part of the Arab nation'' (Article 9/B from
TAL). This article in the constitution raised concerns of some Arab
nationalists, who were afraid of the intentions of the U.S. regarding Iraq and
the possibility of the separation of Iraq from the Arab world; however, their
concerns were not totally allayed, especially considering the shadow cast by
Saddam's regime which constantly asserted Iraq's integral place in the Arab
nation.
4) There were also disputes over the future of Kirkuk and other
disputed areas between the federal state and the Kurdistan Regional
Government. The new constitution has left the status of Kirkuk and other
disputed areas unresolved. Article 140 formulated three mechanisms,
'normalisation', 'census', and 'referendum', to be carried out not later than
31st of December 2007. This article was never implemented, causing long-
time tension between the KRG and the federal government, and eventually
became a source of future conflict, in addition to the infiltration of regional
interests in the area. Since then, the issue of Kirkuk has been penetrated by
regional agendas.
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Table (3) The demographic influnce on the constitutional referendum
(Cohen & Efrati, 2011, p. 41).
Despite the problematic constitutional issues, the Iraqi constitutional
referendum was held on 25 October 2005, and approved by the wide majority of
the Iraqi people; 78 percent voted ''for'' and 21 percent voted ''against'' with a
turnout of 63 percent (Alwasat, 26 October 2005). According to the constitution,
an absolute majority of votes would mean the constitution would be
implemented, but if two-thirds of the votes in any three or more provinces were
against, the whole constitution would fall. As predicted, the higher percentage of
votes in favour was recorded in the Shi'i and Kurdish majority provinces37.
However, the draft constitution was rejected by the majority in two of the main
Sunni provinces, in Anbar by 96.95 percent and Salahaddin by 81.75 percent,
while the Sunnis failed to gain two-thirds in at least three of Iraq's 18 provinces
which they needed to defeat the constitution. The three Sunni provinces (Mosul,
Anbar, and Salahaddin have Sunni majorities) did reject the constitution, but in
Mosul the result did not reach the two-third majority necessary for the total
37 Since July 1968, Iraq had experienced five temporary constitutions; however, no one of these
had been subjected to a public debate or popular mandate through a referendum. For more
about Iraq's previous constitutions see al-Jidda, N., (2003) al-tatawrat al-dsturyya fi al-Iraq (the
constitutional developments in Iraq) Dar al-Hikma, Baghdad. p. 3-4.
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defeat of the constitution. A difference of percentage, 55.08 percent ''against''
and 44.92 percent ''for'', became a guarantee of success for the constitutional
process (see table 4). Due to violence and boycotting, the turnout in the Sunni
provinces was only 58 percent. If the same percentage of voters as in the Shi'a
and Kurdish provinces had expressed their opinion, it is likely that the
constitution would have been rejected by two-thirds of these three Sunni
provinces (Washington Post, October 26, 2005).
So, as al-Istrabadi (2008, p. 1641) has pointed out, the referendum result
led to the approval of the constitution without the support of Sunnis; a shift of
83,000, or 0.75 percent of the votes out of a total of eleven million would have
caused the failure of Iraq's 2005 permanent constitution. Furthermore, both
election results of January 2005 and December 2005 produced extremely
ethnic and sectarian governments, highly dominated by the Shi'a, in coalition
with the Kurds (See table 3). Almost all Kurds, and roughly 75 percent of Shi'a,
voted for the ethno-sectarian choices. Regarding the non-sectarian and liberal
parties, they did not get more than 15 percent of the votes (IHEC, 2005
constitutional referendum). These two parliamentary elections set up the main
pillars of the distribution of power among Iraqi components. Neither the
permanent constitution nor the elected government managed to stabilise the
country. On the contrary, both processes have deepened the ethnic and
sectarian polarisation38.
One of the main problems was that the permanent constitution did not
provide any practical solution for curbing the ''tyranny of the majority'' and the
idea of power sharing adopted by TAL. This can be clearly observed through
the power vested in the Prime Minister's office in the 2005-constitution. For
example, almost all the executive powers were left in the hands of the Prime
38 The identitarian fissures of Iraqi society may push us to agree with those scholars that have
stated that democracy may have negative consequence for non-homogenous societies, in
particular when it is imposed immediately on post-war societies. For example, in Bosnia
elections played in favour of the local leaders to legitimise their criminal actions, rather than help
political stability (see Pascual and Kenneth, 2007, p.15). The above approach may also be
applicable to Iraq after 2003; as Farid Zakaria (cited in Pascual and Pollack, 2007, p: 16)
indicates, “elections had wondrous aspects but they also divided the country into three
communities and hardened these splits, to describe the last four years a period of political
progress requires a strong definition of political development''.
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Minster. According to article 78, the Prime Minister is the Commander in Chief
of the armed forces, and also has the power to appoint the National Intelligence
Service which reports directly to him. Given the dictatorial past of Iraq, it is
arguable that the main political powers should be divided into three political
appointments: a President of the Republic, a Prime Minister, and a speaker of
the Parliament. This would limit the development of a dictatorship of the
majority.
In 2009 some amendments were added to the constitutional negotiations
through the formulation of two mechanisms in order to guarantee the rights of
the minorities. First was through the activation of the Presidential office, by
providing it with the power of veto as provided for in the TAL. Second was
through the creation of a second legislative body, the Federation Council (Majlis
al-Ittihadi), following article 65 of the Iraqi constitution, which included
representatives of provinces and regions. Unfortunately, the Federation Council
was not able to limit the power of the Prime Minister, and it did not function as a
body which could limit the executive. This was because no provision was made
over how much power the council had. In order to solve this issue, the Erbil
agreement on 8th August 2010 was mostly dedicated to provide a consociational
form for al-Maliki's cabinet in 2010, in which powers would be shared and rights
and duties would be assigned to all of the sections of Iraq's population. The
Erbil Agreement also initiated an attempt to create what is known the National
Council of Strategic Policies, to re-distribute the power sharing, especially
regarding the power of the majority in the executive authority and fear of the
emergence of a Shi'a majority dictatorship.
From this point of view, it can be argued that the Iraqi constitution is a
combination of a majoritarian system and the idea of de-centralisation, without
having an active and recognisable constitutional mechanism to curb the
domination of the majority, which emerged from al-Maliki's government after the
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq39.
39 According to article 37 of TAL and article 138 of the 2005 constitution. there was meant to be
a “Presidency Council'' which included the president and two other vice presidents, that was to
have represented all three of Iraq’s main components, and which would have a veto on the
National Assembly decisions, but this council was dissolved after one parliamentary term, and
had replaced by “the President of the Republic” after 2010.
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It is however, important to analyse some of the problematic issues that
have been raised by the contradiction between the de-centralisation of the state
on one hand, and the majoritarian aspirations of the political elites reflected in
Iraq's permanent constitution on the other. This constitutional contradiction can
be clearly observed in sections four and five, which relate to the size of the
powers of central government and provincial authorities. For example, as
Nathan Brown (2006, p. 56) points out, the list of the central government's
powers is extremely short. Areas such as security, foreign affairs, defence,
education, economy infrastructure and health, are usually the exclusive
responsibility of the central government, while according to article 114, the
regions share responsibility with the federal authorities in the areas of health,
education, water resources, and electricity. This de-centralisation continues to
the extent that only foreign and defence issues are exclusively the responsibility
of the federal government.
According to article 114, the creation of a new region is constitutionally
permitted. The creation of a region proceeds through two mechanisms: one-
third of the governorate’s council’s members have to make a formal request, or,
alternately, one-tenth of the people's vote in each governorate will create a
mandate.
Article 114 has provided the Iraqi political elites the chance to threaten the
creation of a new region whenever their disputes reach a deadlock. Meanwhile,
this constitutional right can be used as a card in political bargaining. After the
U.S. withdrawal there were some calls for changing the formation of the
regions, such as creating a southern region in Basra and the Sunni region in the
west. Despite of the legality of these requests, they were rejected strongly by
Maliki's government, on the pretext of preventing Iraq’s disintegration (Hamoudi,
2013, p. 152). The constitutional right for the formation of new regions has been
completely blocked by al-Maliki's government.
In the same tone, article 122/5 has provided unlimited power to the
regional governments and provinces: ''The Governorate Council shall not be
subject to the control or supervision of any ministry or any institution not linked
to a ministry. The Governorate Council shall have independent finances''. This
is an unusual case amongst Middle Eastern countries, in which local
government is usually subjected to the control of a ministry, known as ''ministry
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of local governments'', usually part of the central government (Brown, 2006, p.
56).
It can be said that such constitutional rules may push Iraq towards a
confederative system, in terms of common responsibilities between the federal
government and its regions (Brown, 2005, p.13). The same might be true of the
constitutional articles related to the possession of oil and gas which do not
provide any clear distribution of responsibilities between the central government
and the regions. Article 111 states: ''oil and gas are owned by all the people of
Iraq in all the regions and governorates''. The same level of ambiguity continues
in the following article (112), which provides only for a difference between old
and new oil fields. According to this article, the federal government can manage
the oil and extract gas only from the old fields, whilst the rest are the
responsibility of the regions40.
Similarly, the federal government does not possess sufficient constitutional
mechanisms to diminish the authority of the regions; such a request to a region
would require the approval from the parliament of the region and the majority of
the citizens from that region through a referendum. Moreover, article 126/4
makes any constitutional amendment very difficult to achieve. It states that:
Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away
from the powers of the regions that are not within the exclusive powers of the
federal authorities, except by the approval of the legislative authority of the
concerned region and the approval of the majority of its citizens in a general
referendum.
This powerlessness of the federal government toward its regions has
provoked disputes between provinces and regions (KRG) on one hand, and the
federal government on the other, especially in cases where the parliament of
the region claims that a certain amendment will lead to an increase of the power
40 Article 112 has been the cause of a longstanding problem between the KRG and the federal
government. The KRG has claimed that their right to sell oil and gas to Turkey is legal.
However, the previous Deputy Prime Minister Shahristani issued warnings to the companies
that any company working in the KRG oil and gas fields would be blacklisted by the Iraqi
government.  The main problem is that so far there is no law for organising oil and gas in Iraq,
whereas according to article 112, this issue must be organised by law. The Iraqi ministry of oil
filed a lawsuit against both Turkey and KRG for exporting the oil of the Kurdistan region in 2014.
KRG, Ministry of Natural Resources: <http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/ku/media-center-ku/press-
release/362-2014-03-31-21-38-59> [accessed 20/07/14].
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of the central government. This is due to the fact that in Iraq the regional
borders have been defined by ethnic and religious divisions, a factor particularly
clear especially after the 2011 Arab Uprisings.
It can be said that the constitution and its implementation have not been a
solution for Iraq's major problems, in particular the problems that have existed
between the three main components. Furthermore, the constitutional process
has not hammered out the dilemma of power; in particular, the monopoly of
power through majoritarianism has become another predicament in post-2003
Iraq. Furthermore, the permanent constitution has failed to find an acceptable
mechanism for coexistence among Iraq's fractions. Especially regarding the
integration of the Sunni Arabs into post-war Iraq, the U.S.’s engagement can be
harshly criticised. The constitutional process was more about forming a legal
cover for the political process than addressing the redistribution of power. For
example, there are about 60 constitutional articles which should be organised in
law, but have not. The 2005 constitution has not been fully implemented by
Iraq's successive governments following 2005, and therefore has become more
a part of the problem rather than a solution.
3.3. The U.S withdrawal strategy from Iraq: Unaccomplished
responsibility
The U.S.'s model of state-building in Iraq cannot be understood entirely
without examining the U.S. withdrawal strategy from Iraq at the end of 2011.
This section will answer two main questions. First, did the U.S. fulfil their
responsibilities in post-war Iraq? Second, what model of state-building did they
leave behind in Iraq? In order to answer the above questions, it is important to
say that the U.S.'s withdrawal from Iraq was absolutely untimely, and produced
two major interrelated results which may have ramifications on the future of Iraq
for a long time. First, the American pull-out from Iraq left unresolved the balance
among the three main components, Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. This meant that
after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi political process became distanced from
notions of power sharing, in favour of a majoritarian hegemony. This resulted in
the exclusion of Sunnis from governmental institutions via various accusations.
This was in addition to the enduring problems between the federal government
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and the KRG41. Second, the depth of the internal cleavages among the
components facilitated the penetration of regional powers, especially those who
were seeking to fill the vacuum left by the Americans. This is especially true
after Syria's turmoil, which highlighted the conflict between the Shi'a and Sunni
camps.
The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq had not depended on Iraq's levels of
political, economic and military abilities. Although Bremer himself admitted that
Iraq was a ''completely failed economy'', the CPA ''did not have a lot of time to
kick-start this economy'' (Bremer, 2006, p.113). The U.S. plan was mainly
influenced, on one hand, by the U.S.'s domestic pressures, especially electoral
issues and the competition between the Republican and Democratic Parties,
and by regional pressures in Iraq on the other. One of the main reasons for the
failure of the Republican Party in the 2008 presidential election was America’s
role in the war42.
The withdrawal from Iraq took place through two strategic agreements.
The first was the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which provided
for legal immunity for U.S. troops and established dates for a full withdrawal.
The second, containing the broader Strategic Framework Agreement, was
approved by Iraq's parliament in late November 2008. According to article 24/1
of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),''all the United States
Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011''
(Status of Forces Agreement, 2008).
The agreements had been signed after a series of negotiations which
lasted eight months and were dominated by serious objections from Iraq, Iran,
41 On December 19th 2012, al-Maliki issued a warrant against vice president Tariq al-Hashimi.
Moreover, most of the Iraqi parties claimed that Iraq under the rule of Maliki turned into an
authoritarian regime. In addition, other Shi’i parties such as the al-Sadrist group threatened to
end their participation in Maliki’s government, while for the first time after the Iraq war Sunnis
called for a federal region.
42 Taking a close look at Bremer's book, it can be noticed that he was under pressure to
decrease the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, especially by Donald Rumsfeld. He clearly admitted
so, saying ''our goal should be to ramp up the Iraqi numbers, try to get some additional
international forces and find ways to put less stress on our forces, enabling us to reduce the
U.S. role. The faster the Iraqi forces grow, the lower the percentage will be of U.S. forces out of
the total forces'' (Bremer, 2006, p. 162).
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and Syria. Iran demanded (through its influence on some Iraqi parties) changes
to some articles in the security agreement, which had been adopted in the first
draft (Nicolas, 2009). A closer look at the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) reveals that both sides agreed on the withdrawal schedule of the
American troops without having any shared plan to ensure whether the Iraqi
forces could control domestic and regional order without U.S. troops. This
prompted the U.S. President Barack Obama to dedicate around 50,000
additional troops, whose tasks would be limited to the training and equipping of
the Iraqi security forces. In addition, the U.S. would assist the Iraqi government
in the fight against terrorism, as well as against any possible military escalation
before the end of 2011 (SOFA, article 4).
Regarding the capability of Iraq's Army in protecting the country's security,
both Iraqi and U.S. military experts admitted that Iraq was not in a situation to
cope with internal and regional threats. For example, on December 2011, the
deputy head of operations for the U.S. Army in Iraq, Lt.-Gen. Frank Helmick,
emphasised that ''there are still security gaps in the new Iraqi Army that
Washington is leaving behind'' (cited in Gold, 2012). Similarly, Babakir Zebari, a
former commander of Iraq's armed forces, in 2010 stated that the ''U.S. army
must stay until the Iraqi army is fully ready in 2020'' (Today's Zaman, 08-13-
2010). The fall of Mosul into the hands of Daesh in June 2014 has been the
strongest evidence for the above statements. A country with a deeply divided
society, fragile institutions and a weak state identity does not have any other
alternative than calling for the intervention of external forces when it is
threatened43.
The evidence from both Iraq and U.S. officials shows that the U.S. did not
have a proper strategy for the post-U.S.-withdrawal Iraq. Thus, post-2003 Iraq
has become a battlefield for regional conflicts, in particular after ripples of the
Arab uprisings in the Persian Gulf, which has been deeply affected by ethnic
43 The premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011 displayed similarities to the
British withdrawal from Iraq in 1932. From 1927 onward, the British policy was to unburden itself
of responsibility towards Iraq as soon as possible. When Iraq granted its independence in 1932,
it was not fully able to defend itself from its neighbours, nor able to impose order across its
territory (Dodge, 2003, pp. 9, 41). This has clearly also been the case after the U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq, with IS occupying a quarter of Iraq's territories in June 2014.
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and religious policies. Even when it had 140,000 troops on the ground, America
was never the only influential power on Iraqi soil44. It can be said that three
factors accelerated the infiltration of Iraq’s competitive neighbours: first, the
rising of internal tensions among Iraq’s three main groups, especially their
sense of political deprivation from the opposing parties which pushed the three
communities to look for support from external powers; secondly, the organic
social, religious and tribal links between Iraq’s groupings and regional countries,
such as Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey45; and thirdly, the impact of the
Arab uprisings, which has reshaped the whole region on the basis of ethnic and
sectarian borders. These three factors strongly spurred regional penetration into
the state-building process following the U.S. withdrawal.
Furthermore, the vacuum left by the U.S. has been filled by regional
powers, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. That is to say, the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq distanced the U.S. from an important source of influence in
the region, in favour of Iraq's neighbouring countries and non-state terrorist
groups. This has led the U.S. to become a less dominating power in Iraq and in
the whole region since 2011. This situation can be compared to the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam when Richard Nixon called for U.S. troops’ withdrawal
in 1973, a move that ended the U.S. dominance in Asia in favour of Marxists
(Katz, 2012). The same occurred with the withdrawal of Soviet combatant
forces in Afghanistan in 1988-1989, which ended Russian dominance in the
region.
From this point of view, the ramifications of the U.S. pull-out of Iraq have
extended to affect the internal balance of power among Iraq's components, and
at the same time on the regional security system. Internally all three of Iraq's
44 Michael Rubin, who was one of the directors of the Pentagon's Office of Iran in Iraq during the
U.S. invasion of Iraq, later attached to the CPA, expressed concerns during his first few weeks
in Iraq about the obvious presence of Iranian agents in Iraq. Rubin said that Bremer and the
civilian U.S. leadership in Iraq were aware of Iranian actions in Iraq, but Pentagon generals did
not want to open another wider war by targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guards inside Iraq. In
July 2003 just weeks after arriving in Baghdad, Rubin reported to his superiors in the Pentagon:
''we are in very serious trouble [in Iraq]''. He described the situation in Iraq as an Iranian
invasion (Solomon, J., 2016. The Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals
that Reshaped the Middle East. Random House, 2016, p. 63-64).
45 Iraq's tribal links with Syria will be discussed in detail in chapter five.
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factions (Shi'a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurd) were concerned about their political
future in Iraq, and they each tried to find an alternative security; Shi'as have
relayed more to Iran, Sunnis have turned to the regional Arab countries such as
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, and Kurds, despite their lack of natural state
allies in the region, have improved their political and economic relations with
Turkey. These concerns also were true of Iraq's neighbours, especially the U.S.
allies in the region. As Katz (2012) pointed out, the U.S. withdrawal has made
some of the U.S.’s allies becoming less certain of the ability and willingness of
the U.S. to defend them. This has meant that they have sought for alternative
security arrangements and have even struck first at some of their enemies in
the region. This was exactly what happened following the U.S. withdrawal in
Iraq. The entire region has polarised around ethnic and sectarian foundations,
with most of Iraq’s sects aligned with militias and non-state actors, such as ISIS,
al-Nusra front, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunna, Islamic Army in Iraq, Asa'ib Ahl
al-Haqq, the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organisation. These militias have been
used in proxy wars and regional settlements among Iraq's neighbouring
countries. This has been the case during the time of the Syrian crisis from 2011
onward, in which the conflict quickly spread over Sunni-dominated areas, and
led to protests against al-Maliki's government, particularly in Anbar, Nineveh,
and Hawija (BBC, 23 April 2013).
The aforementioned form of sectarian polarisation in the region has added
more tensions to the conflict among Iraq's components on the one hand, and
the non-state actors and regional players on the other hand, a situation that can
be very hard to control. This complex picture of Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal
has been viewed by the neighbours of Iraq as a source of threat to their internal
and regional security affairs. The lack of a strategic structure for after the
withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq, has inflamed the internal disputes
among political powers and provided a good chance to Iraq's neighbouring
countries to fill the vacuum in favour of their regional agendas. This can be
better demonstrated through the thesis’s theoretical framework of regional
security complex.
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3.4. Conclusion: Unaccomplished state-building model
It is clear that none of the U.S.’s expectations and plans materialised on
the ground. Crucially, they never expected that the roots of the differences
among three major fractions were so deep. The U.S.'s main plan was to build a
central government in Iraq as quick as possible in order to add Iraq to the list of
its allies in the region. However, a few months after the invasion they had to
revise their strategy, and tried to remedy the situation by supporting a power
sharing regional plan which involved the three main groups. The CPA had
neither enough sources nor enough time (14 months) to establish a solid
foundation for the new state in Iraq. This deeply impacted on the constitutional
process and produced an ethnic and sectarian body for the distribution of
power, based on a weak central government in Baghdad with a decentralisation
of power in favour of regions and provinces.
The building of a state in a top-down fashion with a decentralisation of
power based on an ethno-sectarian model cannot be practical in the Iraqi case,
for number of reasons:
First, the downfall of the Iraqi state in 2003 produced an anarchic situation
characterised by a destabilisation of security. Meanwhile, the political process
following the U.S.-led invasion could not build a state which could provide law
and order. Thus, in the absence of a real state that could deliver protection and
stability, all factions felt threatened, and had to look for other sources of
protection in the neighbouring countries, which then had the opportunity to
increase their influence in Iraq’s internal affairs.
Furthermore, the U.S's project of state-building, in the Iraqis’ eyes, came
from outside, in contrast with the process of state-building in Western Europe
which was an internally-generated process. There has been no single
successful state-building process in the Middle East that has been led by
outsiders. Especially, as Diamond (2004, p.43) observes, the U.S. efforts have
been viewed by most of the Iraqi people as an occupation by western
Christians, rather than an international effort to build a new Iraq. Finally, the
untimely withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Iraq ruined most of the earlier efforts of
state-building. What U.S. left behind after 2011 was a government but was not a
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state, because it lacked the three main functions of the state: security, welfare
and representation (see Schwarz, 2005).
Therefore, it can be argued that, if the 1921 British version of state/nation
building designed Iraq's external borders as a new state in the region, the U.S.
version has designed Iraq's internal borders among Iraq's components on the
bases of ethnic and sectarian identities. The U.S. has left behind a state-
building process unaccomplished in two aspects, which later became main
reason for spurring Iraq's neighbours’ involvement in the state-building process
after 2003. First, the U.S. left Iraq without building political foundations for
power-sharing among Iraq's main groups of Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd. Second, the
U.S. left Iraq without any viable strategic plan to deter Iranian hegemony in Iraq.
Thus, it could be concluded that the state-building model sponsored by the U.S.
in post-2003 Iraq was in itself a reason behind Iraq's neighbours' engagement in
the process of state-building in Iraq, which this thesis deals with in the next
chapters.
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Chapter four:
4. Iraq and Iran: From enmity to amity
''The road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala'' (Ayatollah Khomeini,
July 1982)
Introduction
Iranian involvement in Iraq has been one of the most debated subjects
since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It would be very hard, if not impossible, to
understand the regional dimensions of the ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003
Iraq without taking into consideration Iran's role in Iraq and in the conflict. In the
last chapter I argued that the form of state-building that the U.S. has left behind
has been an unaccomplished process and has produced a fragile state.
Considering the Persian regional security complex, in addition to the presence
of number of middle powers, has been one of the factors that prompted Iraq's
main neighbours to become involved in the state-building process in Iraq,
especially those which have ethnic and sectarian links with Iraq. Based on this
argument, this chapter examines how and why Iran engaged in the ethno-
sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq, and why Iran's engagement in Iraq has
been more effective and intensive than that of Iraq's other neighbours. What are
the mechanisms that the Iranians have depended on in their intervention in
post-war Iraq? Furthermore, to demonstrate the standard form of RSC this
chapter will also analyse the ramifications of the Iranian involvement in Iraq
through the pattern of rivalry, balance of power, and alliance patterns among
the main powers within the region, in particular for the two other regional
players, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Their interferences in Iraq may partly be
reaction to the intensive Iranian involvement in post-2003 Iraq, as a result of the
''security complex'' interconnectedness of the region in which one state cannot
pragmatically be considered apart from another (Buzan, 2003, p.190).
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To answer the abovementioned questions, this chapter has been divided
into three sections. The first examines Iran’s strategy in Iraq after 2003 (how
Iran became involved in state-building and ethno-sectarian conflicts in post-
2003 Iraq), and the strategy will be analysed by taking into consideration three
main aspects: 1) the diminished U.S. capability in Iraq; 2) the support for a pro-
Iranian Shi'i government in Iraq; and 3) the engagement with the Kurdish
region. Moreover, in order to understand the interrelated regional security
among Iraq's neighbours, the second section examines the impact of Iranian
leverage in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and its consequences for other regional
actors, in particular Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the U.S. is
not a direct member of the Persian Gulf's RSC, due to its indispensable role in
shaping regional security dynamics in the Persian Gulf, section three has
addressed the U.S. as an influential actor of the Persian Gulf's regional security
complex.
4.1. Iran’s strategy in Iraq after 2003: How Iran became involved in
the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq
Before analysing Iranian strategy in post-2003 Iraq, and the ways in which
the Iranians became involved in the ethno-confessional tensions, it is important
firstly to understand the position of Iraq in the Iranian strategy, and what post-
2003 Iraq meant for Iran as well as the motivations that drive Iran’s strategy
toward Iraq.
The first motivation can be found in the building of new political-security
architecture in the Persian Gulf. Iranian hegemony in Iraq means that Iran has
created a real soft power (the so-called Shi'a Crescent) stretching from
Afghanistan through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. However, what some
researchers call ''Shi'a Crescent'' is no more than the product of Iranian foreign
policy's influence in fragile countries in the region. Further, this is not solely
based on Shi'a ideology but on the capabilities of Iran to make use of the
ideology for political purposes. Iran's links with Sunni Hamas and Iraqi Kurds
can be best exemplified in this context. Having Iraq as an ally provides Iran with
the capability to affect the traditional security order in the Persian Gulf and
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create a new regional security system. As Barzegar (2007, p.102) says, for the
first time in history since the Islamic Revolution, both ideological and political
interests of Iranian foreign policy have been met in post-Saddam Iraq. Iraq’s
political, economic and security position is much more important for Iran than for
any other allies of Iran in the region, such as Syria or Lebanon.
A number of factors influenced the Iranian strategy towards post-2003
Iraq. The size of Iraq’s Shi’i population is the second largest in the Middle East,
after Iran. In addition, the Shi’a population has had an active political and
ideological role in the political process following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Second, there is a huge supply of natural resources present in Iraq, particularly
oil, especially in the southern region where the Shi’a primarily reside. Third, the
geostrategic location of Iraq can act as a security buffer for Iran in the Persian
Gulf against any potential foreign invasion. In addition, from the Iranian point of
view, an Iraqi Shi'i regime would guarantee Iranian security interests in the
Persian Gulf. The Iranian historical, political, and ideological links with Iraq's
new political elite running the Iraqi government and political process since 2003
is also a major factor in the shaping Iranian strategy toward post-2003 Iraq.
These gains could turn into be a big political investment for Iran; as Nasr (2006,
p.67) notes, it could provide Iran with the ability to be a regional superpower
and a base for a Shi'a zone of influence stretching from Mesopotamia to Central
Asia.
Second, Iraq's ethnic and religious identities have had a direct influence
on the national, ethnic, and religious identities in Iran, since both Iraqi Kurds
and Arabs have strong ties with their Iranian counterparts. In the Kurdish case
this relationship was clear, in the collaboration between Kurdish liberation
movements based in both countries. That had occurred when Iraqi Kurdish
leader Mustafa Barzani participated with several thousand fighters in
establishing the Republic of Mahabad (also called the State of the Republic of
Kurdistan) in eastern Kurdistan, north-west Iran, on 22 January 1946. That
ethnic solidarity was repeated in 2014 during Iraqi Kurds’ battles with Islamic
State. The Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I), Kurdistan Freedom Party
and Kurdistan Struggle Agency, had engaged alongside with the Iraqi Kurds
into the battlefield against IS (see Rudaw, 2014).  After 2003 these ties (ethnic,
religious, social, economic and political) have deepened due to the new political
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alliance between Iran and the new ruling elite in Iraq. Iran may consider these
ethno-religious connections (or in the words of this thesis’s theory, the domestic
level of Iran's security complex dynamics) with the Iraqi Kurds a threat to its
internal stability, especially in the possible future event of Iraq's division.
Third, Iranian hegemony in Iraq could provide Iran the power to hinder the
interference of the U.S. and its allies in the region, and to be in a stronger
position in its negotiations with the West46. Baker III, and Hamilton’s report
(2006) provides an example, when they clearly recommended to the U.S, that,
‘’given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their
interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them
constructively’’. U.S. and Iranian coordination could also be seen in the
international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq, when Iran showed its
cooperation with the West. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
said ''If we agree to do something in Iraq, the other side of the negotiations
should do something in return''. (Reuters, Aug 21, 2014). Iran’s influence on
Iraq, coupled with its sometime cooperation with the West, has allowed Iran to
exert its influence in other contexts, such as Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.
Fourth, Iran wishes to build a 'sphere of influence' in southern Iraq, relying
on its soft power with Iraqi Shi'a groups (Milani, 2011, p.74). This is mainly
achievable by increasing its political ties with the Iraqi political elites, such as
Da'wa, Sadrist, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Parties. In
addition, Iran has a high interest in increasing its economic, religious, financial,
and political presence in Iraq in order to avoid any possible division of the
country. However, even in the case of Iraq’s division, Iran would still maintain
46 According to current and former American and Iraqi government officials and experts on the
Iraqi banking sector, Iraq has provided Iran with a vital flow of dollars to bypass the nuclear
sanctions. President Obama made clear in his statement on the announcement of additional
sanctions over Iran that:
The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf
Islamic Bank in Iraq under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (CISADA). Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank have facilitated transactions worth
millions of dollars on behalf of Iranian banks that are subject to sanctions for their links to Iran’s
illicit proliferation activities. (The White House, 31 July 2012).
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great influence over Iraq’s southern Shi’a region, also the most rich in
resources. Furthermore, regionalism has been demanded by the ISCI and other
Iraqi politicians many times in since 2006, their aim to have a semi-autonomous
region with similar rights to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In such a case, Basra
would most likely fall under the Iranian influence in the region.
According to the aforementioned factors regarding Iran's strategy towards
Iraq, it can be said that Iran's involvement in the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq cannot be explained only through the ideological ambitions of the
Iranian regime. In particular, due to the securitization of the Persian Gulf region,
especially since the 1980s, for Iran and other Arab Gulf countries, security and
foreign policies are hardly detachable (Kamrava, 2011, p.186).Therefore to
understand Iranian strategy in Iraq and the wider region it is important firstly to
address the factors that are driving Iranian foreign policy in the region. As
Ramazani (2013, p.148) argued, although both factors of ideology and
pragmatism have long existed throughout Iranian history, the balance of
influence has been shifted away from religious ideology toward pragmatic
calculation of the national interest in the making of foreign policy decisions, due
to the dynamic processes of cultural developments in Iran. This is especially
true after Ayatollah Khomeini's era in the late 1990s, when a domestic political
reform movement paid attention to national interests more than religious
ideology (Maloney, 2008, p.21). The same is true of Iranian national security
policies in the region, also more influenced by pragmatic balance of power than
by religious ideology (see Kamrava, p.2011, p.184). There are few major
disagreements between Iran's conservatives and reformists on this issue.
At the centre of Iran's pragmatic approach, the geopolitical factor
constitutes an important driver of Iran's regional policy, in particular towards its
immediate neighbours (Byman et al, 2001, pp. 7-8). Of course there are other
factors, such as ''revolutionary Islam'' and Persian nationalism, in addition to the
ethnic and sectarian factors. However, the influence of the mentioned factors
has, overall, declined in Iran's foreign policy (Byman et al, 2001, p.8). To an
extent, even the principle of the rejection of diplomatic negotiations with the old
adversary the U.S. has been abandoned in Iranian foreign policy. In March
2006 Ayatollah Khamenei proclaimed that “there are no objections to talk with
Washington if the Iranian officials think they can make the Americans clearly
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understand the issue pertaining to Iraq” (cited in Maloney, 2008, p.19).
Negotiations between U.S. and Iran (even sometimes cooperation) over Iraq
have occurred many times before and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
(Gordon, 2016)47.
Despite the complexity of the Iranian engagement in the process of state-
building through ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq, it is possible to
divide it into different stages, as outlined below.
 Iran's policy toward Iraq 2003-2005: Considerable caution
From 2003 to 2005, Iran was anxious about the U.S. presence next door.
At that time the main concern of Iran was that it could become a second target
for American invasion48. Throughout this stage, Iran was concerned about the
new political situation in Iraq, the form of state that the U.S. would set up in the
country, and which Iraqi factions would dominate the new government. As
Kamrava argued (2011, p.202), Iranian short-term strategy during that period
can be attributed to Iran's fear of any direct confrontation with the U.S. troops in
Iraq. This period witnessed Iranian involvement through its former opposition
allies against the Ba'ath regime, in particularly the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI) and the Badr forces. Ali Allawi, a former Iraqi defence minister and
author of The Occupation of Iraq, said: ‘‘about 10,000 trained and disciplined
Badr fighters entered Iraq, either unarmed or armed only with light weapons,
and reassembled in various towns and cities as the fighting arm of SCIRI”
47 A former American ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that the U.S. had talked with
Iran regarding Iraq’s future in advance of the U.S.-led invasion to topple the Ba'ath regime, Iran
agreed that they would not fire at U.S. warplanes that strayed into Iranian airspace. “We wanted
a commitment that Iran would not fire on U.S. aircraft if they accidentally flew over Iranian
territory”. Gordon, M.R., 2016. US Conferred With Iran Before Iraq Invasion, Book Says. New
York Times, 6.
48 According to a U.S. classified document dated 2005, leaked to Wikileaks, ''the U.S. military
forces in Iraq were authorized to pursue former members of Saddam Hussein’s government and
terrorists across Iraq’s borders into Iran and Syria'' (Wikileaks, February 4, 2008). In response
Tehran warned American forces in Iraq via its Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Mohammad
Ali Hosseini that "Any entrance to the Iranian soil by any U.S. military force to trail suspects
would be against international laws and could be pursued legally". (Wikileaks, February 12,
2008).
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(Allawi, 2007, p.139). Although, during this period, Tehran demonstrated its
willingness to negotiate with Washington about its nuclear program (Gordon,
2016), there is no evidence to show that Iranian posture toward Iraq was related
to their nuclear talks with the U.S. In contrast to U.S. accusations, there is no
clear evidence to prove that at that time Iran was supporting insurgent groups'
activities in Iraq. On the contrary, Iran, as mentioned earlier, played an
important role in deterring any possible American attack against their interests,
including the emergence of an anti-Iranian regime, as well as a civil war in post-
2003 Iraq.
It is evident, after all these years, that most of the violent attacks in 2003-
2005 came from Sunni and Ba'athist groups traditionally hostile to Iran.
However, in this period Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shi’a group Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM)
was responsible for some attacks49. At that time, al-Sadr was not an Iranian ally.
In general, he has had a fluctuating relationship with Iran, and has been more
an Iraqi nationalist following his father’s belief that Iraq’s Shi’a Arabs are the
rightful leaders of the Hawza50 (see Krohley, 2014). It may be argued that the
Iranian fear of an aggressive U.S. reaction prevented Iran from carrying out
attacks against the U.S. troops in Iraq at that period.
With a closer look at the Iranian policy towards Iraq at this period, it can be
concluded that Iran might have not been against the idea of a Shi'a southern
federal region when the idea was first suggested by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in
August 2005. Although there is not any evidence to prove that Iran was behind
this suggestion, due to the close ideological ties between Iran and the ISCI the
southern federalism might not have been suggested without Iranian prior
awareness. However, the idea of southern federalism has been strongly
rejected by most of the Shi'a and Sunni parties, which have claimed that this
model of federalism aims to divide Iraq into ethnic and sectarian areas.
49 The U.S.-Iraq intelligence in al-Hillah, dated June 8, 2005 which was classified at the
SECRET level, illustrated that Gawad (Al-Hassnawi) and Hamid (Kanosh), who were members
of the Karbala city council, were at the same time members of the Mahdi Militia in Karbala and
associated with known Mahdi Militia members Ali Abd (Taan) and Mohamed (Kadhim). Both of
them were confirmed members of a Mahdi Militia cell operating in Karbala. Taan and Kadhim
occasionally worked as bodyguards for Al-Hassnawi and Kanosh (Wikileaks, May 16, 2008).
50 Hawza is a type of seminary centre which provides training to Shi'a Muslim clerics, such as
the preeminent Hawza of Najaf in Iraq and the Qom Hawza in Iran.
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 Iran's policy toward Iraq 2005-2008: Shifting to an active player
There are two main reasons for the shifting of Iran's policy from a passive
player into an active player in this period (see Cohen, 2011). First, Iran reached
the conclusion that America would not be able to control Iraq, and that it failed
in the state-building process to create what they claimed was a democratic
regime. As a middle power in a penetrated regional state system (according to
the thesis’s theory), Iran found that as an opportunity to involve itself, especially
given that Iran had long experience in interfering in volatile regimes, such as
Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Second, after 2006 it became obvious that Iraq
was descending into a civil war with disastrous consequences for Iranian
internal and external security. Also, the conservatives' coming into power in Iran
under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 supported this
change. As Takeyh (2009, p.237) revealed, the rise of the “new right” made a
significant shift in Iranian foreign policy toward a mixture of ultra-nationalism
and Islamist ideology, stressing Iran's right to become a regional superpower.
Iranian foreign policy faced many tensions during this period, whether on the
international level (e.g. with the U.S. and Israel) or on the regional level (e.g.
with GCC countries) (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2008, p.132). This period
witnessed the building of extensive intelligence networks with Shi'a, Sunni and
Kurdish militia groups. Iran's ties with the Badr Organisation and other Shi’a
groups like Fadila and Jaysh al-Mahdi bloomed. This is particularly noteworthy
with the high-ranking members of the Iraqi exile political groups, such as Abu
Mahdi al-Muhandis and Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, as well as radical figures from
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, such as Qais al-Khazali and Ismail al-
Lami, who formed secret armed groups in coordination with Iran (Moaveni,
2003).
 Iran's policy toward Iraq 2008-2011: Keeping Shi'a groups united
Early March 2008 witnessed a diminution of the Iranian influence in Iraq.
This was due to the constructive efforts that had been made by al-Maliki's
government to curb the role of the armed militias that seized the city of Basra
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and Sadr city in Baghdad, led by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) under the influence
of the Iraqi Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Al-Mahdi militia was the strongest ally
of Iran at that time. Arguably there were a number of reasons contributing to the
curtailing of Iran's power at that moment. Firstly, the changing of the U.S. policy
toward Iraq in 2007, through sending 30,000 additional troops to the country,
had a drastic impact on the security situation in favour of the U.S.. Secondly,
the U.S. strategy of participating in the Sahawat, ''Sunni Awakening", which
turned many of the Sunnis against al-Qaeda in late 2006, had a significant
effect of reducing the surge against the government and restoring security
(Mardini,2010, p. 52). Thirdly, the ''Charge of the Knight'' operation against the
Shi'a militias was another blow to the Iranian hegemony in post-Saddam Iraq.
That government campaign, supported by a remarkable percentage of the Iraqi
people, in particular secularists, has been seen as a step toward the
enforcement of the rule of law and bringing back order to the state51.
This transformation became more obvious in the 2009 provincial elections,
when the majority of the Iraqi people voted for the parties least tied to Iran and
least involved with the militia groups, such as Prime Minister Maliki's State of
Law coalition, and Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiyya list (al-Iraqiyya gained 91 seats and
State of Law 89 out of 325 in total). However, the Iranian decline did not last for
long, because al-Maliki's coalition did not let al-Iraqiyya form a new government;
this occurred primarily due to the Iranian efforts of re-building the Shi'a alliance
that had been impacted by political differences. Iran also put more pressure
upon the Sadrist Movement and the two main Kurdish parties, the PUK and the
KDP, to support Maliki's government. Maliki paid back his debts to the Iranians,
and during the second term of his government, Iranian hegemony in Iraq
reached its highest extent. The 7 March 2010 parliamentary elections witnessed
high engagement by Iran. The competition between the Iraqi National
Movement, led by Ayad Allawi, which won a total of 91 seats, and the State of
Law Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, with 89 seats,
reached its peak (Isakhan, 2015, p.72). Muwafaq al-Rubai’i, who was Iraqi
51 The Charge of the Knights was an attempt which could transform al-Maliki from a sectarian
character to a national leader following the U.S. invasion, especially after his election list of
State of Law marked a great success in the elections of governorate councils in January 2009.
However, the limited character of al-Maliki, and the conflict inside the Shi'i house, especially
with Shi'a paramilitary groups, hindered this attempt.
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national security advisor, made explicit reference to regional and international
interference with Iraqi affairs, particularly in the formation of the new Iraqi
government. According to Sharq al-Awsat newspaper (29 July 2010) one of the
INA leaders admitted that “Iran has informed us that we should accept al-Maliki
even though he hit us on our heads”. Iranian funds to the ISCI were reduced by
50 percent in order to pressure them into accepting al-Maliki as the new Prime
Minister.
 Iran's policy toward Iraq after 2011: Toward a strategic partner
The Arab uprising has intensely affected regional policies among Arab and
Islamic countries, and deepened ethnic and religious tensions in the Middle
East. The Syrian conflict was a major turning point for all three of Iraq's
components, Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds. Each of these groups has joined the
ethnic and sectarian combat in Syria. Since then Iraq has allied itself with the
Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah front. It can be argued that the Islamic State (also
Daesh or ISIS) attack on Mosul and other Sunni territories in central and
northern Iraq has linked even more strongly Iraq’s Shi’as to Iran. If there was no
ISIS, it may have taken a decade for the same relationship to form. After Daesh
took over the most of the Sunni-majority territories with the help of some Sunni
tribes and insurgents, the Iraqi Shi'a found themselves with no friends in the
region except Iran (Al-Jazeera, 4 Jun 2015).
After 2014, there has been increasing amount of evidence that shows the
presence of Iranian military advisors in Iraq. The top Popular Mobilization Units
commander, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, underlined to the press that “the presence
of experts and advisers from Iran gave us a major boost. They provided us with
(military) guidelines, and even prevented the fall of the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan,
Erbil. Major General Soleimani went to Erbil to prevent its fall.” (Pars Today, 1
Jun 2016). The existence of IS has strongly linked Iraqi Shi’ism with Iran,
regardless of the political differences between them.
It is important to note that what differentiates Iranian engagement in Iraq
from the engagement of other neighbouring countries is Iran's focus on building
links with Iraq's official political, military, economic and religious institutions. On
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the political level, Iran has built durable relations with a number of Shi'a political
parties, such as the Islamic Daʿwa Party (Ḥizb Al-Daʿwa Al-Islāmiyya) and the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Most of the political elite that has dominated
the political process in Iraq since 2003 had spent part of their political life in
Iran. For instance, the Badr Organisation (previously known as the Badr
Brigade) was founded in Iran in 1982 by Shi'a exiles that were trained, financed
and armed by Iran and fought alongside Revolutionary Guard Corps during the
Iran-Iraq war against Saddam's Ba'ath regime. Badr was the armed wing of the
largest Shi'a political party in Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
(Mumford, 2012, p.140).
However, when the ISCI attempted to disassociate itself from Iranian
tutelage in 2012, the Badr group broke away in order to keep its solid ties with
Iran. Badr has strong ideological links with the Iranian Islamic regime and is a
strong supporter of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Since
2012, Badr has played an important role in both its political and military wings in
the Iraqi arena. The group has controlled many official positions in the Iraqi
governments. In the former Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki's government, al-Amiri,
the head of the organisation, served as the Minister of Transportation. Also in
October 2014, Mohammed Ghabban, a member of the Badr Organisation, was
appointed Iraq’s Interior Minister. In 2004, when the official Iraqi Security Forces
were formed, most of the Badr Organisation was incorporated into these forces
(Stanford University Report, 2016). Iran's infiltration into political and military
institutions in Iraq become even deeper after the Iraqi Parliament passed a law
in November 2016 recognising over 50 militias under an umbrella organization
of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) as an independent military formation.
(Al Arabiya, 27 November 2016).
Regarding the Iranian strategy in post-Saddam Iraq and its engagement in
the state-building process, it can be argued that Iran has acted on three main
levels:
4.1.1. Limiting U.S. capability in Iraq
After Iran realised that Iraq was on the verge of collapse and could not be
controlled by the U.S., Iran began to pursue its strategic aims in post-2003 Iraq.
Iran was very concerned about its geopolitical position after September 11, due
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to the influence of global terrorist groups in both Afghanistan and Iraq. After
2003, the Iranians found that they had very strong links with the new political
elite in Iraq, due to the fact that most of the Iraqi political parties in power in
post-2003 Iraq had spent most of their life in opposition in Iran. The ISCI and
Da'wa Parties, as well as both of the main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the
PUK, had a history of opposition to the Ba'ath regime, and they had played a
role in the Iranian opposition to Saddam's regime during the Iran-Iraq War52.
The Shi’a and Kurds now dominated the post-2003 political process. By working
with Shi’as and Kurdish parties, Iran became most dominant country in Iraq
amongst Iraq’s other neighbours.
It can be said that the most powerful mechanism which was in Iran’s
hands for curbing the U.S. plans in post 2003 Iraq was the use of Shi'i proxy
militants. Some of these groups, funded by Iran, were recruited in Iran in order
to provide logistic information about American troops and supply weapons to
carry out attacks on the coalition forces in 200553 (al-Khoei , 2010). . Although,
all these claims cannot be regarded as reliable evidence, this has been insisted
52 The main Iraqi political figures that spent a part of their opposition life in Iran and constituted
the post-2003 Iraqi government, and who meanwhile have kept their ties to Iran, are Ibrahim al-
Jaafari, Ammar al-Hakim, Humam Hamoudi, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, Bayan Jabr, Nuri al-Malaki,
Masoud Barzani, Muqtada al-Sadr and Jalal Talabani. Other members of the Iraqi new elite,
such as Ahmad Chalabi, were not in exile in Iran but did maintain good relations with Iran;
Chalabi was accused by the U.S. in 2004 of sharing secret information with Tehran about
American intelligence gathering against Iran. The above-mentioned political elite have been a
key factor of Iranian power in the post-2003 Iraq. For more about Iraq's political elite after 2003,
see Kemp, 2005, Iran and Iraq: The Shi’a Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,
United States Institute of Peace.
53 According to some regional intelligence reports, 4,000 Iraqi fighters in Iraq were trained and
armed in Iran in order to provoke an Islamic revolution in Iraq. Most of these fighters were
former Iraqi prisoners in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Other reports also revealed that many
young Iraqis were also recruited by Shi'a clerics to go to Iran for religious and political
indoctrination and militia training in 2004 and 2005. Many members of the Badr Corps have
been incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces, suggesting an increase of Iranian hold over the
very basic structural elements of post-war Iraq. Muhammad, who was the uncle of a young man
who went to Iran, said ‘’the young man and a number of others were recruited from Husseiniya
mosque, a large Shi’a mosque in Baghdad. The young man told his father he was going to visit
a religious site in Iran. But, Muhammad said, “They took them to a camp and gave them a
briefing on what is happening in Iraq, and what Iran is trying to do: Support the Shi’as and help
them retain power’’ (The Washington Times, January 9, 2006).
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many times by the U.S. former Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, who has
frequently warned about Iranian interference in Iraq’s affairs. In 2005, he stated:
“we do not want weapons to come across from Iran into Iraq, or training of Iraqis
to take place.” (The Washington Times, January 9, 2006).
According to Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports (Kenneth,
2010, p. 2), the support for Shi'a militias by Iran, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the
Badr Brigades, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam and the Mahdi Army,
reached a peak in 2006-2008 and 2014-2016. Shi'a militias and insurgent
groups were supported with the provision of weapons and troops, most of which
were provided by the Quds Force (the Special Forces of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC) who are responsible for extraterritorial
operations. The question that remains open is, was Iranian support of these
paramilitary Shi'a militias only for the sake of curbing U.S. capabilities in Iraq?
The formation of Iraqi Shi'a militias derives from Tehran's experience in
Lebanon in the 1980s. The Iranian Support for these militias is multiuse and
multipurpose. One of the aims may be as Takeyh (2009, p.254) argues, that
Iran wants the Shi'a to have control deriving from their demographic advantage,
but if the political process fails, they must be properly armed to win the civil war.
Second, these paramilitary militias can provide Iran with an upper hand not only
against the U.S. but also against the Iraqi government, the KRG and even Iraq's
neighbours if necessary. They have acted many times opposition to the Iraqi
government, whether during al-Maliki's government (in Basra) or during Abadi's
government (in Tuz Khurmatu and Tal Afar). This is in addition to their disputes
with the KRG in disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, Jalawla, and Tuz Khurmatu, or
their participation in Syria's crisis after 2011. Having a huge number (140,000
men registered in 60-70 groups) armed in Shi'a militias can curb and direct the
political process in Iraq, given that many of these militias have been involved in
the political process (Al Jazeera, 26 November 2016).
Iranian efforts to curb the U.S. process of statebuilding in Iraq have been
confirmed by both U.S. and British officials. James Jeffery (Reuters, 26 Aug
2010) the U.S. ambassador in Iraq in 2010-2012, stated:
My own estimate, based just upon a gut feeling, is that up to a quarter of
the American casualties and some of the more horrific incidents in which
Americans were kidnapped ... can be traced without doubt to these Iranian
groups.
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Despite the intensive Iranian engagement in Iraq, it can be argued that
Iran until the U.S. withdrawal did not have a comprehensive plan of state
building to apply in Iraq. Most of the Iranian efforts focused on hindering the
U.S. from applying their own form of state-building in Iraq. What Iran was
concerned with was that the Americans wished to build an Iraq with close links
to the Sunni Arab countries, such as the GCC countries and Jordan, or an Iraq
influenced by the dictates of pan-Arab nationalists, as had been left by the
British in 1921, which might turn Iraq again to a hostile regime towards Iran.
This was according to the wishes of a number of Arab countries, particularly
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. They expressed their concerns and
preferences about what the new Iraq should look like. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt put pressure on the U.S. not to allow post-2003 Iraq to be dominated by
the Shi'a and form part of the Shi’a soft power in the region. So, the Iranian
strategy of countering the U.S. task in Iraq was mainly relevant to Iran's security
policies rather than to the sectarian agendas in post-war Iraq. As Haddad
(2011, p.10) reveals, the external influence is not a direct factor of sectarian
relations in Iraq; alternatively, it is a major factor to understand the sectarian
relations in post-2003 Iraq. What can be concluded here is, what has driven
Tehran to counter the U.S. presence in Iraq was the regional security complex
dynamics of Iran with Iraq, and not a pure ideological agenda of exporting
Islamic revolution in post-2003 Iraq. Iran's regional security policy is largely
determined by the role and position of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf (Kamrava,
2011, p.185). So, if we apply Gause's concept of ''perceived threats'' (see
Gaues, 2010, p.9), it can be said that Iran has perceived the U.S. presence in
Iraq as a threat in its regional and domestic security issues.
Another key factor for Iranian hegemony in Iraq dates back to Iran's
penetration of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) after 2003; this happened through
Iranian agents making contacts within the Iraqi security institutions, as well as
infiltrating large numbers of Iranian proxies into Iraqi security. All this made
Iranian intervention more effective than the intervention of Iraq's other
neighbours. Some of these groups even operated as distinct parts of the official
Iraqi military forces. Between 2003 and 2005, 90 percent of the 35,000 of north-
east Baghdad's police officers were affiliated with the Mahdi Army, and 60,000
of Baghdad's police force was shared between the Badr Organisation and
Mahdi Army. These militia members, who lacked any professional military
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training, had infiltrated the Iraqi Security Forces (Allawi, 2007, p. 423). It is clear
that both the Iraqi security forces and Iraqi military forces have played active
roles in the ethnic and religious tensions after 2003. This was clear with the
intervention of the security forces during the Sunni demonstrations against
Prime Minister Nuri al-Malki in Falluja, and Ramadi; in the northern city of
Hawijah alone, more than 40 anti-government protesters were killed by Iraqi
security forces (Reuters, 23 April 2013). This enflamed a new sectarian conflict,
and constituted one of the reasons for ISIS’s invasion of Sunni territories in the
western and northern cities of Iraq in 2014.
Iran's support for Shi'i militias was part of a calculated strategy. In June
2007 the U.S.'s military forces estimated the equipment and funding provided by
Iranian Quds Forces for these militias in Iraq to be approximately three million
dollars per month54 (Kagan, Kagan, and Pletka, 2008, p.17-18). This evidence
showing the Iranian involvement in supporting the violence in Iraq should be
assessed in the context of Iran’s hindering the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Some researchers pointed out that the U.S. and Iran have had somewhat
similar goals in post-2003 Iraq, since the instability of Iraq and a civil war would
not have favoured Iranian national interests (see Takeyh, 2009, p.250). In
reality, it is fairer to say that any civil war in Iraq would not have favoured any of
Iraq's neighbours. However, Iran has long-term experience of taking advantage
of the destabilised and moderate states in the region, such as Lebanon,
Palestine, and most lately Syria and Yemen. It is not, therefore, only a matter of
stability; Iran and U.S. in fact have different aims and agendas toward post-
2003 Iraq, and the model of state the U.S. had in mind to build was very
different from the Iranian model. The U.S. former ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad,
said ''the Americans and Iranians had major differences over how to form a new
Iraqi government and deal with Tehran’s support for terrorism'' (cited in Gordan,
2016). The U.S. wanted to build an Iraqi government faithful to them, which
could guarantee the alliance of other countries in the region, such as the Gulf
States, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and even Israel, all of which are rivals to Iran.
54 Also in spring 2007, through a joint special operation between the U.S. army and Iraqi
security forces against militia leaders funded by Iran, a number of suspects were arrested with
documents and evidence which linked them with Iran (Kagan and Pletka, 2008, p.17-18).
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On the other hand, Iran wanted a weak, federal and elected but unified
government in Baghdad for a number of reasons. First, the elections would
keep the Shi'a in power, as long as they stayed united. Second, a weak federal
government would give Iran a chance to expand its soft power in Shi'a territory
in order to impose its influence. Third, Iran wanted a weak Iraqi state that could
not be a threat to Iran, as it had been during the Iran-Iraq War. Fourth, since a
Shi’i regime in Iraq would not have been tolerated by all of Iraq’s other
neighbours, it would be in constant need of Iranian support and therefore would
owe a great political debt to Iran.
Iran, through the military training and logistic aid to Shi'a militia groups in
Iraq, intended to transform them from unorganised and unprofessional militia
groups into professional ones on the model of the Lebanese Hezbollah and
uncontrollable by the government. Both Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Quds
Forces have worked together in Iraq since 200355 (see Ostovarp, 2016, p.173)
to this aim. This was clearly noted by General David Petraeus, the commander
of the Multi-National Force in Iraq in 2007:
[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran,
through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Quds Force, seeks to
turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests
and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq
(Congressional Record, October 2007, p. 25033).
In the meantime, it is evident that Iran has used its influence on Iraqi
politicians with links to Iran in order to put pressure on the Iraqi government to
support the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country. Furthermore, Iran also
used its leverage on number of Shi'a militias to help force the American forces
out of Iraq. For example, Muqtada al-Sadr warned the U.S. many times that if
they stayed longer than December 2011, the deadline for American withdrawal
agreed in the Strategic of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the U.S.
55 When the conflict between the Shi'as and Sunnis reached its peak in 2007 and 2008, the U.S.
military forces claimed that there were 150 members of al-Quds forces in Iraq, and a small
number of them had been arrested. The evidence showed that Iran had supplied them with
advanced weapons and ''destructive technology''. The evidence has been confirmed again
when a member of Lebanese Hezbollah, Ali Mussa Daqduq, was arrested in the company of an
extremist Shi'a militia leader, Qais al-Khazali, in Basra in March 2007 (Dodge, 2012, p. 187).
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(SOFA), U.S. troops in Iraq would be targeted by his followers (Smith, 2012, p.
424).
It can be argued that proxy forces have been one of the most effective
tools of the Iranian foreign policy since the Islamic revolution in 1979. This can
be clearly seen in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria (see map 2). In Iraq they
tried to foment local mistrust towards American and other coalition forces, not
only within Iraq but also in the Gulf State regimes which host American bases
on their territory. The former U.S. ambassador James Jeffry (Reuters August,
26, 2010) said that, ''Iran has sought to use Iraqi proxies to destabilise its
neighbours and make it inhospitable for foreign forces''. However, Jeffry’s
statement may be questionable, since there has been little evidence about Iraqi
proxy militias’ engagement with destabilising the security situation in countries
hosting American troops, for instance in the Gulf countries. If there was such an
intention, it would not only have affected the political and security situation in
the Gulf countries, but also it would have served terrorist groups such as al-
Map 2 The Saudi-Iran Proxy Wars in the Middle East
(Foreign Policy, JANUARY 6, 2016)
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Qaida and Daesh, helping them become powerful inter-state forces in the
region, as has been the case in Syria and Iraq after the Syrian conflict.
The Iranian strategy to curb U.S. capability in Iraq after 2003 can be
judged successful for three main reasons. First, the U.S. has not achieved its
goals in Iraq, and the process of state-building of Iraq has been judged a failure
also by American officials. Second, the U.S. failed to build an Iraqi state allied
with them and with its own allies in the Persian region. On the contrary, Iraq
became a close ally of the Iranian regime alongside Syria and Lebanon's
Hezbollah, and joined the “resistance club” under the Iranian leadership. Third,
Iran has not only become a hegemonic power in Iraq, but has also dragged Iraq
into the regional sectarian conflict in the Persian Gulf. Iran has used Iraq as a
key player towards shaping regional and international politics in both the
Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
The regional alignment between the Syrian regime and al-Maliki's
government after the Arab uprising is evidence of that sectarian alignment. This
is proved by the presence of Iraqi Shi'a militias fighting alongside the Syrian
regime. According to the study carried out by the International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism (ICT) (Gilbert, 2013, p12), the number of Iraqi Shi'a militia
fighters fighting in Syria is between 2000 and 300056. These militias mainly
came from three Iraqi groups: Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, which fractured from Muqtada
al-Sadr's movement in 2006 with support from the IRGC, Quds Force and
Lebanese Hezbollah; Kataib Hezbollah (KH); and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada
(KSS), led by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani (a.k.a. Hamid al-Sheibani), an Iraqi Shi'a
who has worked under the Quds Force since the late 1980s. These are in
addition to the Badr Organization and Muqtada al-Sadr's Liwa al-Youm al-
Mawud (Promised Day Brigades) and Liwa Abi al-Fadl al-Abbas (The Abu al-
56 It can be said that the number of the Iraqi Shi'a fighters in Syria may have been
overestimated. Many Shi'a fighters are volunteers, but others are Iranian-trained militiamen who
honed their skills against the U.S.-led forces following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Iraq's Foreign
Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told Reuters in an interview that: ''There has been an exaggeration of
Iraqi brigades or units fighting in Syria. Really there has been a limited number of volunteers,
these volunteers have gone there without any sanction or approval or support from the
government or the Iraqi regime or the political leaders'' (Reuters, Jun, 19 2013).
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Fadl al-Abbas Brigade). The latter has played a prominent role in Syria57 (see
Anzalone, 2013; Al-Salhy, 2013; Mahmood and Chulov, 2013).
Thus it can be concluded that Iran played a significant role in limiting the
U.S. effort in Iraq, which has meant hindering the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq. Moreover, the Iranian attitude does not originate exclusively from the
ideological views of Shi'ism in Iraq, or from the traditional hostility (since 1979)
between Iran and the U.S., but is driven by a wider foreign policy strategy which
is mainly directed by Iran's regional security dynamics in the Persian Gulf and
the Middle East, based, as Kamrava (2011, p. 186) observes, on the
securitisation of Iran’s foreign policy. The Iranian alignment with these militia
proxy forces in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq after 2003 has become a part of the
Iranian regional foreign policy.
It is important to note however, despite the rising of Iranian power in Iraq
after the U.S. troops' withdrawal at the end of 2011, the U.S. role still cannot be
overlooked. As Gause (2010, p. 5, 6) points out, it is difficult to understand the
Persian Gulf regional security complex without including the U.S. as a member,
despite the changing of its intensity of involvement after the troop withdrawal at
the end of 2011. Iran's position in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, as well as Iran's
regional security policy, are highly determined by the presence and position of
Washington in the region (Kamrava, 2011, p.185).
Since the end of 2011, and until the advent of the Islamic state in June
2014, the influence of the U.S. has declined in Iraq. However, the IS aggression
in Iraq brought back the U.S. heavily to Iraq as part of the U.S.-led coalition
against IS. After troop withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S. plan to shape Iraq's
policies faced some changes, and shifted to the CIA and State Department
(Dodge, 2012, p.185). From 2012 until the advent of IS, the U.S. has mainly
focused on counter-terrorism and civilian plans, especially through its embassy
in Baghdad and its consulates in Erbil and Basra. However, since the advent of
the IS attack on Iraq in June 2014, U.S. involvement has been more focused on
military issues, especially counter-terrorism through carrying out air strikes
57 After 2012, the Iraqi Shi'a fighters have become more open about joining Syria's war. Their
involvement had been publicly declared by prominent Shi'a militia Asaib Ahl al-Haqq in July
2013, when they declared that a sub-unit called Liwa Kaffel Zeinab (Supporter of Zeinab
Brigade) had been established to defend Shi'a holy shrines in Syria (see Blanford, 2013).
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against IS and providing training to Iraqi forces. This has been in contrast to the
Iranian approach which has been more effective since U.S departure and
possessed more means and been more feasible to engage in both military and
political issues in Iraq. This has been confirmed by Sami al-Askari, a senior Shi'i
politician, who said: “They [the Iranians] have many means. Frankly, the
Americans can't do anything” (Arango, 2017). Although al-Askari's statement
might be highly exaggerated, Iran is more powerful than the U.S. in Iraq on
many levels. On the political level, Iran has a large number of allies in the Iraqi
Parliament, who can protect Iranian goals. Likewise, on a military level, Iran has
great influence on Iraq's government institutions. For instance, Iraqi interior
minister, Qasim al-Araji, was a PMU leader, and a previous commander of the
Quds Force installed in the Iraqi Ninth Badr Corps (Associated Press, 8 May
2017). In November 2016 the Iraqi Parliament recognised the tens of different
Shi'i paramilitary forces known as Hashd al-Shaabi as a new security force
alongside the Iraqi army.
Although the US-Iran nuclear deal might have provided Iran with more
confidence towards the American presence in the region, and lead to a sort of
coordination with the U.S. on the war against IS, it has not made any obvious
change in their policies towards Iraq. As Indyk (2015) argued, Iran might have
been keen to use Iraq and other regional issues as a bargaining card with
Washington in their nuclear talks, especially regional cooperation in Iraq and
Syria. However, America has been very careful about this. The Arab U.S. allies'
in the Gulf also feared that their interests might be exploited in favour of the US-
Iranian nuclear deal. Therefore, they have pushed Washington not to make
other regional deals with their strategic rival, particularly when they were not
part of the negotiations (see Indyk, 2015). Therefore, the U.S. factor has been
active even after withdrawal as part of the Persian Gulf security complex.
Theoretically, this has contributed to the interplay between the global and
regional security structure and confirmed what Buzan discovers, that “the
security interdependence within the regional level is more pronounced than the
global level” (2003, p.188). However, the U.S. and other international factors
have not much altered the intensity of Iranian involvement in the state-building
process since the US departure in Iraq. The role of the international community
also has changed after 2011, particularly through the Security Council resolution
of 2249, which unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks perpetrated by IS
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around the world (Security Council, 20 November 2015). The resolution
provided a guarantee that there would be an effective fight against transnational
terrorist organisations, through the collective action of the UN members based
on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. However, the international
community’s role, mostly represented by the UN, has been more of a
humanitarian role in Iraq. The marginal role of the UN might be traced back to
early U.S. policy towards Iraq, particularly during the CPA period, which actually
left a very limited role for the UN to play in Iraq, as has been discussed in
chapter three.
4.1.2. Supporting Pro-Iranian government in Iraq
Iran was the first country in the region that recognised officially the Iraqi
Governing Council in 2003 and formally sent its delegations to Baghdad. There
has been evidence that even before 2003, Iran had already made plans
regarding post-Saddam Iraq, especially after Iran realised that the Ba'ath
regime was on the verge of collapse. Iran's historical relations with the groups
which would become the Iraqi Shi'a political elite, and the Shi'a majority
population of the Iraqi state, helped the Iranian regime to find an easy path
towards its hegemony in post-Saddam Iraq (see Bongers, 2012, p. 148) . The
main reason behind this strategy is that Iran wanted to build a new regional
security system to shape the regional policy in the Persian Gulf and extend its
influence through Iraq to the Arab and Islamic world.
It can also be argued that both security and economic factors have
contributed to Iran’s strategy in support of a pro-Iranian government in post-
Saddam Iraq.
Iran's political-military support for the Iraqi government after 2003
Although the insistence on instituting an elected government directly after
the U.S. invasion was not an Iranian demand, Iran has supported the idea of
holding elections in Iraq from the beginning of the creation of the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC) in June 2003. Having an elected government after the
U.S. invasion was one of the most serious demands that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani presented in October 2004 to the head of the CPA, Paul Bremer, during
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the constitutional process, since an election was the best way to guarantee
Shi'a dominancy in post-Saddam Iraq. The Iranian support might also echo the
consensus made among Iranian officials after the eight-year war against Iraq
that the main cause of Iraq's aggression was the Sunni domination of the state
(Takeyh, 2007, p.177). Although this belief may be simplistic, it has cast a long
shadow over recent Iraq-Iran relations, also leading to strong Syrian and Iranian
alignment since the 1980s.
The instability caused by the Iraqi security situation and the regional proxy
wars in Iraq offered Iran a golden opportunity to interfere in the internal
decisions of the Iraqi government, such as election issues, Iraq-U.S.
agreements, candidates' disputes, and political consensus. The more the ethno-
sectarian conflict persists, the greater is the probability of regional intervention
in Iraq. This is especially true for Iran, as Barzgar (cited in Visser, 2010, p.4)
argued; considering the demographic realities of Iraq, it will be to Iran's benefit
to have a Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish conflict on the top of the agenda. Iran deeply
influenced the trajectory of the state-building process in Iraq after 2003 by
forging a political and military alliance with Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the
al-Da'wa Party and the Sadrist group. These allies played a key role in the
constitutional process. Furthermore, Iran frequently influenced the Iraqi
parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010, as well as provincial elections in
2009, through funding and supporting its preferred candidates. For example,
some U.S. government officials estimated the Iranian support for the Shi'a
parties at between $100 million to $200 million in 2009, in addition to the $70
million which had been donated to the ISCI (Dodge, 2012, p. 187). According to
the United States military commanders, there was intelligence evidence that
Iran tried to influence the Iraqi elections results through military and financial
support via their political links inside and outside the government (Guzansky,
2011, p. 90).
The Iranian engagement in Iraq's political and governmental issues has
created the political, governmental and military elite in power in the official
institutions and in charge of the whole political process since 2003. Moreover,
this impact has been even stronger due to the sectarian tensions among Iraqi
factions. This is emphasised in a telegram released by WikiLeaks sent from the
U.S. embassy in Baghdad:
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What diplomats believed were the close ties between the commander of
the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolution Guards and Iran's point man on Iraq,
B. G. Qassim Sulaimani and Iraq's top government officials since at least
2003(Cohen, 2011, p.226).
Furthermore, Iran's strategy has not only been based on 'leading from
behind' but also engaging on the ground, working with the Iraqi political elite
and at the same time paying close attention to the movements within Iraqi
politics at different moments, to the extent that it would be impossible for
anyone to become Iraqi prime minster or president without Iranian support58.
For instance, during the March 2010 parliamentary elections, al-Iraqiya List, a
nationalist and secular formation supported by the majority of Sunnis, won the
national election with  91 seats out of 325, two more seats than State of Law list
(89 seats) headed by the former Prime Minster, al-Maliki. Iran interfered directly,
by inviting most of the Shi'a groups to Tehran to form a single coalition in order
to prevent al-Iraqiya list from forming a government (Sharq al-Awsat, 29 July
2010). This effort led to the formation of the Shi'a-dominated government under
al-Maliki's presidency. However, in 2014 Iran cancelled its support for al-Maliki,
because of the political opposition inside Shi'i parties over his third mandate.
The fragility of the state structure that has been built since the 2003 U.S.
invasion has been a pivotal part of this involvement. The post-2003 political elite
in Iraq have deeply influenced by ethno-religious polarisation, which has been
sponsored by regional powers. Any of Iraq's three main components, whether
Kurd or Sunni or Shi'a, need to depend on the regional powers' support,
because of the political and constitutional structure of the state that has been
fashioned by the U.S.-led coalition after 2003, in which is hard to protect Iraq
from regional involvement.
The same role had been played by Iran when al-Maliki's second
presidency was rejected by both of Iran's close allies, the Sadrists and the ISCI.
In this case, fearful of losing a Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq, Iran forced
the Sadrist group and the Kurdish former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani to
accept the second term of al-Maliki's presidency, by encouraging Talabani to
58 The spokesperson of the Iraqi government Sa'ad Hadithi clearly admitted in a TV interview
with Rudaw TV that the commander of Iran’s Quds Force Qassem Soleimani is a “military
advisor” to the Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Iraq (Rudaw, 16 October 2017).
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derail a no-confidence vote against al-Maliki in April 2012 (see Knights, 2014)59.
From the 2005 to the 2014 parliamentary elections and the replacement of
Maliki with Haider Al-Abadi after tough negotiations inside the Shi'a parties, Iran
has played a huge role in Iraq's political arena. This strategy has had the
purpose of keeping a Shi’a-centric government in power, guaranteeing Iran a
political and military presence in Iraq. This has been a presence very visible in
the fight against the Sunni insurgents, and other terrorist groups such as Islamic
State (ISIS), that took control of the most Sunni territories in the northwester of
Iraq. On one hand, Iran has officially and secretly helped Iraq against ISIS.
President Rohani of Iran said that Iran would help al-Maliki if asked by Iraq
(Milani, 2014). According to a number of media reports (see Reuters, 2014),
Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force (IRGC), fought against
ISIS with the Iraqi Army in the town of Amerli, where they successfully defeated
ISIS. During the ISIS attack on Iraq, Iran has helped in all the direct operations
on the battlefields in the Jalawla and Sadia sub-districts on the border between
the two countries60.
It is, however, important to note that Iran's engagement in the state-
building process post-2003 has been framed in a non-sectarian form, with Iran
presenting it as part of a war against terrorism. Iran depicted the conflict in
these terms as it feared losing Arab and Islamic support, which would have
seriously limited Iran's role in the wider Middle East. These developments show
that Iranian foreign policy lost its positive image in the Arab world (Sunni world)
post-2003. Instead of being viewed as a force confronting the West and Israel,
and the defender of the oppressed, Iran is now largely considered only as a
defender of the interests of Shi’as, wherever they are.
Iran's economic support for the Iraqi government after 2003
59 The second term of al-Maliki's premiership was also supported by the U.S. in 2006. The U.S.
ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad played an essential role in selecting and boosting Maliki as the
Shi'a bloc's candidate (see Chulov, 2010).
60 According to American officials, with the advent of IS in June 2014, Iran directed surveillance
drones over Iraq from an airfield in Baghdad and provided Iraqi forces with additional military
equipment (The New York Times, 25 Jun 2014).
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Iranian engagement in Iraq has not solely been limited to the political and
military aspects, but has also involved the economic sphere. Iran's economic
support included the political and military support to the post-2003 governments
in Iraq. In July 2005 former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’fari, during his Shi'i-led
interim government, visited Tehran in order to build political and economic
relationships. He announced that Iran would support Iraq with one billion dollars
to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, such as schools, libraries and hospitals (Cohen,
2011, p. 225).
In the Maliki period, the economic and trade relations, alongside the
political ties, reached their peak. From 2006 to 2009 Maliki visited Iran four
times as a Prime Minister, and each of these visits led to an economic
agreement. However, it is important to note that Iranian economic support has
mainly focused on Iraq's southern territories, especially Basra and the two main
Shi'a shrine cites of Najaf and Karbala, thus strengthening the religious and
cultural links between Iran and Iraq. The Iranian companies that have invested
in house construction in southern Iraq will in the foreseeable future control a
$16 billion market in Basra alone (see the Iraqi National Investment
Commission, 2013). Territories such as Basra, Najaf, and Karbala, have
effectively become Iranian economic zones. In August 2007 there was an
agreement between Iraq and Iran to build pipelines between Iraq and the
Iranian city of Abadan, to transfer crude and other oil products. Furthermore,
Iran won a contract of $1.5 billion to reconstruct the city of Basra in February
2009. In addition, in July 2009 both countries reached an agreement to remove
governmental barriers of trade, in addition to another contract between the
Basra Investment Commission and Iran with the purpose of creating a free
trade zone between them (Fulton, Wellman & Frasco, 2011; al-Ansary, Reuters,
2011). “We have a number of agreements with Iran on energy, on trade, on oil,
on visitors — that is, pilgrims — which is very important to them,” said Hoshyar
Zebari, the former Iraqi foreign minister, in 2007 (Wong, 2007).
This can be attributed to the Iranian long-term vision, the exercising of its
political, economic and soft power that Iran has with the Shi'a community in the
south of Iraq. This can be seen in the size of the trade between the two
countries, which stood in 2013 at $12 billion and is expected to reach $20 billion
in 2018 (Alsabaah, 26/10/2014). Iranian economic hegemony will most likely
139 | P a g e
continue in many economic sectors, as long as Iraq cannot meet more of its
domestic demands independently.
Worth considering is that the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 created
new political and religious ties among almost all Shi'i communities throughout
the Middle East. Since 2003 the holy Shi'a city of Najaf in Iraq, home to the
Imam Ali Shrine, has become a major destination for millions of Shi'a pilgrims
from all over the world. Furthermore, Iraqi Shi'a holy places have become a
major destination for 40,000 Iranian religious tourists that visit the area every
month, in addition to the estimated three to four million tourists who attend the
Shi’a festival of the Ashura commemoration each year (see Wong, 2007). In the
meantime, Najaf pilgrims provide $20 million a year and Karbala $3 million a
year to the Iraqi economy from Iran, for the construction and improvement of
tourist facilities. Also, each Iranian pilgrim spends up to $1,000 on hotels, food
and souvenirs during their visit to Iraq. In 2010, the Iraqi provincial tourism
officials stated that the number of Iranian pilgrim visitors to Iraq is between
5,000-7,000 visitors a day, and during religious events the number increases to
10,000 visitors a day (Alshirazi, 2010)61. It should be noted that Tehran has not
only interfered in the post-2003 Iraq, but has also built deep links with the
political, economic, religious and military institutions in Iraq. This can be clearly
seen in the case of Iraq and Iran's institutional ties on the levels of the
economic, the military and the religious.
The U.S. and a number of western analysts (e.g. Wurmser, 1999, p.79)
expected that unleashing Shi'ism in Iraq by empowering the Najaf Marjayya
(clerical Shi'a authority) would challenge the legitimacy of Iran's Islamic
Revolution and Velayat-e Faqih. One of these Middle East strategists named
Wurmser wrote a few months before George W. Bush's election in 2000:
The survival of Ba’thism in Iraq is integrally connected with the survival of
the Khomeiniist Shi’ite revolution in Iran—even though the two nations hate
each other. Ridding Iraq of Ba’thism can sabotage the Islamic revolution and its
regional allies. But we will not defeat Ba’thism by assisting some feckless Iraqi-
based underground movement such as the Mujaheddin al-Khalq, which is
61 In November 2015, more than 500,000 Iranian religious visitors crossed the Iraqi borders
without visas heading for the holy city of Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein. Official sources expected that the number of Iranian visitors who commemorate this
event would reach three million people (Iraq trade link news, 30 Nov 2015).
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actually an arm of Saddam’s regime. Iran must be severed from its Shi’ite
foundations (Wurmser, 1999, pp. 73-74).
Conversely, the breakdown of Saddam's regime has strengthened Shi'a
identity not only in Iraq but in most countries that have Shi'a populations,
particularly in the Levant and Gulf States. However, the religious importance of
Najaf does not grant Iraq a leadership role among the Shi'i communities in the
Middle East; on the contrary, Iran is taking the leadership of the Shi'a
communities in the Middle East. Iran has become a centre of the Shi'a
communities in the entire Middle East, from Pakistan to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. After the U.S. war in Iraq, Shi'a
people in all of these countries see (to some extent) Iran as a point of reference
for Shi'a identity in the world. Despite the significance of Iraq’s place in Iran’s
religious narrative, there is no evidence that Iran has pushed the Iraqi political
elite to adopt the Iranian model of Velayat-e Faqih (Governance of the Jurists).
The Iranian former foreign minister stressed in 2003, “No Iranian official has
suggested the formation of an Iranian-style government in Iraq” (Takeyh, 2009,
p. 252).This could be due to the lack of consensus between the Iranian and
Iraqi Shi’a scholars on the relationship between religion and politics.
Alongside the political, military, religious and economic ties between Iran
and Iraq, Iran has also left its cultural impact on Iraq through exercising its soft
power over Iraq. In the 1980s and also after the Shi'a massacres in 1991, about
100,000 Iraqi Arab Shi'as immigrated to Iran and became refugees there. These
Iraqi Shi'a communities were educated in the Persian language, and a
generation grew up in the Iranian culture. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, an
estimated 100,000 of them have returned to Iraq and became workers,
businessman, teachers and policemen, most of them have finding employment
in governmental institutions (Nasr, 2006, p. 62). These former Iraqi refugees
now became an active elite, and spread their influence over most of the
political, economic and military institutions in Iraq.
4.1.3. Iran's engagement with Iraqi Kurds
Iran had its foreign relations offices and intelligence agencies in Iraqi
Kurdistan even before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it was also the first
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country to open its consulate general in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007. Iran's
involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan dates back after the Kurdish uprising in 1991,
when Kurdish army forces took over three main Iraqi governorates, Sulaimanya,
Erbil and Duhok62. Since then Iran has been involved in both politics and
intelligence issues in Iraqi Kurdistan63. Iran's engagement with Iraqi Kurds
makes the argument clearer that the sectarian factor has not been a leading
driver of the Iranian involvement in Iraq in the post-2003. The argument will be
made in this section that sectarianism and ethnicity are not the main source of
Iran's penetration in Iraq, but instead it is the regional security complex
dynamics. It can be argued that Iranian strategy toward the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) after 2003 can be summarised in three main points. First,
Iran has been carefully monitoring political, economic and military activities of
the Iraqi Kurds, to assess whether they pose a threat to Iranian interests in the
region. Second, Iran has sought to use Iraqi Kurds as a 'game players' in the
regional equations, whether against Turkey or even against Iraq's central
government in order to alter the balance of power in the region. For example,
during the Syrian crisis the PUK, which is calculated to be on Iran’s side, has
supported the PYD and officially recognised a Kurdish-majority region in Syria.
However, the KDP, which is aligned with Turkey, refused to recognise Kurdish
autonomy (Rojava) in Syria (see Wilgenburg, 2014). Third, Iran has been
pressuring the Kurds to stay inside the circle of Iraq's federalism and support
the Shi'a dominated government in Baghdad. Arguably, Iran has been
successful in using all of these mentioned mechanisms with the Iraqi Kurds with
the complicity of Kurdish authorities. However, all this does not mean that Iran
has total control over Iraqi Kurdistan since the KRG is still split between the
PUK and KDP, on the one hand, and Iranian and Turkish leverage on the other.
The KRG has played a strategic role in the Iranian and Turkish rivalry in the
region. On one hand, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which had a
62 Since the Kurdish civil war started in 1994, Iran involved itself in Iraqi Kurdistan and
occasionally backed the PUK against the PDK. During the Kurdish civil war in Iraq, Iran’s main
policy was alternately backing both parties (PUK and KDP) and seeking to limit the influence of
the U.S. and its Gulf War allies in the region (see Cockburn, 2007).
63 According to some Kurdish media sources, Iran had its official Intelligence Agency in Iraqi
Kurdistan under the name of 'Qarargay Ramazan' or Ramadan Headquarters. Iran's intelligence
has killed about 300 members of the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan
(Moradi, 30 November 2014, YouTube).
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prominent position in the KRG, has been close to Turkey politically and
economically, and have considered themselves part of the Turkish and Sunni
front in the region for the last five years. On the other hand, the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK), led by the former Iraqi republic President Jalal Talabani,
has been supportive of Iran's role in post-2003 Iraq, and had a constructive role
in keeping a Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad.
Since Iran has limited or no ideological soft power to exert in Iraqi
Kurdistan, Iran has always paid close attention to the security, political and
economic issues of Iraqi Kurdistan, because of its geopolitical position; the
KRG's longest border is with Iran. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds have greater political,
economic and social ties with Iranian Kurds than with Turkish and Syrian Kurds,
because of the historic link which began in 1946 with the establishment of the
Mahabad Kurdish republic in Iran which many Iraqi Kurds were involved in, and
continuing during the repression of the Saddam years when Iraqi Kurds sought
support from their counterparts in Iran and from the Iranian government itself.
This is in addition to the presence in Iraqi Kurdistan of most of the Iranian
Kurdish oppositions parties, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan
(DPIK or KDPI), Komala (Organisation of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian
Kurdistan) and Iran-Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). These realities
constitute two major concerns for Iran.
First, Iran has realised that the KRG has set up most of the prerequisites
and features of a state in Iraq. Also, the President of the KRG, Massud Barzani,
and other Kurdish officials, have not hidden the Kurdish agenda for
independence, and this has seriously alarmed the Iranian side since these
claims could directly influence Iran's Kurds and heterogeneous communities to
follow the same path. Second, in the last few years the KRG has attempted to
build positive relations with western countries, especially the U.S., to the extent
that more than 30 diplomatic missions and most of the 26 representations
present in Iraqi Kurdistan are from western countries. Furthermore, according to
a survey led by the KRG Department of Company Registration (KRG official
website, 1 Oct 2014), the number of foreign companies registered to operate in
the Kurdistan Region reached 2,955 in 2014, including the names of some of
the biggest oil companies in the world, such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Total,
Genel Energy, DNO, Gulf Keystone Petroleum LTD, OMV, HESS, Oryx
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Petroleum, Repsol and Dana Gas. Therefore, in the near future, the KRG could
become an economic and political centre for the western countries in the region,
along with the Gulf States. The international role of the KRG became evident
after 2014 with the international war against ISIS in which Iraqi Kurds played a
main role, providing logistic and military support. The presence of a strong
Kurdish region in Iraq undermines Iran’s interests in the area. For this reason
Iran does not view these new developments favourably.
Iran has dealt with these challenges in different ways. It has worked
extensively to build political linkages with high ranking Kurdish politicians in
order to exercise its influence on the KRG’s ambitions. This political
coordination was clear with the PUK and its leader, former Iraqi republic
President Jalal Talabani. Talabani has played a major role in the Kurdish-Shi'a
alliance and made notable efforts to deliver al-Maliki to power twice, in 2005
and 2010. Therefore, the Iranian policy toward Iraqi Kurds has very little to do
with ethnic and sectarian ambitions, but rather is purely directed by a pragmatic
policy which is mainly dominated by Iran's regional security complex dynamics
with Iraqi Kurds. For instance, when ISIS took over of the north-west of Iraq, the
KRG's President Massud Barzani officially rejected the possibility of the KRG’s
involvement in the conflict if ISIS did not target Kurdish territories, while the
PUK had officially announced that the KRG must fight ISIS. The PUK
unofficially facilitated  the Iranian Quds Forces and Iraqi Shi'a militia groups,
such as the Badr group, when they entered the cities of Sadia, Jalawla, and
Kirkuk64 (Awena News, 16 Nov 2014), a move strongly criticised by the  KRG’s
and KDP’s officials.
64 A number of Kurdish media sources state that about 200 of the Iranian elite military forces
arrived in the Sulaymaniyah International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2014. These
forces have been transferred to Kirkuk city, in a coordinated military collaboration between
Iranian military forces and the PUK's administration in Kirkuk. Also Nazm Dabakh, the
representative of Kurdistan Regional Government in Tehran, told a Kurdish newspaper Awene
(25 October 2014): ''whenever Kurdish political parties faced a problem and wanted to arrange a
meeting with a minister or the President of Iran, they do so only through Qasim Sulaimani. With
his contact they can swiftly meet their target''. He says that ''Qasim Sulaimani heads Iranian
affairs in Iraq to the extent that Qasim Sulaimani denotes the Islamic Republic of Iran, or Iran in
Iraq signifies Qasim Sulaimani''. This is due to his dominant role in Iraq and Kurdistan; the
Kurdish Political leaders have sent many letters to Iranian officials to thank Sulaimani. He also
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The second approach of Iran's involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan can be
observed through Iran's supporting of insurgent, terrorist, and militia groups.
For example, Iran had used Ansar al-Islam many times against Iraqi Kurdish
parties. Although Iran has denied any links with the group, Iran openly allowed
the group to operate along its borders. In July 2005 Kurdish officials alleged that
Iran provided logistical support for the group by tolerating the flow of goods and
weapons and providing a safe area beyond the border (Schanzer, 2004).
The effective implementation of Iran's strategy has depended on both Iraqi
Kurds and central government in Baghdad preserving a balance between both
powers (Rafferty, 2011, p. 137). Iran has exploited Iraqi Kurdistan when they
found that Iraq became unmanageable and compromised Iranian interests in
the region; Iran supported the central government when they suspected that the
Kurds exceeded their power more than necessary. Iranian officials have many
times showed their concerns about the KRG’s attitudes. According to the
Kurdish daily newspaper Rudaw (2 Jun 2014), Iran had transmitted two main
messages to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders through its powerful man in Iraq Qassim
Sulaimani; during his visit to Iraqi Kurdistan he warned the KRG that Iran would
be against Kurdish independence. Rudaw (2 Jun 2014) reported that Sulaimani
told Kurdish leaders ''you [KRG] should not think about the division of Iraq and
harming Kurdish-Shi'a relations''. The second message that Sulaimani
transmitted to the Kurdish leaders, was that Iran is worried about Turkey's deep
involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report pointed out that Sulaimani asked the
KRG’s leaders to distance themselves from Turkey, and not to be a part of the
campaign aimed at removing the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad from power.
It can be said that after the Syrian crisis, Iran had put more pressure on
the Iraqi Kurds to avoid acting against the Iranian interests in the region.
Reports pointed out that Iran, via its ‘shadow commander’ Qassim Sulaimani,
had bullied KRG leaders to allow them an open supply route across Iraqi
Kurdistan to Syria. Although relations between the KRG and Iran have
sometimes been cordial, the relationship has always been an unequal one
favouring the power of Iran. A senior Kurdish official said:
declared that ''Qasim Sulaimani plays a key and significant role not only in Kurdistan or Iraq but
the whole Middle East''.
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It is very difficult for us to say no to Sulaimani, when we say no, he makes
trouble for us. Bombings. Shootings. The Iranians are our neighbours. They’ve
always been there, and they always will be. We have to deal with them. (Filking,
2013).
However, it is important to emphasise that the Iran's involvement in the
KRG has not always been initiated by Iran. Kurdish parties, especially the PUK
and PDK, have used Iranian leverage in Iraq in their internal disputes. This was
the case at the expiration of Barzani's presidential mandate in August 2015,
which ended up with the prevention of the parliament's speaker from entering
Erbil, as well as during the conflict in the PUK leadership between two opposing
factions within the PUK, which motivated Iran to send a six-member delegation,
which included Tehran’s ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar, immediately to
Sulaymaniyah to mediate between the rival factions in September 2016 (Rudaw,
2/9/2016).
Despite Iranian leverage in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG especially in the last
six years has been politically and economically closer to Turkey than to Iran.
The size of Turkish trade between Turkey and the KRG is larger than the
Iranian trade. In 2013 the size of trade between Iraq and Turkey reached $12
billion, of which about 70 per cent was with the KRG (Todays Zaman, August
25, 2013). However, Iranian leverage in Iraqi Kurdistan will rival Turkish political
and economic domination for a long time. Correspondingly, the KRG officials,
including those of the KDP who promoted the KRG's political ties with Turkey,
seriously intend to keep friendly relationships with Iran. The KRG has
understood the significant role of Iran and its hegemony in the entire Middle
East. Iran can easily destabilise the domestic security situation in the KRG, due
to their political links with other significant Kurdish parties in the KRG, such as
the Talabni Party (PUK), and with the Gorran movement which has gained
significant influence on the KRG's political process, especially after the March
2010 elections. Iran also has close political ties with the Kurdistan Islamic
Group.
It is clear therefore that Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as part of its regional
security and sphere of influence; however, Iran does not simply control the
KRG, especially what is called the Yellow Zone, which is dominated by the
KDP. For Instance, Iran exerted all its efforts to change the KRG decision to
have an independence referendum supposed to be run on 25 September 2017,
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through Iraqi government, Shi'a militias and even their pressure on the PUK
which shares strong and longstanding ties with Tehran, but they could not
prevent it. Nazim Dabagh, the KRG representative in Iran, made clear that the
Iranians said, ''we are for the territorial integrity of Iraq and we will do everything
to preserve it. However, if you go ahead with the referendum, we will do
whatever necessary to stop it — things that you cannot even imagine" (Al-
Monito, August 7, 2017).
Despite the occasionally disagreements between KRG and Iran, both the
KRG’s president Massud Barzani, and the KRG's Prime Minster Nechirvan
Barzani, have visited Iran many times. The bilateral economic relationship
between the KRG and Iran is strengthening day by day, reaching four billion
dollars in 2013. Taking into account these factors, it is realistic to say that Iran
will not abandon its interests in Iraqi Kurdistan even if the KRG gets its
independence from Iraq, Iran's security complex dynamics with the KRG will still
remain viable. Apart from having Kurdish minority in Iran, the KRG can facilitate
Iranian control in the region and enable them to monitor the activities of other
regional players, such as Turkey and the U.S., and even the Arab Gulf states.
All this is to say that the Kurdish factor has been a durable feature of the Iranian
engagement in the state-building process following the fall of the Ba'ath regime.
4.2. Hegemonic Iran in Iraq: the view from Saudi Arabia and Turkey
As Gause (2010, p. 9) argued, the most salient factor of the Persian Gulf
security is that the states act more against ''perceived threats'', and they choose
their allies according to how their own domestic regime security could be
affected by the consequence of regional conflicts. This means that both regional
security and domestic security are highly linked in the Persian Gulf, because of
three interrelated factors. First, the geopolitical construction of the Persian Gulf
and Levant has ensured that the security of each state cannot be separated
from other countries in the region (according to RSCT), due to ethnic and socio-
political links among these countries. Second, the powerful role of domestic
factors in shaping external factors has made the regional state system very
permeable; for example, the Shi'a factor in Iraq could have a cross-border
impact on Shi'a communities in Saudi Arabia, and the same is true of Sunni and
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Kurdish factors. Third are the interventionist intentions of Iraq's middle power
neighbours, wishing to engage in Iraq's volatile situation that has been shaped
by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Based on this theoretical framework, all three
factors can make Iran's engagement a source of concern for other regional
actors.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a turning point in the regional
balance of power among Iraq’s neighbours, and has changed the nature of the
political, security and alliance systems in the Persian Gulf and the Levant. In
this context, a part of the regional ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq can be
blamed on the rising of Iranian hegemony in Iraq. This regional escalation has
provoked other countries’ concerns. The regionalisation of Iraq’s ethnic and
sectarian conflict after 2003 has highly affected the domestic dynamics of the
Iraqi conflict, and thereafter the state-building process. In order to see the whole
picture of Iran’s engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq,
this section will analyse the Iranian hegemony in Iraq from the view of two key
regional players, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, both countries which have serious
concerns about the implications of the Iranian hegemony in post-2003 Iraq.
4.2.1. Ethno-Sectarianism as security dynamics: What would
Iran's hegemony in Iraq mean for Saudi Arabia?
It can be argued that Saudi Arabia has many reasons to be concerned
about Iranian influence in Iraq, since Iraq is the only state in the region that
borders with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq
acted like a protector of the eastern gate of the Arab world from Iranian
hegemony65. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Baghdad has become a part of the
Iranian hegemony, as well as a sphere of influence for both Saudi Arabia and
Iran. For Saudi Arabia, the Levant and Iraq is a geo-strategic area in its conflict
65 Iraq's political situation has directly affected Saudi-Iranian relations in the last two decades.
The official relations between both countries have witnessed oscillatory stages. In 1991, Saudi
Arabia broke its relations with Iran on the eve of the Operation Desert Storm, while in 2004 the
relations between both countries were re-established. In 2005 their relations deteriorated again
due to the coming of conservatives into power in Iran, and the countries’ sharp differences
regarding Iraq and Syria in 2013 and 2014.
148 | P a g e
with Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia's conflict with Iran in both Iraq and Syria
could be an opportunity for Riyadh to succeed or fail in clipping Iran's wings in
the Arab world and restore the regional balance of power in favour of Saudi
Arabia (Wehrey & Sadjadpour, 2014). Iraq and Syria constitute the only corridor
for Iran to access the Arab world, and influence Arab Shi'a communities in the
Persian Gulf. Furthermore, for Saudi Arabia the rivalry with Iran in Iraq is not
only about who controls Baghdad, but it also a security issue which represents
a geopolitical and ideological struggle against a wider range of Iranian allies in
the region, such as Syria, and in Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen (Houthis).
It is important to know, however, that Iranian leverage in Iraq is not solely
driven by Iran’s religious links with the Iraqi Shi'a. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq
the sectarianism has become a prominent part of the regional security
dynamics, and especially after the Arab Uprising, and namely following the
Syrian crisis, these dynamics have been further highlighted in the region.
However, Iranian domination in post-2003 Iraq is primarily related to Iranian
strategic hegemony in the region, through the creation of a sphere of influence
stretching from central Asia to the Persian Gulf. That intention has been clearly
mirrored by Tehran's city delegate in Iran's Parliament, Ali Raza Zakani (Al-
hayat, 27 Nov, 2014) when he stated that there are three Arab capitals today
fully under the Iranian rule of velayat-e faqih, and the Iranian Islamic Revolution:
Baghdad, through the Shi'a-led government there; Damascus, through the
Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad; and Beirut, through Hezbollah. Sana’a,
Yemen's capital, is the fourth Arab capital, which finally joined the three other
Arab capitals controlled by Iran after it was won by the Houthis. By the same
token a former adviser to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, Mohammad
Sadeq al-Hosseini on the TV interview on September 24, 2014 said:
Iran and its allies in the axis of resistance are the new sultans of the
Mediterranean and the Gulf. [They] will shape the map of the region. We are the
new sultans of the Red Sea as well…Saudi Arabia was a tribe on the verge of
extinction.66 (The New York Times, 11 Nov. 2014).
66 Despite the existance of regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the fiery rhetoric
especially from the Iranian side does not reflect the real political power of Iran. Iran's regional
influence is sometimes portrayad highly exaggerated, and in some cases must be assessed
through political propagandas.
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The ideological statements may not reflect the real intentions of Iran in the
region; however, it has been a real source of concern for other regional powers,
especially Saudi Arabia, and has been a source of tension between Riyadh and
Tehran. Furthermore, the Iranian regional engagement in the domestic conflict
in 2012 between the government of Yemen, the southern neighbour of Saudi
Arabia, and the Houthi militia groups, has seriously provoked Saudi Arabia's
concerns in the region. The main reason for that, as Ramazani (2013, 247-248)
argues, is that the Arab Gulf countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular
have concerns about Iranian Shi'a ideology on two related levels. First, they
think the hostility of Iranian Shi'ism has been backed by the power of the Iranian
state. From this point of view, the Gulf Sheikhdom regimes' are illegitimate and
extremely compliant to alien powers, and should be removed by a revolutionary
Islamic government. Second, the Iranian revolutionary ideology could have an
influence on the Shi'i communities in their own states. From this perspective the
Saudis might believe that Iran wants to contain Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Iranian
involvement from the northeast through the Iraqi Shi'as, and in the meantime
from the southern border through the control of the Houthis in Yemen can be
assessed in this context.
However, unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia might not have effective strategies for
dominance in the region. The majority of Saudi priorities are security and
defensive strategies related to the accomplishment of a Gulf security system
which can be assessed mostly as a reaction to the perceived Iranian threat in
the region. Saudi mechanisms of influence on the neighbouring countries are
usually limited to the provision of financial funding and the use of diplomacy.
However, Iran is more dependent on radical militias and paramilitary anti-state
forces in countries with a weak central government and large Shi'a populations
(Taylor & Boons, 2012, p. 41). Meanwhile, both countries have avoided falling
into direct confrontation with each other. Another part of Riyadh's concern might
be attributed to Saudi Arabia’s lack of the political, security and military
capabilities to balance the Iranian power in the region, or build an effective
coalition of power to control the Iranian leverage in the Persian Gulf (see
Barzegar, 2010, p. 5). Saudi Arabia prefers to use backstage options to
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exercise its leverage, rather than publicly involve itself with the conflict with
Iran67.
It is also important to recognise that Iraq is not far from being a potential
source of military threat for the regional security system in the Persian Gulf.
Although the U.S. occupation of Iraq demolished all of its prior military power,
Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still see Iraq as an imminent
threat. The military expenditure of these countries has significantly increased
after the fall of Saddam's regime, to deter any new Iraqi attempt at domination.
Certain data, e.g. the size of Iraqi forces, indicate that Iraq could indeed be a
source of military threat, and could debilitate the Gulf security system,
especially after Iraq's recovery post-occupation (Rajab, 2010, p. 275). The
uncertainty of the size of Iraq's military force after the stabilisation of the Iraqi
state could be a sign, in addition to Iraq's demands from the U.S. administration
to purchase sophisticated arming systems. Moreover, the new ideological
alignment between Iraq and Iran has turned Iraq into an active part of the Shi'a
front side, along with Syria and Hezbollah. All these indications are flashing
warning lights for Saudi Arabia's concern about the Iranian presence in Iraq.
It is important to know that the Saudi-Iranian conflict in Iraq is not only
relevant to Iraq, but is also related to their wider rivalry in the region, which is
not solely driven by ideological aims (Gause, 2010, p. 181). Both powers are
involved in the volatile domestic politics of fragile states, such as Palestine,
Lebanon, and Yemen, as well as Iraq. They both backed their local allies in Iraq
to gain power: Iran backed al-Maliki and Riyadh backed Allawi, who is also a
67 Barzegar's view might have been true until the Saudi-led Sunni coalition of military
intervention in Yemen on 25 March 2015, which has marked a new shift in Saudi Arabia's
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. It can be argued that Iran's regional power sometimes has
been overestimated. A closer look at Iran's political and economic problems reveals that Iran
has been hindered in its rivalry with the GCC countries. For example, the GCC countries have
spent 7.5 times more on their defence system than Iran spent in the ten-year period 1997-2007;
and 15.6 times as much on arms as Iran spent during the period of 1988-2007 (Rahigh-Aghsan
and Jakobsen, 2010, p. 560). The difference is even more dramatic when it comes to Saudi
Arabia's gross domestic product (GDP), which is more than 60% larger than Iran's one. With
these data in mind, we can claim that the rising of Iran is not that durable and might even not be
sustained for a long time. The rise of Iranian hegemony after 2003 might stem more from
religious and ideological factors. As Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen (2010, p. 561) have
observed, it is a matter of shift of the ideological balance of power rather than the military one.
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Shi'a but is opposed to Iranian intervention in Iraq. On the other hand, Iran has
also worked with non-Shi'a allies, such as Kurds in Iraq, or Hamas in Palestine.
The same is true of Saudi Arabia, which has made approaches to Muqtada al-
Sadr many times considering his Iraqi nationalist intentions. Although Saudi-
Iranian rivalry in Iraq has not been totally separated from sectarian tensions,
given the sectarian identity of these proxy forces it seems sectarianism is a
tactical tool rather than a main driver of their involvement in Iraq.
4.2.2. What does Iranian leverage in Iraq mean for Turkey?
Turkey and Iran have a history of rivalry in the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East. However, until now Iraq has not become a central zone of conflict
between Iran and Turkey, as has been the case in Syria, despite both countries
sharing a number of common issues in Iraq, such as the integrity of Iraq and
Iraq's stability in the region; both countries also support different models of state
in the new Iraq. As Guzanskey (2011, p. 98) states, Turkey prefers an Iraqi
state which rules via a broad-based alliance as much as possible, including
most of the Iraqi ethnic and religious fractions, without representing a single
religious or ethnic identity. In contrast, Iran wants to have a Shi’a dominated
Iraq isolated from the U.S. and western countries. Iran does not want a strong
Iraqi state with a strong Arab national identity in the region. Alternatively, a
weak Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq will always look to Iran to preserve its
political and security interests from other Sunni-dominated countries in the
Persian Gulf.
Furthermore, due to Turkey's lack of ties with Shi'a political actors such as
the ISCI and the Da'wa Party which have dominated the presidency of the
council of ministers since 2005, Turkey has supported opposite sides to the pro-
Iranian Shi'a government in Iraq. It can be argued that the political rivalry
between Iran and Turkey has intensified primarily after the preparation of the
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. This especially dates to when Turkey found out that
American departure would have left the new Iraq under the Iranian domination.
Therefore, since Iraq’s March 2010 parliamentary election, Turkey's focus has
been primarily on the secular and Sunnis parties, especially al-Iraqiyya
coalition. Moreover, Turkish uneasiness with Iran's policy toward Iraq is also
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reflected in the tense bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq. These
tensions reached a high level, with Maliki's government in particular, when al-
Maliki issued an arrest warrant against the former Vice President Tariq Al-
Hashimi in December 2011. Ankara's reaction transpired from the words of the
former Turkish Prime Minster Erdogan in January 2012, in a speech for the AKP
Party, when he said that ''Mr Maliki should know this, If you engage in a violent
process amid a sectarian conflict in Iraq, it will not be possible for us to keep
silent about that'' (cited in Ayman, 2012, p. 18). These words show that Turkey
is seriously worried about the Iranian influence in Iraq, due to the fact that
Turkey has understood that what Iranian leverage means is the creation of new
regional system in the Persian Gulf which helps Iran to strengthen its crescent
hegemony passing through the Turkish border with the Arab world, starting from
Iran through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, compromising the Neo-Ottoman strategy
towards the Arab and Muslim world favoured by Turkey. Furthermore, Iraq has
deep political and economic links with Turkey. In economic terms, Iraq could be
an alternative to Russia and Iran for supplying Turkish energy needs for oil and
natural gas. Also, in 2011 and 2012 Iraq was the second largest export partner
for Turkey, which reaching $12 billion of exports in 2012, even more lucrative
than Germany68. Also Turkey has its political and security interests inside Iraq
which may be affected by the Iranian leverage in Iraq.
Since the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran, paramilitary and non-
state actors, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Shi'a militias and terrorist groups have
been actively used by Iran as instruments of pressure on regional and
international policies. According to some Turkish media sources, Iranian
intelligence and the Quds Forces have built good relations with the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) in Qandil, by providing all kinds of help to persuade their
Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party (also known as PYD), to avoid
68 Despite the Iranian hegemony in Iraq, which has prompted the majority of scholars to say that
Iran is the only winner in the war on Iraq, it can be said that, from an economic point of view,
Turkey is a real winner of the U.S. invasion of Iraq after 2003. Iraq has become the most
lucrative market of Turkish products in the world, above Germany. In 2013 Turkish exports to
Germany were $13.3 billion, while to Iraq they were $11.9 billion. However, if we examine
imports, Turkey imported $24.1 billion in goods from Germany, about twice the volume of its
exports. Turkey's imports from Iraq amounted to only $200 million, which means that Iraq had
been more important for Turkey than Germany (See Cetingulec, 2014).
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fighting with the Syrian regime (The Daily Star,12 May 2014). It can be argued
that Iran has been successful in this plan, and has extended the longevity of the
Syrian regime.
The implication of the Iranian influence in Iraq for Turkey cannot be fully
understood without taking into account the Turkish-Iranian struggle regarding
the Syrian regime. Turkey is very aware that Iranian domination in Iraq will give
Iran a better chance to create a new regional security order, curbing the
ambitions of the new Turkish foreign policy of extending its influence to the Arab
world. Therefore, Turkey wishes to rebalance the new regional reality that has
been created by Iran after 2003 by eliminating the Syrian regime, and in this
way limit Iranian influence in Syria. This could stop an Iranian leverage in the
region, as well as cutting Iranian support to both Lebanese Hezbollah and
Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine. Turkish concerns over the Iranian
leverage in Iraq have driven Turkey to involve itself with the Kurdish region
(KRG), despite their disagreements with many of the elements present in the
KRG. In December 2015, Turkish concern over Iraq’s conflict reached the level
of Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq near Mosul, despite the strong
objections of Iran and the Iraqi government in Baghdad. All this is to say that the
Turkish involvement in Iraq cannot be decoupled from its regional security
complex dynamics with Iraq on the one hand, and Iran’s powerful engagement
in Iraq, which on the other hand demonstrates the interconnectedness of the
state-building process in Iraq with Iraq’s neighbours.
4.3. Conclusion: security shaping ideological alignment
Analysing Iran's engagement in post-2003 Iraq yields the conclusion that
Iranian involvement has occurred on three levels. Firstly was hindering
American capabilities in Iraq, in order to prevent them achieving what they had
planned. This made serious troubles for the U.S. and the CPA for building the
form of Iraqi state that they wanted. Instead of that, Iran put political and
security pressures on the CPA in order to constrain the U.S. to follow Iraq's new
political elite, formed of the Shi'a and the Kurds that had close political ties with
Iran. The second level of the Iranian engagement in Iraq was through
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supporting the Shi'i-led government and building institutional links with the new
Iraq on the political, economy, military and religious levels, through Shi'a militia
proxies and political parties, such as the Islamic Daʿwa Party and the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq. Third, Iran was also actively engaged with Iraqi Kurds,
because of their prominent role in the post-2003 Iraq on the one hand, and to
ensure a guarantee for the Shi'a-led government in Baghdad on the other.
The abovementioned Iranian engagement in Iraq has been done through
both Iran's hard and soft power. Insurgent groups and Shi'a militia proxy forces
are present, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Mahdi Army, the Badr Organisation,
Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Saraya al-Salam. These non-state actors played a
significant role in achieving the Iranian strategy post-2003. The second
mechanism of applying Iranian strategy in Iraq was Iraq's new political elite, due
to their political, ideological and cultural ties with Iran. Iran's soft power
(ideological and economic) influences constituted the third instrument of the
Iranian involvement post-2003 invasion. Iraq's Shi'a majority population which
had been discriminated against and excluded since the beginning of the
establishment of the Iraqi state has been another factor of Iran's soft power for
shaping the trajectory of state-building in the post-2003 Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq's
fragile economy following the U.S.-led invasion was another cause, which Iran
wisely seized to improve its political leverage by adding an economic
dimension, to create a complete sphere of influence in the south of Iraq.
In all the aforementioned levels of Iran's involvement in post-2003 Iraq, the
pragmatist approach of the Iranian geopolitical position in the region and its
regional security complex with Iraq has been a leading factor driving Iranian
involvement in Iraq. However, the ethno-sectarian factor has been an effective
tool, which facilitated Tehran to achieve its aims in Iraq.
The efficiency of the Iranian influence in Iraq depends on the security
situation on Iraq on one side, and the extent of disagreement among Iraq's
three main components, Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds on the other. Iran's influence
on Iraq's political arena will increase as long as sectarianism dominates the
political arena in Iraq. For instance, the advent of ISIS has highly boosted Iraqi
Shi'as’ connections with Iran. This incident has made an important turning point
in the relationship between the Iraqi Shi'a and the Iranian regime, which
transformed it from a political alignment into an ideological partnership in the
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region. Therefore, Baghdad has become a strategic asset to Tehran, and at the
same time part of Iran's regional security complex (in agreement with this
thesis’s theory). This can be clearly noticed from the statement of Iran’s Foreign
Minister Zarif during his visit to Iraq in August 2014, when he said that ‘’Iran
regards Iraq’s security as its own’’ (IRNA, 24 Aug. 2014).
The theoretical contribution in this chapter can be observed on a wide
scale. All three RSC levels of local, regional, and global have been active
regarding Iranian engagement in the state-building process; however the
regional level has been more dominant than two other levels. The global factor
which is demonstrated in Iran's nuclear agreement with the West has not made
any obvious change regarding Iranian and U.S. polices towards Iraq.
Thus, it could be concluded that Iran's engagement in the state-building
process in Iraq shows the extent that ethnic and sectarian dimensions have
been a form of Iran's penetration in the state-building process after 2003. In
contrast to Iraq’s other neighbours, especially Riyadh and Damascus, which
could not engage in the building of political and military institutions in post-2003
Iraq that could have provided them with a large influence to direct the political
process in Iraq, Tehran has developed considerable influence within most of the
political, military and religious institutions in post-2003 Iraq. This has raised
other regional actors’ concerns and led them too to engage in the post-2003
Iraq, which will be addressed in the upcoming chapters.
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Chapter Five:
5. Iraq and Syria: Ideological enmity and sectarian
amity
''Everyone who wants to bring peace to Iraq has to work closely together with Syria''
Syria's Deputy Prime Minister (Spiegel, 21 February 2007).
"It’s the same situation as it used to be in Iraq… Everyone is afraid of one another" Iraqi
refugee fleeing Syria, (The New York Times, 24, September 20142012).
Introduction:
Syria has been and will continue to be a significant factor in directing the
state-building process and ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq, as a result of Syria's
long-shared geopolitical, ideological and social structure links with Iraq, whether
after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq or after the Syrian civil war since 2011.
The stages have played parallel roles in term of interrupting the state-building
process and escalating inter-communal enmity in post-2003 Iraq. The central
concern of this chapter is to explore how and why Syria has engaged in the
process of state-building in Iraq after the 2003 U.S-led invasion, as well as how
the process of state-building became part of the ethnic and religious conflict
among Iraq's neighbours.
In order to answer the abovementioned question, this chapter has been
structured into three sections. First, I will discuss how the Syrian strategy
towards Iraq has been shaped following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Also
addressed is how Syria has been involved in the state-building and ethno-
sectarian strife in Iraq. Two key factors which have been essential pillars of
Syria’s involvement in Iraq have been addressed. The first is Syria's
sponsorship of Iraq's Sunni insurgent groups (Islamic nationalists, Jihadi
Salafis) and former Ba'athists, putting pressures and making difficulties for the
U.S. troops in Iraq especially between 2003 and 2005. The second is a
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ramification of the Kurdish issue in Iraq; links with Syrian Kurdistan cannot be
overlooked when regarding Syria’s engagement in post-war Iraq. The second
section goes on to analyse the impact of the Syrian crisis, and its implications
for Iraq, from 2011 onward. This shows another side of the Syrian impact on
Iraq's conflict on the one hand, and also how the state-building process in post-
2003 Iraq became part of the cross-border inter-communal conflict between
Syria and Iraq on the other hand. The third section shows how Daesh (IS or
ISIS) challenged both state-building and the state system, not only for Iraq but
also for Syria, as evidence of how Syria's regional security complex is linked
strongly with Iraq (based on thesis theory of RSC).
5.1. Syria’s strategy towards post-2003 Iraq: how Syria became
involved in the state-building process in Iraq
Since 2003, Iraqi-Syrian relations have gone through several political and
diplomatic fluctuations which can be difficult to categorise into accurate phases.
For the sake of this study, these relations are categorised into pre- and post-
2011. It can be argued that Syria’s engagement in the process of state-building
in Iraq from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq until the Syrian crisis in 2011, has not
been driven by sectarian calculations. Syria’s primary fear in this stage was
mostly over the deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq and what were they planning
for in the region, rather than what the new form of the Iraqi state should look
like. Damascus was seeking to understand whether the new Iraq would be
another American ally in the region, or part of the resistance bloc against Israel.
Syria's active support for former Ba’athist and Jihadist groups, and turning a
blind eye to their crossing its border to fight U.S forces, can be considered
evidence for that. The second stage starts from the onset of the Syrian
upheaval in 2011, which shifted Syria's position from the centre to the periphery,
from a regional player to a battleground fractured along ethnic and sectarian
lines. At this stage Syria and Iraq’s relations were re-established on the basis of
sectarian calculations in the region.
However, the transformation of Syria-Iraq relations after 2011 has not
happened through diplomatic phases. What made these relations transform
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from long enmity into the new amity was rather the new regional polarisation
that has been driven by sectarian calculations as a regional security complex.
There is no evidence to prove of an Iranian role or mediation between the two
countries, since Maliki’s government (at least from 2003 until 2011) was not as
supportive of Assad’s regime as Iran and Hezbollah have been. At the onset of
Syrian uprising, Maliki met with members of the Syrian opposition and accepted
the need for constitutional change in Syria. However, the concern of Maliki and
the Iraqi Shi’a was that any Sunni-dominated government in Syria would
strengthen the Sunnis in Iraq’s western provinces, which is exactly happened in
the Syrian crisis (see Salem, 2012). Furthermore, any possible change in the
regional security order can directly affect the regional security complex in the
entire region (according to the thesis theory of RSC).
In order to understand Syria's strategy in Iraq following the U.S.-led
invasion, it is necessary to engage with a number of factors that have shaped
Syria's involvement in post-2003 Iraq as key drivers of the Syrian policy towards
Iraq.
First, in order to strengthen its regional power, Syria continued to use its
traditional policy by playing the Arab nationalist card to enhance its internal and
external legitimacy against its rivals in the region (see Mufti, 1996, p. 47). A
close look at Syria's political legacy in the region can conclude that Syria has
always regarded itself as the "cradle of pan-Arabism'' in the Middle East
(Drysdale, 1992, p. 348). This view has been based on the Ba'ath's wider
ideology on which Syria has actively depended since 1960, through interfering
in almost all Arab issues throughout the Arab world. What had made this policy
possible was the existence of a penetrated regional system that has
experienced instability in both the Levant and the Persian Gulf (see Ehteshami
& Hinnebusch, 1997, p.3). The ideology of pan-Arabism has played a
predominant role in the making of Syria's foreign policy and has supplied the
Assad regime with legitimacy inside and outside the country (Hinnebusch, 2012,
p. 103). Therefore, the fall of Saddam's regime and a new unstable Iraq was a
great opportunity for Assad to capitalise on the demands of Iraq’s opposition
against the U.S. occupation, in order to boost its regional penetration role.
Second, the main driver of Syria's involvement in post-Saddam Iraq has
been Syria's desire to create a space within which the U.S. will be forced to see
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Syria as an important player and partner for negotiations (see Hirschfeld, 2005).
Despite Assad's disputes with the Ba'ath regime in Iraq, Damascus stood
against the U.S. occupation of Iraq (Sassoon, 2012, p. 160)69. Damascus was
highly worried about the U.S. military presence on its border, especially when
there were growing noises that Damascus could be America’s next target70. It
could be therefore argued that Damascus was keen to prove its regional
importance for the U.S. in Iraq, and to drag them into the diplomatic process, for
two reasons (Pollock, 2007, p. 10). First, if western states were in negotiation
with Syria the U.S. most likely would not have attacked it; and second, the
Syria-U.S. negotiation could send a message to Syria's people that the U.S.
needs Syria's help in the region, which at the same time shows the durability
and importance of the Syrian regime in the eyes of Syrian citizens.
Although U.S.-Syrian relations have not been without cooperation, their
relations never reached the level of amity (see Scheller, 2013, p. 50). For
example, after the 9/11 attacks, Syria cooperated with the U.S. authorities
against Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. In June 2002, the U.S. Assistant Secretary
69 Both pan-Arab branches of the Ba'ath party of Syria and Iraq have had long historical rivalry;
they were at odd about almost all political issues in the Arab world, for more details about Iraqi
Ba’ath Party, see Sassoon, J., 2012, Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party: inside an authoritarian
regime, Cambridge University Press.
70 According to one of the top-secret State Department cables that were published by WikiLeaks
in 2010, it can be argued that undermining Assad's regime since 2006 has been part of the U.S.
agenda. A close analysis of this document can lead to a conclusion that the main goal of U.S.
policy toward Syria in 2006 was destabilising the Syrian government by any means. William
Roebuck, who was a Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, suggested to the
State Department that, ''the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the
increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists" is an "opportunity" that the U.S. should
take action on. To do so, Roebuck suggested that the U.S. should work closely with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia to speed the development of sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shi'a in Syria.
As he proposed, this could be through the ''exaggerating'' of the Shi'a revival in Syria, and
''play[ing] on Sunni fears of Iranian influence'' in Syria (WikiLeaks, 13 December 2006). It can be
concluded that Syrian fears of the U.S.'s regime change policy after the U.S invasion of Iraq had
been reasonable. It can also be said that this plan actually worked in 2007, when Syrian
opposition groups and number of Sunni clerics (Ulama) accused the Iranian ambassador
Hassan Ikhtari of spreading Shi'ism in Syria. The Syrian regime for the first time yielded to such
demands and replaced the Iranian ambassador (see Pierret, T., 2013. Religion and state in
Syria: The Sunni Ulama from coup to revolution, Cambridge University Press).
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of State William Burns (Congressional Research Service, 2006) told a
congressional committee that “the cooperation the Syrians have provided in
their own self-interest on Al Qaeda has saved American lives.” Also in 2004 the
'State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism' revealed that Syria
cooperated with U.S and other countries against terrorist organisations and Al-
Qaeda groups (Washington Post, 16 Nov 2005). To a degree, Syria was ready
to coordinate with the U.S. and Iraq regarding the control of the border between
Syria and Iraq in 2005. In addition, Syria handed over Saddam's half-brother
Sabawi Ibrahim and around 30 Iraqi Ba'athists to the Iraq authorities; Damascus
also called for the signing of a security agreement with the Iraqi Interim
Government (Shueibi, 2005). All these attempts by Syria have been one-sided
efforts, which can be assessed in the context of Syria's aspiration to build a
diplomatic sphere for negotiation with the U.S. after the Iraq war.
However, the Bush administration did not want to engage Syria on Iraq, at
least until 200671. On the contrary, Washington put more pressure on Syria
through both the U.S. Congress Syrian Accountability Act and the UN Security
Council resolution 1559 in September 2004, which imposed on Syria a
withdrawal from Lebanon in the spring of 2005, especially because of its
suspected role in the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the previous Prime Minister
of Lebanon in February of that year (Eyal, 2005, p.126). This incident struck the
backbone of the Syrian regime, cutting the arteries connecting the Syrian
71 In 2006 the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) in a report suggested to the Bush administration to have
direct talks with both Syria and Iran, due to their great influence on Iraq's stability. The report
was an attempt to reconsider the U.S. policy in Iraq and the region, especially towards Iraq's
neighbours. The report had a positive reception in the Syrian press; also the Syrian ambassador
in Washington, Imad Mustapha, repeatedly welcomed the Baker-Hamilton recommendations of
direct talks between the United States and Syria, stressing the constructive role of Syria in
stabilising Iraq. According to The Economist, in November 2006 Bashar al-Assad suggested to
the British envoy Nigel Sheinwald four conditions for greater regional cooperation: '' (1) an end
to the UN investigation into Syria’s role in the Hariri assassination; (2) a guarantee that
Washington will not try to undermine the Syrian regime; (3) a return of Syria’s influence in
Lebanon; and (4) the return of the Golan Heights''. Although none of these conditions were
implemented by the U.S, in the late November of that year Walid al-Muallem visited Baghdad
and re-established Syrian-Iraqi diplomatic relations. (See Baker III, J.A., Hamilton, L.H. and Iraq
Study Group, 2006, The Iraq study group report; Wikas, J., December 5, 2006, Syria's
Response to the Baker-Hamilton Report).
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regime with its long-term ally Hezbollah. Thereby the U.S. wanted to isolate
Syria from its middling role in the Israel-Palestinian struggle in the region, which
has been one of the main pillars of the domestic and foreign legitimacy of the
Syrian Ba’athist regime since the 1960s. Thus, the Bush's administration closed
all the doors on the Assad regime. This can be taken as a major reason for
Syria's engagement in the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq, via resorting
to its strategic approach of state sponsorship of non-governmental armed actors
in the form of using foreign fighters and terrorist groups in Iraq (see Scheller,
2013, p. 11)72.
After the fall of Saddam's regime, Syria started to exert influence in Iraq in
an attempt to demonstrate the extent of her strategic importance in the region.
Damascus’s major goal behind this policy was to prove to the U.S that
Washington cannot achieve stability in Iraq without Damascus. The geopolitical,
demographical and ideological influence of Syria on Iraq, in addition to Syria's
long experience as a middle power in a penetrated regional system, has made
Syria confident in playing that role. Syria's strategy in post-2003 Iraq was to put
pressure on the U.S. in order to deter America from seeking regime change in
Syria. The only way to do so was through an alignment with Iraqi insurgent
groups, which mostly were Sunni at that time. Shi'a and Kurd were in favour of
the new Iraq, and were major parts of Iraq's state-building efforts guided by the
U.S. Also the Syrian position as a base of pan-Arabism would be damaged by a
Syrian alliance on a sectarian basis or support for the pro-U.S. forces in Iraq.
This is to say that Syria had limited options to engage in the state-building
process in post-2003 Iraq, apart from becoming involved with Sunni insurgent
groups, hosting former Ba'athists, and turning a blind eye to Jihadist groups
fighting the U.S. occupation forces in Iraq.
72 The Syrian regime has a long history of supporting non-state actors and terrorist groups.
Damascus has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979, through supporting
groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and the PKK against neighbouring countries. There are several
forms of state sponsorship of terrorism, such as: 1) hosting terrorist groups actively, 2) explicit
support, 3) financial and logistic support, and 4) military support. For more about Syria's
sponsorship of terrorist groups see: Scheller, B., 2013. The Wisdom of Syria's Waiting Game:
Foreign Policy Under the Assads; Harnisch, S., & Kirchner, M. (2011) Neoclassical Realism and
State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Institute for Political Science, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität
Heidelberg.
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In February 2007, Iraqi government officials accused Syria of being a
cause of destabilisation of Iraq's security (European Council on Foreign
relations, 2013). After a month the U.S. State Department advisor to Iraq, David
Satterfield (Reuters, 28 March 2007), stated that ''at least 80 per cent of suicide
bombers in Iraq had transited through Syria''. Damascus had overreacted to the
American policy in the region, to the extent that Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk
al-Shara' stated "Syria's interest is to see the invaders defeated in Iraq. The
resistance of the Iraqis is extremely important. It is a heroic resistance to the
U.S.-British occupation of their country'' (BBC News, 1 April, 2003). It can be
argued that, if Syria's reaction could not be assessed as acknowledgement of
Iraqi and U.S. accusations towards Damascus, it can be assessed as a Syrian
attempt to be dealt with as a regional power in Iraq's post-2003 transition
process.
Washington continued to attempt to contain Damascus's regional policy
not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon and Palestine. It can be said that Syrian-
U.S. cooperation in Iraq could have improved the trajectory of the state-building
process in Iraq and the regional security order in the entire region to be much
better than has in fact been reached73. Since the U.S. invasion, Syria has been
a destabilising factor for political transition in Iraq. This has occurred through
affecting main foundation of state-building in Iraq, which has been the security
factor. That is not to say Syria is the only player which must be held responsible
for Iraq's security situation post-Saddam. According to most Iraqi and U.S.
intelligence reports (especially what are called the Sinjar documents74), Syria,
73 In May 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Syria to discuss a number of
crucial issues with Syrian President Bashar Assad. His visit included a list of demands, such as
the dismantling of Hezbollah, withdrawal from Lebanon and cooperation with U.S. troops in Iraq.
These demands struck at Syria’s most important interests in the region, because they impacted
issues such as Syrian hegemony over the Golan, Syria’s zone of influence in the Levant, and
Syria’s Arab nationalist position in the Arab world. The U.S. presented all these demands
without offering any guarantees to Syria. Powell told the U.S. press ''we are not coming bringing
any carrots''. This led the Syrian foreign ministry spokesman to say that Syria was willing to
participate in the regional solution, but could not accept to be dictated to by the U.S; he said the
''cooperation required real engagement on a parity of dignity'' (Hinnebusch, 2005, p.7).
74 In September 2007, in the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar just twelve miles from the Syrian
border, the U.S. forces discovered computers and found a number of documents that included
the records of more than 600 foreign fighters. The fighters had infiltrated into Iraq between 2006
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due to its local and regional connections with Iraq, has been Iraq's main
insurgent gateway for former Ba'athist and other foreign fighters transiting to
Iraq (Fishman, 2008, pp.5-32).
Third is Syria's struggle for regime survival. Syria's involvement in post-
2003 Iraq can be better understood through Syria's approach of managing
external crisis at home. Bashar's policy to deal with Iraq can be seen as a
connection between domestic and foreign policy. Following Ayoob's (1995, p.9)
argument, this means that the Syrian regime's security has been rooted in both
the internal and external vulnerability of the regime's legitimacy. The Iraq War
pushed Assad's regime to choose either cooperation with the international
community, or to take into consideration its domestic public opinion (Scheller,
2013, p. 25). Giving Syria's position as a defender of Arab nationalism, Syria
tried to not damage its reputation in the eyes of Arabs. As a result, Syria's
official position was not only against the invasion, but was also a hostile attitude
to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. In opposition to some Arab countries, Syria
chose to stand with the Arab street. This might become clearer when we view
the statement Bassam Barbandi, a former Syrian diplomat in Washington, DC,
when he said, “Assad understood that part of Bush's strategy in Iraq was to end
minority rule of Sunni ruling over majority Shiite. He feared that he would be
next. From then on, he started work with mujahidin” (Weiss, and Hassan, 2015
p.103). Bashar wished to deliver a message to the Bush administration that his
regime was not a minority-based rule, but supported by the majority of Arabs. In
addition, he had the ability to mobilize both Arab nationalists and Islamists
against the U.S. if it thought of attacking the Syrian regime.
In early April 2003, Bashar told the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir that
'popular resistance' would prevent America from controlling Iraq (Kabalan,
and 2007. What was surprising was that the documents revealed Syrian behaviour at odds with
the regime's public statements and diplomatic status. The Sinjar documents well revealed Iraq's
neighbours’ links with and financial support for Iraqi insurgent groups, al-Qaeda fighters and
other terrorist groups that were involved with destabilising the security situation in Iraq. For more
details about Sinjar records see Fishman, ed. (2008) Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout,
Combating terrorism center at West Point.
164 | P a g e
2010, p. 30). A similar argument has been made by a Syrian former foreign
minister Farouk al-Shara' at the Syrian parliament, that Damascus has chosen
to stand with ''the Iraqi people and international legitimacy'' (Kabalan, 2010,
p.30). So, Syrian engagement in post-2003 Iraq has been driven by domestic,
regional and international factors which are directly linked with its regional
security complex on the one hand and the U.S. presence as a super power in
the region on the other.
After the fall of Saddam's regime, Syria found a suitable ground to create a
comparable zone of influence among Iraqi Sunnis, especially through the Sunni
provinces which historically have a sense of kinship and homology toward
Syria. This was helped by the fact that the Iraqi Sunnis were predisposed to
hold some Arab nationalist principles, against the Shi’a political elite who were
close to Iran, and against also the U.S. occupation. Both Pan-Arabism and anti-
American sentiments were part of the Syria's regional policy toward Iraq. The
ideological convergence between the Syrian Ba'ath and Iraqi Ba'ath could have
been a point of connection in this regard. In order to achieve both
abovementioned factors – protecting the Syrian regime and winning regional
prestige – Damascus attempted to ally with Sunni insurgent groups, Jihadists
and former Ba'athists following the U.S. invasion of Iraq (see Hafez, 2007, p.
47). The Syrian involvement in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq through support
and alignment with non-state actors and proxy groups is exemplified in the case
of Iraq after 2003.
However, the above argument should not lead us to ignore the fact that
the flow of insurgents from Syria to Iraq may not have always been under the
control of the Syrian authorities. This is because of demographic and geo-
economic links between Syria and Iraq (see map 3). For example, as Levitt
(2009, p.18) points out, the tribes of the Iraqi-Syrian desert between the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers traditionally have paid little attention to the border. This
can be attributed to the significant role of the tribes in the state formation in both
Iraq and Syria (See Khoury and Kostiner, 1990). There has been evidence that
in early 2005 Syrian intelligence started arresting Al-Qaeda-linked groups in
Damascus, Aleppo and Deir al-Zour, as a result of intense diplomatic pressure
that both Iraq and the U.S. put on Syria to stop recruiting terrorist groups on its
165 | P a g e
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soil (al- Shishani, 2009, Lister, 2015, p.38)75. The June 2006 Jihadist suicide
attack which targeted the Syrian state TV and radio headquarters in Damascus
might have been a reaction to the Syria's 2005 arrest campaigns against radical
Islamists in Syria. According to many reports, including that produced by the
U.S. embassy in Damascus, the attack was most likely instigated by Abu-
Qaqaa's followers, who were targeted by the arrest campaigns in 2005 (Lefevre,
2013 p.152). Despite Syrian cooperation regarding the monitoring of the flow of
foreign fighters to Iraq, the violence, explosions and attacks on U.S. troops and
Iraqis who were working with the government remained as before, and even
increased between 2006 and 2007. This could be evidence that the flow of
Iraq's former Ba'athists and foreign fighters from Syria to Iraq may not have
been fully under Syrian control.
75 The U.S. deputy Secretary of State, Richard L. Armitage, visited Syria in 2005 and met with
Assad. He stated that, ''Syria has made real improvements in recent months on border security,
but we all need to do more, particularly on the question of foreign regime elements participating
in activities in Iraq, going back and forth from Syria'' (Lister, p.38).
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The conditions of the Iraqi-Syrian border are very different compared to
the metropolitan centres as a result of tribal control on the social and political
reality of the border. Cross-border trafficking and illegal smuggling have often
been a fruitful business on both sides of the border (Fishman, 2008, p. 85). For
instance, the Sinjar documents made clear that the Deir al-Zour section had
been an easy gateway to cross, due to the tribal links between both sides of the
border of Syria and Iraq (Fishman, 2008, p. 50)76. The same can be said about
the Iraqi-Syrian Kurds in term of trans-border engagements, such as ethnic,
cultural, cross-border social, economic and familial ties. The Kurdish tribes, like
Hasinan and Miran (also known as Kochar), were separated by the Syria-Iraq
border, which divided Syrian Upper Jizerah from Bahdinan in Iraq (Tejel, 2009,
p. 73). In the 1980s, Damascus turned a blind eye to the recruitment of
hundreds of Syrian Kurds to the ranks of the peshmargas (combatants), mainly
into Barzani’s KDP, in order to put pressure on Saddam’s regime (see Tejel,
2009, p. 73). These demographic links were a double-edged sword for Syria's
engagement in the state-building process in Iraq. Syria exploited these ties in
favour of its involvement in Iraq. However, tribal links have played a major role
in the trans-state spill-over effects on the Syrian crisis. The U.S. concerns over
Syria's engagement after 2005 came from that source, when they paid much
attention to tightening Syria's border with Iraq and restraining cross-border
penetration, aiming to limit the impact of Syria’s political policies and traditional
social ties with the border regions of Iraq.
The role of economic factors also cannot be underestimated in the Syrian
policy-making towards Iraq. When Iraq was under the U.N economic sanctions,
especially between 2000 and 2003, a number of reports indicated that Iraq was
shipping about 150,000 to 200,000 barrels of oil per day through the Syrian
Mediterranean port of Banias (Lesch, 2005, p. 181). The Banias pipeline
produced $1 billion per year in revenue for Syria, which equalled five percent of
76 According to the Sinjar records, most foreign fighters that crossed from Syria to Iraq benefited
from the smuggling economy that existed between the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Indeed, 53 of the 93
Syrian coordinators, identified by name, were paid by the fighters they transported into Iraq.
Syrian smugglers earned more than $3000 each year in this business. For more details about
foreign fighters and their economic impact see  Levitt, 2009, p.18
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Syria's GDP (Hinnebusch, 2014, p. 200). Syria was purchasing Iraqi oil at a
discount price of about $10-$15 per barrel for domestic use (Lesch, 2005, 2003,
p. 181). This is in addition to the building of a new pipeline for gas fields near
the border on the Iraqi side. The invasion of Iraq hit Syrian economic interests
hard, especially the gains from the illegal oil supply. This point has not been
underestimated by the Iraqi government after 2003, as they realised that Syria
must be linked by economic interests with Iraq to provide Damascus some
economic guarantees in order to show that the new Iraq could be beneficial to
Syria.
In 2006, Iraq attempted to resume its relations with Syria through an
economic doorway. On this basis, the previous Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki
visited Syria in August 2006 for the first time for any Iraqi president since the
1980s, in particular to discuss security issues and building economic relations.
The visit led to the reactivation of the Banias pipeline that was closed during the
U.S. occupation of Iraq. A year after, in 2007, Syrian exports to Iraq recorded
$641 million (Banes-Dacey, 2009). By the same token the Syrian Prime Minister
Mohammad Naji al-Otri made a visit to Iraq in April 2009 and signed over 20
trade deals during this visit (Banes-Dacey, 2009). However, the economic
calculations have not been an effective point in shaping Syria-Iraq relations.
The abovementioned factors may explain why Syria became engaged in
the state-building process in Iraq. Now it may be worth considering the ways in
which they interfered, and the mechanisms of the Syrian engagement in state-
building in post-2003 Iraq.
5.1.1 Pressurise the U.S.: Supporting Iraqi insurgency
There have been several arguments made that the destabilised,
separated, fragile and sectarian Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion has not
been beneficial for Syria (e.g. Yacoubian 2011, p. 153) or other secular regimes
which do not support radical Islamist groups. However, this view is general and
simplistic; for example, Egypt has long turned a blind eye to the supply of
Hamas, through tunnels from its territory; Libya too was involved in supporting
Islamist group of Abu Sayyaf. Despite Assad's enmity toward Islamist groups,
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after 2003 Damascus’s record has shown Assad's tolerance and support for
Islamist and terrorist groups against the U.S. in Iraq (Rubin, 2010). Thus, Syria's
longstanding regional policy that has been built on destabilising vulnerable
regimes in the region and Syria's regional policy in Lebanon and Palestine can
be assessed in this context. It is, however, important to note that these
mentioned concerns had not been part of Syria's priorities in post-2003 Iraq.
The form of the new Iraqi state has been a secondary priority for Damascus
following the U.S.-led invasion. Damascus’s top priority in her involvement in
Iraq was averting the threat of permanent American military presence in the
region and the possibility of an American attack on Syria after Iraq. The latter
priority relates directly to the survival of the Assad regime on the one hand and
its regional middle power role on the other. Syria, in contrast to other regional
actors, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, did not engage with the
dominant political parties of Shi’as, Sunnis and Kurds, which were the main
political actors after the U.S. invasion, or try to build any institutional bases with
Iraq's main factions, in order to use these contacts in the future. Meanwhile,
Syria did not become involved in supporting Iraq's political groups in the
elections, as has been the case with other regional players in post-2003 Iraq.
This meant in fact that Syria did not have a clear vision towards the form of
post-2003 Iraq that they would prefer to be built. This is a focal point to
understand Assad's strategy toward the state-building process in post-2003
Iraq.
From this point of view, Syria wanted to draw the attention of the U.S. to
the fact that Syria cannot be ignored in the new political process in Iraq, in order
to deliver a message to the U.S. to not think about regime change in Syria77. A
strong indication in that sense came from Syrian Deputy Prime Minister
Abdullah al-Dardari when he said ''Everyone who wants to bring peace to Iraq
has to work closely together with Syria'' (Spiegel, 21 February 2007). To do so,
Syria looked for opposition voices against the U.S. occupation of Iraq, whether
77 After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria has been accused many times by the U.S. officials of
being a security threat in the region. For instance, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control,
John Bolton, made it clear ''that Syria remains a security threat in two major areas: weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and support for terrorism''. Bolton listed Syria alongside Iran, Libya
and North Korea “rogue states” that pose threats to the U.S. national security (The Washington
Times, 29 September 2003).
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they were local oppositions, such as former Ba'athists and other Sunni
insurgent groups, or foreign fighters, such as Jihadist and al-Qaeda-linked
groups. Hafez (2007, pp. 55, 56) has divided Iraq's insurgent groups after 2003
into two groups, the Islamic nationalists and ideological Ba'athists. The first
group was aiming to oust coalition forces from Iraq and reintegrate Sunnis and
nominal Ba'athists to the political system. The second group is divided between
Salafis and ideological Ba'athists, who were aiming to defeat the political
system of the Shi'a dominated government and the Kurdish autonomous region.
However, Hafez's classification has been limited in regard to al-Qaeda foreign
fighters in Iraq as has been revealed by the Sinjar Report in December 2007
(Felter & Fishman, 2007, p. 3). The dynamics of AQI’s logistics networks in
Syria, and the percentage of suicide attacks in Iraq committed by foreign
fighters, are revealed in the Sinjar documents.
In public, Assad claimed to be a neutral player, stating to French television
on 21 March 2007, “what we are doing is to start dialogue with all parties,
whether they are supporting the political process or opposing it” (Quoted in
Pollock, 2007, p. 6). Arguably, there is no evidence that the Syrian regime made
distinctions between these insurgent groups on the basis of sectarian identities
prior to 2011. Apart from the above mentioned groups, there were also radical
Shi'a followers of Muqtada al-Sadr (see Combating Terrorism Center report,
2008). It can therefore be said that from 2003 until 2011, Damascus did not
seek directly to stoke sectarian tensions in Iraq, even if their largely passive
support for Islamist groups to pressure the U.S. did have that effect. Syria’s
support for some sectarian groups in Iraq may later have threatened the Assad
regime at home.
Syria has been accused many times by both Iraq and U.S. officials for not
doing enough to stop the flow of foreign fighters and Sunni insurgent groups to
Iraq. In February 2007 Iraq's spokesman Ali Dabbagh asserted that “Fifty per
cent of murders and bombings are by extremists coming from Syria… and we
have evidence to prove it'' (BBC, 4 February, 2007). By the same token in
March 2007 the State Department coordinator David Satterfield stated that ''at
least 80 per cent of suicide bombers in Iraq had transited through Syria''
(Reuters, 27 March 2007). The issue of insurgent and terrorist groups that came
from Syria had been a major problem between Baghdad and Damascus on the
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one hand, and the U.S. and the Syrian regime on the other hand. According to
Iraqi bank records, before the invasion, the former Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein had withdrawn and transferred over a billion U.S. dollars to Syria in
cash. This has also been addressed by some press reports in 2006, claiming
that Saddam's half-brother Sabawi Ibrahim, the former head of Iraq's General
Security, had been a chief financial and facilitator of the Iraqi insurgency in
Syria (Levitt, 2009).
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was a belief that Saddam's
regime had planned for the post-war insurgency against the U.S. troops in Iraq
(Allawi, 2007, p. 173). This seems to be rather unlikely, because even in the last
weeks of the regime, Saddam did not believe that the U.S. was seriously
intending to invade and overthrow the Ba’ath regime. It is, therefore, implausible
to involve Ba'ath party strategists for any role in the post-conflict insurgency in
Iraq. As Ali Allawi (2007, pp. 173,174) has pointed out, Saddam was expecting
an internal uprising and not a military invasion of Iraq.
All these insights should not lead to the assumption that Syria alone was
responsible for the entire insurgency after 2003. Syria can be blamed for not
doing enough to prevent the flow of insurgents from Syria to Iraq78. However,
the engagement of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries is not to be
underestimated, even regarding the insurgents who crossed into Iraq from
Syria. In June 2015 WikiLeaks published more than half a million cables, some
of these confirming that a number of Iraqi politicians and tribal leaders from
Nineveh and Anbar had been encouraged politically and financially by Saudi
Arabia to join the insurgents against the Shi'a dominated government in Iraq
78 In an interview in late 2003 with one of those who worked to transport young Arab men from
Syria into Iraq, he describes how they did not face arrest from the Syrian regime. The smuggler
said, ''Jihad was being allowed into the open, Syrian security officials and presidential advisers
attended festivals, one of which was called the People of Sham Will Now Defeat the Jews and
Kill Them All." He said ''money poured in from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries''. When
asked why they were not arrested, he replied ''it was because we were not saying anything
against the government, that we were focusing on the common enemy, America and Israel, that
beards and epaulets were in one trench together." However, it is important to note that Syria's
role in supporting Iraq's insurgency has fluctuated over time, especially in late 2004 after a
number of official accusations by both the Iraq government and the Bush administration; Syria's
involvement with insurgents was rolled back. (Abdul-Ahad 8 June 2005).
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(WikiLeaks, 19 June 2015b). According to the Sinjar documents, foreign fighters
of Saudi origin have made more of a financial contribution to al‐Qaeda in Iraq
than have any other nationalities. The document showed that the highest
number of foreign fighters to fight with al‐Qaeda in Iraq between August 2006
and August 2007 were Saudis, followed by Libyans (Fishman, 2008, p.5).
Among the total 576 fighters whose nationalities were mentioned in the Sinjar
records, 41 per cent (237) were Saudis, and 19.2 per cent (111) were Libyan.
However, the number of foreign fighters in Iraq in the Sinjar records has
contradicted an earlier study of Obaid and Cordesman (2005, p.5). Obaid's
report, based on intelligence service reports of Saudi and other intelligence
agencies, particularly on the questioning of hundreds of captured militants,
includes a comprehensive analysis of militant activities in addition to personal
interviews with Saudi and non-Saudi fighters in Iraq. The report claims that the
largest number of foreign fighters in Iraq were not Saudis, but Algerians, at 20
per cent, followed by Syrians (18 percent) and Yemenis (17 percent). The
percentage of Saudi foreign fighters in Iraq is 12 percent, or approximately 350
fighters. The Obaid and Cordesman report may not be entirely neutral,
however, because of Obaid's official link with the Saudi state, aside from the
report's dependency on Saudi intelligence data and its difference from the
Sinjar reports. However, both reports confirm that Saudi foreign fighters had
been actively engaged in the ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq.
Syria's involvement in post-2003 Iraq has reflected negatively on the
process of state-building, given Syria's role as a transit point for radical fighters
and arms to Iraq. Based on the Sinjar records, the U.S. military officials stated
that approximately 90 percent of the fighters that arrived in Iraq between 2006
and 2007 travelled via Syria, and 90 percent of these were “suicide bombers”
(DeYoung, 2008). At the end of 2004, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
officials concluded that Syria played a major role in directing the insurgency in
Iraq (Mauro, 2009). The Assad regime has used its alignment with and
tolerance for Iraqi insurgent groups, such as Islamic nationalists, former
Ba'athists, and al-Qaeda-linked groups, as a diplomatic tool against the U.S. in
Iraq. On this basis, the Iraqi Study Group Report in 2006 (Baker III, and
Hamilton, 2006, p. xv) advised the U.S. to engage with Syria in Iraq more
constructively. In May 2007, the Bush administration took some significant steps
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in this direction through a bilateral meeting with Syria (Costel, 2008, p.101). To
a degree, it can be argued that after 2006 the relationship between Syria and
Iraq reached a new stage. Iraqi former Prime Minister al-Maliki visited Syria
twice, and the Syrian Prime Minister also visited Iraq reciprocally in 2009.
Discussed on the visit was the prevention of militants from operating from either
country, which led to a restoration of diplomatic relations between both sides. In
early 2009, the countries exchanged ambassadors for the first time since 1979.
However, until 2011 there were numerous fluctuations in the bilateral relations,
and a normal and stable relationship could not emerge between the sides. In
the post-2011 period, the new sectarian polarisation in the region brought about
a new era in relations between both regimes, which cannot be evaluated by the
standards of the preceding years.
It can be seen from the above analysis that, unlike Iran, Syria did not
benefit from its strong relationships with the former Iraqi opposition groups that
had been in Syria during Saddam’s years and their opposition life. Kurdish
leaders, such as Jalal Talabani who later became a President of Iraq for two
terms, and most Shi'a leaders, including Nuri al-Maliki who became an
important figure in the political process following the invasion, and Ibrahim al-
Jafari who was interim Prime Minster for the Iraqi government in 2004, had all
been in exile in Syria. However, Assad made little effort to exploit this factor and
boost Syria's influence on the political process in post-2003 Iraq. This might be
as Ayman Abdel Nour has argued, because Syria's relationship with Iraqi
opposition groups in Syria was more about power and partnership. They were
not more than a tool of pressure against Saddam's regime, and their contacts
were only with the intelligence and not with the foreign ministry79 (cited in
Scheller, 2013, pp. 178-179). Unlike Iran, Syria's involvement was mostly
through Sunni insurgent groups and former Ba'athists, which both the Shi'a and
the Kurds considered as serious threats to the state-building process.
Syria's disengagement with both the Shi'as and the Kurds can be
attributed to several factors. First, both Shi'a and Kurds were main pillars of the
new Iraq state, and their leaders were working closely with the U.S.. Second,
79 A Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid al-Muallem, acknowledged on al-Arabiyya TV that ''in the
Syrian intelligence there was a branch for Palestine, a branch for Lebanon, and a branch for
Iraq” (cited in Scheller, 2013, pp. 178-179).
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Syria's rapprochement with Iraqi Shi'a could have been a very risky move to
make for the Syrian regime, which rules a Sunni majority that is deeply
connected with the Iraqi Sunni across the border. Third, Assad's regime had
already been accused as a Shia-Alawi regime by Syrian opposition groups;
therefore, Assad has been very cautious of any spill-over of ethnic and
sectarian tensions from Iraq’s conflict. Fourth, Syria's involvement in Iraq prior
to 2011 was based on Syria's nationalist ideology as a tool for the
destabilisation of vulnerable states in the region.
On this basis, it may be inferred that Syria's engagement with the Sunni
insurgent groups and other foreign fighters has been a challenge for the state-
building process in post-2003 Iraq because of two main reasons. First, like
Saudi Arabia's engagement with Iraqi Sunnis, the Syrian engagement with
Sunni Arabs in Iraq contributed to the Sunni alienation from the new political
process in post-2003 Iraq. Sunni opposition to the new political process has
been a factor for the Shi'a and Kurdish domination of the political, constitutional,
and economic institutions after 2003. For example, the Sunni boycott of the
2005 parliamentary election affected Sunni integration to the new political
system of the Iraqi state. This has pushed the Sunnis to look for regional
support rather than seeking for internal solutions within the Shi'a-dominated
government in post-2003 Iraq. Second, the Syrian strategy for managing the
chaos in post-2003 Iraq challenged U.S. efforts to build a new political body for
the Iraqi state. The Iraqi and U.S officials' accusation to Syria is a strong
indication in this regard.
5.1.2. The Kurdish factor
The invasion of Iraq has raised two main issues in the regional arena, the
Kurdish question and the rise of the Shi'a. However, Syria, unlike Iran and
Turkey, could not benefit from either factor. This can be ascribed to two main
reasons. First, following the US-led invasion, Syria regarded itself as the historic
guardian of Arab nationalism. Therefore, supporting any Shi'a groups in Iraq
would refute this traditional claim of the Assad regime. Second, notwithstanding
the point just made, Syria has a history of sponsorship of non-state actors in the
region. Because of their support for former Ba'athists and Sunni Iraqi insurgent
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groups, Syria lost its chance to make use of the Kurdish factor in Iraq.
Regardless of Jalal Talabani's special relationship with Hafiz Assad during his
exile from Saddam's regime, there were not to be any lucrative relations with
the Iraqi Kurds.
Syria proved incapable of utilising the Kurdish card in Iraq. However, the
equation was not one-sided, as Iraqi Kurds similarly failed in gaining Syria’s
support in their relations with Baghdad. The Iraqi Kurds’ aspiration to become
loyal American allies in post-2003 Iraq on one hand, and their distrust of Iraq's
neighbours, especially those which have Kurdish minorities, such as Iran, Syria
and Turkey, on the other, were responsible for this failure. Those have been the
main reasons behind Iraqi Kurds’ caution to approach to Syria since 2003. The
vulnerability of the Syrian state structure along ethnic and sectarian lines could
be another factor explaining why Syria did not use the Shi'a and Kurdish factors
regardless of their significant role in the post-2003 Iraq. Syria has the same
heterogeneous composition that Iraq suffered from particularly after 2003. This
means that internal factors have played a significant role in shaping Syrian
foreign policy towards Iraq after 2003. As Tejel  (2015, p.79) points out, Syria's
relations faced a severe blow following the fall of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq, due
to the Iraqi Kurds’ alignment with the U.S. which strengthened not only Syria's
concerns but those of most of Iraq's neighbours that have Kurdish minorities.
Until 2011, Damascus avoided Sunni-Shi'i sectarian solidarity or playing
on the sectarian mobilization in Iraq, because of the potential consequences for
the Syrian regime at home80. In addition, Syria has sought to maintain the
durability of its regional security complex, with Iraq on the one hand and the
nature of the Iraqi state-building process which has become part of the regional
security dynamics on the other hand (based on the thesis theory of RSC).
Furthermore, Masoud Barzani's domination of the KRG's main political pillars
after 2003 has been another factor which has made it difficult for Syria to
80 Alawis were not mobilized around sectarian identities in Syria in the 1950s; however as a
result of the regime's internal power struggle in the 1960s, the regime's sectarian solidarity has
been reactivated as a tool to access Hafez Assad's ''neo-patrimonial'' state. Although Alawis
became class-diffrensiated under Hafez's rule, the Islamic uprising in the 1980s pushed Assad's
regime to rely on Alawi assabiyya which actually damaged the Ba'ath's legitimacy amongst the
Sunni community in Syria. See Hinnebusch, 2015, p.124, Alawis and the Ba'ath party in Kerr
and Larkin, 2015, The Alawis of Syria: War, faith and politics in Levant.
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engage with the Iraqi Kurds. Barzani's alignment with Turkey since 2007 cannot
be underestimated in this regard.
Directly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria attempted to work with Turkey
and Iran to respond to the Kurdish challenge that stemmed from the new
Kurdish position in Iraq, and the possible influence of this on other countries in
the region (Shifrinson, 2006, p. 4). These efforts led to regional coordination in
the form of ministerial meetings between Iran, Turkey and Syria, in the sharing
of intelligence reports, and security sweeps of Kurdish parties to undermine
Kurdish military and political activities. However, the regional disagreement
between these states regarding regional issues and their engagements with
Kurdish parties has not produced any unified approach. Less than a week after
the signing of the Transitional Administration Law (TAL) in March 2004, the
example of what Iraqi Kurds had achieved in Iraq encouraged Syrian Kurds and
lead to an uprising in the north-eastern city of Qamishli against the Assad
regime (BBC, 17 March 2012). The Kurdish demonstrators toppled a statue of
the Hafez al-Assad which angered the regime and led to the arrest of several
thousand Syrian Kurds and the deaths of about 30 Kurdish demonstrators81.
The incident alarmed the Syrian regime, which realised that that any
independent Kurdistan or even the KRG could mobilise Syrian Kurds against
the regime. In January 2010 Barzani made clear in his discussion with
Brookings Institute that ''the official position of the KRG is that we are against
any inhuman conduct or behaviour with the Kurds, wherever they might be''
(The Brookings Institution, 27 January 2010). It can therefore be argued that
Syria from 2003 until 2011 was against any single sect-dominated government
and Kurdish separatist aspirations in Iraq. The importance of the Kurdish factor
for both Syria and Iraq became even deeper after the Syrian uprising of 2011.
81 In March 2004, during a chaotic soccer match between the Kurdish soccer team al-Jihad and
the Arab team al-Fatwa, a fight broke out between the fans of both teams. This was
exacerbated when some fans of the Arab guest team raised the picture of former Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, in order to anger the fans of the Kurdish team. The fight quickly escalated
from stone throwing into a political conflict, when the Kurdish fans raised the Flag of Kurdistan.
The reaction by the Syrian Army forces was very swift; they deployed thousands of troops
backed by tanks and helicopters. At least 30 Kurds were killed and thousands more fled to Iraqi
Kurdistan. For more, see, Tejel, J., 2009. Syria's Kurds: history, politics and society. Routledge,
p.115.
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It is important to note that Syrian involvement in Iraq has been mostly
through supporting insurgent groups. Despite the interference of a number of
regional neighbours in the Iraqi elections, particularly in the 2005 and 2010
parliamentary elections, because of Syria's fear that it may be the next target for
invasion after Iraq and its lack of relations with Iraq's political parties within the
political process in Iraq and the Shi'as, Sunnis or Kurds, Syria has not been an
influential player in this regard. However, other regional players, such as Iran,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, engaged in the Iraqi elections through providing
financial, political and media support for certain parties or election lists. A former
national security adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie (Wakalat Nun al-Khabaryya, 15-
07-2009) confirmed this involvement in 2009 and stated: "we have seen several
indications from regional and neighbouring countries which attempt to interfere
in the upcoming general elections in order to support certain Iraqi parties at the
expense of others". So as has been explained earlier, the Syrian engagement in
post-conflict Iraq has been driven by fear of the U.S. intentions in the region and
by Syria's internal challenges more than having a specific plan for the new
state-formation in post-war Iraq. However, in the wake of the outbreak of the
Syrian crisis in 2011, Syria's relations with Iraq took on a new dimension; the
next section will address this shift.
5.2. Reversing the impact: The ramifications of the Syrian crisis on
Iraq after 2011
The Syrian impact on Iraq after 2011 is an interesting case, not only for
understanding Syria's regional security complex status with Iraq, but also for
understanding how Syria became involved in both the state-building process
and ethno-religious conflict in post-war Iraq. It can be argued that the Syrian
conflict has affected Iraq on two main levels. First, it has intensified ethnic and
sectarian relations through the polarization of both intra-state and inter-state
sectarianisation in the region. To an extent, all three of Iraq's main groups,
Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd, expanded their conflict from Iraq to Syria and vice versa.
Second, Syria's war has led to the significant rise of Kurdish nationalism and the
KRG's role across the region.
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Iraq's regional policy towards Syria from 2003 until the Syrian crisis in
2011 is a good example for explaining the interaction of the conflicts in both
Syria and Iraq. The former Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki accused Syria several
times of hosting former Ba'athists and terrorist groups that were responsible for
Iraq's destabilisation. In August 2009, both countries withdrew their
ambassadors as a result of bombing attacks in Baghdad which claimed more
than 100 lives (Al Arabiya, 25 August 2009). However, two years later, when the
Syrian crisis started, Baghdad made a 180-degree turn in its policy towards
Damascus, from long ideological enmity, and Syria’s former position of
harbouring of Iraqi Ba'athists and being the insurgents’ gateway to undermine
the Shi'a and Kurd-dominated government in Baghdad, to Iraq discovering a
new sectarian amity with Assad's regime. Iraq's Shi'a militias openly involved
themselves in the Syrian crisis to support Assad's regime, even more actively
than Syria had engaged in Iraq after 2003 (see Kaufman and Shiloach, 2015;
Al-Tamimi, 2015; Hinnebusch, 2014; Smyth, 2015b).
In this context, the reversing impact from Syria's conflict into Iraq could be
seen through the spillover of ethno-sectarian conflict in the region. As al-Khoei
(2016, p.7) argues, both Iraqi groups of Shi'a and Sunni viewed the Syrian
conflict through their different lenses. Iraqi Shi'a saw the conflict as an extension
of their own conflict with Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups. For example, a Shi'a Iraqi
politician Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, who is also a commander of Saraya
Ansar al-Aqeeda (a militia which rose to prominence after the call for 'popular
mobilisation' in 2014), said that:
Syria for Iraq is a crucial security concern. Syria provides Iraq with
access to the Mediterranean Sea, which is of immense strategic concern
for us. For the Shia, Syria is also unique because it is a nexus between
Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, Turkey. We don’t just have to protect our home by
fighting on our own door step; it is in our interest to fight them away from
our home in Syria too (al-Khoei, 2016, p. 7).
On the other hand, the ramifications of the Syrian uprising have been
deeper on the Iraqi Sunnis. They viewed the Syrian crisis as an opportunity to
undermine al-Maliki and Shi'a power in Iraq. The tribes and mosques in Deir al-
Zour backed Sunni insurgent groups in Anbar. Similarly, Iraqi tribes provided
their Sunni cousins from the Syrian side with money, weapons and thousands
of fighters to support them (Hinnebusch, 2014, p. 22). When the Syrian uprising
began, thousands of Iraqis from the border city of al-Qaim demonstrated
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against the Iraqi government procedures which prevented them from hosting
their Syrian relatives if they wished to stay with them (Ruhayem, 2012). Iraqi
Sunnis view the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to overthrow the Shi'i-
dominated state in Baghdad. Former Iraqi intelligence officer Mohamed al-
Bajara confidently said that the rebel victory of the Syrian Sunnis would
strengthen Sunni power in Iraq. “When Iran loses Syria, that means they’ll lose
influence here... the new regime in Syria will be Sunni. So in these provinces,
our backs will be protected by a Sunni regime” (Hauslohner, 2013). Thus the
Syrian conflict provided a broader view for both Shi'a and Sunnis in Iraq which
exceeded the borders of Syria and Iraq into a regional conflict.
In 2011 Syria-Iraq relations entered a new phase: Assad's regime ceased
to be a threat to Iraq's national interests, as it had been viewed by Iraq prior to
2011. However, several months after the Syrian uprising started, Syria became
an extension of Iraq's internal and external security affairs in Iraq's strategic
calculations. From the first day of the outbreak of the demonstrations in the
Syrian city of Deraa, Baghdad has taken a cautious stance towards the ongoing
developments in Syria. That prompted one of the leaders of the Iraqi National
Alliance (Shi’a), Bayan Baqir Solagh, to state that ‘‘should the current Syrian
Revolution succeed, fighting will move to the doorsteps of Baghdad’’ (al-
Shaizmi, 2014). The main concern of Iraq (the Shi’a-dominated government)
was that the Syrian events would spill over Iraq's borders and ignite sectarian
and ethnic wars in the region; or, more precisely, that having a new Sunni-
dominated government in Syria would provide the Iraqi Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Mosul a chance to challenge the Iraqi Shi'a-dominated government
in Baghdad. Al-Maliki's statement in 2014 well explained the seriousness of this
issue when he said that:
The rise in terrorism in Iraq is rooted in the rise of regional
sectarianism and directly related to the developments in the Syrian crisis
and its repercussions on the Iraqi arena. We are very worried about the
Syrian arena transforming into a field that attracts extremists, terrorists and
sectarians from various parts of the world, gathering them in our
neighbourhood (al-Kadhimi, 2013).
It is important to know that the Syrian conflict pushed Baghdad to move
even closer to Tehran (Saouli, 2014, p.125). Despite the U.S. sanctions on Iran,
the Iraqi government was part of the Iranian assistance to Assad's regime after
2011. Although the U.S. warned Baghdad to prevent the transport of arms and
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close its airspace to Syria, Tehran used Baghdad as a corridor to transfer
weapons to Shi‘i militant groups in Syria. Baghdad provided fuel oil to Syria with
a 50 percent discount of the international market prices, which even the Iraqi
foreign ministry was not aware of (al-Khoei, 2016, p.8). Al-Maliki, who played a
significant role in the Sunni exclusion from political power, saw the conflict in
Syria as a regional proxy war managed and supported by Gulf countries to
spread Wahhabism in the region. He accused Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey
of planning to create a Sunni sectarian state in order to hasten the downfall of
the Iraqi government (Gordon, 2012).
The militarization of Iraq's sectarian conflict and political process was
another consequence of the Syrian crisis in Iraq. In late 2013, the number of
Iraqi Shi'a militia members that had gone to Syria was estimated at about 5000
(Levitt, 2014), most of whom were mobilised for the protection of the Shi'a holy
shrine of Sayyidah Zainab in southern Damascus. In particular, after the IS
occupation of Sunni majority territories has significantly threatened Iraqi Shi'a.
As a reaction, on 13 June 2014, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called all Iraqi able-
bodied men to join the Iraqi security services and defends Iraq from IS.
Like Iraqi Sunnis, the Iraqi Kurds found the Syrian uprising as an
opportunity to strengthen their position, namely their western flank. The Syrian
upheaval has had a significant impact on the rise of Kurdish nationalism across
the region. This can be seen in the PYD military support for the Iraqi Kurds
(KRG) when IS attacked Yazidi Kurds in Sinjar (Shingal). The war against IS
has increased Kurdish nationalism among all Kurds in neighbouring parts of the
region. Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Syria have fought alongside Iraqi Kurds in
Iraq (see Gunes and Lowe, 2016, p.10). at the end of October 2014, Ankara
agreed to let Iraqi Kurdish Peshmarga fighters from the KRG to cross the
Turkish border. There was a remarkable shift in Kurdish regional relations when
the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmarga supplied Syrian Kurds with heavy weapons and
Peshmarga military forces in their fight against IS in Kobane. After the IS attack
on Mosul in June 2014, Kurdish armed forces immediately took control of lands
vacated by the Iraqi Army, and they expanded the KRG's border by 40 percent
(Cordell and Wolff, 2016, p. 319). This has strengthened the KRG's power, as a
result of which the KRG president Barzani announced that they would not
180 | P a g e
negotiate the status of these territories with the Iraqi government and would
prepare for a referendum on the Kurdistan region's independence.
In comparison of the impact of Iraq after 2003 and Syria after 2011, two
conclusions can be drawn. If the Syrian involvement in Iraq after 2003 had a
less sectarian character, then Iraq's solidarity with Assad's regime after 2011
has been highly sectarian and at the same time cannot be separated from Iraq’s
security concerns. In several aspects, Syria after 2011 has been in a similar
situation to Iraq after 2003 (see Starr, 2012). This has been particularly notable
since Syria became a state highly penetrated by regional players on one hand,
and divided along ethnic and sectarian lines on the other. What can be
concluded from the complex case of Syria and Iraq is the changing roles of
enmity and amity between two long-rival regimes. This raises a debatable
question, as to whether the state-building process in a situation of a sub-
regional security complex (such as in the case of Syria and Iraq) can be part of
the ethnic and religious conflict among regional actors or not. That has
happened in Iraq, and may be possible in Syria. Or does state-building mean
shaping a new regional security order in the region? In the case of post-2003
Iraq, it could be argued that both cases have been part of the state-building
process.
As has been discussed throughout this chapter, the influence of the
international environment has been very important regarding Syria's
involvement in Iraq. The factor of the U.S. as a global power (or as an existing
power in the region) played a significant role in Syria’s engagement in Iraq,
whether from 2003 until the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, or after the Syrian conflict
from 2011 onwards. Although since the Syrian revolt began Syria’s role as an
penetrating power in the Iraq’s state-building process ceased, but Damascus
remained very relevant to Iraq even after 2011; in particular the spillover effects
of ethnic and sectarian conflict have converted Syria into a major threat to Iraq.
Obama's policy of avoiding interfering in Syria has made the conflict open for a
wide range of state and non-state actors. The IS attack on Iraq in June 2014
could have been one of the consequences. As Helfont (2015, 542) argued, the
US's new approach of “the importance of working closely with friends and allies’’
has created more strategic opportunities for the U.S.. However, this strategy
has not been effective in controlling the Syrian crisis and limiting its spillover
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into Iraq. This collaborative approach has borne no fruit; rather it has provided a
chance for other regional neighbours to become involved in the conflict and
added more fuel to the ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq.
The role of Russia also cannot be overlooked regarding Syria's effect on
Iraq after 2011. Moscow arrived on the Syrian scene through the Syrian conflict,
especially after Syria became internationally isolated. Russia protected Assad
against UN Security Council resolutions many times (Scheller, 2011, p.202). To
an extent, from 2011 onwards Russia has become associated with the so called
resistance block, alongside Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and even Iraq. The extension
of the Assad regime's life attracted both Iraqi Shi'a and Jihadist groups to join
the Syrian conflict. This has affected Iraq's security tremendously, especially in
June 2014 when IS destroyed the Iraq-Syria border and seized large territories
in Iraq, which will be discussed in the next section.
5.3. Islamic State82 as a reaction against state-building
One of the key issues that has been addressed in this chapter, in order to
understand Syria's engagement in Iraq, is Syria's long-standing experience of
flirting with non-state actors as a tool to destabilise weak regimes in the region
(see Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). Following the U.S.-led coalition
invasion of Iraq, both former Iraqi Ba'athists and Jihadist groups had been part
of the Syrian involvement in Iraq as a strategy to put pressure on the U.S. to
change their policy toward Syria. However, Syria's association with Iraqi Sunni
insurgent groups or the Syrian Sunni Ulama has not been the main factor of
82 In order to understand the roots of Islamic State or Daesh (also ISIS or ISIL), we have to turn
back to the beginnings of the emergence of the al-Qaeda-linked ideological groups which
emerged after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. One of the most active groups was a group who
worked for a period without any specific name under the leadership of a Jordanian named Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, then took the name of the Party of Monotheism and Jihad (Jama’at al-
Tawhid w’al-Jihad - JTWJ) which was made up mostly from foreign Jihadi fighters who wished
to fight against the U.S. occupation in Iraq (see, Abdul Hussein, 2015, p. 220; Ibrahim, 2015,
p.184). In September 2004 Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, Emir of al-Qaeda,
and then the name of the group finally changed to "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia” (Tanẓīm Qāʻidat
al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn), or al-Qaeda in Iraq (see Lister, 2015, p.37).
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Daesh's emergence in Syria and Iraq, as Lister points out (2015). The
emergence of Daesh can be said to have been part of a wider process which is
mainly rooted in two factors. First is the U.S. invasion of Iraq after 2003, and the
form of the state that the U.S. left behind. Especially relevant are the dissolution
of the Iraqi army and the “de-Ba'athification” decree, in addition to Maliki's
policies from 2006 to 2014, which have contributed to the Sunni mobilisation,
not only in Iraq but also in Syria. Second, as Gerges (2016) points out, the
Syrian uprising after 2011 offered a fertile ground to the Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis
against the Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq, and the Syrian regime. In
addition, the regional interference in Iraq and Syria accelerated the birth of
Daesh. That is to say, the regional dimension of ethno-sectarian conflict in the
region, which is also linked to the regional security complex dynamics in the
Persian Gulf (based on thesis theory of RSC) on one hand, and the permeability
of the Arab state system  on the other, have been main factors behind the rising
of Daesh.
The Syrian flirtation with Islamic movements can be traced back to the first
year of Bashar's power in 2000, in which he inherited this policy from his father
Hafez al-Assad. As Pierret (2013, p.193) points out, this was partly as a result
of Hafez's approach toward Islamic movements in the 1990s. This period
witnessed an Islamist boom, in terms of building mosques, establishing Islamic
schools, and the resurgence of Quranic studies. In addition, the flow of foreign
Islamic finance, especially from Wahhabi establishments in Saudi Arabia, which
took a very conservative reading of Islam, increased to religious institutions in
Syria (Pierret, 2013, p. 213).
It can be argued that Hafez's openness to the Islamist groups was similar
in many aspects to the actions of Saddam Hussein's regime in the mid-nineties,
under the name of al-Hamlah al-Imaniyah or the faith campaign83. These
83 The Faith Campaign was formally launched in June 1993 by Saddam and led by Saddam’s
deputy, Izzat al-Douri. Al-Douri also supervised the criminal economy that smuggled oil and
other commodities across Iraq’s borders, often through the tribes, to evade the sanctions
imposed on Iraq in the nineties. These campaigns led to a combination of Salafism and
Ba'athist ideology, and effectively led to the growth of the armed insurgent movements of
Ba’athi-Salafism. It can be argued that the Faith Campaign began cynically, as an attempt to
win for the Saddam regime some pillars of support to avoid a repetition of the 1991 Shi’a revolt
(see Baram, 2014; Orton, 2015).
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campaigns had a great influence on both regime and society in Iraq. In the
aftermath of the regime change in 2003, hundreds of former regime elements
took the lead in organising the insurgency, and later became the nucleus of
what is now called Daesh84. However, that does not mean, as Baram (8 April
2016) claims, that Saddam was responsible for the creation of Daesh, nor was
Syrian regime, as has been stated by Lister (2015). Both Saddam's faith
campaigns and Bashar's openness to the Islamist groups were part of
strengthening the regimes’ legitimacy at home. An example of the Assad
regime’s use of Islamic rhetoric is found in the words of Ahmad Hassoun, who
became Grand Mufti after the death of Ahmad Kuftaro in 2005. Hassoun said,
''Bashar al-Assad's election for a second term was comparable to a bai'a [oath
of allegiance] similar to that of the prophet'' (Lefevre, 2013, p.155).
On the other hand, we should not forget that part of Syria's alignment with
Sunni scholars and moderate Islamists was mostly to use them against
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists. For example, a
prominent Kurdish cleric, Said Ramadan al-Buti, who has consistently backed
the Ba'ath regime since the 1970s, accused the Muslim Brotherhood of having
acted ''in contradiction with the principles of Islam, and having brought fitna or
civil war to Syria'' (Lefèvre, 2013, p.155). More support to the Syrian regime has
come from Salah Kuftaro, son of the prominent former Grand Mufti Ahmad
Kuftaro, who stated in 2005 that ''our religious community in Syria is always
under surveillance by the government and I support that so no extremists sneak
in among us'' (Lefèvre, 2013, p 156).
It is evident that during 2004 and 2005 the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, which
later took the name of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 2006, was actively used by
Assad's regime against U.S. forces in Iraq (see Filiu, 2015, pp. 200-201). The
Iraqi and U.S. official accusation of the Syrian regime was an indication in that
regard. According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, during 2004 and 2005 the Syrian
84 According to some intelligence estimations, the number of former Ba'ath officers who joined
Daesh is between 100 and 160. Most of these officers occupy the middle and high-ranking
positions in IS. According to officials, most of those who joined were former intelligence officers
from Anbar province, and others were army officers from the city of Mosul, in addition to the
members of the security services belonging to Saddam Hussein's clan from around the city of
Tikrit (see Asharq Al-awsat, 18 Feb 2016).
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regime actively collaborated with Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq, including AQI
and other Sunni al-Qaeda-linked ideological groups. However, there has been
evidence that in early 2005 Syrian intelligence started arresting AQI-linked
figures in Damascus, Aleppo and Deir al-Zour, as a result of intense diplomatic
pressure that both Iraq and U.S. put on Syria to stop the terrorist groups (al-
Shishani, 2009; Lister, 2015, p.38; Pierret, 2013, p.197)85. The U.S deputy
secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage, visited Syria in 2005 and met with
Assad; he stated that, ''Syria has made real improvements in recent months on
border security, but we all need to do more, particularly on the question of
foreign regime elements participating in activities in Iraq, going back and forth
from Syria'' (Lister, 2015, p. 38). The Iraqi former Ba'athists and officers have
played a great role in smoothing the connections between the AQI nexus and
Syrian Ba'athists. The pragmatic collaboration between al-Qaeda in Iraq and
former Iraqi Ba'athists was made on an operational level inside Iraq and on a
command level in Syria (Lister, 2015, p. 37; Filui, 2015, p. 200-201).
In October 2006, Muharib al-Juburi announced a state which was known
by two names: the Islamic state of Iraq (Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamyya), and ''the
Islamic state in Iraq'' (al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq) (see Tejel, 2015, p.17).
However, the announcement of that state drew little attention on the both official
and popular level in Iraq. A statement of ISI's spokesman Al-Juburi in 2006 is a
strong indication that the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 was the reaction to the
state-building that the U.S. conducted (or at least accepted), which in fact
mostly involved the Shi'a and (to a lesser extent) the Kurds, when he described
the new-born ISI as a Sunni zone:
After the Kurds have taken possession of a state in the north, and the
Shi‘a have been established in a federal state in the middle and south…it has
become necessary for the honourable and free Sunnis among the mujahidin
and engaged scholars and notables to give something [comparable] to their
brothers and their sons…especially in light of the farcical drama known as
85 An active contributor of the jihadi website al-Faloja.com, Abu Fadil al-Madi, posted an article
warning Salafist and Jihadist groups to reconsider their strategy toward Syrian regime. He
claimed that there was a kind of unannounced agreement between Syrian regime and Jihadists
to ''stop mutual hostility'' against each other. However the regime breached the agreement and
launched a number of campaigns against all the Sunni Jihadist groups in 2005 (al-Shishani,
2009). The aftermath of the al-Madi statement can be seen as evidence for the influence of
diplomatic pressures on Syria, and their attitude toward working with U.S..
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‘Maliki’s state,’ in which, sadly, traitorous Sunnis have played roles. (Bunzel,
2015, p. 18)
There have been many indications that the AQI (previously Jama’at al-
Tawhid w’al-Jihad, JTWJ) was not just an anti-American organisation, but also
rejected the whole political process and the new Iraqi government that was
established after 2003; meanwhile, anyone who was working with or
participating in the new political process was regarded as a traitor and an
apostate. The anti-Shi'a perspective of the organisation became public when
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in September 2005 declared ''all-out war'' against Iraqi
Shi'a, claiming that they were collaborators with the occupation. Zarqawi went
further by asking Iraqi Sunnis to fight against the Shi'a, which he described as
‘’al-rawafid’’ (the refusers) (Abd al-Hussein, 2015, p. 222). His deep hatred
towards the Shi’a can be clearly seen in his letter to Osama bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri:
…the Shi`a, have declared a secret war against the people of Islam. They
are the proximate, dangerous enemy of the Sunnis, even if the Americans are
also an archenemy. The danger from the Shi`a, however, is greater and their
damage is worse and more destructive to the [Islamic] nation than the
Americans, on whom you find a quasi-consensus about killing them as an
assailing enemy (U.S. Department of State, 2004).
Al-Juburi's statement can be taken evidence for the Sunnis' position on al-
Qaeda's strategy in Iraq; without Sunni support, the Jihadist success in Iraq
would have been difficult. That can be clearly seen in both Bin Laden’s and
Zawahiri's points of view towards AQI strategy in Iraq. Although both Bin Laden
and Zawahiri were supporters of the establishment of the caliphate in Iraq, Bin
Laden advised Zarqawi not to attempt to establish it without first gaining support
from the Sunni masses (McCants, 2015, p. 12). This was because both AQI's
immediate goal of driving out the U.S. troops, and the longer-term ambition of
establishing an Islamic emirate, required support from the Sunni masses and
tribal leaders. However, the United States shut the door on the attempts of the
AQI (or ISI) to engage deeply with the Sunni community and tribal leaders, by
establishing the Sahawat (Awakening) militias of the Sunni tribes, and turning
them against al-Qaeda. This strategy divided the Sunni insurgency, and isolated
ISI and al-Qaida-linked ideological groups.
So it can be argued that from 2006 -2012 the notion of establishing an
Islamic caliphate or Islamic state has been supported by a number of al-Qaeda
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branches in Iraq. Both Zarqawi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri (who took leadership of
AQI after the killing of Zarqawi by U.S. forces in June 2006) actively attempted
to establish a caliphate, but all their efforts failed until 28 June 2014 when an
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) proclaimed its caliphate86. Despite the
fact that ISIS was an extension of ISI, the movement was born out of the newly
regional dimension of the sectarian conflict, as an extension from the Sunni
territories in Iraq to the Sunni territories on the Syrian side. This can be taken as
evidence for the sensitivity to the spill-over conflict among Iraq's neighbours,
especially those countries which are linked with Iraq through regional security
complex dynamics (in accordance with the thesis theory).
On this basis, it may be inferred that what is now called Daesh can be
seen as a product of the sectarian-based state-building that U.S. fashioned in
Iraq following their occupation in 2003 on one hand, and the regional
dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq on the other. What
makes this argument viable is the involvement of the same neighbours that
have been engaged in the process of state building in Iraq following the U.S
invasion. The same actors (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and including
Iraq) again have been the major players, whether they are threatened by Daesh
or took advantage of Daesh as a threat to the regional security dynamics. That
is to say, the state-building process in Iraq has reshaped the dynamics of the
regional security complex and regional balances of power, which led to Iraq's
neighbours' involvement in Iraq and also to the rise of ISIS.
There is an important factor that has not given enough attention regarding
Syria's openness to its Sunni community and Syrian Salafists after 2003. The
Iraqi Sunni insurgency against the U.S-led coalition after 2003 was effectively
influenced by the Sunni community and Sunni clerics in Syria. The Iraqi
86 In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio statement in which he proclaimed that
both Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq were merging under the name of "Islamic
State of Iraq and Al-Sham". He stated that the Nusra Front was built up and supported
financially by the ISI. However, soon after al-Baghdadi’s statement, Nusra's leader al-Julani
issued a statement which rejected Baghdadi's claim. Al-Qaeda's emir al-Zawahiri tried many
times to arbitrate between them, but Baghdadi rebuffed Zawahiri's decisions. This disagreement
between al-Qaeda and ISIS led to the point at which in February 2014 al-Qaeda officially issued
a statement dissociating itself from ISIS's actions. For more details in this regard, see McCants,
2015, 93; Filiu, 2015, p. 204-205; Bunzel, 2015, p.29.
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Committee of Ulama after 2003 had attracted the Syrian Ulama. Harith al-Dhari,
leader of the Iraqi Committee of Ulama, was invited several times by Syrian
Ulama to travel to Syria (Pierret, 2013, p. 200). Furthermore, the regime’s
authorisation of Aleppo's Ulama in January 2006 to establish the League of
Ulama of Bilad al-Sham was a first step toward the rising of the Sunni
community regarding political issues in the region. To an extent, from spring
2007, a number of influential Sunni Ulamas, such as al-Husseini, al-Buti and
Salah Kuftaro, publicly criticised Iran for spreading Shi'ism (tashayyu') in Syria
(WikiLeaks, 2007).
Arguably, it is hard to understand the rise of Daesh without understanding
the transformation of Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria. The Arab uprising
has opened two main doors for Daesh, which later played a major role in the
rising of Daesh. One came in Iraq, through the oppression by Maliki's
government of the Sunni opposition in Sunni governorates. To an extent, for
many Sunni Arabs, the only realistic way to have their demands met was to
resort to violent conflict against the Shi'a-dominated government (Cockborn,
2014, p.69). The suppression of Iraqi Sunnis pushed them to prefer anyone who
could protect them from Maliki’s government. Second, the Syrian conflict has
provided Daesh with both manpower and money, to rapidly become a powerful
military organisation and acquiring bases, such as the oil reservations in Deir al-
Zur and Hassaka, which in fact proved to be further recruiting bases among
Syrian Sunni Arabs (see Stansfield, 2014). The interaction between these two
events paved the way for Daesh to take over Mosul in June 2014, and
announce its state of the caliphate.
The fall of Mosul in Jun 2014 has raised two main questions regarding
state building enterprise in Iraq. First is regarding how successful the state-
building process that U.S has conducted after 2003 was. The second one
demonstrates that both Sunni Arabs and Kurds so far have not integrated into
the state structure that has been built in post-2003 Iraq. Unlike the al-Qaeda
organisation, which had little interest in controlling territories, Daesh has
attempted to fill the vacuum that has been created in both Iraq and Syria, and
build a proper state in the territories it controls. A leaked 24-page document,
obtained by the Guardian (Malik, 2015) shows how Daesh was building the
rudiments of the state through establishing governmental foundations such as a
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treasury, economic program, education system and military plan, as well as
centralised control over oil and gas, in addition to other aspects of the state
management. As Walt (2015) points out, Daesh is rejecting the current state-
based international system. With Daesh's caliphate, al-Baghdadi has made
clear that one of Daesh's objectives is to remove the old borders and destroy
the Sykes-Picot map of nation states in the Middle East (Trofimov, 2015).
Indeed, Daesh's fighters have destroyed a number of border checkpoints
between Syria and Iraq. As Francis Ricciardone, a former U.S. ambassador to
Turkey, said: "What we are witnessing is the demise of the post-Ottoman order,
the demise of the legitimate states, ISIS is a piece of that, and it is filling in a
vacuum of the collapse of that order" (Christiansen and Aldajani, 2015).
One can say that cultural, social and religious geography has a great
importance in Daesh's ideology; even at the historical level, geography has a
great presence in the Salafi ideology. For example, the geography of
Afghanistan did not have any historical sacredness, and the country is
geographically and economically poor compared to the al-jazīra al-ʿarabiyya
(the Arabian Peninsula), which is rich and located in the heart of the Muslim
world. This is in addition to the geopolitical position of both Iraq and Syria as
trade centres not only for the Islamic world, but also for the whole world. All this
is to say is that Iraq has played an important role in the Islamic history,
especially with its legacy as a capital of the Abbasid Caliphate in 762 CE. Iraq
has not only been a territorial attraction for Daesh, but also for al-Qaeda; for
example of about 22 statements that were issued by both Osama bin Laden
and al-Zawahiri, Iraq's name was mentioned 17 times, even more than
Palestine (see Abdul Hussein, 2015, p.313).
However, despite the importance of Iraq as geopolitical ground for Daesh,
historically the Wahhabi ideology was not favoured among Iraqi Sunnis. Even in
the framework of political Islam, the Sunni interaction with Islamic parties has
generally been through movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Liberation Party, and not through any of the Salafist groups which did not have
any official existence in Iraq until the faith campaign in the mid-nineties after a
decision of the Ba'athist regime made in order to protect its regime from a
repetition of a possible Shi’a uprising, similar to that occurred in 1991 in the Shi'i
majority areas in the south of Iraq (see Ibrahim, 2015, p.111).
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It can be argued that Saudi influence has played an active role regarding
the rising of Salafi movements in the region. To an extent, Saudi Arabia has
been an ideological ground for Daesh, due to a political marriage between
Saudi rulers and Wahhabi clerics. This can be noticed in the number of Saudi
foreign fighters in Syria, which, according to the Soufan group (Barrett, 2014,
p.13) is estimated at three thousand, the second highest foreign national group
that has travelled to Syria, after the Tunisians. However, that does not mean
that Riyadh has been the cause of the rising of Daesh in the region. At present,
there is no decisive evidence to prove that the Saudi government has financially
supported Daesh. No one can deny that Daesh has received financial support
from Gulf countries, mostly through private donations (BBC, 19 December
2015). Some social media fundraising groups highlighted the challenges of
sending money to Syria or Iraq from Saudi Arabia, due to Riyadh's highly
monitored financial sector, which is why they advised the donors to send their
money to Kuwait (Boghardt, 2014)87. Moreover, the House of Saud is not loved
by Daesh. Daesh may be a greater security threats to the Kingdom than to any
other countries in the region. The concept of the caliphate in itself means the
cancellation of the Saudi Kingdom. It is true that Riyadh might be taking political
advantages from Daesh, and that Daesh may feature many Saudi Arabians in
its ranks, but that is mostly due to the cultural commonality and sectarian
solidarity.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the Syrian conflict is that the rising
of Islamic State has had a great influence on the state-building process in Iraq.
Meanwhile, the spillover influence of the state-building process in Iraq on the
Syrian conflict after 2011 also cannot be ignored. Both events have been highly
interconnected through regional security complex dynamics among Iraq and its
neighbours on the one hand, and regional dimensions of ethno-sectarian
conflict on the other. On this basis, it can be concluded that Iraq's neighbours'
engagement in the state-building process in Iraq has contributed to the rising of
such terrorist groups as Daesh.
87 The cable revealed by WikiLeaks in 2009 explained that the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton had complained about Saudi donors as the most significant contributor to the funding of
Sunni terrorist groups around the world (Cockburn, 2014, p.57).
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Conclusion: State-building versus regime survival5.4.
Syria's involvement in post-2003 Iraq can be understood through Syria’s
long practice of using non-state groups to destabilise moderate regimes and
vulnerable states. This policy has been practised by the Syrian regime toward
Palestine through Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Lebanon through Hezbollah,
Turkey through the PKK and finally Iraq through Sunni insurgent groups and
foreign fighters. Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Iraq became part of the
penetrated regional system, surrounded by a number of middle powers,
including Syria, of which it has been said that its ''foreign policy behaviour
derives from the insecure nature of the state system and, specifically, that
external threats precipitate power-balancing strategies'' (Ehteshami
&.Hinnebusch, 1997, p.3).
All the levels of local, regional and global of RSC have been operative in
shaping Syria's RSC in post-2003 Iraq. However, the main driver of Damascus's
engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq has been rooted
particularly in the threat of regime change by the U.S., the domestic legitimacy
of the regime and the threats from Syria's ethnic and sectarian links with Iraq.
The antagonistic policy of the Bush administration toward Syria, which the
Assad regime was concerned, could mean that Damascus could become the
next target for American military action, was the main factor that shaped Syria's
policy over the state-building process in the new Iraq.
With these points in mind, it can be said that, in contrast to a number of
studies, Syria's interference in state-building and the ethno-sectarian conflict in
post-2003 Iraq until 2011 had less to do with sectarianism, especially regarding
Syria’s support for Iraqi Sunnis. However, Syria's engagement cannot be
separated from ethnic calculations regarding Iraqi Kurds and their ethnic links
with Syrian Kurds. At the same time, Damascus did not cultivate close relations
with key Iraqi political players of both Shi'a and Kurdish sectors in post-2003
Iraq. Syria failed to build any institutional bases among Iraq's factions. The main
goal of Syrian engagement in post-2003 Iraq was to curb the American plan in
Iraq in a way which would deter the U.S. from targeting the Syrian Ba'ath
regime. Although Damascus left a very negative impact on the state-building
process in Iraq, especially with its support and facilitation for Ba'athists and
Sunni insurgent groups, Syria lacked a plan to build any bases to exert
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influence in Iraq, or to build long term relations with Iraq's official institutions, in
the way that both Iran and Turkey have done with Iraq after 2003. Syria
preferred to be in an alignment or position of sponsorship with Iraq's Sunni
insurgent groups and former Ba’athists, to challenge the U.S.-led coalition
forces in Iraq, whilst strengthening its regional power position in the
international state system (Waltz, 1979, p.166). This stance from Syria could be
attributed to the reason that Syria did not want to choose its allies on an ethnic
and sectarian basis. Before 2011, Syria's internal and external dynamics of
regional security complex with Iraq shaped the Syrian engagement in Iraq's
process of state-building more than did regional dimensions of the ethnic and
sectarian, while after the Syrian crisis this equation has been reversed. What
now shaped the engagement of Syria's were the regional dimensions of the
ethno-sectarian conflict, mainly influenced by the Syrian conflict. This can be
seen as evidence of interaction between regional security complex dynamics
and the regional dimensions of the ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003.
Despite the long term Iran-Syria alliance in the region, Syria's strategy has
been different from the Iranian strategy towards the state-building process in
post-2003 Iraq. Until 2011 Tehran and Damascus backed opposite sides and
disagreed on what post-2003 Iraq should look like. Iran wanted a Shi'i
dominated government linked with Tehran, and to have an upper hand on Shi'a
militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade. Alternately, Syria
wanted a united centralised Iraq that could keep Iraq's main components of
Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd under the umbrella of the central government. The Assad
regime was fearful of the spillover of Iraq's inter-communal enmity to Syria, a
threat that has become a reality after the Syrian uprising of 2011.
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Chapter Six:
6. Iraq and Saudi Arabia: Between national harmony
and sectarian hatred
“The potential for disintegration of Iraq was real and that that would bring other countries
in the region into the conflict”. Saud al-Faysal, previous Saudi Arabia foreign minister (cited in
Nasr, 2006, p: 242).
Introduction
The role of Saudi Arabia has been one of the major issues regarding the
rebuilding the Iraqi state, for both the Iraqi government and the U.S. post-2003.
It would be hard to understand the process of state-building in Iraq and the
regional dimensions of ethno-sectarian conflict without reference to the Saudi
Arabian role, because of Saudi Arabia's regional, religious and demographic
positions in the Persian Gulf. I have argued in the previous chapter that the
Syrian engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq has been
rooted from both external and internal threats which have all stemmed from the
concern with regime survival. Further, Damascus did not make any effort to
build institutional bases among Iraq's main factions of Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd, as
has been the case with Iran and Turkey. The main questions that this chapter
seeks to answer are, how has Saudi Arabia been engaged in the rebuilding of
the Iraqi state after 2003? What are the main reasons that are driving Saudi
Arabia’s engagement in Iraq?
In order to cover the above mentioned question, this chapter has been
divided into two main sections. The first section will focus on the Saudi Arabian
strategy in post-2003 Iraq, which examines two aspects of the Saudi
engagement in Iraq. The first is examined through Riyadh's engagement in
post-2003 Iraq, to undermine the Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad.
Further, to see how rivalry, alliance, and balance of power shape the RSC
pattern among the main powers in the region, (see Buzan and Waever, 2003,
p.47), the second section addresses Saudi Arabia's efforts to restore a regional
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balance of power in the region. It is asked to what extent this is related with the
Saudi concern towards the potential disequilibrium of the regional security
system in the Persian Gulf that has become a danger after the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003. Also, in order to frame the whole theme of the regional dimensions
of the ethno-sectarian enmity among Iraq’s rival neighbours, the second section
analyses the ramifications of Saudi Arabia’s engagement in Iraq regarding Iran
and Syria.
Saudi Arabia’s strategy in Iraq after 2003: How Saudi Arabia6.1.
engaged in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq
It is difficult to understand Saudi Arabia’s strategy in post-Saddam Iraq
without first understanding the general security approach of the Saudi regime.
As Gause (2011, p. 170) argues, Riyadh's main regional policy is concerned
with maintaining the security of the regime against domestic and external
challenges, such as transitional ideological challenges to the domestic stability
and legitimacy of the regime on the one hand and external military threats on
the other.. The internal threats are related mainly to the domestic stability of the
Kingdom, which can be affected by the confessional enmity between Iraq's
Shi'a and Sunnis. This is due to the Saudis’ tribal and sectarian links with Iraqi
Arab Sunnis on the one hand, and the rise of the Shi'a religious identity of the
Iraqi Shi'a after 2003, which could mobilize domestic opposition to the regime
on the other. What has made this factor significant is the role played by Hanbali-
Wahhabi ulama within the Kingdom’s political system; as Ismail (2016, p. 2)
points out, ''the Saudi ulama enjoy more power as religious authorities than the
ulama of other Arab countries’’. Meanwhile, they have been a strong source of
directing sectarian tensions, whether inside Saudi Arabia or outside Saudi
Arabia88. That is to say, any development in the sectarian equilibrium in Iraq can
88 For more details about the political and religious role of Saudi ulama, see Mouline, N.,
2014. The clerics of Islam: Religious authority and political power in Saudi Arabia, Yale
University Press. Ismail, R., 2016. Saudi Clerics and Shi'a Islam, Oxford University Press; and
Goldberg, J., 1986. The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia: The formative years, 1902-1918 (No.
19). Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press.
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affect Saudi Arabia. This is especially after 2003, when sectarianism has
become a source of concern for both Riyadh's domestic and foreign policy in
the region.
The domestic security element has contributed to Saudi Arabia's
involvement in the state-building process in Iraq, from supporting Iraqi Sunni
Arabs and insurgent groups, to creating difficulties for the building of an Iraqi
Shi'a-dominated government in post-2003 Iraq. However, Riyadh has exploited
sectarianism to strengthen its domestic legitimacy and regional policy in order to
extend its power among Sunni allies, especially against Iran (Salloukh, 2017, p.
45) .The second security dimension for the Saudi kingdom has been related to
the restoration of a regional power balance in the Persian Gulf, which has been
imbalanced since the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, with the balance now in
favour of Saudi Arabia's traditional rival (Iran) in the Persian Gulf. It is, however,
important to note that Riyadh also uses its regional policy to maintain political
stability at home. This new reality has driven Saudi regional policy to engage in
a number of proxy wars against the Iranian leverage in both Iraq and across the
Middle East. In this context, most of Saudi Arabia's resources in Iraq have not
been dedicated to the state-building process, but instead have been focused on
thwarting the Shi'a-dominated government, countering Iranian hegemony, and
restoring a regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf.
6.1.1. Countering Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq
Since the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921, Iraq's political system, political
elite, and political development have always been a source of concern for Saudi
Arabia. From the monarchic Iraq to the republican Iraq, from Saddam's Iraq to
the post-Saddam Iraq, Iraq has been a troublesome neighbour for the Kingdom.
After the 2003 U.S.-led intervention of Iraq, these concerns reached a peak,
when for the first time in the history of the modern Iraqi state the Shi’a were in
control. From this perspective, the question that needs to be asked is what is
the reason behind Riyadh's concern? Further, what are the ramifications of the
Shi'a-led government in Iraq on Saudi Arabia's regional interests? The answer
to these questions can be found through understanding the role of the security
dimensions in Saudi Arabia's internal and external policies.
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It is true that sectarian policies in Saudi Arabia have been implemented
long before the Iraqi crisis, particularly after the Iranian Islamic revolution of
1979 (see Louer, 2008, p.166; Ibrahim, 2006, p.219). However, From Saudi
Arabia's point of view, Shi'a-dominated Iraq can generate domestic and regional
security challenges to Saudi Arabia. The domestic challenges can be seen in
political disorder, sectarian tension and mobilising terrorist groups in the region.
These concerns could challenge levels of the domestic political and security
situation in the Kingdom. After 2003, Saudi Jihadists saw Iraq as an important
place to wage Jihad, and worked regularly to mobilise young Muslims to travel
to Iraq (Hegghammer, 2010, p. 223). Saudi Arabia shares its longest border
with Iraq; most of this border is shared with the Shi'a Arabs of Iraq.89 Saudi
demographic and tribal ties with both Shi'a and Sunnis in Iraq may easily attract
Saudi tribes and Islamic extremists to join the sectarian tensions in Iraq,
especially in the form of experienced and trained fighters and al-Qaeda
elements in the Kingdom who can infiltrate into Iraq. This happened in eighties
with the Saudis who fought against Russia in Afghanistan with the Taliban and
al-Qaeda; they developed their fighting skills at this time, and some of them
returned to Saudi Arabia and worked with radical Jihadist cells aiming to
transform the political system in the Kingdom (see Hegghammer, 2010, p. 223;
McMillan, 2006, p.4). Iraq's sectarian conflict raised the opportunity of
challenging the domestic security position of Saudi Arabia, whether related to
the Saudi Sunni community or the Saudi Shi'a community.
The second challenge is that the Shi'a-run government in Iraq could
inspire Shi'a minorities in the Kingdom as well as the wider Shi'a communities in
the Gulf, which have mostly claimed persecution and discrimination at the
hands of Sunni-dominated regimes.90 For example, Saudi Shi'a welcomed the
89 In September 2014, the late King Abdullah announced the first phase of the Saudi border
security program related to the 600-mile barrier that stretches from Hafar al-Batin, near the
Kuwait-Iraq border, to the northeast town of Turaif close to Jordan. Saudi Arabia's project is a
part of a security plan in order to protect its 800km border with Iraq; also, 30,000 soldiers have
been sent to the Saudi-Iraq border after Iraqi soldiers withdrew from the area. (See Aljazeera,
2014, Saudi unveils 900km fence on Iraq border).
90 The number of Shi'as in Saudi Arabia is about two million, which according to some sources
means they comprise eleven percent of the population. They live in the oil-rich eastern part of
the Kingdom, mainly in the provinces of Qatif and al-Ahsa. It can be noted that the Saudi Shi'a
community have tried to strike a balance between their national loyalty and religious identity.
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fall of Saddam's regime and viewed the Shi'a-dominated government in post
2003 as the rise of the Shi'a identity in the region (see Blanchard, 2010, p.20).
In April 2003 the Saudi human rights activists Hamza al­Hasan said that the
revival of the Iraqi Shi'a would have a ''great psychological impact on Shi'as in
Saudi Arabia'' (The Affairs of the Saudi Shiite in Saudi Arabia, 2003). The
Saudis may see the Shi'a-centric government in Iraq as inspiring the rise of
Shi'ism in the Gulf communities, especially in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and
many political events have occurred after 2003 and 2011 which can be
assessed in this context (see Matthiesen, 2013, p. 21, Wehrey, 2014, pp. 109,
112).
Indeed, Saudi engagement in the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq
has been more complex than the Iranian and Turkish involvement. This may be
due to the Saudi approach to dealing with the regional and foreign affairs, which
according to Gause (2011, p.178) and Yaphe (2011, p. 125) is mostly based on
risk aversion and non-direct confrontation with regional neighbours, particularly
in Iraq. However, this view of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy might have been
reasonable until the Saudi-led coalition entered Yemen. After the Saudis
launched attacks on 26 March 2015 against al-Houthis in Yemen, it can be said
that the Saudi foreign policy has entered a new phase regarding dealing with its
rivals. On the other hand, the Sunni-Shi’a division has provided Riyadh with a
more involved role in the Arab world. This is not through classical military state-
to-state confrontation, but as Salloukh (2017, p.38) argued through proxy
domestic and transnational actors, such as Sunni groups in Iraq and other
fragile Arab states in the region. Therefore, to address how Riyadh became
involved in the post-2003 state-building process in Iraq, it is important to enquire
about what are the means that Saudi Arabia depended upon on to counter the
Shi'a-dominated government after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Iran has also been very cautious in playing the Shi'a minority card in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore,
the Saudi Shi'a have distanced themselves from the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. In 2007, Ayatollah Nasir Makarim al-Shirazi advised Saudi's Shi'as to avoid provoking
Sunnis. He said ''we are observing your conditions carefully and continuously because of the
exceptional situation you are living'' (Kamrava, 2011, p.77; Wehery, 2014 p.116; Pelham, 2008
pp.225, 226).
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Saudi engagement in post-2003 Iraq can be examined on two levels. The
first can be formulated as a non-state funded level or socio-religious level,
which has mainly been based on the religious establishment of Salafis and
Wahhabis, which has doctrinal control over Saudi society through its social,
political and religious power. The Saudi religious institution, especially after the
Shi'a revival in Iraq, has systematically worked on the mobilisation of the Sunni
community, whether inside Saudi Arabia or outside, to fight alongside their
Sunni brothers in Iraq, which means against the Shi'a-dominated government in
Baghdad. The religious establishment (the Wahhabi ulama), played an
influential role of mobilising young Muslims and collecting private donations for
foreign fighters to fight in Iraq. Thousands of foreign fighters, including many
Saudis, travelled to Iraq in order to undermine the Shi'a-dominated government
and Iranian influence (See Hegghammer, 2010, p. 223). The second level of the
Saudi engagement in post 2003 Iraq can be called a state level. Riyadh has
been very cautious regarding its intervention in both the political process and
ethno-sectarian strife in Iraq. This cautiousness has been attributed to the U.S.-
Saudi coordination, especially during the presence of the U.S. troops in Iraq
until 2011 (see Gause, 2011, p.181). However, Saudi official caution toward
engagement in Iraq does not mean that Riyadh has not been part of the
sectarian conflict in Iraq. It does mean that Saudi engagement in the state-
building process has been done indirectly and secretly. Despite Iraqi and U.S.
accusations over the Saudi involvement with Sunni insurgent groups and
foreign fighters in Iraq, until 2015 it was difficult to find decisive evidence to
prove that for the purpose of academic research. However, the WikiLeaks
publishing of more than half a million cables in June 2015, including Saudi top
secret documents sent from Saudi state institutions, has changed this.
A close analysis of the WikiLeaks documents that related to Iraq can
explain Saudi engagement in post-2003 Iraq through two consistent approaches
(WikiLeaks, 19 June, 2015b): first, through financial and political support for
Sunni insurgent groups, former Ba'athists and tribal leaders, and all those who
were in opposition to the central government; and second, the attempts of Saudi
official institutions to establish close links with Sunni and Kurdish political
figures who were opposed to the government of al-Maliki. On this basis, the
Saudi Foreign Ministry suggested a three-phase plan for connection and
cooperation with the Iraqi Sunni tribes and politicians. The Saudi Foreign
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Ministry proposed providing ''all possible support to the Sunni groups and
national leaders that firmly stand against Maliki's sectarian project'' (WikiLeaks,
19 June 2015c). It can be argued that these official documents can confirm the
Iraq and U.S. accusation against Saudi Arabia's interference in the state-
building process following the U.S.-led invasion.
However, Saudi Arabia's involvement in Iraq, especially from 2003 to
2011, still remains problematic, due to the ambiguity of their interference on one
hand, and the obscurity of their methods of involvement on the other hand. This
ambiguity of Saudi Arabia's policy toward post-2003 Iraq has led to some doubt
as to what form of state Riyadh would prefer in post-2003 Iraq. Another factor
that provides ambiguity to Saudi Arabia's involvement in Iraq derives from two
main reasons. First, as has been mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia's engagement
in post-2003 Iraq was conducted through Iraqi Arab Sunnis. In contrast to Iran
and Turkey, Saudi Arabia lacked the Shi'a and Kurdish links which made Iran
and Turkey to be important strategic partners of the new Iraq’s governments
from 2003 until the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Due to Sunnis’ lack of political
power inside the new governmental body and the Sunnis’ lack of an obvious
political agenda after 2003, Saudi Arabia's engagement in the state-building
process also remained unsystematic. Secondly, following the 2003-U.S.
intervention of Iraq, the Sunnis were isolated from the political process, and
have lacked power in both the political process and governmental institutions.
The Sunnis main sources of political power came via the Iraqi Army and Ba'ath
Party; however, both of these structures were disbanded in May 2003 by the
CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority).
Furthermore, as a result of the lack of a proper regional strategy on the
one hand, and a lack of success in building institutional bases in post-2003 Iraq
on the other, Riyadh's capacity in Iraq remained weaker than that of Iran and
Turkey. This may have been because, as Gause (2011, p.178) observes,
Riyadh's traditional tools for the achievement of its foreign policy goals were
mainly based on financial support on one hand and the Saudis’ leadership
position in the Islamic world on the other. Financial support has played a big
role in Saudi Arabia's regional strategy in supporting their allies in the region,
rather than resorting to direct confrontation on the ground. In the same way, the
Saudis backed Saddam Husain's regime financially by over $25 billion during
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the Iran-Iraq War (Gause III, 2011, p.178). However, the religious position of the
Saudi foreign policy had also played an important role in the Saudi involvement
in Iraq91. Saudi efforts have been focused on consolidating its leadership in a
Sunni regional order (Lynch, 2016). In December 2015 Riyadh led alliance of 34
Muslim majority countries as an “Islamic Coalition” against Huthis in Yeman or
what Riyadh called ''terrorism'' and has showed the Yemen war coalition as a
model for Arab collective action. The religious dimension in the Saudis’ rhetoric
on the ongoing sectarian tensions in Iraq provided Saudi Arabia with a
prominent leadership role of the Sunni Muslims across the Middle East. This
role has expanded even more after the Arab uprisings in 2011, as has been
seen in Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has been accused many times by both the U.S. authorities
and Iraqi officials of supporting Sunni radical groups in order to thwart the state-
building process that has been led by a pro-Iranian Shi'a government in post-
2003 Iraq. However, it is important to note that the Saudi Arabian role was
limited during the presence of the American troops in Iraq. This may be a result
of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia traditional alignment in the region.92 Nevertheless,
91 Religion has formed an active part of the Saudi foreign policy since the regime's coalition with
the religious establishment of Wahhabism, dating back to the founding of the state. This
coalition provides Saudi Arabia with internal and external legitimacy. This has been used
against the Kingdom’s enemies inside, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi Shi'a
community, and liberal voices. The religious institution which is characterised by Wahhabism
has also played a prominent role in external conflicts, through providing religious justification for
the Kingdom's behaviour against its rivals; this has been used against Iraq's new government by
the Saudi Ulama and Muftis through encouraging people to fight alongside Iraqi Sunnis against
what they called ''Shi'a threat'' in the region. For more details, see Lacroix, S., (2011).
Awakening Islam, Harvard University Press.
92 Despite the Saudi-U.S. alignment, Saudi Arabia has been accused by U.S. officials of not
being helpful in Iraq and the Levant. This has especially been true after the U.S. rapprochement
with Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program in 2015. The Saudis felt ignored by the U.S., to
the extent that the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in a Harvard University speech in October
2014 blamed the U.S.'s allies in the Middle East, saying “Our allies in the region were our
largest problem in Syria,” explaining that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were “so
determined to take down Assad,” that in a sense they started a “proxy Sunni-Shia war” by
pouring “hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of weapons” towards
anyone who would fight against Assad (Harvard Institute of Politics, 2 October 2014).
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according to media and intelligence reports (The Los Angeles Times, April 28,
2003), 85 percent of the 1200 foreign fighters who wished to travel to Iraq
during 2003-2005 and were arrested in Syria were Saudis (Nasr, 2006, p. 245).
However, there is no decisive evidence that these fighters were supported by
the Saudi Arabian government. The presence of the Saudis can most likely be
attributed to the non-state sponsored groups, which had received most of their
support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf state donors, not the states
themselves; they were outside the control of Saudi Arabia’s authorities. This is
in contrast to Iran’s engagement, which has been solely through government-
sponsored groups.
The above argument can be further justified when the serious procedures
instituted by the Saudis after 2004 to curb the activities of Islamist militants at
home are taken into account. From 2004 to 2006 the Saudi Interior Ministry
allocated a security budget estimated at $10 billion for personnel recruitment
and equipment as part of a counterterrorism plan (see Hegghammer, 2010, p.
227). The number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria has increased
dramatically after 2011. According to the UN Security Council report, this
number has reached up to 22,000 fighters from over 100 countries around the
world, of which the highest percentages are from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
Morocco (BBC, 2 April 2015; Abdul Husain, 2015, p. 416-421).
It can be argued that despite social and sectarian ties between Iraqi Sunni
tribes and Saudi Sunni tribes, Saudi Arabian Sunni clerics have been the
primary ideological inspiration for Saudi involvement in Iraq. There may be
evidence to suggest that the Salafist and Wahhabist clerics were the main
drivers behind encouraging people in Saudi Arabia to travel to Iraq and take
part in the Sunni insurgency against both through Shi'a dominated government
and U.S. interests in Iraq. Most Wahhabist clerics’ fatwas have showed Shi'ism
as a kind of heresy. As Michael Scott Doran (cited in Nasr, 2004, p. 19)
indicates, in the Wahhabi perspective the Shi'as are a “fifth column for the
enemies of true Islam…The danger of the [Shi‘a] heretics to the region… is not
less than the danger of the Jews and Christians’’. This anti-Shi’ism view from
Saudi Arabian Wahhabis is manifested in the twenty-six Saudi clerics’ fatwa on
November 5 2004 when the U.S. Army launched an attack on the Iraqi
insurgency in Fallujah (Jones, 2011, p. 113). This is mainly due to the
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Wahhabist religious scholars' control over the public discussion in the Kingdom
in return for their support for the legitimacy of the ruling elite93.
The Saudi clerics sent an open letter to all Sunni Muslims, and called on
Sunnis, wherever they were, to help their Sunni brothers in Iraq through
participating in the Jihad against the U.S. The letter states ''Jihad against the
occupation is mandatory for those who are able… our Muslim brothers must
stand by their brothers in Iraq by supporting them as much as possible.'' (Jones,
2011, p. 114). Meanwhile, the hatred against Shi'as took political, sectarian and
regional dimensions when thirty-eight Saudi clerics and Islamic preachers
gathered in Istanbul with Iraq’s prominent Sunni leaders in December 2006, as
an act of solidarity with Iraqi Sunnis. The meeting included Harith al-Dhari of the
Muslim Scholars Association and the Islamic Army of Iraq, and Adnan al-
Dulaimmi of the Iraqi Accord Front. The declaration was published on a number
of websites of Saudi ulama, including those of the progressive Shaykh Salman
al-‘Awdah and the Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawali. The clerics called on all Sunni
Muslims to unite against the Shi‘a in Iraq and to provide support for the Sunni
cause by all appropriate means (Ismail, 2016, p. 113).
The accusation that Saudi Arabia was supporting Sunni insurgent groups
in Iraq was taken as an official stance by U.S. officials. In July 2007, the U.S
ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, clearly remarked on CNN television
that ''Saudi Arabia and a number of the countries are not doing all they can to
help us in Iraq. At times some of them are not only not helping, but they are
doing things that is undermining the effort to make progress'' (USA TODAY,
29/7/2007).
93 The power of religious ideology in Saudi Arabia is not because of the high religiousity of
Saudi society, but because the religious realm offers significant opportunities for political
mobilisation. The Saudi state’s ideology provides political support for religious activities. This
has been protected by a rentier system that has supplied luxury for the unproductive religious
sector. The official Wahhabi scholars are very influential in the education sector and the
judiciary which both contribute to the shaping of Saudi foreign policy. The local organ of the
Higher Council of Ulema (HCU), headed by the Saudi grand mufti, often provides legitimacy to
political decisions through their fatwas (See Hegghammer, 2010, p.232; Cordesman, 2009,
p.20).
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Despite the U.S. and Iraqi officials’ accusation toward Saudi Arabia, one
may argue that Saudi Arabia's official institutions have not been involved in
sending money and weapons to insurgent groups in Iraq. This may have been
credible before the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, because of two reasons. Firstly,
after the 2003 invasion, Saudi Arabia expected the U.S. not to allow Iraq's new
government to be led by pro-Iranian Shi'as, due to both countries’ fear of Iranian
leverage in Iraq. Thus, throughout the American presence in Iraq, Saudi Arabia
monitored Iraq's political evolution cautiously, particularly the role of Shi'a and
Iranian interference in Iraq. They warned the U.S. officially about their concerns
with Iranian engagement in Iraq and the exclusion of Sunnis from the political
process. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal (20 September
2005), in an interview with Fareed Zakaria in September 2005, made clear that
''We fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was
driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without
reason.'' Secondly, Saudi Arabia seriously feared of acting as a direct counter to
the Iranian intervention during the American presence in Iraq.
For many, it would be hard to deny that Saudi funds were channelled to
the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. It is important to note, however, that Saudi Arabian
support for the Sunnis and other insurgents that have fought against the
American forces and the Iraqi government were mostly channelled through
private charitable funds, especially via Saudi religious clerics, which may have
been outside the control of the Saudi authorities. The Iraqi Study Group Report
and Associated Press (2006) found during some interviews with Saudi truck
drivers that money was coming from Saudi Arabia to Iraq to support the
insurgency against the U.S. and the Shi'a-led government. The money had
been collected in the name of Zakat for Islamic purposes and charity and came
from private individuals and was given to clerics. Some of the donors already
knew that the money was being spent in fighting against American coalition
forces in Iraq. The report (Iraq Study Group, 2006, p. 25) remarks that ''funding
for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states''. That does not mean that the Saudi Arabian authorities were
behind these processes. This was not because of their rejection of post-2003
Iraq, but because of their security concerns at home. Moreover, Gen. Mansour
al-Turki, a spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry in 2005, stated that "There
isn't any organised terror finance, and we will not permit any such unorganised
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acts" (The Associated Press, 2006). The Saudi official view does not, however,
negate the fact that Riyadh had been in contact with various Sunni insurgent
groups and political leaders to curtail the building of a Shi'a-dominated state in
Iraq after 2003 (see WikiLeaks, 19 June 2015b).
However, after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, Saudi
foreign policy has changed its tone, moving towards playing a more muscular
role in both Iraq and the region. In other words, U.S. policy has had a direct
observable impact on Saudi foreign policy, partly explainable by the close U.S.-
Saudi relationship and the U.S. allowing the Saudis a relatively free hand to act
(Heathlain, 2010, p. 155). This is noticeable in the statements of a previous
adviser to the Saudi government, Nawaf Obaid94 (2006), made in his article in
the Washington post in 2006. Obaid stated that after the U.S. pull-out from Iraq,
Saudi Arabia would revise its policy toward Iraq. According to his article, there
would be three options on the table from the Saudi side. He stated that:
Options now include providing Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Ba'athist
members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the
insurgency) with the same types of assistance -- funding, arms and logistical
support -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years. Another
possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the
Iranian-backed militias. Finally, Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding
of the militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the
price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it
would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with
today's high prices. (Obaid, 2006)
It could be argued that Saudi Arabia has resorted to all of Obaid’s options
to varying degrees. From providing political and financial support to Sunni
insurgent groups and involving Iraq's Sunni tribal leaders, to manipulating oil
prices in the world markets; all these options have been practised by Riyadh,
aiming to prevent a Shi'a-dominated state and alter the balance of power in Iraq
against Iranian dominance. In contrast to Iran, Saudi Arabia has been cautious
about dealing with radical militia groups. Saudi engagement has been mostly
with state institutions, such as Riyadh’s support of the Lebanese Armed Forces,
94 Nawaf Obaid served as Special Advisor for National Security Affairs to Prince Turki Al Faisal
from 2004 to 2007, and from 2011 to 2015 as the Special Counselor to Prince Mohammed bin
Nawaf, Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom. Saudi officials denied that Obaid's opinion
stated in his article represented Saudi Arabia's official policy toward Iraq and soon after
publishing that article, Obaid lost his job as an advisor for National Security Affairs.
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the Palestine Authority, Saudi support to the Kingdom of Bahrain and to Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt. However, in Iraq the case has been different, due to
Riyadh's lack of any political links with the Shi'a and Kurds as the two main
players in the rebuilding of the new Iraqi state after 200395.
The political character of Sultan Bandar, Saudi intelligence chief from July
2012 to 2014, also cannot be ignored in drawing Saudi Arabia’s policy toward
the state-building process in the new Iraq96. According to Iranian media reports,
he was the mastermind behind al-Qaeda activates in Iraq, funding terrorist
groups in Syria and backing Islamic extremists in Lebanon in order to
undermine Hezbollah (Henderson, 2010). Bandar had also been criticised
privately by the U.S. secretary of state John Kerry for displaying an aggressive
foreign policy toward regional issues, especially related to Iran and Syria (see
Cockburn, 2015, 104).
One can assume that Saudi Arabia has been always concerned about
instability in the Persian Gulf. However, it can be observed that the Saudis
regional policy has witnessed a dynamic alteration from a 'consensual' foreign
policy to a 'confrontational' foreign policy (Al Tamamy, 2012, p.148). This shift
can be seen in four successive cases that faced Saudi Arabia's foreign policy
after 2009. The first one was against the Houthis in 2009, in Yemen, and the
second was Saud's reaction to the Bahrain uprising in 2011. Third is shown in
the Saudi-led coalition that went into Yemen in March 2015, in addition to Saudi
95 Saudi relations with Iraqi Kurds have witnessed a new stage, especially after the rise of
tensions between KRG and al-Maliki government. In December 2015 the KRG’s President
Massoud Barzani visited Saudi Arabia and was warmly welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s King
Salman bin Abdulaziz. A week after Barzani’s visit, Riyadh announced a Muslim 'anti-terrorism'
coalition, which included almost all Muslim countries apart from Iran, Iraq and Syria, despite the
sharing of a common enemy which is the Islamic State; the new Saudi coalition will contribute to
the further regional rivalries with the Iranian Shia-led bloc.
96 Bandar bin Sultan was appointed as Director General of the Saudi Intelligence Agency from
July 2012 to 2014. He replaced Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, without any official reason for the
appointment being provided. His appointment took place amid growing tensions between
Sunnis and Shi'as in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.  Bandar's appointment was
considered as a move on the part of Saudi Arabia to display a more aggressive foreign policy
toward the regional challenges coming from Syria and Iran.
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Arabia’s anti-terrorism coalition in December 201597. All these cases are
indications of a growing willingness from Riyadh to engage in Arab issues, from
which Iraq cannot be excluded.
The Saudi Arabian engagement in the state-building process following the
2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq can be examined through the methods of state
sponsorship of terrorism. This has been enabled by the publication of the Saudi
WikiLeaks cables in 2015, which provide evidence for Riyadh's involvement with
Sunni insurgent groups and Sunni Arab tribes (see WikiLeaks, 2015a). There
are several types of state sponsorship of terrorist groups, depending on the
level of support that is on offer to terrorist groups (Byman, 2005, pp. 59-65).
There are passive supporters, which take a blind eye to terrorist activities, in
addition to the active supporter who supports terrorism socially, politically,
logistically, financially or militarily. Also, state sponsorship of terrorism can be in
secret, through involvement with the terrorist groups, which is very common. It
might be argued that, according to Byman's classification, Saudi Arabia can be
placed as both a passive and an explicit supporter of terrorism in Iraq.
An important factor that must be considered regarding the intercommunal
enmity in post-2003 Iraq is that the Sunni tribes sometimes prefer to ally
themselves with al-Qaeda and Ba'athist insurgency groups rather than
compromise with the Shi'a government in Baghdad. This could be attributed to
the extent of distrust between both Shi’as and Sunnis in post-2003 Iraq. This
has happened many times in the populated Sunni cites, such as Falluja, Anbar,
Saladin and Mosul98. Furthermore, due to the close tribal links between Iraqi
Sunnis and Saudi Sunnis, the Sunni community in Iraq after 2003 viewed
97 This shift of Saudi regional policy might be attributed into more than one reason. The rise of
the Shi'a identity in the region after the fall of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq alarmed Riyadh into
playing a more influential role in the region, especially against Tehran's interventionist policies in
the Arab world. Furthermore, the rise of Saudi Arabia's leadership role after 2011 has allowed
Riyadh more manoeuvring toward Arab and Muslim issues. This is especially so after the fall of
a number of Arab regimes, in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. Additionally the continuation of crises in
Yemen and Syria made it more difficult for the Saudis to continue to act as observers.
98 When Islamic State took over Mosul and other Sunni-populated provinces in Iraq in June
2014, a number of Sunni tribes allied themselves with Islamic State and fought against the Iraqi
Forces. The Sunni cooperation had been one of the main reasons for IS's quick spread in the
Sunni provinces of Anbar, Saladin and Mosul (Al-Quds Al-Arabi 11 Jun 2014).
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Riyadh as supporter of the Sunnis in Iraq. The resorting of some Sunni tribal
leaders and politicians to Saudi Arabia's support might be a strong indication in
that sense (WikiLeaks, 19 June 2015c). What makes it really hard to uncover
the extent of Saudi Arabia's financial and logistic support for insurgent and
political groups in Iraq is the Saudis’ dual policy towards the Jihadists and Sunni
extremists. The Saudis encourage Jihadists and extremist groups to fight
against the Shi'a-led government in Iraq and abroad, while suppressing them as
a threat against security issues at home (see Cockburn, 2015).
6.1.2. RSC formation through restoring a regional balance of
power
One of the essential patterns of RSC formation among the main powers
within the region is a balance of power (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, pp. 45, 47).
This formation derives from the interaction between balance of power and the
anarchic structure on the one hand, and the concerns of local geographical
proximity on the other. From this perspective, Saudi involvement in Iraq derives
from balancing against not only regional threats but also against domestic
threats that have arisen after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq (see Gause, 2010,
p.9). Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was a traditional regional balance
of power of sorts in the Persian Gulf sub-region, especially among the three
main regional players, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Iraq, despite being heavily
affected by the first Gulf War and a decade of international sanctions, was not
so weak as to remain a target for its neighbours. Iraq, prior to the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion, had been a protector of the eastern flank of the Arab world for a long
period of time, and a counterweight to the Iranian leverage in particular for the
Gulf countries. The expense of that role had not been without burden for the
Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia alone provided about $25 billion in financial aid to
Saddam's regime during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War (John & Harvey,
1989, p. 160).
The point that the following section will attempt to argue is that, despite the
ideological (Arab-Persian tensions and sectarian differences) and geopolitical
rivalry (the Arabian Gulf against Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq War) between
Riyadh and Tehran, the main concern for Saudi Arabia following the U.S.-led
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invasion of Iraq stems from the shifting of the balance of power in the Persian
region in favour of Iranian hegemony. Therefore, a significant part of Riyadh’s
engagement in the process of state-building in Iraq can be examined in this
context.
The most perceived threat for Riyadh according to most Saudi Arabian
officials is Iran has been that Iran has been the main security threat in the
Persian Gulf. For instance, a former intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, in
April 2014 told a security conference in Bahrain that the GCC must be prepared
for any possible consequences from Iran's nuclear talks with P5+1 group. He
stated that:
We, as a Gulf grouping, work to create a real balance of forces with it,
including in nuclear know-how, and to be ready for any possibility in relation to
the Iranian nuclear file. Any violation of this balance will allow the Iranian
leadership to exploit all holes to do harm to us.  (Reuters, Apr 23, 2014).
Additionally, Adel al-Jubeir99, the former foreign affairs advisor to Prince
Abdullah in November 2003, told a press conference in Washington, ''we are
concerned that the situation in Iraq unless we deal with it in a positive way could
erode and unravel''. Sectarian calculations have become a major tool that has
directly impacted the regional balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The countries have different strategies to deal with their rivals. Iran has claimed
that their competition in the Middle East has nothing to do with Shi'a-Sunni
tensions. Ali Fayad, head of the Consultative Centre for Strategic and
Documentation Studies, a Hizbullah think tank, claimed that:
At the heart of Iran's foreign policy are two key issues: the Palestinian
cause and confronting Washington's hegemonic schemes in the region. There
is nothing particularly Shia about the two issues. Indeed both have been
presented as the causes for the majority Sunni Arabs. In this sense Iran's
foreign policy is Sunni. One can say that the Islamic Republic has transcended
the sectarian issue in its foreign policy. (Abdel-Latif, 2007).
Despite that, both countries are well aware that sectarian tensions could
lead to a regional spill-over which would effect both countries. However, Saudi
Arabia has attempted to mobilize sectarian tensions abroad and show that
Iran’s policies are based on sectarian calculations. The Saudis may perceive
99 After the death of Saud Al-Faisal in Jun 2015 who held this post for 40 years, Adel al-Jubeir
was appointed in July 2015 as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia. Jubeir is the first
person to head the foreign ministry position from outside the country's royal family.
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that pushing Iran into the sectarian direction could lead to thwarting Iran's rise in
the Arab world, following the high point of Hezbollah's war with Israel in 2006,
and Iranian support for both the Iraqi Shi'a-led government and the Assad
regime in Syria, have strongly damaged Iran in the Arab world.
Following the downfall of the Ba'athist regime in 2003, Iraq no longer
remained a strategic balance against Iran, and rather became in ideological
alignment with Iran. After the Shi'a took power in Iraq, and built a Shi'a regime
friendly with Iran, Saudi concerns became more profound. This was due to the
House of Saudi being well aware that Iraq, throughout its history, had not been
an easy state for the Gulf countries to manage. The Persian Gulf has usually
been under Iran and Iraq's control. Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, have
never been a spearhead against Iran. However, Saudi Arabia has regularly
been an indirect part of the regional rivalry against Iran, mostly under the
leadership of Iraq, for example during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq’s being an ally of
the Iranian regime limits Saudi Arabia's capability to build any successful
regional security system in the Persian Gulf. The Shi'a led government in Iraq
has not only altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf, but also changed
the balance of power between Shi'a and Sunni in the Persian Gulf and across
the Middle East (see Nasr, 2004).
In order to maintain the new balance of power in the Persian region, Saudi
Arabia has worked on both financial and ideological levels (see Gause, 2011,
p.178). Both these tools have been exercised in post 2003-Iraq, the Saudis
supported political Sunni forces through financial aid, directly through political
support to the Sunni parties and indirectly through charitable financial aid from
Saudi citizens. This accusation has been officially reported by high-ranking Iraqi
politicians, such as former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, or other security
characters in the Iraqi government. It can be argued that Saudi Arabia came to
believe that it was impossible to win in Iraq. A close look at Riyadh’s regional
policy after 2011 reveals that since the Syrian crisis has begun, the Saudi focus
has been shifted from Iraq as a hard battleground to countering Iran in Syria as
an easier battlefield on which to defeat Iran. Riyadh has realised that it lacks the
means to achieve hegemony in Iraq's political arena, especially after Islamic
State took over of most of the Sunni-populated areas in 2014. Iran has
intensified its presence in Iraq politically and militarily. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shi'as
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have become a part of the Iranian axis. Despite the on-going rivalry between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia may lose its hope of claiming post-2003
Iraq as a member of the Arab world under Saudi Arabia's leadership.
Alongside the balance of power pattern, Saudi Arabia resorted to two
other RSC patterns of ''rivalry'' and ''alliance'' to counter new regional security
formation in the region (in accordance with thesis RSCT). Following the 2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saudi Arabia has engaged in a number of defensive
alliances, setting up a new security structure in the region. Riyadh's concerns
were serious enough in 2014 for it to suggest to the members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council to form a defence system, an Arab NATO, for a military
alliance among GCC countries and expanding to other Arab Kingdoms, such as
Morocco and Jordan (Stratfor report, May 2, 2014).100 After the Arab uprisings,
Riyadh has felt threatened by the rise of a new Shi’a revival in the region. That
concern has alarmed Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, especially at the
time of the negotiations between Iran and the U.S. over Iran's nuclear program.
Riyadh may be successful in turning Iranian engagement in post-2003 Iraq into
a phobia of the Shi’as in the region, especially among Gulf countries. This policy
has provided Saudi Arabia with a more muscular role among GCC countries
and allowed it to form alliances with other rivals of Iran in the region.
Another approach that Saudi Arabia has adopted to restore a balance of
power in its interests was an aggressive oil policy against Iran, by decreasing
the price of oil. This policy has let the Kingdom expand its oil production and
stabilise the oil price in the world markets. On the other hand, it has harmed the
Iranian oil sector by $1 billion per month, since both Iran and Russia have
depended on the international price on being above $100 a barrel. In 2015 the
international oil price fell to below $50 a barrel (BBC, Business report, 19
January 2015). The Saudi strategy of using oil as a political weapon is aimed
directly at Iran, and might have more than one purpose. In the long term, it may
100 It can be said that a military coalition among Arab Sunni countries has increasingly become
realistic after the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in March 2015, when the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan Egypt, Morocco and Sudan participated in a military attack
against al-Houthi Shi’a rebels and their allies in Yemen, who have been accused of Iranian
support. This political and military coalition can be regarded as the first Sunni coalition against
Iranian hegemony in both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The coalition has also been
supported by non-Arab countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan.
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push Iran to suspend its nuclear program, at least temporarily. Moreover, it
might thwart Iranian support to Hezbollah and Bashar's regime in Syria.
Meanwhile, the decreasing price of oil has also damaged the economy of
Russia, which has been one of the main supporters of Assad's regime in Syria.
The role of the U.S. in the region as part of the RSC has been in play even after
the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq. According to some reports, both Saudi Arabia and
the U.S. have been involved in the fall of oil prices, with the intention to directly
harm Iran’s and Russia's economies. This stance of Saudi Arabia has angered
Iran. Ali Lariani, current chairman of the Iranian parliament in December 2014
said that “this time, we will not forget which countries schemed to lower the
price of oil” (MEMRI, December 31, 2014).
The financial and ideological (Sunni Islam in the form of Salafism) power
has enabled Saudi involvement in Arab issues across the Middle East, in order
to affect the regional balance of power in the region. This is especially true in
the areas of influence that share Saudi Arabian and Iranian hegemony. In this
regard can be seen Saudi Arabia's intervention in Bahrain to keep the Sunni
ruling family in power, the Saudi military invasion of Yemen against the Houthis,
Saudi financial and military support for the Syrian opposition, especially the
Free Syrian Army, supporting Lebanon's government against Hezbollah, and
engaging in the diplomatic negotiations between Fatah and Hamas which led to
the Fatah-Hamas national unity government in 2007 in order to disengage
Hamas from the Iranian camp (see Mason, 2015, p. 49). This was in addition to
the Saudi involvement in Mohamed Morsi's overthrow in Egypt, and supporting
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. All these efforts can be examined through the leadership
role that Saudi sought to play in the new Arab regional order. Meanwhile, all
these indications cannot be divorced from Saudi Arabia’s overall plan of
countering Iranian leverage in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine.
After 2011, Syria has become an important zone of influence in the Middle
East in which Saudi has attempted to reduce Iranian leverage on the Levant.
Saudi Arabia views the Syrian turmoil as a historic moment to enhance its
regional position. Many Saudi commentators see the Syrian civil war as a test
for the emergence of a new Saudi regional leadership (see al-Hamid, 2013;
Wehrey, 2014). Although Saudi Arabia possesses most of the means to play a
pivotal role in regional leadership in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, it will
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be difficult to confront Iranian leverage in Iraq. It seems that Saudi Arabia is
betting highly on the possibility of defeating Assad's regime in Syria to establish
a new balance of power in the region. It can be argued that Syria might be the
last chance for Saudi Arabia to rebuild a regional security system and restore
the balance of power against Iran in the Middle East. However, from the end of
2016 this eventuality has looked less likely after the Syrian regime has
strengthened itself on the battlefield and won gains with Iranian and Russian
support.
Saudi mechanisms of engagement in post-2003 Iraq can be analysed
through the capabilities of Saudi Arabia as a regional player. From this point of
view, it can be said, as Kamrava (2011, p. 177) points out, that Saudi Arabia
lacks the bases of regional power capabilities, such as military capacity,
population bases and ideological bases that would provide Riyadh with the
ability to play a regional leadership role. However, the said argument could be
debatable, particularly due to Saudi Arabia's possessing of some peculiarities
that could drive it to play a regional leadership role in the Persian Gulf. Saudi
Arabia is the largest exporter of total petroleum liquids in the world, controlling
16 percent of the world's known oil reserves (International Energy Statistics,
2013). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is also a religious centre for Muslims across
the world, as well as the de facto leader of the Sunni community around the
world. Finally, the 'Arab uprising' has also provided a good chance for Saudi
Arabia to have a greater leadership influence in the Arab world, especially
amongst Sunnis (see Lynch, 2016). The reasoning behind this can be traced
back to the failing of most traditional Arab regional power regimes in the Arab
world, such as Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. The new Arab political order has
provided an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to take a leading role in regional Arab
affairs, as well as domestic conflicts in countries like Libya, Syria, Bahrain,
Egypt and Lebanon.
However, maintaining the sustainability of that leadership role might not be
such an easy task for the Saudi foreign policy, due to Saudi Arabia’s cautious
stance in dealing with regional conflicts, and avoiding direct confrontations with
other regional powers. The future role of Saudi Arabia as a key player in the
region will be more about building strategic bases for its leadership, and this
could force Saudi Arabia to open more fronts with other rivals in the Middle
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East. Furthermore, the Saudi approach to restoring a balance of power through
supporting insurgent groups in Iraq and Syria has not been successful, since
this strategy created a crisis for Saudi Arabia in its relations with the U.S.. This
also meant indirect support for those groups which also wished to destabilise
the Kingdom’s regime at home. As Gause (2011, p.177) points out, the Saudi
regime views the potentiality of an ideological threat as more immediate than
the possibility of a military threat. Thus, Saudi Arabia's engagement in the
process of state-building has been primarily about containing Iranian leverage in
Iraq, rather than about building a certain form of state in post-2003 Iraq. It could
be argued that patterns of rivalry, balance of power and alliance with friendly
countries and local proxy groups which have been characterised by ethnic and
sectarian tension, especially between Tehran and Riyadh, has contributed to
the Saudi engagement in the state-building process in post-war Iraq.
Rivalry and alliance: Syria’s and Iran’s concerns6.2.
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the magnitude of the regional rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia has substantially increased across the Middle
East. This has created a hostile and competitive environment between the two
countries, to the extent that they are at odds on almost all the political issues in
the region. In addition to the historical, geopolitical and ideological differences,
between both countries, they are also on opposite sides to each other in a
number of open crises, such as the Iranian nuclear program, the rise of Shi'ism
in the Middle East, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the sectarian division in
Lebanon, the Syrian crisis after 2011 and the Saudi-Houthi conflicts in 2009 and
2015. All these disagreements have fuelled the intensive Saudi-Iranian rivalry
with regional repercussions. This is especially so because the U.S. invasion of
Iraq and later Syria's conflict have deeply affected the traditional regional
security dynamics in the region and formed a de facto new security order in the
Persian Gulf. This complex picture of the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf
countries can be seen more clearly through the theoretical framework of Buzan
and Wæver (2003, p.190), which explains how the security dynamics of these
countries are profoundly linked to one another. The dynamics of the Persian
Gulf sub-region have produced a type of relationship between Saudi Arabia and
Iran that can be described as a “durable patterns of amity and enmity” (Buzan
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and Wæver, 2003, p.190). All these spheres of influence between Iran and
Saudi Arabia (and to lesser extent Syria) have produced a regional hegemonic
competition between both countries. The domination of each country is directly
linked with the national security of other countries inside the region. In order to
see how the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq has become part of the
regional involvement in the ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq, it is important to
know what increased Saudi Arabian leverage would mean for others in the
region. In particular, patterns of balance of power, rivalry and alliance are
forming a RSC among Iraq's neighbours (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.47). The
ramifications of Saudi Arabian hegemony in Iraq for both Iran and Syria can be
assessed in this context.
6.2.1. The ramifications of Saudi Arabia's influence in Iraq:
Iran’s concerns
Iran could be the only country in the region that understands how difficult it
would be to cope with an Iraq that is a part the Saudi-led Sunni axis in the
Persian Gulf. The outstanding example of this is Iraq's eight-year war with Iran.
Iran has experienced a long history of enmity with Iraq. Moreover, Iran has not
forgotten the financial aid supplied by Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to
Iraq during the eight years of Iran-Iraq War. Moreover, Iran is surrounded by a
large number of U.S. allies in the region, Afghanistan and Pakistan from the
east, the instability of Iraq from the west, Turkey and Azerbaijan in the
northwest, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf in the south which include all
the GCC countries and the main U.S. military bases in the region. Therefore,
Iran’s concerns over Saudi Arabia's engagement in Iraq are reasonable. From
the Iranian perspective, Saudi Arabia's hegemony in Iraq has two strategic
levels of threat for Iran. Firstly, Iraq has become a part of the geostrategic
calculations of Iran in the Persian Gulf. In particular when the survival of the
Syrian regime is at stake, Iraq is the only state that can be an Iranian ally and a
strategic alternative to the Assad regime for Iran in the Persian Gulf and the
Levant.
Secondly, after the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, the Shi'a majority
got the chance to lead the new Iraqi government with the support of the U.S.
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and the international community. That could provide a chance for the Shi'a
community in Iraq and the whole region more than ever to form a new regional
front against anti-Shi'i and Wahhabi powers that have mostly operated under
the leadership of (or at least from) Saudi Arabia in the last thirty years. For
example, the Saudi financial support of Islamist extremists in the Caucasus and
Central Asia in the 1990s, as Vali Nasr (2004, p. 15) points out, had not been so
much an Islamic project as it was a Sunni one, aiming to strangle Iranian
leverage in the Middle East. Iran perceives the Saudi influence in Iraq as
gradually morphing into a new Iraq in the Sunni Arab world, which will most
likely be under Saudi Arabia's regional leadership, and also will most likely be
hostile towards Iran. This is especially after the absence of Iraq's traditional role
as a key power in the region.
Another point that could be worth considering is a deterioration of the
Iranian influence on the Arab world, especially toward Palestine, Lebanon and
Syria. This will be affected by sectarian calculations, in particular after the Arab
uprising. For instance, the Iranian involvement in Iraq and Syria can be viewed
through the lens of sectarianism in the Sunni Arab communities. Saudi Arabia
has played an effective role in that respect. In 2010, King Abdullah strongly
opposed Iran’s support to militant Palestinian factions; he reportedly told Iranian
foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki that “you as Persians have no business
meddling in Arab matters” (Reuters, 13 May 2014). Riyadh has attempted many
times to take Hamas away from Tehran’s influence, for example by brokering a
peace agreement between Hamas and the rival Palestinian faction Fatah in
2007 (see Mecca Agreement, February. 9, 2007). In this context, Iran will need
an Arab state to manifest its regional polices toward the Muslim and Arab world.
Iraq can play that role geopolitically and economically. In particular, this will be
effective if Iran is able to expand the Shi'a-led government to include Iraqi
Sunnis and Kurds working under the Shi'a leadership in Iraq101.
101 In 2014, Iran abandoned al-Maliki, in order to strengthen the Shi'a house against Islamic
State; Iran took into consideration the Kurdish and Sunni demands for changing the Maliki
government, despite his close ties with Tehran. Iran has kept up its good relation with Iraqi
Kurds, especially with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In June 2014 when Islamic State
attempted to attack Erbil, Iran played a major role in preventing the success of the attack. The
KRG President Masoud Barzani said "We asked for weapons and Iran was the first country to
provide us with weapons and ammunition," (Al-alam, 26 August 2014).
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There are three main aspects that raise Tehran’s concerns regarding
Riyadh’s engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq.
Geopolitically, Iraq has historically shared the traditional domination of the
Gulf geopolitical environment with Iran (Mabon, 2013, p.55). In this respect, Iraq
can be an Iranian gateway toward control of the Persian Gulf and the Arab
world to spread the ideology of the Iranian revolution. Alternately, keeping Iraq
away from Iranian control means Iran's isolation from its zones of influence,
such as Syria and southern Lebanon. Furthermore, in the memory of Iranians,
Iraq could always be a possible threat to Iranian national interests in the region,
unless it is under Iran's control. Iraq has had all the economic, military and
political capabilities to become again a regional player in the region, as it had
been from 1958 to its fall in 2003.
Ideologically, following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Iraq’s Shi'a
community has seized the opportunity to build a Shi'a-dominated government
with a strategic alignment with Iran. That change has totally altered the identity
of the Iraqi state, from pan-Arabist Iraq with a Sunni identity to the openly Shi'a
Arab country in the region. To an extent, Iraq has been an integrated area
which binds Shi'a communities from Lebanon to Pakistan, with the central hub
being in Iran. The Syrian sectarian conflict has shown this solidarity among
Shi'a communities in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and even Afghanistan, from which
Shi’a militia groups have come to fight alongside the forces of the Assad regime
(see Rabi and Friedman, 2017, p. 434 ).
Moreover, Iraq's Shi'a-led government could have an influence on the
Arab Shi'a communities in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. Iranian ideological
hegemony in Iraq could provide a chance for Iran to control the two holiest cities
of Shi'a Islam (Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran) across the world; both Marja’yyas’
of Qum and Najaf can play effective role in this regard (see Louer, 2008, p.270).
Iran can thus take advantage of the religious influence in the export of fatwas
and policies that serve Iran's interest. Also, due to the transnational role of
Shi'a's religious reference (marja' or marja'iyya) Gulf Shi'a can easily make ties
with Iraqi Shi'a through Iraq's religious education, pilgrims and business
(Wehrey, 2014, p.113). For instance, the school of Najaf alongside Qum
(excepting their differences of doctrine), as two coherent social and religious
organisations, can play a prominent role in this regard. All these ideological
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considerations could allow Iran a greater influence on the other Shi'a
communities in the Gulf.102
Economically, following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Shi'a holy
places have become the most important destination for the 40,000 Iranian
religious tourists that arrive in the area every month as part of the estimated
three or four million tourists who make the Ashura commemoration each year
(Eisenstadt, Knights, & Ali, 2011, p. xi). The size of the trade between the two
countries has been increasing annually since 2006, and in 2013 reached $12
billion (Alsabaah, 26/10/2014). It would be hard for Iran to have all these
economic links with Iraq if Iraq fell under Saudi Arabia's hegemony. Due to the
dominant presence of Saudi Arabia, this would most likely undermine Shi'a
dominance in Iraq. Meanwhile, all these economic links between Iraq and Iran
have been mostly the productions of sectarian amity on one hand, and regional
alignment between both countries on the other.
There is another factor that has not received enough attention relating to
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry on Iraq, which is oil competition, especially inside
OPEC. Saudi Arabia's oil policy is dependent on moderate oil prices and
retaining their share in the market. However, that policy is inconsistent with the
need of Iraq, which desires the maximum production and high prices in order to
fund its national reconstruction. It can be argued that the direction of Iraq's oil
policy from now and in the future will become closer to Iran's oil policy, as both
countries need high oil prices to rebuild their national infrastructures (see
McMillan, 2006, p. 13). It could be hypothesised that the Iran-Iraq alignment
might create a new OPEC partnership between both countries. That would
mean Iran would depend on Iraq, as the second largest proven oil reserve, to
compete with Saudi Arabia's oil price, from which Iran has long suffered. All this
is to say that although regional engagement has been a challenge for the state-
building process in Iraq, the engagement of each regional actor can be a
challenge for other actors in the region through the durable dynamics of RSC. It
can therefore be concluded that the state-building issue in Iraq after 2003 has
become a regional matter among Iraq's neighbours.
102 For example, according to some interviews, in the Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia the
most popular marja' is Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, to the extent that 70 to 80 percent of
Saudi Shi'a follow al-Sistani's guidance (Wehrey, 2014, p.113).
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6.2.2. The ramifications of Saudi Arabia's influence in Iraq: Syria's
concerns
The challenges that Syria faces from Saudi Arabian domination in the
aftermath of the 2003 invasion, may have stemmed from the ethno-sectarian
polarisations that have emerged after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. These
alliances have become more organised, and have taken the form of wider
regional coalitions among most countries in the region, in addition to the
involvement of external powers. This is especially after what is called the 'Arab
Spring'. The nature of the political and security threats, alongside the
permeability of the regional state system  that has emerged during the Arab
uprisings, has produced an ethnic and sectarian map in the Persian Gulf sub-
region. The new map of conflict is established on the basis of political-sectarian
alliances. Iran, Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah, or the Iranian-led Shi'a axis, is
arrayed on one side, while the GCC countries, Jordan and later Egypt (under
the rule of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after 2013) can be seen as parts of a Saudi-led
Sunni axis. Regarding Turkey, Iran’s undisputed hegemony in Iraq, and later the
Syrian turmoil, have pushed Turkey to become closer to the Sunni front, and
also seeking for a leadership role in the Muslim world. The conflict in Syria has
reached the point that Turkey and Iran are backing different sides of the conflict.
One could argue that the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen was the most
striking embodiment of the regional sectarian polarisation.
Iraq and Syria have political, ethnic, religious and geo-economic links with
each other. Both countries cannot be adequately addressed without a general
picture of the regional security interdependency. Saudi hegemony in Iraq can
provide Riyadh with much greater control of events in Syria. The social and
ethno-religious links between western tribes in Iraq, such as the Karabila,
Dulaym and Shammar, which extend from Jazira in Syria to Mosul, and Syrian
tribes, has played an active role in the ethno-religious and political violence in
both Iraq and in Syria's conflict (see Alaaldin, 2015, p.192).
Based on interviews with tribal leaders of the northern Sunni Arab-
dominated border areas between Iraq and Syria, Dagher pointed out that:
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Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders affiliated to Iraqiyya and hailing from Nineveh and
Anbar are being asked by Gulf Arab officials or through intermediaries such as
Jordan-based Iraqi businessmen to support the Syrian opposition, according to
people taking part in recent meetings. (Dagher, 2012)
According to the RSCT (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.45) the impact of
geographical proximity on the security interaction between Syria and Iraq can
be very durable and obvious in political, societal and military aspects. This
ethno-religious interconnection between Sunni tribes on the Syrian side and the
Iraqi side has been a major base for the Islamic State to plot its path in the Iraqi
Sunni-populated cities, such as Mosul and Anbar. To an extent, the west of Iraq
has become an extension of the Syrian crisis, as a belt that separates the
Iranian influence in Baghdad from the Sunni zones of the Gulf States, Jordan
and the eastern part of Syria. (see Cockburn, 2015).
To some extent, the interaction between the Syrian insurgency against
Assad's regime and the Sunni insurgency in Iraq has had direct ramifications on
Iraq's internal sectarian conflict. That sectarian solidarity has been clearly seen
in the July 2013 Sunni demonstrations in the three main Sunni cites of Mosul,
Anbar and Saladin. However, the Iraqi government predicted that Sunni unity
would arise among the provinces of western and central Iraq on one hand and
the Syrian Sunni insurgency on the other hand. Bayan al-Jabir, one of the
leaders of the Iraqi National Alliance, stated that “if the Syrian insurgency wins,
the fight will move to the walls of Baghdad” (YouTube, Interview with Bayan
Jabr, 2014).
It may be argued that following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and especially
after Syria's crisis, Iraq's ethno-sectarian conflict has played an essential role in
the Syrian crisis, and vice versa, internally and regionally. After the Syrian crisis,
Syria and Iraq's ethno-sectarian conflicts formed a standard formation of RSC
through all its three patterns of rivalry, balance of power and alliance (see
Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 47). Any domination of Iraq by Riyadh will most
likely put an end to the Assad regime in Syria in number of respects.
Firstly, Saudi dominance in Iraq means Syrian containment in four
directions, to the east with Iraq, to the north with Turkey, in the south with
Jordan and in the east with Israel. All these countries (except Iraq at current)
have bad relations with the Syrian regime. Secondly, Saudi hegemony in Iraq
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would mean a cut in the military and logistical supply for the Syrian regime,
which Syria receives as a result of Iranian support. After 2011, al-Maliki's
government in Baghdad played a great role as a bridge for transferring military
equipment to the Syrian regime and facilitating the Shi'a militias, such as Asaib
Ahl Al Haq, Kataib Hizbollah, the Mahdi Army and the Abu Al Fadhil Al Abbas
Brigade to fight against the Sunni militias and Islamic extremists in Syria (see
al-Mukhtar, 2015).
Thirdly, Saudi domination in Iraq would mean breaking Syria's alliance
with Iran. Saudi views the Syrian crisis as a historic opportunity to break the
Iran-Syria alliance in the region. Saudi's main goal in its Syrian involvement is
related to Saudi Arabia's hope of having a leadership role in establishing a new
Syrian government that will not be in alignment with Iran. Fourthly, Saudi
leverage in Iraq would mean having a pro-U.S. regime in Iraq and ideologically
far from Iran, which most likely would be against both Iranian and Syrian
interests in the Middle East. It is true that the new Iraq is an American ally in the
region, but it is also a pro-Iranian Iraq, as well as member of the Shi'a-led front
under Iranian leadership. This had clearly been seen during the Islamic State
war against the Iraqi government; the Iranian concern and attention was far
greater than the U.S. concern for the Iraq Shi'a, and if there were not Iranian
military troops on the ground and Iranian logistic support, Iraq could have
collapsed103.
It is important to know that since the Syrian crisis started, Syria's role has
altered from being a regional player into a battlefield. Syria's position now is
more about being a part of the regional rivalry between two fronts, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Turkey in favour of changing Syria's regime on one hand, and Iran,
Iraq and Hezbollah in opposition to the change of Assad's regime. Furthermore,
Saudi engagement in Iraq and Syria, by supporting the opposition to the
regimes, is motivated by decades of rivalry with Iran, in order to break Iraq and
Syria's alliance with Iran. All this is to say that the relevance of Iraq's ethno-
103 During the preparation of the Iraqi Army and the Shi'a militias, of the Hashd al-Shaabi
“popular mobilisation units” to drive ISIS fighters from the city of Tikrit, the Saudi foreign minister
Prince Saud al-Faisal said in a press conference in Riyadh that ''What is happening in Tikrit is
exactly what we are worried about, Iran is taking over Iraq''. (Aljazeera Net, Arabic, 5 March,
2015)
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sectarian division is a durable interconnection with Syria's ethnic and religious
tensions. The Syrian Desert borders two of the main Sunni-populated Iraqi
provinces, Mosul and Anbar. This is in addition to Syria's border with the Iraqi
Kurds, which links Iraqi Kurds with the Syrian Kurds; links of solidarity have
been clearly seen during the Syrian Kurds fight with IS and Iraq's Kurds’ support
for Kobani in the Syrian side. The vitality of security interconnectedness
between Syria and Iraq on the one hand and the permeability of the regional
state system on the other, makes any form of the state that depends on balance
among the ethnic and sectarian factions of Shi'a Arab, Sunni Arab and Kurd, in
Iraq, affect directly Syria's situation104. So, it can be concluded that Saudi
Arabia's engagement in the process of state-building in Iraq is a significant
challenge especially for the Shi’a-led axis, namely Iran and Syria. The regional
challenges that stem from the state-building in post-2003 Iraq are interrelated
with the balance of power on one hand and regional security complex dynamics
on the other. That is to say that the process of state-building in Iraq has become
part of the ethnic and sectarian conflict among Iraq’s neighbours in a form of
RSC.
Since the RSC (Buzan and Waever 2003, p.51) addresses domestic,
regional and global levels of analysis, the role of global powers cannot be
underestimated in the Saudi involvement in Iraq without the U.S. role, whether
as part of the regional security complex in the Persian Gulf or as a global power
after their troops’ withdrawal in the end of 2011. The U.S. role has remained
functional in three main aspects after the troops’ departure. First, the U.S.
played an active role in mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, aiming to
integrate Baghdad into the Arab world in order to limit Iranian leverage in Iraq.
Second, as has been addressed earlier, the U.S. was also involved in the fall of
oil prices in 2014 with the intention to harm Iranian and Russian interests in the
Middle East, particularly Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria (MEMRI, December
31, 2014). The third factor is the 2015 U.S. nuclear deal with Iran which has
affected Saudi and regional security in the Persian Gulf. The nuclear deal,
reassuring Tehran of the security of its position, may provide Iran with a kind of
confidence to challenge U.S. allies in the region (see Kamrava, 2011, p.136).
104 This point has been explained in chapter five.
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International developments also should not be underestimated in Saudi
Arabia’s involvement in Iraq. The U.S.-Iran nuclear deal has influenced Saudi
Arabia's rivalry with Iran, especially in Syria and Yemen. As Lynch (2016) points
out, the Iranian reintegration into the international system and its evolving ties
with U.S. have been viewed by Riyadh as a significant threat to its own regional
position, and might therefore yield more reason for mobilizing anti-Iran
sectarianism, especially in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. However, it is unlikely
that the U.S.-Iran deal has produced significant tangible changes on the ground
in Iraq, due to Saudi Arabia’s limited opportunity to use it against Iran in Iraq.
After the IS occupation of Iraq, Saudi Arabia had few cards to use against the
Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq. Since almost all Sunni territories in Iraq
were seized by IS, on the other hand the Sunni leadership were not in a position
to make challenges to the political process after 2011. Most of their active
leadership had been either excluded or marginalised from government by al-
Maliki, such as Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, Osama al-Nujaifi, and Rafia al-
Issawi (Chaudhry, 2012).105 In addition, Shi'a militias' have exerted significant
control on the political process after the IS attack on Iraq in Jun 2014.
Moreover, both Iran and the U.S., despite their different agendas in Iraq, were
on the same side of fighting IS. Saudi Arabia was also part of the U.S.-led
coalition targeting IS. For the abovementioned reasons, Riyadh did not have
much space to manoeuvre against Iran in Iraq. This might be another reason
which has left few options to Riyadh to mobilize sectarian tensions in Iraq as a
reaction to the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal.
Conclusion: Saudi Arabia: balance against domestic and6.3.
regional threats
Riyadh’s involvement in the state-building process in Iraq, unlike that of Iran,
has lacked a strategy for deep involvement. Relative to the Iranian involvement,
Saudi involvement in post-2003 Iraq has been limited, and has mostly had a
105 Al-Maliki also damaged the credibility of Iraqiyya ministers in government. In August 2011,
Maliki accused the former electricity minister Raad Shalal of signing fraudulent contracts worth
$1.7 billion and forced him to resign. In a similar vein, Maliki forced Ayad Allawi’s cousin,
Mohammed Tawfiq, to resign as a communications minister in August 2012 (BBC, 27 August
2012.
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consensual rather than a confrontational stance during the U.S. existence in
Iraq. However, Riyadh's engagement with Iraqi Sunni and insurgent groups has
led to the alienation of Sunnis from the state-building process after 2003. Since
the fall of the Ba'ath regime, Saudi Arabia has not been part of any serious
project of Sunni constructive participation in the Shi'a-Kurd dominated
government in Iraq. This is to say that Saudi Arabia's policy toward Iraq can be
described as a non-direct intervention policy, based primarily on a risk
avoidance policy. The consensual nature of Saudi's foreign policy toward 2003-
Iraq has two main reasons.
First, due to the long-term alliance Saudi Arabia has with the U.S., the Saudis
preferred not to make troubles for the U.S. in Iraq. Second, one notes Saudi
Arabia's avoidance of a direct confrontation with both Iran, and the Iraqi-Shi'a
government in Baghdad. Riyadh used sectarianism to robust its domestic and
regional stability against any preserved threats. These two reasons dominate
Saudi Arabia's policy toward the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq.
Riyadh designed the process of state-building in post-2003 Iraq as a Sunni-
Shi’a crisis in two levels. Domestically, Riyadh invested in this strategy to
secure its domestic legitimacy and cast the new Shi’a-dominated Iraq as a
domestic threat at home. Riyadh showed itself as a defender of Arab Sunnis in
Iraq, and backed them through political, financial and diplomatic tools.
Meanwhile, Saudi opposition to the Shia-led government in Iraq did not take the
form of an overt military confrontation with the new Iraqi state. Saudi
government officials have openly accused, and described the new political
process in post-2003 Iraq, as a sectarian one. Regionally, Riyadh viewed the
new Iraq as a crucial challenge to its regional security system that depends on
the balance of power and regional stability (within the context of regional
security complex). As Buzan and Waever (2003, p.49) argue, “the regional level
matters most for the states within it’’.
To achieve both abovementioned goals Riyadh focused on countering Iranian
influence in Iraq through Sunni political parties inside and outside the Iraqi
government on one hand, and through its intelligence and diplomatic ties with
the U.S. official institutions on the other, has been a pillar of Saudi Arabia’s Iraq
policies. Therefore, Riyadh has lacked any concerted strategic plan towards
state-building in Iraq and the form of state that new Iraqi should look like. Saudi
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engagement in Iraq has not been based on any institutional building, or building
longstanding links through the influence with Iraqi groups, or durable ties with
Iraq's official institutions, as has been the case with Iran and Turkey. Even in
the case of engagement with Iraqi Sunnis, with the only part of Iraq’s population
with which the Saudis can claim links, has lacked any bases of institutional
building, which has been one of the reasons behind the Saudis’ weakness in
Iraq. On the contrary, the Saudi engagement in Syria has been based on
building institutional links with the local players on the ground, such as
moderate Islamist, nationalist, or secular groups, under the banner of the Free
Syrian Army (FSA). Saudi efforts to curtail the Shi'a-dominated government and
to counter Iranian leverage in Iraq have shifted the state-building process in Iraq
towards further sectarian tensions, not only among Iraq's components, but also
as part of the wider proxy ethnic and sectarian conflict among Iraq's neighbours,
particularly between Riyadh and Tehran.
Saudi policy in Iraq cannot be adequately addressed without understanding
Saudi policy toward wider regional issues in the Middle East, particularly Iran
and Syria. Iranian leverage in the Persian Gulf and the Syrian crisis have been
the two major contributing factors of Saudi's engagement in Iraq after 2003 and
particularly since 2011. This has made Saudi Arabia's policy in Iraq a part of the
broader regional policy in the Persian Gulf, rather than focused on building a
particular form of state in Iraq.
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Chapter Seven:
7. Iraq and Turkey: The ethno-sectarian balance
“Mr. Maliki should know this: If you engage in a violent process amid a sectarian conflict
in Iraq, it will not be possible for us to keep silent about that,” (Today’s Zaman, 26 March 2012)
Erdoğan- On 24 Jan.  2012
Introduction
In the last chapter I showed how Saudi Arabia engaged in the process of
state-building following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In order to complete the sketch
of the regional dimension of the ethno-denominational conflict in post-2003 Iraq,
it is important to examine Turkey's engagement in Iraq on several levels. This is
due to the fact that (with the exception of Syria), none of Iraq's other neighbours
stands to be affected as profoundly as Turkey by the outcomes of the state-
building process in Iraq, regarding in particular the Kurds. The main question
that will be addressed in this chapter regards how and why Turkey became
involved in the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq. To examine this key
question, this chapter will have to take a number of sub-questions into
consideration. The most prominent of these questions is, what has driven
Turkey to engage in inter-communal enmity in Iraq? Furthermore, what made
Erdoğan suddenly become a main ally to the KRG after a history of enmity and
conflict relationship which lasted until 2007?
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, this chapter is
structured into two sections. First, it will discuss how the Turkish strategy has
been shaped towards Iraq following the U.S.-led coalition in 2003, and how
Turkey has been engaged in the state-building process in Iraq. The first one can
be examined through the political and economic ties between Turkey and the
KRG, and the second by investigating Turkish involvement with Iraqi Sunnis by
creating a political balance between Iraq's main components of Shi'a, Sunni and
Kurds. The second section of this chapter seeks to understand the sub-regional
security concerns that have escalated after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in the
225 | P a g e
Persian Gulf. In other words, what does Turkey’s leverage mean for other
players in the region such as Syria and Iran?
7.1. Turkey’s strategy in Iraq after 2003: How Turkey became engaged in
the state-building process in Iraq after 2003
It would not be logical to underestimate regional factors that have
contributed to the formation of Turkey's policy towards Iraq after the U.S.
invasion, in particular the change of the balance of power in the region, resulting
from the demise of the Ba'ath regime after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.
Despite the cool relations between Saddam's regime and Turkey, Iraq had
always secured the south-east part of the Turkish border, which connects Iraqi
Kurds with Turkish Kurds. Second, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq led to the rise of
other regional powers, whose hegemony might cause concern for other players
in the region. However, the main concern for Turkish foreign policy was not a
change in the balance of power in the region, as has been the case regarding
Iraq's other neighbours, but was related to domestic politics. As Aras (2014,
pp.18, 159) argues, Ataturk's principle of “peace at home, peace in the world”
can still be applied to Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq. It can be said that
Turkish policy toward post-2003 Iraq is mostly a product of its domestic politics.
From this point of view the Kurdish question is an essential factor for Turkish
strategy in post-2003 Iraq, especially when for the first time in its history the
Kurdish issue in Iraq took on a legal and constitutional character in regional and
international relations. Meanwhile, the domestic change of Turkish policy due to
the coming to power of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in
2002, with the adoption of a new foreign policy framework based on ''Strategic
Depth'' and ''zero problems with neighbours'',106 has been another factor left its
106 The concept of 'strategic depth' that has been adopted by Davutoğlu is mainly rooted in
classical realist geopolitical dynamics of the state territory. According to his interpretation, this
approach offers a new 'geopolitical discourse' regarding Turkey's position in the world system,
which has based on a liberal form of Islam towards those countries that had historical,
geopolitical and religious ties with Turkey during the Ottoman Empire. The primary aim of this
approach is to create a variety of alliances with Turkey's neighbours to achieve powerful
regional and global influence. The 'strategic depth' can provide Turkey with the chance to
transform its position in the international system from a 'wing country' and middle power to a
'pivotal state' and a 'global actor'. According Davutoğlu's doctrine Turkish foreign policy should
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influence on Turkish regional policy towards Iraq (see Müftüler-Baç, 2014, p.
39).
So, it can be argued that the Turkish strategy towards Iraq following the
2003 U.S. invasion has been largely based on two pillars (Bakir, 2015).The first
is geopolitical security; since the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and up until this
point in time, Turkey has been consistently concerned about the establishment
of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq107. The Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) factor has played a central role of reshaping the Turkish strategy
toward the KRG, as it would be hard for Turkey to tolerate the PKK's free hand
in Iraqi Kurdistan, which had been a strong possibility after 2003, with the PKK
politically and militarily more active in Iraq108. This would be the case especially
if Iraqi Kurds had offered logistic, military and financial support to PKK forces,
which had been one of Turkey’s accusations against the KRG after 2003. The
second is an economic security issue. Iraq's stability can be a strategic gain for
be based on five principles, (1) balance between security and freedom, (2) zero problems with
neighbours, (3) proactive and flexible diplomacy, (4) multi-dimensional foreign policy and (5)
'rhythmic diplomacy'.  (See Yalvac, 2012, pp.168-169; Ozkececi-Taner, 2017, pp.201-204).
107 Although there has been a notable improvement in the Turkish stance towards an
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, so far there is no clear statement that Turkey would
be wholly supportive of a Kurdish state in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite that, the AKP’s spokesman
Huseyin Celik's statement to the Financial Times in June 2014 (the Financial Times, June 27,
2014) stated “In the past an independent Kurdish state was a reason for war [for Turkey] but no
one has the right to say this now”, while he added that the division of Iraq is not the “number
one choice'', but if it happens Turkey ''will live with it”. This kind of perspective among part of
Turkish political elite based on the vision that, if the new Kurdish state, comes into existence,
will be under the Turkish sphere of influence in the region as far as Barzani has leverage on the
KRG.
108 Whether during my time in Iraqi Kurdistan or during my regular visits whilst conducting my
PhD research in the UK, I have noticed the strong presence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan,
whether as support for their ideology or as Kurdish sympathy toward their struggle. They have
gained a popular base in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially among young people in both Sulaimania
and Erbil. This has been made more visible during the KRG fight with IS, to the extent that both
the PUK and the Gorran movement, both parts of the KRG government, have provided a
significant focus on the PKK and PYD fight against IS, particularly in Sinjar. They have also
criticised the KDP and KRG for their negative relationships with the PKK and PYD. In addition,
both the PUK and Gorran have used the PKK as buffer against KDP expansion to the Turkish
and Syrian parts of Kurdistan, which have been in the sphere of influence of the PKK.
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Ankara on political and economic levels (see Bengio, 2014, p. 274). This is
especially the case at the level of energy security, because both sides possess
valuable resources which could help achieve an economic integration between
the countries. Iraq needs tremendous work on its infrastructure and Turkey has
a huge contracting sector, not to mention the vital private sector, which could
contribute effectively to helping Iraq and for the benefit of Turkey as well109.
What has previously been underestimated in Turkish foreign policy toward
Iraq is the role of identity, namely Sunni Islamic identity (Kosereisoglu, 2014).
There are a number of indications which can confirm the role of Sunni Islamic
identity in the AKP’s regional policy, particularly after 2011, for instance the
Turkish attitude toward its Alevi Turks during the Syrian crisis and Turkish
support for Sunni extremist groups against Assad's regime. In the Iraqi context
is the strong Turkish support of former Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi against
his arrest warrant issued by the Iraqi state, as well as the former Mosul
governor and head of the Nineveh Guards Atheel al-Nujaifi, who was also given
a detention warrant from the Iraqi Federal Court for allegedly allowing Turkish
troops into Iraq in 2015. These events damaged significantly Iraq-Turkey
relations. Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan stated that ''al-Hashimi’s
involvement in these alleged crimes is out of the question'' (cited in
Kosereisoglu, 2014). However, the sectarian identity in Turkish regional policy
has never been an independent factor, but has been either a reaction or a sub-
factor subordinate to the central concern is security. Iranian active support for
the Shi’a-led government in Iraq on one side, and the Syrian crises on the other,
have made it difficult for Turkey to distance itself from the sectarian polarisation
in the region.
I agree with both Bengio (2014, p.273) and Aras (2004, p.102) that the
Kurdish issue has been an important factor in Turkish policy toward Iraq.
However, Turkish policy towards post-2003 Iraq has not been constituted by a
single stage. I will show that Turkish policy has gone through several stages,
109 It can be said that until 2008 the status of Kirkuk and the card of the Turkmen minorities
living in Iraq were together part of the Turkish calculations in post-2003 Iraq. However, after the
development of Turkish ties with the KRG these two factors have lost their importance in
Turkish policy toward Iraq (see Altunışık, 2009, p.178)
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and has been characterised somewhat by reluctance and ambiguity from the
beginning. In this context, three main stages can be determined regarding the
formation of Turkish strategy towards post-2003 Iraq.
The first stage lasted 2003-2008. The major Turkish issue at this stage
regarding Iraq was security concerns, particularly the KRG's new constitutional
position as a semi-independent federal region and the possible consequences
of this for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Furthermore, there was the potentiality
for Iraqi Kurdistan to become a breeding ground for the PKK forces against
Turkey110. To an extent, the Turkish stance on the issue of Kirkuk determined
the Turkish attitude toward the Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2005. In contrast
to the positions of Iraq’s other neighbours, which welcomed the election results,
Turkey saw the 2005 election results as not translating into a fair representation
of the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, and called for a rebalancing of
the elections, especially in Kirkuk (see Mursi, 2010). It can be argued that the
Turkish attitude toward Iraq was driven by its calculation on the Iraqi Kurds,
particularly after the Kurdistan Alliance recorded a significant success in 2005
parliamentary elections by winning 75 seats (25 %) of the total votes. The same
attitude was expressed by Turkey towards the referendum on the new Iraqi
constitution in December 2005, of which Turkey rejected some of the
constitutional articles, especially on the issue of federalism and Kirkuk (see
Lundgren, 2007, p.105).
This stage witnessed serious disagreements between the KRG and
Turkey. In October 2007, Turkey threatened a military intervention against the
PKK inside KRG territory. At this stage, Turkey was seeking allies with Iraq's
other factions of Turkmen and Sunnis in order to curb the rise of the Kurdish
Region. The only strong alignment Turkey had was the Turkmen minority.
However, the 30 January 2005 election for the Transitional National Assembly
in Iraq showed that the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) won only 1.1 percent of the
110 It is true that the Iraqi Kurds cooperated with Turkey against the PKK in the 1990s. However,
since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, and with the end of Saddam's regime, the KDP and PUK
have disregarded that deal with Ankara. In due time, they suspended cooperation with Turkey
against the PKK. Also, according to Western security contractors in Iraq, local Kurdish forces
have protected the PKK and its associated groups by facilitating or providing them with logistical
support (Onay, 2008).
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total votes, and just 18.4 percent of the votes in Kirkuk which Turkey had long
insisted was a predominantly Turkmen city, while Kurds won 60 percent of the
total number of seats (Lundgren, 2007, p.105)).111 As a result of the weakness
of the Turkmen component and its size in the political process after 2005,
Ankara abandoned the policy of only depending on the Iraqi Turkmen to counter
the Iraqi Kurds. Instead, Turkey directed Iraqi Turkmen parties to cooperate with
both Shi'a and Sunni parties in an attempt to curb KRG aspirations112.
The second stage lasted from 2008-2011. This stage can be called a
reconciliation of Turkish policy towards Iraq, in particular towards the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG). Turkey played a constructive role in this period,
especially regarding its political and economic relations with the KRG.
Furthermore, the political relations between Iraq and Turkey improved quickly,
and the former Iraqi Prime Minster al-Maliki visited Turkey twice. Moreover, the
former Turkish Prime Minster Erdoğan became the first Turkish Prime Minister
for 18 years to visit Baghdad, which he did on 10 July 2008. In addition, in
March 2009 former President Abdullah Gul became the first Turkish president to
visit Iraq in 33 years (Todays Zaman, 2015). In this period, Turkey was looking
for a role in managing the ethno-sectarian conflict among the main Iraqi
factions, Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds. It can be said that Turkey's main concern
was to find loyal groups among the Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds to work with. In
this period, Turkey did not abandon the Turkmen card against the KRG, but it
also advised them to cooperate with the Iraqi Kurds (Taştekin, 2014).
111 Owing to the Sunnis’ boycott of the 2005 elections, they received only 6 percent of the votes,
while due to the Kurdish enthusiasm for the political process in the new Iraq they won 27
percent of the parliamentary votes. The election results had a significant influence in altering the
Turkish strategy toward the Kurds, in particular and in Iraq in general. The elections delivered
the message to Ankara that the Kurds would have a strong say in the new Iraq. (see Oktav,
2011, p.65)
112 Turkish use of the Turkmen card against Iraqi Kurds from time to time can be traced back to
number of factors. First, to have an influence on the Iraqi Kurds and counterbalance the Kurdish
desire to integrate Kirkuk to the KRG; second, to show that northern Iraq is multi-ethnic region
and not only inhabited by Kurds; third, Ankara might also want to use the Turkmen card in Iraq’s
domestic disputes. They organised and armed Turkmens against Kurds before and after the
U.S invasion of Iraq. (See Lundgren, 2007, pp.92-93)
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The third stage was between 2011 and 2016. In this stage, Turkish foreign
policy entered a new phase which was based on taking a sectarian side. It can
be argued that a number of factors directed Turkish foreign policy towards that
course. First, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011 offered Iran an
opportunity to play an undisputed role in Iraq. This move left Ankara in need of
allies in the region in order to counter the new rising hegemony of the Iranian-
led Shi'a bloc. Second, Turkey found the Arab uprisings as a historic opportunity
to boost its regional leadership in the Arab and Islamic world. Third, the AKP's
doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, based on Ahmet Davutoğlu's concept of ''Strategic
Depth'', had a significant influence on the new Turkish policy in Iraq and the
entire Middle East. Turkey tried to cultivate its historical soft power in the Arab
and Islamic world as a multi-regional power in the Middle East (see Ozkececi-
Taner, 2017, pp. 205-206). This role can be clearly observed in Tunisia, Egypt,
Iraq and Palestine, and at its peak in Syria. To this extent, Turkey can be
assumed to have spread its ruling model to other Arab countries.
Despite the rise of a Turkish regional role, Turkey has failed to deliver its
model through the Arab uprisings, and the principle of zero-problems with
neighbours has quickly turned into zero-friends in the region, in particular
regarding Syria, Iran, Iraq, Israel and even Russia. This has also divided
Turkish society on ethnic and religious lines, between Turkish Sunnis, the Alevis
and the Kurds. The ethnic and sectarian framework of Turkey’s policy toward
Iraq can be clearly observed during the operation of Mosul in October 2016.
Erdogan showed himself as a defender of the Iraqi Sunnis, and said in a
televised speech: "we will be in the operation and we will be at the table…Our
brothers are there and our relatives are there. It is out of the question that we
are not involved" (Daily Sabah, 17 October, 2016). Thus it can be argued that
identity (Sunni Islam) has also contributed to Turkey's engagement policy
towards the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq. However, we should not
forget that the factor of identity politics has also been an inseparable part of the
Turkish RSC with post-2003 Iraq, which has been seen by Erdogan as a fertile
field for investment in more regional conflicts as a source of power.
One can see many symbolic steps which have been taken by Turkey to
show a non-sectarian face. For example, in December 2010, for the first time
since the AKP came to power, Turkey’s Prime Minster Erdoğan publicly
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attended the Shi'a holy day of Ashura in Istanbul (Kane, 2011, p10). By the
same token in March 2011, Erdogan visited the Shi'a holy city of Najaf in Iraq
and met with the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Alwasat, 29 March, 2011). A
fresh look at this period can provide a new insight on the Turkish policy towards
Iraq's ethno-denominational composition and its regional links. These three
above mentioned stages of Turkish involvement in post-2003 Iraq can be seen
more accurately through the ways that Turkey engaged with both the KRG and
Iraqi Arab Sunnis.
7.1.1. Turkey and the KRG: Security shaping a political and economic
alliance
The main question that needs to be answered regarding the Turkey-KRG
alliance is how and why Turkey reached a point where it became a close ally of
the KRG, with all possible risks that the KRG might still hold for Turkey, not just
in Iraq but in the entire region. These threats are due to the KRG's direct
influence on other Kurdish communities in neighbouring countries, including
Turkey. In the words of Turkish observer, “in Turkish security perceptions, there
is no real separation between northern Iraq and south eastern Turkey: they are
the geographic and ethnocultural extension of each other” (cited in Park, 2012,
p.86). The Turkey-KRG alliance after 2007 may be better understood according
to the logic of “Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer”. From this
point of view, a number of factors explain Turkey’s changing policy towards the
KRG, some of them looking farther than the KRG and Iraq, but to the whole
region. These reasons can be reduced to four factors.
As has been pointed out by Lundgren (2007, p.4), Ankara's foreign policy
toward KRG is an extension of its domestic politics at home. Consequently the
first and most important factor is based on Turkey's strategy in its conflict with
the PKK. Turkey, from its lengthy experience, has reached the point of believing
that it is impossible to defeat the PKK through the use of military power.
Therefore, Turkey has started to apply a strategy of countering the PKK both
from the inside and the outside. Inside, Turkey initiated a peace process with its
Kurds while outside Turkey has depended on the KRG, or more precisely on
Massud Barzani the President of both the KRG and the Kurdistan Democratic
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Party (PDK) as a counterbalance to the PKK. Turkey has depended on the
political and ideological disagreements between the Kurdish parties. It has been
noticed that Turkish relations with its own Kurds are closely related to its
relationship with Iraqi Kurds (see Oktav, 2011, p.63). From this point of view,
Turkey's main goal for its alliance with the KRG stems from an underestimation
of the strength of the PKK leadership among Turkey’s Kurds on the one hand,
and the desire to show Europe and the U.S. that the PKK is not representative
of the Kurdish question in Turkey on the other. By applying this policy, Turkey
may want to shift the leadership of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey from
the PKK and Qandil to the KDP and Erbil113.That has been clearly noticeable
from Erdogan’s statements when he claims that ‘’the PKK organisation does not
represent Kurdish citizens living in Turkey’’ (Daily Sabah, 21 May 2016).
Turkey has failed to do that, especially after Turkey's 2015 general
elections, when the Peoples' Democratic Party (known as the HDP) exceeded
the 10 percent election threshold by polling 13.12 percent of the votes, and now
is the third largest political group in the Turkish Parliament. Moreover, Turkey
has used its relations with the KRG to facilitate the peace process with its own
Kurds. In November 2013, Erdoğan invited Masoud Barzani, the President of
the KRG, to its re-election campaign in the south-eastern city of Diyarbakir. That
led to objections by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) (now part of the
HDP), which saw Barzani's visit as support for Erdoğan, instead of the HDP
(see Daily News, 16 November 2013).
Arguably, Barzani's contribution to the Turkey-Kurdish peace process has
been acknowledged with a Turkish blessing. Barzani has criticised the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) policy in Syria many times. He accused the PYD
of standing with al-Assad’s regime and monopolising power in the Syrian
Kurdish region. From the AKP's perspective, engaging the KRG through a
political, economic and diplomatic alliance with Turkey, rather than isolating it, is
a vital key to get KRG support against the PKK (Gönül Tol, 2010). However, this
113 Qandil is a mountainous area of Northern Iraq near the Iraq–Iran border. The Qandil
mountain range stretches to a depth of nearly 30 kilometres inside Turkish territory. Qandil has
become a main base of the PKK and has been bombarded many times by Turkish fighter jets;
the last time was at the end of July 2015, when Turkey launched air strikes on PKK positions
inside Iraqi Kurdistan.
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view has not been feasible, since the majority of the KRG's population regard
the PKK as an extensional part of the wider Kurdish national identity.
Meanwhile, the main KDP rivals in northern Iraq, such as the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Movement for Change (Gorran) are sympathetic
towards the PKK. That national sympathy has been seen clearly during the
Islamic State (formerly ISIS) attack on the Yezidi town of Shingal in August
2014, when Kurdistan’s Peshmerga forces and the People’s Protection Units
(YPG) fought together against IS. The same has been seen when the KRG
parliament agreed to send fighters to help defend the northern Syrian city of
Kobane from Islamic State forces, after their Turkish permission to cross its
territory was received.
Second, it is true that the domestic Kurdish question in Turkey has played
an important role for Ankara's new foreign policy towards the KRG as has been
argued by Lundgren (2007, p.4) and Bingio (2014, p. 273). However, shifting
Ankara's policy towards the KRG and Iraq has not only been related to Ankara's
domestic calculations of the Kurdish question, but also has regional goals,
especially what is relevant to the Turkish rivalry with other powers in the region.
Since 2008, Turkey has considered that KRG has a greater strategic
importance than the domestic Kurdish issue. The KRG can provide Turkey with
more strategic goals, especially regarding Turkey's plan to become a centre of
the energy transfer to connect the energy-rich Middle East and Central Asia
with European energy markets (Park, 2012, p.146). It is important to note
however that initially, Turkey was reluctant to go down this road, especially
other two Turkish opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,
MHP) (see Aziz, 2015, p.189), which expected that a KRG-Turkey alliance
especially regarding energy issues could lead to a strengthening of the KRG's
position, economically and diplomatically, and thereafter a step forward towards
independence. They were correct to some extent; the KRG-Turkey energy
alliances have contributed greatly to the enhancement of the political and
diplomatic position of the KRG in the entire region.
However, it is important to note that an analysis of the Turkey-KRG
alliance cannot be entirely understood without reference to the Justice and
Development Party's (AKP) ideology, which is based on a version of
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conservative liberalism on one hand and regional leadership on the other
(Kosereisoglu, 2014). A powerful economy can play a significant role in
strengthening the state's political power. According to the Davutoğlu (2010, pp.
43, 446) doctrine, which has been driving Turkish foreign policy since 2002,
economic interests can help resolve political differences, and promote the
interdependence of the Turkish economy in the region. Turkey, in order to boost
its regional and global hegemony, has to play the role of a regional energy hub
for which Turkey's geopolitical position is suitable.
From this point of view, the Kurdistan Region can be a source for Ankara
to diversify its energy channels. Aside from that, the KRG can provide Turkey-
based energy firms with the ability to enter into the global energy sector through
Turkey's investment in the KRG oil sector (see Müftüler-Baç, 2014, p. 549;). In
addition, Erbil can provide Ankara with natural gas, which is very important to
Turkey in its negotiations with Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s GNP has
increased from $226 billion in 2000 to $794 billion in 2012, which according to
the IMF coincided with the increase in energy demand (Balci, 2014, p.17). In
2001, Turkey’s natural gas consumption was 16 billion cubic meters, while by
2011 and 2012 it had reached 46.3 billion cubic meters (see Figure 4).
In 2009, Ankara began to directly import oil from the Kurdistan region, and
the prospect of a gas pipeline serving the newly announced Nabucco pipeline
assumed greater importance for Turkey. According to the KRG's Ministry of
Natural Resources (MNR-KRG report, 25 August 2013), such an export pipeline
was expected to flow through the Kurdistan Region to Turkey by 2016. It can be
said that the Kurdistan Region's gas can mark a major watershed in the Ankara-
Erbil alliance in the region. It is important to note that in last few years the
dependency of Ankara upon Russia and Iran has been an obstacle for Turkey's
energy security, and makes Ankara unconfident regarding the Iranians and
Russians in its regional calculations, especially regarding the future of the
Syrian regime. Three-quarters of Turkey's supplies of gas and oil comes from
Russia and Iran, while the size of Kurdish gas could total approximately 200 tcf
(5.67 bcm) of natural gas reserves, which is about 3 percent of the world's total
reserves (see MNR-KRG, 25 August 2013). The KRG's oil and gas can be an
alternative to at least the gas of one of these two countries. Meanwhile, the
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KRG's gas and oil does not impose any political burden on Turkey, because of
the KRG's urgent need to sell its energy.
Furthermore, the new KRG position on the global energy map could play a
prominent role in the regional and global gas markets on one hand, and
strengthen the KRG's political, diplomatic and economic positions towards
independence in the region on the other. Turkey’s Minister of Energy and
Natural Resources Taner Yeldiz stated in 2012 that “Turkey’s future energy
requirement is 48–50 billion cubic metres of gas. Our neighbour has a
significant role to play in this” (MNR-KRG, 25 August 2013). Furthermore, the
average export volume of KRG oil exports from the Kurdistan Region via the
Iraq-Turkey pipeline started at 100,000 barrels per day in early February 2011
and reached an average of 600,769 barrels per day (bpd) in November 2015
(Ministry of Natural Resources, 11 November 2015).
Figure (2) Turkey's natural gas imports in 2012
Source: EMRA, natural gas market sector, report 2012
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The Ankara-Erbil alliance is based on a number of energy agreements,
some of which are long term contracts114. In March 2013, Turkey's Prime
Minster Erdoğan and the Kurdish Prime Minster Nechirvan Barzani signed an
agreement to build a twin pipeline for crude oil and natural gas between Turkey
and Iraq (Ministry of Natural Resource, 26 August 2013). In June 2015, Erbil
exported 17,130,639 barrels of crude oil (an average of 571,021 barrels per
day) through the Kurdistan pipeline network to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey
(Monthly report of Ministry of Natural Resources, June, 2015).
Third, Ankara's relations with the KRG may be a source of Ankara's
pressure on Baghdad. Despite this, Ankara did not prefer to break its relations
with al-Maliki's government. However, their relations have deteriorated, directly
after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. This can be attributed to a number of factors.
The issue of an arrest warrant against former Iraqi Vice-President, Tareq al-
Hashemi in December 2011, worsened relations further between Erdogan and
al-Maliki, especially when Ankara refused to hand him over to Iraq.
Furthermore, Turkey expected Iraq to be supporting Assad's regime, unlike the
Turkish government which has been strongly against Assad. Moreover,
Davutoğlu’s visit to Kirkuk without Baghdad being prior informed was another
issue that angered al-Maliki's government. Finally, there were the oil-selling
deals with the KRG on the world markets. All these disagreements between
Baghdad and Ankara can be assessed in this context. the collapse in relations
between the countries resulted in the calling of the Turkish ambassador Younis
Demerer to Baghdad in August 2012 .The Iraqi government sent a protest note
to the Turkish government about the visit of the former Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu to Kirkuk without Iraq's consent.
Fourth, the KRG-Turkey alliance could be a means of curbing Iranian
hegemony in Iraq. Ankara was long reluctant to accept the KRG as legitimate
federal entity, or to accord the KRG a prominent role in post-2003 Iraq.
However, following the U.S. withdrawal, Turkey felt it must put some eggs in the
114 In June 2014 the KRG Prime Minster Nechirvan Barzani said during a speech at the Kurdish
Parliament in Erbil, “We have signed an energy deal with Turkey that goes for 50 years and can
be extendable if necessary”. The agreement could be regarded as a secretive framework
agreement between both sides, and has provoked rejections from both Baghdad and the U.S.
(Hurriyet Daily News, 5 June 2014).
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KRG's basket, otherwise all the other players would have done this. Turkey's
keeping away from Erbil may have meant that Erbil might have turned to Iran,
which would mean full Iranian hegemony in the Iraqi arena. Ankara now through
its political and economic relations with Erbil possesses a strong voice in Iraqi
Kurdistan. The Turkey-KRG alliance has become a success story for the
“strategic depth” approach. Despite the lack of an entirely cooperative
relationship between Ankara and Baghdad, Iraq has become Turkey’s second
trade partner, as Turkish exports to Iraq have increased from $5 billion in 2009
to hit $12 billion in 2013, of which 70 percent was with the Kurdistan Region
(Hurriyet Daily News, September/15/2014).
It can be noticed that, similarly to Iran, Turkey has built institutional bases
for their influence in Iraq, especially in their political and economic links with the
KRG, and to a lesser extent with part of the Iraqi Sunnis. These institutional ties
can be exemplified through a 50-year deal for the export of Kurdish oil to Turkey
signed in November 2013. This long term oil deal between Turkey and the KRG
has angered the Iraqi central government. The Iraqi Minster of Oil Shahristani
said, “This is a hostile action that no other neighbour has taken against Iraq”
(Gulf News, June 2014). However, despite
Iraq’s and the U.S.’s rejection of this deal, which was made without the
permission of the central government, the KRG and Turkey have continued the
flow of oil from the Kurdistan Region to international markets. Until now, the
contents and terms of the deal have not been disclosed to public, the media,
and even to the international audit company Deloitte, which is working with the
KRG to provide transparency to oil revenue and production in the region (NRT,
1 January 2017). Some evidence has revealed that the agreement contains
higher security issues, particularly the deployment of Turkish troops in the KRG
and steps to minimise the influence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the
region (see Niqash, 23 May 2015).
However, it can be argued that the KRG-Ankara alliances might not be as
durable as has been claimed by some researchers, since Turkey and the KRG’s
ties and energy deals have been mostly done through the AKP's relations with
Barzani's party (the KDP). This is possible because of Barzani's leverage on the
most important parameters of the KRG's institutions, such as the premiership of
the KRG and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and being the head of
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the Kurdistan Region Security Council. All the institutions mentioned are
headed by members of the Barzani family. The KRG-Turkey relationship has
been based mostly on partisan and personal relationships, rather than
institutional relations, and this could be a source of threat to these relations at
any time. On the other hand, the Turkey-KRG alliance has been a source of
disagreement and has been criticised, particularly by the PUK and the Gorran
movement (see EKurd Daily, 21 July 2016). For instance, in July 2016
WikiLeaks released thousands of AKP emails, one of which showed that on 15
March 2016 the AKP provided the KRG President (Barzani) with $200 million in
financial aid.
Turkey’s engagement in Iraqi Kurdistan has not been only political, but has
reached the field of investments as well. In 2010, the number of Turkish
companies investing in Iraq reached 3,200, of which about 750 are operating in
the Kurdistan Region (Turkish Weekly, 2 May 2012). It can be observed that
due to the fragility of the KRG's economic infrastructure, the KRG has become
to a significant extent a region dependent on Turkish products in all aspects.
Erbil city, which is the capital of the KRG, looks more like Istanbul and Turkish
cities than an Iraqi city. Turkish exports to Iraq and the KRG have increased
over the last decade (Cagaptay, Fidan, and Sacikara, 2014). In 2007, the total
size of Turkish exports to the KRG reached $1.4 billion, which meant the KRG
was the nineteenth largest export market to Turkey. In 2011 the size of the
Turkish export to the KRG stood at $5.1 billion dollars as the sixth largest export
market. By 2013, the KRG had become the third largest export market for
Turkey (see infographic 9 and 10).
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Figure (4) Country ranking for Turkey's export destinations
Source: The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 2015
Despite the political and economic improvement of Turkey-KRG relations,
Ankara's relations with Erbil are highly driven by security dimensions,
particularly the interconnectedness of the Turkish regional security complex with
Iraq on the one hand and with Iraqi Kurds on the other. The PKK factor has
played a central role in shaping these relationships. Turkish engagement in the
KRG has been driven by both internal and regional factors. Additionally, the
KRG’s political ambitions, relations with Syrian Kurds and KRG ties with other
Figure (3)Turkish exports to Iraq with estimated exports to the KRG
Source: The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 2015
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regional powers in the region like Iran, might also have an influence on the
Ankara-Erbil alliance. It is also important to note that, the Turkish policy towards
Iraqi Kurdistan is a product of its nation-building project, which is still unstable
and a non-integrated project. This is mostly due to disagreements over the
national identity question in Turkey. Therefore, the Iraqi Kurds might remain a
source of concern for the Turkish state.
7.1.2. Looking for a role in new Iraq: Turkey’s engagement with Iraqi
Sunnis:
The Turkish engagement in Iraq can be seen through the context of
Turkey seeking for a role in the new Iraq on one hand, and the new regional
security order that has been set up after the U.S. invasion of Iraq on the other
side, in line with the redefinition of Turkey's foreign policy based on Turkey’s
historical, cultural and geopolitical position with neighbourhood countries (see
Kalin, 2011, p.13). In the beginning, Turkey was looking to make a balance
among the three main Iraqi components, which are Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd. The
reason behind this was mostly due to the rise of Kurdish power as an important
factor in Iraq and the region, as well as its influence on the other Kurdish
communities in neighbouring countries, especially in Turkey. Ankara was highly
concerned about the disintegration of the Iraqi state along ethnic and sectarian
lines, particularly because of Kurdish aspirations. Thus, Ankara's main aim was
to protect the balance among the three main groups (Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd) in
order to protect the territorial integrity of new Iraqi state (see Lundgren, 2007,
p.82). Other than the Turkmen minorities, it was difficult for Turkey to find a
loyal ally among Iraq's components. Due to this, both of post-2003 Iraq's
dominant factions, Shi'a and Kurd, were not looking for an alliance with Turkey.
The Shi'a parties were in a close knit relationship with Iran, and the Kurds were
in a frosty relationship with Turkey until 2007.
Despite Turkey's playing of Iraq's Turkmen card following the U.S.
invasion, Turkey concluded that the Turkmen could not provide Turkey a
sufficient role in the new Iraq115. That was seen when the U.S. besieged the city
115 The previous representative of the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) in Ankara stressed this point
clearly; he said, ''The strategic value of the Turkomans is very limited, we have no power, no
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of Tel Afar in 2004, during a joint operation between the U.S. Army and Iraqi
forces to destroy the suspected insurgents’ havens in the city of Tel Afar. This
incident was widely reported in Turkish media, and the U.S. was accused of
committing “massacres and ethnic cleansing'' against Turkmen. This event had
angered Turkey to take a hard stance against the U.S., and the former Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gül stated that if the U.S. military operation continued,
Ankara's relationship with Washington would be reviewed (Barkey, 2005, p.9).
The above mentioned argument supports the view that Turkey has been
looking for a prominent regional role in post-2003 Iraq. In early 2007, when the
Shi'a-Sunni tensions reached the point of civil war, Turkey tried to play a
reconciliation role in order to strike a balance between them. One of Turkey's
aims in participating in the seven-country meeting in Pakistan was to mitigate
Iranian hegemony in Iraq. However, Turkey did not break its relations with the
Shi'a groups in Iraq. During the Shi'a-Sunni conflict of Iraq, and until the U.S.
withdrawal which coincided with the arrest warrant against the Sunni Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi, Turkey did not take sides, and tried to play the role
of mediator in the region. In 2006, the Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, visited
Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and tried to maintain good relations with
both the Sunni and Shi'a axis, as well as with al-Maliki's government during that
period (CNN Turk interview with Davutoğlu, on 2 January 2008). The evidence
seems to be strong that Ankara was actively looking for a regional role, and Iraq
was a good field to provide this role to AKP's new foreign policy..
However, it was difficult for Turkey to play a mediation role and find an ally
at the same time. Turkey considered that both Shi'a and Kurds were pleased
with their new role in Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis, however, were hopelessly looking
towards a political process following the U.S. invasion, in particular after the
National Assembly elections of 30 January 2005 in Iraq and the ratification of
the Iraqi constitution, which made clear for Iraqi Sunnis that the new Iraq would
never be a Sunni-dominated Iraq.
people in the high-ranking bureaucracy and no geopolitical importance''. (Lundgren, 2007,
p.92).
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In contrast to a number of studies (for instance, Kane, 2011), it can be
argued that Turkish engagement with the Iraqi Sunnis from 2003 until 2011,
which coincided with the American withdrawal from Iraq and the issuing of an
arrest warrant against former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, cannot be
merely assessed in the sectarian context. Rather, as Kosereisoglu (2014) points
out, it could be as a result of a series of reactions to dynamic and arguably
natural strains between the AKP’s material political interests and symbolic
identity. I would argue that the Turkish involvement with Iraqi Sunni parties can
be attributed to both domestic and regional factors, which will be discussed
below.
First, Turkey through its alliance with Iraqi Sunnis could thwart the Shi'a-
Kurd dominance in the new Iraq on one hand and curb Iranian hegemony in
Iraq and the entire region on the other. This hegemony provides Iran with an
upper hand in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. These places could also be a zone of
influence for the Turkish neo-Ottoman foreign policy in the region. Moreover,
the exclusivity of Shi'a power could lead to the disintegration of the Iraqi state;
the landmarks of this disintegration become obvious regarding the Iraqi Kurds.
Also, during al-Maliki's government, the call of the Sunni region has become a
political requirement for Iraq's Sunnis.
Second, Turkey perceived that through its relationships with Iraqi Sunnis it
could acquire a card to use against the Kurdish ambition for independence. This
is due to the fact that most of the KRG's border is with Sunni Arabs, especially
territories that are called ''disputed areas'' between the KRG and the federal
government, which includes the rich oil city of Kirkuk. The Turkish alliance with
Sunnis, such as the al-Hadba party which was formed in 2009 in Ninawa, and
al-Iraqiyya List, can be said to have contributed to this context. In Turkey's
perception, Iraqi Sunnis were a buffer which kept the Iraqi state united against
the Kurdish call for independence until the U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011.
In the wake of the Arab uprising, Turkish relations with Iraq entered a new
phase. The relationship between the countries started to sour when Turkey
openly supported al-Maliki's rival Ayad Allawi in the parliamentary elections in
2010 (see Crisis Group Middle East Report, 31 July 2012). The issue of Tareq
al-Hashemi, the former Iraqi Vice President, worsened relations between al-
Maliki and Erdogan further in 2011, especially when Ankara refused to hand
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Hashemi over to Baghdad. To this extent, it has been argued that the al-
Iraqiyya bloc had been set up at Turkish former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's
residence in Ankara (Bozkurt, 2012). Furthermore, it can be argued that Turkey
also worked to bring Kurds and Arab Sunnis together to curb a Shi'a-led
government in Iraq. The KRG's President Masoud Barzani's efforts with other
Iraqi parties, especially al-Iraqiyya, against al-Maliki's power, and later the
KRG's coordination with the Turkish-backed Sunni groups, such as that of the
former governor of Mosul, Atheel al-Nujaifi, can be clear indications in that
sense.
Turkey's focus on Iraqi Sunnis can be also examined through the
extension of Iraqi Sunni identity to Syrian Sunnis. This is especially after the
Syrian conflict; the Turkish engagement in the Sunnis’ protests in Iraq's Sunni-
populated governorates (Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Diyala and Kirkuk) was
intensive. This has led Iraq's Shi'a officials to see Turkey as part of the Sunni-
led axis alongside the other Sunni-led countries in the region, against Iraqi
Shi'as. That could clearly be seen in the statements of Iraqi officials; for
example, Ali al-Moussawi (Crisis Group report, 31 July 2012, p.29), the former
adviser to al-Maliki, blamed Turkey for Sunni insurgents in Iraq and said,
''Turkey should change its policies toward Iraq; it should stop cooperating with
our communities, stop fuelling extremism, sectarianism and terrorism in Iraq
and Syria. It should establish friendly ties with the Iraqi state". By the same
token, in a Crisis Group interview in January 2013, the National Security
Minister Falih al-Fayyadh said:
This crisis is not only a domestic crisis. These are not like other protests
in the region. It is a matter of Turkish interference and reflects the Muslim
Brotherhood’s project. Some demonstrators are normal citizens who have
simple demands. But there are others who ask for the fall of everything – the
government and the constitution – and are eager for a conflict. (Crisis Group
report, 31 July 2012, p.29)
However, since late 2014, Turkey has lost control over the Sunni insurgent
groups in large sections of Iraq and Syria. To an extent, some of these Sunni
groups have turned to extreme terrorist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and
Islamic state. Therefore, there have been many formal statements from Iraq,
Syria and even the U.S. blaming Turkey for not putting enough effort into
preventing terrorist groups from entering Iraq and Syria. According to some
local reports inside Turkey, in January 2014 the Turkish National Intelligence
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Organisation (MIT) had transported a terrorist group into Tel Abyad to join the
fighting against Assad's regime in Syria (Today's Zaman, 05 June 2015)116. It
can be argued that, the Turkish involvement in Iraq and Syria has turned
Davutoğlu's doctrine of ''Zero-Problems with neighbours'' upside down with the
Shia-led countries in the region. In December 2012, the former Iraqi Prime
Minster al-Maliki in an interview with The Wall Street Journal said:
We welcome them [Turkey] on the economic cooperation front and we are
open for them, but we do not welcome interference in political matters. Turkey
interferes by backing certain political figures and blocs. We have continuously
objected about their previous ambassador's interferences and they have
admitted this interference. In political matters, they have an unacceptable
interference. (12 December 2011).
Nevertheless, Turkey tried to recast its sectarian approach with the Iraqi
Shi'a in November 2013. In this context, Turkey's former Foreign Minister
Davutoglu visited the Iraqi Shi'a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, and met a
number of prominent Shi'a leaders including Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani and
Muqtada al-Sadr. His visit was mainly intended to rebuild its relationships
between both countries and eliminate sectarian barriers (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12
November 2013). However, relations between both sides remained within the
context of sectarian polarisation, in particular after Turkey’s military intervention
near Mosul and asserting its desire to participate in the liberation of Mosul in
October 2016. The previous Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki accused Turkey of
losing Mosul after he was blamed by the investigative committee report for the
fall of the city of Mosul to the Islamic State (ISIS) in June 2014117 (Aljazeera,
2015).
116 According to the Cumhuriyet report, which was based on the court record of an investigation,
the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) had been involved in transporting Islamic
State fighters and weapons by passenger buses to Tel Abyad in Syria. Turkish police had found
weapons on two passenger buses in the Southern city of Adana. Further, significant amounts of
ammunition had been found in these buses. The bus drivers confessed that MIT had rented
them to deliver these fighters and weapons to Syria, under the guise of transporting refugees.
For more details see Today's Zaman, 05 June 2015.
117 In July 2015 the Iraqi Vice President, Nuri al-Maliki stated in Tehran that "The fall of Mosul
was the result of a conspiracy which was manufactured in Erbil in cooperation with the Turks
and intelligence services in Ankara." Maliki's statement came after his name was placed at the
top of the list of the Iraqi parliament’s report regarding the fall of Mosul city to the Islamic State
group (ISIS) (RUDAW 16/8/2015).
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It is important to observe, however, that despite the Turkish involvement in
Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion, the success of Turkey's policy in post-2003
Iraq remains limited in scale. This can be attributed to several factors. The
Turkish involvement in Iraq remains somewhat suspicious in the eyes of the
three main components of Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd. This is especially so regarding
the longstanding Turkish nationalist desire for the annexation of Mosul and
Kirkuk to Turkey, which has been brought up by the Turkish nationalist elite
from time to time (see Aras, 2004, p.105). In the advent of the Arab upheavals,
Turkey's regional policy descended into its joining with the Sunni axis,
especially after Turkey's involvement in Syria and its supporting for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia. Turkey lost its neutrality in dealing with
Middle Eastern political issues. Therefore, the Turkish policy towards Iraq will
remain a source of concern for Iraqi Shi'as. These concerns reached a peak in
October 2016 when Turkey's parliament voted to extend the deployment of an
estimated 2,000 troops in northern Iraq (in Bashiqa camp), training Sunni
fighters and Kurdish Peshmarga preparing for participation in the battle for the
liberation of Mosul. This led to political and diplomatic tensions between
Baghdad and Ankara. The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi condemned the
vote and warned of a potential regional war if Turkish troops remained in Iraq
(The Telegraph, 5 October 2016). The Turkish attitude has been viewed as an
attempt toward creating a Sunni buffer in Mosul against the Shi’a-dominated
government and Iranian influence in the region. Regarding the thesis’s RSCT
argument, Turkey gradually became more active in Iraq through its processes of
desecuritisation with Iran, which is clear in the case of Bashiqa, Tal Afar and
Shingal (see Manis and Kaválek, 2016). A security analyst and former adviser
to the Turkish military, Metin Gurcan, told Al Jazeera ‘’the U.S. believes that
Turkey is trying to create a Sunni power-house around Mosul and it is not
necessarily against this idea, a Sunni entity in northern Iraq may reduce Iran's
influence in this region, and the U.S. would appreciate that," (Al-Jazeera, 14
October 2016).
However, Turkey’s policy toward Iraqi Sunnis is not necessarily about
curbing Iranian influence in Iraq. It is about using the Iraqi Sunnis as a political
card in case Turkey wants to put pressure on the Shi’a-centric government or
Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, Turkey has had historical links with Mosul, which gives
Turkey the claim to see it as a possible sphere of influence for them in new Iraq.
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In addition, the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) presence after 2014 in
Shingal, and their coordination with Iraqi government also should not be
underestimated in this regard. Agid Civian, the commander of the (PKK)
acknowledged that the Iraqi government had provided YPS (Shingal Protection
Units, which were set up by the PKK during Daesh’s occupation of Shingal) with
logistics, weapons and monthly wages (Rudaw, 15 August 2016). On the other
hand, Turkish involvement in Iraq, as has been discussed earlier, has been part
of the ethnic and sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq, which has not been hidden
by Turkish officials. In October 2016, Erdogan clearly confirmed this when he
said that "only Sunni Arabs, Turkmen and Sunni Kurds should remain [in
Mosul]" (Al-Jazeera, 2016).
Regarding the Kurds, despite the fruitful alliance between Ankara and
Erbil, the Kurds are cautiously looking at these relations. Many Iraqi Kurdish
parties, especially the PUK and the Gorran movement, see Turkey as using the
KRG as a card to pressure the PKK on one hand, and as a vassal of Turkey
through the KRG's economic dependence on Turkey on the other. Meanwhile,
some Iraqi Sunnis have looked cautiously at the Turkish engagement in the
state-building process, in particular with the Kurds and Turkmen minorities.
After 2011, the Turkish rapprochement to the al-Hadba party, which was led by
Atheel al-Nujaifi in Mosul, and the Iraqi Kurds, became a source of concern for
some Iraqi nationalist politicians. The issue of vilayet Mosul, which was part of
the Ottoman Empire, still remains in the mentality of Iraqis (see Aras, 2004,
p.105). However, it is important to note that Turkey has been successful in
establishing links with a part of the Iraqi Sunnis through building institutional
bases of influence in Iraq. The Turkish military employment in the Bashiqa
camp in northern Iraq, training Sunni and Kurdish local fighters for the battle to
recapture Mosul at the end of 2016, can be analysed in this context. It can be
argued that this kind of engagement by both Turkey and Iran has been a
remarkable influence in favour of these countries’ presence, not only in Iraq's
political arena but also in the entire region.
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7.2. What Turkey’s leverage means for others in the Iraq: Syria’s and
Iran’s concerns
Traditionally, the most vulnerable of Turkish borders are the ones shared
with Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Imai, 2016, p.27). This can be better understood
through the regional security complex, particularly, when it comes to the
regional foreign policy agendas of Iran and Syria, as key actors in a penetrated
regional system (see Ehtishami and Hinnebusch, 1997)118. The security
dependency between members and their regional leadership role, has provided
these actors (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) with a durable pattern of
amity and hostility (based on thesis theoretical areas). Therefore, the influence
of Turkey in Iraq as a penetrated state has become a source of concern for
others in the region, in particular Iran and Syria. The following sections will
examine these concerns, and how the leverage of one country in the region is
viewed as domination by the others.
7.2.1. The implications of Turkey's influence in Iraq: Iran's concerns
Despite the position of Turkey as an insulator state which sits among
number of sub-regional complexes, such as the Balkans, Caucasus, Levant,
Gulf, Maghreb, and Central Asia (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.41), the
Justice and Development Party's dominance regarding Turkey's domestic and
foreign policy after 2002 provided Turkey's policy with a strong push towards
engagement with most regional issues, mainly in Iraq and Syria. This has led to
Turkey’s becoming an active part of the Middle East RSC. Nonetheless,
Davutoğlu's guideline of ''strategic depth'', in which the Middle East has an
important position, did not come at the right time. This was mostly due to the
118 It is worth considering that the role of Syria as a middle power in the global system and a
key actor in the regional system (Levant) has changed after the Syrian crisis in 2011, from
interfering state to interfered-with state, from bully to target. Syria, following the 2011 Arab
uprisings, has become a battleground among other regional powers, namely the Iran-led Shi'a
countries on one hand, and Saudi- and Turkey-led countries on the other. While Syrian impact
on Iraq cannot be overlooked, whether as a neighbouring country of Iraq or as a political, ethnic,
sectarian and regional extension of Iraq, what has changed regarding the Syrian influence on
Iraq is its role, but not its influence. So far, the Syrian crisis has played a key role in the Iraqi
scene and this could continue for an indefinite period.
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fact that, since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, both the Persian Gulf and the Levant
have become part of the political, ethnic and religious crisis which is on-going
across the region. Meanwhile, Turkey's engagement in regional issues has not
occurred without it taking sides. This is especially the case from the Arab
upheavals onwards; Ankara's policy was based on supporting Muslim
Brotherhood movements, alongside Qatar, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt and
Syria (Keyman and Gümüşçü, 2014, pp. 93-94). Turkey has been heavily
involved in Syria and the backing of Sunni extremist groups alongside the
Saudi-led Sunni front, as well as being part of the Saudi-led bombing campaign
against Shi'a rebels in Yemen. In addition to supporting Sunni parties against
al-Maliki's Shi'a-led government in Iraq, all these attitudes make Turkey appear
as a durable part of Levant and Gulf's sub-regional complexes on the one hand,
and as a hostile axis to the rising of the so-called Shi'a powers in the region led
by Iran. If the U.S. invasion paved the way for the Turkish-Iranian
rapprochement (see Koprulu, 2009, p.195), the U.S. withdrawal has done the
opposite. Considering Turkish heavy engagement in the processes of
securitisation in both Syria and Iraq, the regional level is crucial for security
analysis, in line with the thesis RSCT (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.47). From
this point of view there are three areas (factors) that may shape a RSC between
Ankara and Tehran and provoke Iranian concerns towards Turkey's involvement
in post-2003 Iraq.
First, in the Iranian perception, Turkey's influence in Iraq can be seen as a
concern for undermining the Shi'a-led government that was founded after the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Ankara's support for the Iraqiyya List against al-Maliki,
Ankara's hosting of former Vice President Tareq al-Hashimi in 2012, and
Turkey's support for Sunni insurgent groups in the Iraqi Sunni provinces, and
Turkey’s deployment of troops near Mosul in 2016, can be assessed in this
framework.
Second, Turkey's involvement in Iraq can be seen as an obstruction for
Iran extending its hegemony among Shi'a-led countries in the region. Since the
U.S. invasion, Iran has been working intensively in order to make a kind of Shi'a
crescent to link Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This crescent can have
geopolitical, military and economic benefits for Iranian leverage in the region.
The most important economic strategy for that crescent can be observed in the
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Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline project, or what is being called the Islamic Pipeline,
which was agreed in July 2012, just a few months after the Syrian crisis began.
This project is for a pipeline with a capacity of 110 million cubic meters of gas
per day, which provides Iran with a supply of natural gas from Iran and Iraq to
the Mediterranean coast of Syria and then on to Europe (see Minin, 2013;
Ahmed, 2013).
The Islamic Pipeline project was viewed from the Sunni countries and
Turkey's side as a Shi'a pipeline project against the Nabucco-West pipeline
(also called as the Turkey–Austria gas pipeline) which could supply the KRG
with potential supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Egypt, with gas to
the Turkish-Bulgarian border and then on to Austria (Hurriyet Daily News, 30
September 2010). The main aim of this project is to diversify the natural gas
suppliers for Europe, therefore reducing European dependence on Russian
energy. The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline, if achieved, would make Iran completely
independent of the transit ways of Qatar and Turkey leading to Europe. The
project could mark a major watershed in regional relations and the balance of
power in the region.
Third, Tehran views Ankara’s leverage in Iraq as a significant obstacle to
its desire to extend its hegemony in the region. The Turkish military base in
Bashiqa, in order to train Sunni fighters and Kurdish Peshmarga preparing for
engagement in the operations against IS in Mosul is an example of that (The
Telegraph, 5 October 2016). Moreover, Ankara's active engagement in regional
issues, especially after the Arab uprisings in Iraq, Syria and Yemen alongside
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is a strong indication of this. During the Saudi-led
intervention in Yemen, Erdoğan accused Iran in a press conference in March
2015 when he said ''Iran is trying to dominate the region'' (Al Arabiya, 27 March
2015). Erdoğan regarded himself as a member of the Saudi-led coalition when
he said that Iranian behaviour ''has begun annoying us, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf countries. This is really not tolerable and Iran has to see this,” (see Today’s
Zaman, 12 April 2015).
Fourth, Tehran has been worried about the Turkish-KRG alliance in Iraq.
This is mostly due to the fact that from the Iranian standpoint, Ankara's
hegemony on the political and economic sphere in Iraqi Kurdistan provides
Turkey with further control on the Kurdish issue, not only in Iraq but also in Iran,
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Syria and Turkey. This can be seen as a threat to Iran, as it allows Turkey to
play the Kurdish card in other parts. This is because of the political, diplomatic
and economic position of the KRG on one hand, and the KRG's influence
towards Kurdish movements and parties in the region on the other. The Kurdish
card has played an important role in the regional conflicts between Iran, Turkey,
Syria and Iraq119. KRG political officials have mentioned many times that Iran
has asked them to allow it to transfer weapons to the Syrian regime through
KRG territory. A Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) advisor Baram Majeed Khan
is quoted as saying that “Iran is worried about the fact that the Kurdistan Region
has strong economic and commercial ties with Turkey” and added, “Iran feels
that Turkey has crept into the Kurdistan Region more than it should” (Idiz,
2013).
Fifth, Iran sees Turkey as a buffer to the west and the U.S. in the region
(see Weitz, 2011). In September 2011, Erdoğan accepted the deployment of
NATO's missile shield in Turkey, even without the consent of parliament.
Despite Ankara insisting that the missiles were not against Iran, Iranian officials
regarded this as a serious threat to the security and military balance in the
region. Tehran warned that they would attack Israel and Turkey, if the U.S. or
Israel attacked Iran (Akyol, 2012). Furthermore, a few days after the nuclear
deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut
Cavusoglu called on Iran to play a constructive role, review its regional policies
and abandon sectarian politics, specifically in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon (Bekdil,
2015).
However, despite the abovementioned concerns (areas of conflict) that
Iran has towards Turkey, it is hard to say if their divergent interests in Iraq will
lead to a direct clash between them. The last two decades of their bilateral
relations in the region show us that relations between Ankara and Tehran can
be more converged than diverged, whether related to the integration of the Iraqi
state, thwarting Kurdish ambitions, and regional stability in the region, or
regarding economic interests, such as Turkey's dependence on Iranian natural
gas. To this extent, Tehran is still the second largest supplier of natural gas and
oil to Ankara after Russia; in 2014 Turkish-Iranian trade amounted to $14 billion
(Reuters, 7 Apr 2015).
119 This factor has been mentioned in more detail in previous chapters.
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The most divergent factor in Turkish-Iranian relations has been the Syrian
crisis, which has distanced Baghdad from Ankara and brought it closer to
Tehran. While the relations between both countries have not been without the
playing of bargaining games in Iraq, both have accepted their leverages in Iraq.
Turkey has acknowledged Iranian dominance in Baghdad, and to some extent,
Iran has also recognised Turkish leverage in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the meantime, it
is important to know that Iran has a prominent regional role in the AKP's
doctrine of ‘’strategic depth’’ (see Davutoglu, 2010, pp. 389-395). Iran and
Turkey (Egypt was the third) are seen as two main axes of the regional triangle.
The evidence seems to be strong that Iraq will remain as a sphere of influence
between Iran and Turkey and the sustainability dynamics of this competition will
be the Kurdish issue, the Shi'a-Sunni conflict, and economic issues, in particular
energy issues. All of these mentioned factors will be the fuel of regional conflict
over Iraq among Iraq's neighbours (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria). The
above discussion showed the sensitivity of the regional security complex of
Iraq's neighbours, and how this complexity contributed to the state-building
process (ethno-sectarian conflict) following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This is to
say the regional security complex position of the international relations between
Iraq and its neighbours has made sure that the state-building process in Iraq
cannot be divorced from its regional dimensions, especially regarding Iraq's four
neighbours addressed in this thesis.
7.2.2. The ramifications of Turkey's leverage in Iraq: Syria's concerns
Over the past 20 years, Turkish-Syrian relations have gone through a
durable pattern of amity and enmity. From 1998 to 2011 positive relations were
enjoyed, which after 2011 totally collapsed (Scheller, 2013, p.116). Syria’s
concerns regarding Turkey's domination in Iraq can be explained in good part
through the patterns of rivalry, balance of power, and alliance, as a durable
pattern of RSC among the main powers in the region (see Buzan and Wæver,
2003, p.47).. Turkey's security in Iraq and the region means insecurity for Syria
and others (according to the thesis theory RSC). From this point of view, Syria
has a number of reasonable concerns regarding Turkey's domination of the
Iraqi arena, whether prior to the Syrian crisis or during the Syrian crisis. It can
be argued that since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Syrian policy towards Iraq
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has been motivated by two key factors: the nationalist dimension of the Syrian
policy was expressed in Syria’s opposition to the U.S. occupation of an Arab
country. However, after the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Syrian perspective has
shifted from nationalist motivations to sectarian motivations (at least in the eyes
of Sunnis). Turkey's regional policy, particularly after 2011, has been firmly on
the opposite side to Syria's sectarian axis, which is provoking further reaction
from Damascus.
It is important to know that events in Iraq have always been seen as a
regional extension to Syria, especially the political events in both countries,
which can be highly interrelated. This is to say that whoever has the upper hand
in Iraq, can have the upper hand in the entire region. This is namely the case
since the start of the Syrian civil war; Iraq has swung to the Iranian-led Shi'a
orbit in the regional chess board. Meanwhile, since the start of the Syrian crisis,
Turkey has openly joined the conflict through supporting Syrian opposition
groups against Assad's regime both logistically and financially (see chapter
five). In Syria's perception, Turkish leverage in Iraq can provide Turkey with two
important pressure cards against Syria.
Firstly, Turkey through its leverage in Iraq can use the Iraqi Sunni card,
which has been a crucial part of the Syrian crises after 2011, against Assad's
Alawite regime in Syria. The sectarian sympathies between Iraqi Arab Sunnis
and Syrian Arab Sunnis have been a part of both the Syrian crisis and the
dominance of the Islamic State in Iraq, when the latter captured the Mosul
governorate in June 2014. Since the Arab uprisings, Turkey's regional role
among Sunni groups has been significant. Turkey's presence from Gaza, to the
Syrian opposition stretching, to northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, then to the
Turkish alliance with Iraqi Sunnis, can be assessed in the context of Turkey's
ambition towards creating a "Sunni crescent" in the region (see Karaveli, 2012).
Syria therefore sees Turkey as a definite threat to Syrian national security.
However, despite Turkish engagement with Iraqi Sunnis after 2003, there has
been little evidence that Turkey exploited the Iraqi Sunnis against the Syrian
regime after 2011.
Secondly, Turkey's leverage in Iraq will enable further Turkish influence
on the Iraqi Kurds that have been playing a prominent role in the region after
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This can provide Turkey with an opportunity to
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capitalise on the Iraqi Kurds, towards influencing the course of events inside
Syrian Kurdish areas. Turkey has cooperated substantially with the KRG and its
President Barzani to play a key role in shaping the Syrian Kurdish opposition
(see Cagaptay and Evans, 2012, p.7). Ankara has made every effort to prevent
the PKK from establishing a Kurdish entity in Syria120.
In the meantime, Iraq had long been a source of economic benefits for
Syria. On 23 April 1952, the Iraq-Syria pipeline, which connected the Kirkuk oil
fields in the Kurdistan region of Iraq to the Syrian port of Banias on the
Mediterranean, was opened, and has been a source of windfall profit for Syria
of around $1 billion per year (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 13 December
2007).121 The reconstruction of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline was a key demand in
Syrian-U.S. negotiations over Iraq during November 2007, in the Middle East
peace conference in Annapolis. However, Turkey's hegemony in Iraq
undermined this plan; Turkey’s flow of northern Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk–
Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (also known as the Iraq–Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline) has an
operational capacity of 400,000 barrels per day (Monthly report of Ministry of
Natural Resources, June, 2015). Northern Iraq has become Turkey's sphere of
influence in the region, not only politically through the Ankara-Erbil alliance, but
also economically.
120 In late July 2015, Turkey proposed a "safe zone" be carved out in Syria in order to allow
some Syrian refugees in Turkey to return to the secure zone. However, such a proposal is not
without political gains for Turkey, especially regarding Kurdish ambitions. The leader of the HDP
(People's Democratic Party) Selahattin Demirtas told the BBC that, ''Turkey's real intention was
to make an incursion into Kurdish areas in Syria so as to stop Syrian Kurds from controlling
contiguous territory'' (BBC, 29 July 2015).
121 The Kirkuk-Banias pipeline that was built in the early 1950s was the target of a U.S. airstrike
during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. After the U.S invasion, the pipeline has become a target of
Sunni insurgent groups several times, and has been completely out of action since the war
began in 2003. The pipeline has a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day. In 2007, Russia's
Stroitransgaz Company was awarded the repair job for the Iraqi side. However, in April 2009,
the contract was abolished because the company expected that the rehabilitation of the existing
pipeline would be more costly than building a new pipeline. Thus, Iraq and Syria reached to an
agreement in September 2010 to build two new pipelines. One of them has the capability of 1.5
million barrels per day (240×103 m3/d) by carrying heavier crude oil, while the other pipeline,
which would carry lighter crude oil, has the ability of 1.25 million barrels per day (199×103
m3/d). For more details, see Hafidh and Newswires, 2010; Bloomberg Business, 2010.
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Although Syria has been removed from the list of major players in the
region, Syria will play a central role as a battleground in the broader struggle for
regional hegemony. This has significantly influenced the process of state-
formation in post-2003 Iraq becoming part of the regional dimensions of ethno-
sectarian conflict. The Syrian crisis has affected Turkey’s role as an insulator
state in the region. After the Syrian civil war, Ankara failed to build its security
community with its neighbours. Meanwhile, its doctrine of 'zero problem with
neighbours' has totally collapsed (Imai, 2016, p. 28). The inflow of refugees and
foreign fighters has reduced Ankara's ability to control its borders, while military
activities, societal threats and its RSC with its neighbours have been
increased.122 After the Syrian crisis the stability of Iraq and the entire region
has been linked to stability in Syria. The regional security complex structure of
the region (Persian Gulf and Levant), in addition to the ethno-denominational
composition of the alliance in the region, has created further tensions with
regard to the security dynamic.
It is important to note, however, that although according to the Status of
Forces Agreement Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) the role of U.S.
troops in Iraq after 2011 would be advisable, in term of security (control of
airspace, counterterrorism and training Iraqi forces) and policy (reassurance to
neighbours and continued U.S. engagement), the role of the U.S. must not be
underestimated whether in Iraq or in the Persian Gulf sub-region after the U.S.
departure in Iraq. At the end of 2016, the U.S. had about 500 Special Forces in
Syria, and more than 5,000 in Iraq in assistance, training and advisory roles as
part of the military operation against the Islamic State (Cox, 2017).
The international developments have also contributed to Turkey's
involvement in post-2003 Iraq. The role of both the UN and U.S. has been
important during a dispute over Turkish deployment of some 150 troops and 25
tanks to a base in the Iraqi Nineveh province at the end of 2015. This is
especially noteworthy after U.S. President Obama’s call to Turkey to wıthdraw
122 In 2016 the number of refugees who crossed over the Turkish-Syrian border is nearly
5,000,000; 2,800,000 of these are in Turkey. Also, in 2015, the Turkish government declared
that they have detained 913 foreign fighters. For more see Imai, K., 2016. Rethinking the
Insulator State: Turkey’s Border Security and the Syrian Civil War. Eurasia Border Review, 7(1),
pp.19-29.
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any military forces in Iraq that are “not authorized by the Iraqi government”
(Kalin, 7 January 2016). To an extent, the Baghdad complaint to the UN
Security Council pushed Turkey to withdraw some troops to Iraqi Kurdistan.
However, the international factor that is represented by the United Nations has
not been effective in directing Turkish engagement in Iraq. This might be largely
because of the dominance of both great and regional powers in the region
which have been challenged the UN's ability in the Persian Gulf and Levant.
7.3 Conclusion: State-building as a regional security complex
Turkey's involvement in the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq has
been driven by two major complex and interrelated factors, of which the
sectarian factor has been the weaker. As has been analysed, the Kurdish
question as a RSC has been one of the main factors that directed Turkey's
involvement in the post-2003 Iraq. The Turkey-KRG alliance was a result of this
policy, not the cause. Preventing the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from
transforming Iraqi Kurdistan to its safe haven for their political and military
activates has been the essence of this policy. Moreover, Ankara through its
alliance with the KRG and namely Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party wanted
to inhibit the PKK from representing the Kurdish national identity in Turkey on
one hand, and isolate the PKK from the political process in Iraqi Kurdistan on
the other. That is to say, Ankara through its political and economic alliance with
Erbil stopped the emergence of the Kurdish Syrian model, which has been
dominated by the PKK's wing the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya
Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) in Northern Iraq. Although Erdoğan used the Sunni
identity from time to time, Turkey’s engagement in the state-building process in
post-2003 Iraq, in contrast to those of other neighbours of Iraq, has not been
through ethnic and sectarian kinship. It has been mainly through the Iraqi Kurds
and to a much less through Iraqi Sunnis and Turkmen. This has provided
Ankara an opportunity to design its leverage in Iraq through building institutional
ties with the KRG, and, to a lesser extent, with Iraqi Sunnis, in contrast to other
players, like Saudi Arabia and Syria, which have lacked the ability to build such
institutional links with Iraq's main components.
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It is true that Davutoglu’s political paradigm of the “strategic depth”
framework has contributed to Turkish engagement in Iraq, although this has not
been the essential factor for the Turkish policy towards post-2003 Iraq..
Turkey’s engagement with both Iraqi Sunnis and the Turkmen minority has
been a sub-factor. Turkey has played a complicated and pragmatic game
through its engagement with these ethnic and sectarian identities, utilising both
the Sunni and Turkmen cards against Shi'a dominance and, once again,
against Kurdish ambitions. Of note is that, at the same time, it used the KRG
against the Shi'a-led government in Baghdad. Iraq's territorial integrity of Iraq
and the threat of federalism was feared by Turkey until the withdrawal of the
U.S. from Iraq and the beginning of the Syrian crisis, after which Turkish policy
has been more understanding toward these issues.
Thus Turkey's engagement approach in post-2003 Iraq provided Turkey
with political pressure cards against both Shi'a and Kurds on one hand, and
with the utilisation of Erbil against Baghdad on the other. Despite Turkey's
condition as a passive and insulator power according to the RSCT, since the
U.S. invasion of Iraq Turkey's position has been more active as a part of Middle
East RSC. Turkey kept its regional leverage in both Iraq and the region, which
has enabled Turkey to compete with other actors in the region, namely Iran.
Turkish military involvement in northern Iraq and in the process of the liberation
of Mosul can be best exemplified in this context. All this suggests that the
factors motivating Turkish engagement, i.e. security factors (the Kurdish
question and protection of Iraqi unity) and seeking a regional role (Turkey’s
engagement with Iraqi Sunni and Turkmen, then the KRG) are factors which
have together contributed in general to the regional dimension of the state-
building process in post-2003 Iraq.




This research has intended to find out the engagement of Iraq's regional
neighbours (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) in the state-building process
from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq until the end of 2016. The relationship
between ethno-sectarianism and state-building within its regional dimensions
has been examined from an international security perspective. This thesis found
that ethnic and religious conflicts have been an enduring part of Iraq's
neighbours' engagement in the process of state-building in post-2003 invasion
of Iraq123. The reason for this is that the ethnic and sectarian conflict in post-
2003 Iraq has interconnected with the regional security dynamics of Iraq’s
neighbours within the framework of the regional security complex. . The
theoretical tools of RSC has contributed to answering the thesis research
question of how and why Iraqi neighbours have been involved in the state-
building process and ethno-sectarian conflict in post-war Iraq. I have found that
Iraq's neighbours have interacted with Iraq through multiple levels of internal
and external factors. The internal factors can be demonstrated through regimes’
domestic instability, which has largely been shaped along ethno-sectarian
conflict in both Iraq and the entire region, and external factors through the rivalry
and balance of power (based on the thesis theory of RSC). The thesis
conclusion can be summarised in the following sections.
123 For the purposes of this thesis, Iraq’s neighbours refer specifically to Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Syria.
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The beginning of the contagion: The U.S. model of state-8.1.
building in Iraq
The political architecture that was fashioned by the U.S. in post-2003 Iraq
was in itself a major cause of regional interference in the state-building process
and thereafter ‘the ethno-sectarian conflict’ in Iraq. The 2003 U.S. version of
state-building in Iraq was built with similar methods and mentality as British
implemented eight decades ago in Iraq. If the British version of state-building in
the 1920s and 30s had led to a Sunni-dominated state, the U.S. version after
2003 has led to a Shi'a-dominated state. This is not because of the U.S.'s
support of the Shi'a, but because of the state-building model which was
fashioned by the CPA in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion. Both models failed
(so far) to produce a secure foundation for a nation-state to integrate the three
main groups (Kurd, Shi’a Arab and Sunni Arab) in the body of the modern Iraqi
state. Almost all the U.S. steps of rebuilding the Iraqi state, from the Iraqi
Government Council, the Iraq Interim Government, the process of de-
Ba’athification, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi parliamentary
elections of 2005, the constitutional process, to the calls for ethnic-based
federalism, all these significant milestones of the state-building process have
led to the effective dismantling of the Iraqi state and therefore contributed to the
regional involvement in post-2003 Iraq. This is mostly due to the interaction of
Iraq's neighbours’ ethno-denominational demographic composition with Iraq’s
socio-political structure. To an extent, not only from the perspective of the
political elite, but also from the viewpoint of Iraq's components, any type of
state-building process in Iraq is seen as a redistribution of power among Iraq's
three main groups (Shi’a Arab, Sunni Arab and Kurd). The British version of
state-building, which had been rejected by both Shi’a and Kurd, and the U.S.
version of Shi’a-centric government which has also been rejected by Arab
Sunnis, are strong indications of that.
The previously mentioned view spread regionally after the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003. The redistribution of power among Iraqi groups became part of
Iraq’s regional neighbours’ concerns, particularly in its ethnic and sectarian
structure, due to cross-border ethnic and religious links between Iraq's groups
on the one hand and Iraq's neighbours on the other. The Turkish concerns
regarding the Kurdish question and Saudi Arabia's fears of a Shi'a-dominated
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state in post-2003 Iraq are the best examples in this context. Based on the
thesis discussion, it can be argued that Iraq's state-formation is not merely
Iraq's internal issue, but at the same time is also a regional issue. An important
example of this is the model of ethnic-based federalism in Iraq after 2003. The
Iraqi federalisation project has been facilitated by the regional engagement in
the Iraq's internal affairs after 2003. As Kanan Makiya (cited in Salamey and
Pearson, 2005, p. 200) points out, the calls for federalism have boosted ethno-
sectarian tensions among states bordering Iraq, especially in the countries
which have the same ethnic and religious mosaic as Iraq. This fragile form of
federalism has led to further fragmentation among these identities and has
stretched beyond national borders.
State-building as regional security complex dynamics8.2.
One of the central issues that this study has identified regarding Iraq's
neighbours’ involvement in Iraq is a constant interaction among three main
variables (processes): security complex dynamics, ethno-sectarian conflict and
the state-building process in post-2003 Iraq (see figure 7). The thesis shows
that one of the main reasons of Iraq's neighbours’ involvement in the process of
state-building in post-2003 Iraq can be attributed to the enduring interaction
between regional security complex dynamics that have been reshaped after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq on the one hand, and the process of state-building in post-
2003 Iraq on the other. This is mainly because of Iraq's neighbours' security
interconnectedness within the framework of regional security complex with one
another, and also with Iraq's ethno-denominational composition. The interaction
between Iraq's socio-political structure, particularly its ethnic and religious
communities, with those of its neighbours, has become critical to Iraq's
neighbours’ stability and their regional role.
The four states that have been addressed in this study are linked with Iraq
through multiply multiplicity of domestic, regional and international security
factors. The domestic factors have mostly been formed by ethnic and sectarian
discord as security threats on the one hand, and RSC dynamics on the other;
and this have played a major role in Iraq's neighbours' interference in the state-
building process in Iraq. On this basis, Turkey’s interference in Iraq has been
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driven by both domestic and regional factors. However the domestic level has
been the critical one. Turkey's active engagement with Iraqi Kurds after 2003 is
a strong indication towards this. Ankara wanted to prevent the ethnic/political
influence of the Iraqi Kurds on the Turkish Kurds, and the influence of the PKK
on the KRG. With regard to Syria’s involvement in post-2003 Iraq all three levels
of RSC (domestic, regional, international) have been in play: protecting the
regime inside and preventing the spillover of the ethnic and sectarian conflict
into Syrian territory. Meanwhile, Syria was looking for a regional role in post-
2003 Iraq; especially after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in the end of
April 2005, Syria felt isolated from its role as a regional player. The presence of
the U.S. and the possibility for Syria to become the next target for invasion have
been other factors of concern to the Syrian regime.
However, in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran the regional levels of
security have a much more powerful role than domestic factors. That is to say
that both Tehran and Riyadh have been less driven by their domestic factors,
which at the same time means that both the Shi'a factor in Saudi Arabia and the
Kurdish and Sunni factors in Iran have been lesser challenges for the domestic
security in these two states. Iranian and Saudi engagement in the state-building
process (and ethno-sectarian conflict) in post-2003 Iraq have been for both
mostly for either building regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf, or countering
each other's hegemony in the region. That is not to say that domestic levels of
security were not in play; Saudi Arabia have also invested domestically in
showing the Shi’a factor as a threat to legitimise its regime at home, and Iran
has interacted with the Iraqi Kurds with a watchful eye on its own Kurdish
population. However, the Iranian support for the Shi'a-dominated government in
Baghdad and Saudi Arabia's efforts to weaken Shi’a-centric state-building have
been essential parts of their involvement in post-2003 Iraq, thereafter altering
the regional security order. The thesis also found that, despite the variation of
the intensity of the Kurdish question among Iraq's neighbours (Turkey, Iran and
Syria), the Kurdish issue has been part of the shaping of the RSC of Iraq's
neighbours that have Kurdish minorities. Ankara, Tehran and Damascus to
varying degrees have concerns about Iraqi Kurdish status in post-2003 Iraq.
Moreover, the thesis found that both Turkey and Iran have engaged
through building institutional bases and cementing long-standing relationships
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with Iraqi components. Ankara has built institutional ties with the KRG and part
of the Iraqi Sunnis, while Tehran has built long-term political, religious,
economic, and security links with the Shi'a and part of the Iraqi Kurds (such as
the PUK). In contrast to Turkey and Iran, both Saudi Arabia and Syria have
lacked the ability to build durable institutional links with Iraqi components, and
this has been a main reason behind the weak position of both these two
countries in the state-building process in post-war Iraq.
The Syrian crisis after 2011 has further demonstrated the regional security
dynamics of the ethnic and sectarian rivalry in the region. One question that can
be drawn from above discussion is, to what extent has the state-building
process in post-2003 Iraq been part of the ethnic and sectarian conflict among
Iraq's neighbours? The following section seeks to answer this question.
State-building as an ethnic and sectarian conflict in the region8.3.
As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq there has been a shift in the ethnic and sectarian tensions, not
only on the level of domestic politics but also on the level of international
relations, particularly in the Persian Gulf sub-region. The victory of the Shi'a list
of the United Iraqi Alliance in the January 2005 parliamentary election, gaining
48 percent of the Iraqi votes, constituted a turning point in Iraq’s ties with its
neighbours. After the withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Iraq at the end of 2011,
and especially in the wake of Syrian crisis, the regional security order has been
shaped by the new interstate polarisation, which has been based on the ethno-
sectarian identities as a part of regional security dynamics. To an extent, in the
wake of the Syrian crisis the four mentioned regimes, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Syria, and even Iraq, have responded to the crisis according to the
wider ethno-denominational calculations and the balance of power in the region.
Furthermore, one of the themes to emerge from my analysis of the
regional dimensions of ethnic and sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq was the
role of non-state actors. Non-state actors, such as the KRG, the PKK, Shi’a
militia groups, Sunni extremist groups, and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida
and IS, have played a significant role on the domestic, regional and global
levels as securitising actors, alongside state, and sometimes as proxy allies
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with state-actors in escalating the relations between these three processes:
state-building, ethno-sectarian conflict, and regional security dynamics. Based
on the thesis theoretical area, the permeability of the Iraqi state or in Ayoub's
(p.190) words ''the low level of social cohesion'' has been a main reason behind
this penetration. In this context, this thesis explored the powerful contributions
that non-state actors have made to the regional neighbours’ involvement in the
both state-building process and ethno-sectarian tensions in post-2003 Iraq.
It is interesting to note that in all four cases of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
and Syria's engagements in the state-building process in Iraq, the ethno-
religious calculation has been a persistent factor for Iraq's neighbours'
engagement. The main factor which has transferred the ethno-sectarian discord
from its internal context to a regional one is the regional security dynamics
within the framework of RSCT. Thus, the state framework has been challenged
by ethno-sectarian conflict in the domestic, regional and global levels, and has
become the defining dynamic of RSC of each of those countries, whether
domestically, in the cases of Syria and Turkey, or regionally in the cases of Iran
and Saudi Arabia. To an extent, since the U.S. invasion of Iraq the ethnic and
sectarian conflicts have become epicentre of violence in the region. It can be
argued that the process of state-building in post-war Iraq cannot be divorced
from its regional dimensions of ethnic and sectarian discord among Iraq's
neighbours.
State-building as a balance of power8.4.
Another argument concluded from this study is the complexity of the state-
building process in Iraq, which has morphed from an internal issue into a
regional issue. This can be attributed to two main factors: first, the regional
security complex structure of the region, which created a framework of security
interdependency among Iraq's neighbours; and second, that both Iraq’s
geopolitical position and human geography gave some political developments in
Iraq the capability to affect the Iraq's neighbours' stability, and vice versa. Thus,
the ethnic and sectarian composition of Iraq's main groups of Shi'a, Sunni and
Kurd, has been influenced even the nature of regional alliances. For example,
the eight decades of Sunni domination in Iraq made this state remain in a semi-
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persistent alliance with the Sunni countries of the Arab world, which was based
mainly on countering the Iran-Syria hegemony in the region. However, the 2003
Iraq war has caused a significant shift in that regional alliance, and has swiped
Iraq from the Sunni bloc to the Shi'a bloc, from amity with the GCC to amity with
Iran and Syria.
It can be seen from the above analysis that after the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
the ethnic and sectarian identities of each of Iraq's groups have been viewed as
a political factor for control of the state. That is to say, the ethno-sectarian
balance of power among Iraq's groups has become an influential part of the
balance of power in the region. In the words of Buzan and Waever, (2003, P.46)
''balance-of-power logic works naturally to encourage local rivals to call in
outside help, and by this mechanism the local patterns of rivalry become linked
to the global ones''. This has been demonstrated through the implications of
each state’s involvement for the other involved states in post-2003 Iraq. The
leverage of each group, and state, in Iraq has been viewed as a concern for the
other players. It is important to recognise that in many cases the ethnic and
sectarian balance between Iraq’s three main groups (Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd)
has been viewed as a source of challenge to the regional balance of power
among Iraq’s neighbours. Here we cannot agree with Gause (2010, p. 9) that
‘‘the most important and distinctive factor in the Gulf regional security complex
is not power imbalance, but the salience of transnational identities’’. Both
factors are in fact highly interconnected and complete each other in post-2003
Iraq and in particular among the four of Iraq’s neighbours addressed in this
thesis.
That can be clearly noticed from Saudi Arabia’s official decision makers
when they described the U.S. invasion of Iraq as a handing over of Iraq to Iran
(see Prince Saud al-Faisal’s interview with Fareed Zakaria, 20 September
2005). Thus, the process of state-building and transnational identities after 2003
affected the regional balance of power between Iraq's neighbours, through
moving Iraq away from the Sunni bloc toward the Iranian-led Shia bloc. Hence,
the thesis concluded that part of the regional engagement in the process of
state-building in Iraq after 2003 has been for the setting of a new form of the
balance of power in the region. This is because what shapes the RSC among
the main powers in the region is a pattern of rivalry, balance of power and
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alliance (according to thesis theory) (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 47). This
argument may become clearer particularly with the Turkish insistence to
participate in the Battle of Mosul in October 2016 (see chapter seven). The
abovementioned argument also raises an important question of the state-
building literature as to whether state-building is merely an internal issue or a
regional subject as well. The next section will try to address this question.
State-building as a regional issue8.5.
It can be argued that a vast amount of academic literature has dealt with
state-building as an internal issue. For example, Charles Tilly (1975) argued
that, within the modern process of state making, the state-building process is an
internal effort. Tilly's argument might be well applied to the western countries,
especially those states that were formed through the Westphalian international
system of nation-states. However, in the case of Middle Eastern state formation,
most of the countries were made by western external actors, particularly in the
last decade of the 20th century. However, my argument regarding Iraq's
neighbours' involvement in the post-2003 state-building process in Iraq has
demonstrated that all three levels of RSC, internal, regional and global, have
been in play. Although the question of which level is dominant has not asked by
RSCT, in this thesis the domestic and regional levels have been shown to be
more powerful than the international factors, with regard to the security
dimension that has driven the regional actors’ involvement in the both the ethnic
and sectarian conflict and the state-building process following the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq. For instance, the role of UN has been marginal compared to
the role of the U.S. and other regional powers in Iraq. Despite their efforts to
engage in political issues, due to other regional and great powers’ deep
involvement in post-2003 Iraq, the UN role has mostly been focused on
humanitarian issues.
In contrast to Ayoob's study (1995, p. 189), the results of this study have
not shown the domination of internal factors over the regional factors. Without
underestimating the role of internal factors as a motivation behind Iraq's
neighbours’ engagement in the trajectory of state-building in Iraq, all three
levels of internal, regional and international factors have contributed to Iraq's
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neighbours’ engagement in the state-building process. That is to say that the
process of state-building in Iraq has been an enduring part of Iraq's neighbours'
engagement in the ethno-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq and vice versa. To
a degree, the thesis showed that whenever the domestic conflicts between
Iraq’s three main factions have deepened, the regional penetration of Iraq's
internal issues gets stronger. The sectarian civil war in 2006-2007, the Syrian
crisis after 2011, and Daesh’s occupation of Sunni territories in Iraq, are
examples in this regard. It is, however, important to note that, according to the
RSCT the U.S. belongs to neither Gulf nor Levant sub-complex regional
securities, although it has played a significant role in shaping RSC in both
mentioned regions, whether prior the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq or after the U.S.
withdrawal in the end of 2011. The role of the U.S. has been effective regarding
the involvement in all four of the addressed neighbours of Iraq in post-2003
Iraq.
Before jumping to a conclusion, it is important to ask when and where
state-building tasks take a regional context, and why most of the processes of
state-building that have been carried out around the world, even those
sponsored by the U.S., EU, and UN, have not all ended up with regional
involvement. None of the cases of state/nation-building, from Germany, Japan,
Somalia, Haiti, Cuba to Afghanistan, have led to the regional neighbours’
involvement as has been the case in Iraq. On the contrary, in most of these
cases mentioned, the role of regional actors has been constructive (see
Dobbins, 2003; Fukuyama, 2008).
The results of this study have shown that the state-building process can
become a regional issue when the state-building enterprise linked with its
neighbours in a regional security complex framework. In case of Iraq, each of
Iraq's neighbours, from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran to Syria, have links with Iraq
through regional security complex dynamics (based on thesis theory of RSC).
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, these security dynamics have been
demonstrated in the form of ethnic and sectarian lines. This regional structure
has made the security of each of these states easily affected by any change or
even political developments in the security dynamics in the region. The intra-
state discord in post-2003 Iraq has become intertwined with the inter-state
conflict, due to the spatial distribution of the ethnic and religious sectors of the
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population in the one hand and the ethnic and religious cross-border links
among these communities on the other hand. It can be concluded that any
state-building process in the context of the presence of an active regional
security complex (sub-complex) structure, the possibility of the shift of state-
building from a domestic issue to a regional issue will be very likely, whether the
structure of these security complexes is shaped by ethnic and sectarian
dynamics or other dynamics, such as border disputes or economic factors.
The limitations of the study and recommendations for future8.6.
research
The end of study is hopefully the start of a project rather than its
completion, and of course the current work is not without limitations. The scale
of this debate is large, and the issues are extensive and multifaceted; this thesis
therefore is limited in addressing a number of aspects. The thesis has been
limited in addressing the state-building process through institutionalisation
theory, which focuses on state-building as internal process in post-conflict
societies. However, the focus on the state-building process in the regional
context did not allow this study to cover this area, which I think will be an
interesting subject in political development studies for future studies. Moreover,
this study has also been limited in not incorporating other neighbours of Iraq
such as Jordan, Kuwait, and even the GCC countries other than Saudi Arabia,
because of two main reasons. First, the thesis theoretical framework excludes
those countries which are not in a regional security complex status with Iraq.
Second, all of the four countries addressed in this thesis have played the roles
of regional powers and at the same time have links with Iraq through both local
and regional dynamics.
Moreover, this research has also been limited in investigating whether
Iraq's neighbours can be blamed for the failure of the state-building process in
post-2003 Iraq or not. Many studies and researchers have merely focused the
blame on the U.S. and its method of state-building as a main cause for the
failure of the state-building project in Iraq; however, very few studies have
addressed Iraq's neighbours as another reason for that. Also the thesis has
been limited in its coverage of the post-Mosul phase, which can be considered
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as a turning point in both the ethno-sectarian framework and the state-building
process in Iraq and the wider region.
Another field that can be fruitful for future studies which also this study has
not covered, is a comparison between the post-conflict state-building process in
Iraq, and other state-building cases in Latin America and Europe, such as Haiti,
Panama, Colombia and the Western Balkan states. Namely, the case of the
western Balkans can be very relevant to compare to Iraq's case; in both cases,
the regional security complex dynamics have been very active.
One of the other interesting areas that this study identified during the
discussion of the regional dimension of the state-building and ethno-sectarian
conflict in Iraq is the possibility of both state-building and ethno-sectarian
conflict in Iraq becoming part of the wider regional security formation in the
future. All the above mentioned areas, as future research strategies, can
broaden the scope of regional studies regarding the Middle East in directions
which have been almost ignored in recent years. Most of the research areas in
political science and international relations have either addressed the Middle
East, or individual countries in the region, as units of analysis, rather than as
inter- and intra-connected regions. However, Middle Eastern security dynamics
might be better understood when examined at the regional level. Considering
the whole Middle East as a single monolithic region may be limited for providing
an accurate argument.
Conclusions8.7.
Iraq's neighbours' engagement in the state-building process following the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has been driven by multiple factors of internal, regional
and international dimensions of RSC. However, some levels of security are
more dominant than others. Turkey's intervention in the state-building process
has been motivated by internal and regional factors. The Kurdish question in
Iraq and its ramifications on Kurds in Turkey has been a dominant factor of
Turkey's RSC; in addition, Turkish engagement with Iraqi Sunnis has operated
through the AKP's strategic approach of reengagement with the Middle East. All
three levels of RSC were operative regarding Syrian involvement in post-2003
Iraq: the external threat of regime change by the U.S., protecting the legitimacy
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of the regime inside, and looking for a regional role for use in its negotiations
with the U.S., have been main factors that motivated Damascus to interfere in
Iraq. On the other hand, despite domestic and global levels of security, Saudi
Arabia's and Iran’s interventions in Iraq's state-building process and ethno-
sectarian conflict are associated largely with their regional hegemonic rivalry,
rather than their internal dynamics of ethnic and religious factors. This relates
particularly to what is called ''state-to-state relations'' in RSCT (see Buzan and
Wæver, 2003, p.51). Also, the thesis noted that both Turkey and Iran have built
institutional bases for their leverage in post-2003 Iraq, Turkey through the KRG
and a part of the Arab Sunnis, and Iran through the Shi'a-centric state and part
of the Iraqi Kurds, have built institutional links with Iraq's groups. However,
Saudi Arabia and Syria lacked the capability to build such institutional relations
with Iraqi factions, and this has been a main cause for their ineffective positions
in the process of state-building in Iraq after 2003.
Based on the discussion and arguments outlined, the thesis found that
Iraq's neighbours' involvement in the state-building process and ethno-sectarian
conflict in post-2003 Iraq has been rooted in the multiple RSC dynamics of
Iraq's neighbours with Iraq on the one hand, and with each other on the other.
Meanwhile, Iraq's neighbours' engagement in the process of state-building has
also been part of the ethnic and sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq. What can
be concluded in both cases is the interdependent relation between the state-
building process in post-2003 Iraq and the regional dimensions of the ethno-
sectarian conflict. The question of what is the driver of this symbiotic
relationship between state-building process and ethnic and sectarian conflict in
the region has been a focal point of this research.
The thesis also concluded that what makes these two variables
intertwined is the existence of regional security complex dynamics among Iraq
and its neighbours within the framework of RSCT. Given this evidence, it can be
argued that the process of state-building following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
has influenced the domestic, regional and international security dynamics of
Iraq’s neighbouring countries. Although ethno-sectarian conflict in post 2003
Iraq has been a form of Iraq's neighbours’ penetration in the state-building
process and shaping RSC, it explains very little of their regional involvement in
post-2003 Iraq. It was not a root cause in itself. The cause was that Iraq's
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Figure (5) The regional dimensions of state-building in post-2003 Iraq
Source: Author’s Own.
neighbours are linked with Iraq through regional security complex dynamics.
Iraq's state-building process after 2003 has been very closely connected to
Iraq's neighbours' involvement in the ethnic and sectarian conflict in the Persian
Gulf sub-region.
What can be concluded regarding this thesis’s main research question of
how and why Iraq's neighbouring countries engaged in the process of state-
building in Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime? The regional security complex
dynamics of ethnic and sectarian conflict have been an enduring part of the
engagement of Iraq's neighbours in the process of state-building following the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The impact of Iraq's neighbours' involvement has
negatively affected the trajectory of state-building in post-2003 Iraq, and will
continue to do so as far as Iraq remains a part of its neighbours regional
security complex, the permeability of the regional state system and the ethnic
and sectarian discord in the region.
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